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Abstract 
Decision-makers in safety-critical industries such as the railways are frequently faced with the 
complexity of selecting technological, procedural and operational solutions to minimise staff, 
passengers and third parties’ safety risks.  In reality, the options for maximising risk reduction are 
limited by time and budget constraints as well as performance objectives.  
Maximising risk reduction is particularly necessary in the times of economic recession where critical 
services such as those on the UK rail network are not immune to budget cuts.  This dilemma is 
further complicated by statutory frameworks stipulating ‘suitable and sufficient’ risk assessments 
and constraints such as ‘as low as reasonably practicable’. These significantly influence risk reduction 
option selection and influence their effective implementation.  
This thesis provides extensive research in this area and highlights the limitations of widely applied 
practices.  These practices have limited significance on fundamental engineering principles and 
become impracticable when a constraint such as a fixed budget is applied – this is the current reality 
of UK rail network operations and risk management.  
This thesis identifies three main areas of weaknesses to achieving the desired objectives with 
current risk reduction methods as: 
 Inaccurate, and unclear problem definition;
 Option evaluation and selection removed from implementation subsequently resulting in
misrepresentation of risks and costs;
 Use of concepts and methods that are not based on fundamental engineering principles, not
verifiable and with resultant sub-optimal solutions.
Although not solely intended for a single industrial sector, this thesis focuses on guiding the railway 
risk decision-maker by providing clear categorisation of measures used on railways for risk 
reduction. This thesis establishes a novel understanding of risk reduction measures’ application 
limitations and respective strengths. This is achieved by applying ‘key generic engineering principles’ 
to measures employed for risk reduction. A comprehensive study of their preventive and protective 
capability in different configurations is presented.   
Subsequently, the fundamental understanding of risk reduction measures and their railway 
applications, the ‘cost-of-failure’ (CoF), ‘risk reduction readiness’ (RRR), ‘design-operational-
procedural-technical’ (DOPT) concepts are developed for rational and cost-effective risk reduction.  
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These concepts are shown to be particularly relevant to cases where blind applications of economic 
and mathematical theories are misleading and detrimental to engineering risk management. 
The case for successfully implementing this framework for maximum risk reduction within a fixed 
budget is further strengthened by applying, for the first time in railway risk reduction applications, 
the dynamic programming technique based on practical railway examples. 
Key words: Risk Reduction, Cost Effectiveness, Decision Support, Systems Approach, 
Organisational Readiness, Budget Constraints, Optimisation, Dynamic Programming.
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
Risk management, in general, has evolved through publications, guidelines and standardising practices. 
On the UK railways, the management of safety risks has in the past two decades, evolved significantly, 
primarily driven by fatal accidents.  To date, this evolution has not been properly critically evaluated.   
The critical evaluation is required to determine the validity and practicality of the current framework for 
risk management, employed for delivering the overall risk management objectives in the face of growing 
concern about the state of the railways and its management.   
The existing and on-going ‘spending cuts’ has negatively affected the investments in infrastructure and 
rail renewal projects in the UK amidst increasing regulatory and performance requirements, increasing 
passenger numbers and the increasing need for improved passenger safety. Furthermore, the adoption 
of rigorous European regulations into UK rail transport introduces the practical obligation to achieve a 
maximum risk reduction within available funds. 
The key safety regulations, which are mandatory, can only be achieved by introducing and implementing 
techniques that further reduce or eliminate the level of uncertainty inherent in existing risk management 
practices.  The decision-maker is frequently faced with decisions on the selection of options for risk 
reduction within the available funds. The goal being to ensure risk reduction is optimised to ALARP (As 
Low As Reasonably Practicable) levels within budget constraints.  
The most widely accepted and practiced method by regulators, operators and contractors to achieve the 
goal of maximum risk reduction within available budgets is the use of Cost-Benefit techniques to select 
options for optimising risk reduction. The criticisms and present-day awareness of the inaccuracies and 
uncertainty of the CBA method are well documented and presented. To reduce the inaccuracies, there is 
a heavy reliance on sensitivity analysis methods. This thesis also shows that for safety risk management 
decisions, sensitivity analyses are incorrectly used to address the challenges with the method. The 
increasing reliance on sensitivity analyses is demonstrated by the significant effort that has been directed 
towards developing sensitivity analysis methods which themselves are flawed, in most cases unverifiable 
and lack the engineering basis for making robust arguments within operational safety cases. In addition, 
the case studies based on real examples further demonstrate that cost-benefit methods just do not 
deliver optimal results once budget constraints are introduced – budget constraints are today’s reality.  
The techniques used for risk reduction given options flag the absence of systematically and 
comprehensively justifiable methods for optimising risk reduction given budget constraints.  The failure 
to introduce robust practicable techniques to optimise risk reduction when faced with budget limitations 
leads to inaccurate assessment of options for risk reduction and potentially wide reaching adverse 
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effects. A number of examples where these failures are catastrophic are evaluated and presented in this 
thesis.   
This thesis and supporting published work are supported by extensive research on existing techniques for 
optimum risk reduction within budget constraints. The thesis starts by outlining examples of the current 
practice. By considering these practices with inherent deficiencies, the thesis develops an accurate 
definition of the problem and subsequently reviews, in detail, applications and limitations of the use of 
the CBA (Cost Benefit Analysis) technique.  
The aim of this work as part of a PhD research programme is to develop a novel solution for the problem 
of optimising risk reduction within a fixed budget which is systematic, verifiable and looks to: 
 Support the decision-maker or risk analyst by providing a comprehensive framework (with 
concepts, methods and tool) that will facilitate decision making on risk reduction 
 Satisfy regulatory requirements whilst introducing a commercially viable risk management 
framework; 
 Enhance the safety of rail industry staff, passengers and others;  
 Minimise losses (such as cost) that is currently almost uncontrollable on railway projects  
To illustrate the scale of the current need to develop a framework that addresses the issue of maximising 
risk reduction given a fixed budget, Tube Lines (the only remaining Infraco of the three initial Infraco 
companies responsible for renewal works and maintaining the London Underground) had recently 
received the Public Private Partnership  (PPP) Arbiter’s final decision on the scope and cost of work it 
must deliver over the second review period of the PPP Contract (from mid-2010 to 2017) which it has 
with London Underground Limited following a long standing dispute on cost of projects.  The arbiter 
announced an increase in the final settlement from approximately £4.4 to £4.5 billion from Tube Lines 
initial formal submission of £6.8 billion.  This means that Tube Lines will, in a bid to deliver 
uncompromised services to the railway public, work within tight budgets, approximately 34% less than 
Tube Lines had initially proposed. The research is particularly important as it looks to save costs whilst 
not just maintaining but enhancing safety.  
The general approach adopted in the thesis is presented in three phases, to highlight the solution to the 
problems facing the railway industry. 
 Phase 1 – Evaluation of railway network safety risks, regulations, costs and risk  evaluation and 
management practices with strengths and limitations (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) 
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Phase 2 – Reviews (literature and practice) and introduction of structured concepts and 
applications for achieving this goal ( Chapters 5, 6 and 7) 
o Cost of Failure concept 
o Principles of Risk Reduction 
o Functional Capability of Risk Reduction Options 
o Dynamic Programming in risk reduction 
o Readiness for Risk Reduction 
o Design Operational Procedural and Technical (DOPT) 
o Amount of risk removed by a Risk Reduction Option 
Phase 3 – Examples of application of the solution, outcomes and conclusions; contributions and 
recommendations for future work (refer to Chapters 8 and 9). 
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Chapter 2 examines the impact of railway safety and the legal framework for the current risk 
management practices.  This chapter presents the regulatory basis for risk reduction that directly applies 
to operating the UK railways, introduction to the safety performance of the railways in the last two 
decades and highlights the ‘tipping point’ for railway safety i.e. railway privatisation.  This chapter also 
illustrates, using railway operations and performance data, the link between investments, passenger 
growth and safety performance (by reviewing over ten years safety performance data) on mainline and 
other railway networks in the UK. The scene is then set for a critical evaluation of the key factors that 
have affected and will continuously impact decisions made on the safety of the railways.  To help achieve 
the objectives of this chapter, an in depth study of the major railway accidents which resulted in the rapid 
evolution of the UK railway has been undertaken and presented. 
Chapter 3 introduces the currently practiced risk assessment and management techniques, provides a 
thorough review of these techniques, including benefits and disadvantages. Chapter 3 also 
comprehensively outlines the application of these techniques within the current regulatory framework 
and their cost implications.  This naturally leads to discussions and a thorough review of the concepts of 
ALARP and TOR (Tolerability of Risk) presenting practical examples of how decisions are reached using 
current decision-making techniques.  In this chapter, this thesis considers the feasibility of risk 
acceptance criteria in the evolving regime of regulations and the impact of accidents on the existing risk 
assessment and risk management strategy. 
Chapter 4 introduces and focuses on the financial challenges and cost implications of Achieving Maximum 
Risk Reduction and is suitably titled – Economics of safety and safety budgets.  This chapter presents the 
initial platform for an evaluation of the use of the cost-benefit approach, supporting quantitative tools 
and techniques used for optimum risk reduction selection. In this chapter, a thorough review of CBA and 
its application to risk reduction is presented.  In addition, an exhaustive review of Expected Utility Theory 
in its application as an alternative methodology in optimising risk reduction in safety-critical industries 
(primarily engineering applications) is also presented. 
With the inadequacies in current practice established by the conclusive research and study of railway 
accidents and extensive review of railway industry norms in the preceding chapters, Chapter 5 and 6 
comprehensively present the basic principles and application of risk reduction within the railway 
network. These chapters present in-depth study on the essential link between the risk reduction 
principles and their preventive and protective applications. This review of risk reduction options and how 
they are currently used in the railway industry is systematic and considerably simplifies the work of risk 
analysts.  
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
5 
 
By using practical examples, preventive and protective options are subsequently presented with 
examples of best application. Most importantly, these chapters provide the risk analyst with a 
comprehensive method of identifying the limitations or strengths (i.e. functional capability) of each 
option or combination of options in specific applications. This knowledge is further structured and 
enhanced by the provision of a method for classifying options in their best use as protective, preventive 
or dual. The concept ‘Dual’ = means that for the particular application, the option can be equally 
beneficial for reducing the likelihood of the accident as well as for reducing the consequences in the 
event of an accident. By this novel work we present a verifiable and distinctive classification of measures 
as preventive, protective or dual for different failure contributors and scenarios. 
The classification and tables provided in the appendices for the railway safety risk analyst is an extensive 
outline for ease of assessments and option selection that support the maximisation of risk reduction 
within fixed budget. The tables presented address Collision Between Trains, Derailment and Platform 
Train Interface accidents. Level crossings related accidents are not addressed in this work.  
Considering the comprehensive reviews, the practical knowledge of options and their best application 
cases, Chapter 7 introduces concepts and methods that support the risk evaluation and option selection 
process. This chapter underlines the deficiencies in the process of risk reduction and offers solutions 
through concepts and methods such as: 
 Risk Reduction Readiness Model 
 D-O-P-T (Design Operational Procedural Technical) Assurance 
 Amount of risk removed by a risk reduction option 
Finally, a conclusive optimisation solution to the existing problem of maximising risk reduction within a 
fixed budget is presented. Being a novel application of dynamic programming in an area previously and 
incorrectly dominated by the cost-benefit method, several test cases and validation tests are undertaken 
and provided in so doing reinforcing the case for the superiority of the optimisation method proposed. 
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Chapter 2 Hazards and Risks in the UK Railway Industry 
Chapter 2 presents the key railway regulations and regulatory framework that support railway safety. 
Railway accidents, inquiries and actions such as the privatisation of the railways, amendments to railway 
operational management are also presented. Furthermore, this chapter looks at the costs of the railway 
accidents, effect of privatisation on safety and associated costs of failures prior to and following major 
modifications to the railways. The lessons learned from the major accidents, a significantly important 
aspect of risk management is evaluated, providing the basis for the concepts and methods introduced for 
optimising risk reduction in later sections of this thesis. These lessons from the major inquiries into the 
railway accidents resulted in proposals for enhancing safety management through improvements in: 
 Leadership 
 Performance criteria and monitoring 
 Alignment of the UK railway industry with the European Railway Train Management 
System/European Train Control System (ERTMS/ETCS)  
2.1 Overview of UK Railway Safety 
The discussion of railway safety is best addressed by an initial presentation of key changes in the 
enforcement of UK railway safety regulations and further evaluation of the railway safety decision-
making process.  
The major changes in the current enforcement of health and safety policy on UK railways are a significant 
consequence of the 2004 railway review.  It proposed primary reforms, including the abolition of the 
Strategic Railway Authority (SRA), its replacement by a group within the Department for Transport (DfT), 
and the transfer of safety regulation to the Office of Railway Regulation (ORR). 
Before 2006, health and safety policy and enforcement on UK railways was the responsibility of the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE).  This responsibility was duly handed over to the Office of Railway 
Regulation (ORR) and the transfer currently means that the ORR oversees the regulation of the operation 
of the railways and other guided transport systems including heritage, metros and light rail systems. The 
Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations provide the regulatory regime for rail 
safety within the UK. Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Miscellaneous Amendments) 
Regulations 2013 came into force on the 21st May 2013. 
The basis of this transfer is set out in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) and ORR. The purpose of the MOU is to ensure the effective coordination and 
cooperation between these organisations in relation to the regulation of health and safety, including 
policy matters and the enforcement of health and safety law on railways, tramways and other guided 
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transport systems in Great Britain. Some of the most important guiding statements are that the HSE 
considers the MOU as a facilitator of the performance of its functions, in accordance with the Health and 
Safety at Work Act from 1974.  For its part, the ORR acknowledges that the MOU, in accordance with the 
Railways Act 2005, contributes to the provision of appropriate arrangements for fulfilling its duties in 
relation to the railway safety purposes. In addition, the MOU ensures that the allocation of 
responsibilities set out in the Health and Safety (Enforcing Authority for Railways and Other Guided 
Transport Systems) Regulations 2006 works effectively and provides clarification for duty holders as 
required.  The Health and Safety (Enforcing Authority for Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems) 
Regulations allocates enforcement functions to ORR and defines who the Enforcing Authority (EA) is for 
particular activities and in relation to certain premises. 
Another significant step towards enforcing health and safety regulatory policy is that the Railway Act 
2005, also as a result of the 2004 railway review, places a statutory duty on the government to set out 
every five years: 
 How much public expenditure it wishes to devote to rail; 
 What the railway is expected to deliver in the key areas of safety, reliability and capacity.   
The UK government presents a five-yearly strategy on the delivery of a sustainable, modern railway by 
the publication of white papers on proposed plans for improving safety and performance to the public.  
In order to fully investigate the overall performance of the UK Railway system over time (past two 
decades), a review was undertaken of considerable research in the areas of customer behaviour, 
justifying investments in railway safety and reliability.   Some of the research has been independent, but 
most of it was instigated by the government through the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the Office of 
Railway Regulations (ORR), the Department for Transport (DfT) and the Railway Safety and Standards 
Board (RSSB).  These noteworthy publications, usually annual, provide comprehensive information on the 
current state of the railway and details of the methodology to safety planning in the industry. These are 
based on duty holders’ initiatives and the projections of the safety benefits they aim to achieve.  These 
sources are: 
 ‘Transport Statistics Bulletins’ produced by the Department for Transport 
 ‘Annual Safety Performance Reports’ published by the Railway Safety and Standards Board 
 ‘The Railway Strategic Safety Plans’ 
 The HSE’s ‘Annual Reports on Railway Safety’ 
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These reports are principally sources of statistical data derived from the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases 
and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) 1995, including information on key findings and 
trends.  RIDDOR refers to the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations that 
provide a set of health and safety regulations. RIDDOR mandates the reporting of work-related accidents.  
The Railway Strategic Safety Plans, RSSB (2008), RSSB (2007) were developed by the rail industry in 
consultation with the DfT, ORR, SRA, HSE, Trade Unions and Rail Passenger Council, in order to analyse 
the current railway risk profile, identify priorities, comprehensively outline the steps to resolve the 
priorities, and demonstrate the industry’s commitment to safety as the foundation of an efficient, well-
run railway. 
The primary industry source for information on the safety performance of the mainline railway is the 
Annual Safety Performance Reports (ASPR) produced by the RSSB, which provides safety intelligence and 
risk information to RSSB members, rail employees, passengers, the government and its agencies and the 
public at large.  These reports are annual for consistency with its associated High Level Output 
Specification (HLOS) and the Railway Strategic Safety Plan (SSP).  They contain reviews of performance 
levels across a number of topic areas and consider how key safety issues are addressed by the industry 
(RSSB 2010).  The areas addressed include those identified in the Railway Strategic Safety Plan (SSP) 
which covers a five year period. 
The ASPR’s scope is generally limited to incidents that occur in stations, on trains, or elsewhere on the 
mainline railway infrastructure such as the track and the trackside.  Workforce fatalities that occur away 
from these locations, but during working time, are also included, although not used as part of this work.  
Most analyses in the ASPR are based on data from the Safety Management Information System (SMIS). 
However, this is supplemented where appropriate with data from other sources, such as British Transport 
Police (BTP), the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) and Network Rail. Where a chart or table has been 
derived from a source other than SMIS, it is referenced. Thus the Safety Risk Model (SRM) is updated 
regularly, and it is from this model that the key risk areas are determined.  Changes in the level of risk and 
hence progress against the trajectories are reviewed and updated as the risk models are updated.  
Performance is fundamentally monitored by individual duty holders and their own systems, but also at 
the national level using SMIS, the SRM, and through the production of periodic and special topic reports. 
As a result of this monitoring, corrective actions may be initiated by individual companies, or collectively 
through new or revised national programmes, standards changes etc.  The regular review of performance 
at the national level is overseen by the RSSB through a series of papers considered as part of the 
‘Strategic Board Agenda’. Individual, national, cooperative groups monitor performance in particular 
areas and agree collective actions where appropriate.  The report includes comprehensive statistical 
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analyses on a wide range of safety performance indicators: many concern the actual safety performance 
level that has been achieved; others provide a measure of the underlying risks. 
 
Figure 2: Railway Industry Safety Planning Lifecycle (Railway Strategic Safety Plan 2008-2010) 
Figure 2 illustrates the industry’s planning cycle, based on a plan-do-review model.  The Strategic Safety 
Plan (SSP) fits into the ‘plan’ sector of the model, at the industry cooperation level, bringing together the 
planning work done by duty holders and taking into account the input from the UK Government and the 
European Community. Implementation is primarily a duty holder responsibility, although some activities 
are coordinated by RSSB as National Programmes. 
A critical review of these separate publications over a ten year period, with the aim of linking their 
objectives, demonstrates a convergence of intended functions to the key challenges faced by the railway 
industry.  These can be summarised as:  
1. Predicting future safety performance and maintaining a pre-determined level of safety. 
2. Reducing the cost of delivering a safe railway. 
3. Developing and maintaining competency across all personnel levels on the railway. 
4. Safety assurance for the infrastructure, rail vehicles and associated systems. 
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The reports also provide a mechanism for disseminating information about the work of Her Majesty’s 
Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) and an opportunity to cascade messages on emerging issues and findings 
from these investigations which would not necessarily justify separate publications. 
In response to notable accidents such as the Hatfield train accident, the three railway accident statistical 
papers by Evans (2003, 2005, 2007) are prominent sources supporting the view that improvements have 
been made following the 2004 railway restructuring. 
The results of interviews with key people in the railway industry, together with a review of submissions 
from key interested parties are outlined in the Centre for Regulated Industries paper, CRI (2005).  The 
findings were that all major characteristics of the rail reform in Britain were seen as workable, while  
empirical data revealed that as a result of the reforms prior to the Hatfield train crash, improvements had 
been comparatively successful.  However, some failings were noted, such as in the introduction of a 
private infrastructure manager.  This was due to indecision over refranchising and partly the after-effect 
of the Hatfield crash.  This undoubtedly affected general passenger perception of railway safety, leading 
to the general view that the 1994/95 privatisation, the 2004 railway review, and other implementations 
that followed have actually worsened the railway performance. 
2.2 Railway Privatisation and Safety 
The analysis of railway accidents between 1967 and 2010, by different railway accident research groups 
and government organisations clearly indicate that the privatisation of the railways did not degrade 
safety performance, despite a stream of opponents to the statistical evidence made available by Evans 
(2007), and DfT (2010).  
Following the privatisation of British Rail in 1994/95, the number of journeys increased by 71% from 735 
million to 1,258 million between 1994/95 and 2009/10.  35% of this increase was realised since 
1999/2000 (DfT, 2010).  Within this period, the recorded high fatality rates resulted from major accidents 
such as at Ladbroke Grove in 1999. However, the transport accident statistics show that only one 
passenger fatality has occurred since 2005. A major accident is a single incident with high consequences. 
Most cases of fatality or major accidents since 2005 have been as a result of train movements (TMA).  
These led to injuries and fatalities as a result of train movement, whilst the train itself is not involved in 
the accident (these have been discussed in Section 2.3 of this thesis). 
Examples of TMA include people falling from moving trains; when passengers alight from a moving train; 
or getting caught between carriage doors as a train moves away from the platform.  In Chapter 8, a 
railway case study (Passenger Door Trap and Drag) of this type of major accident is used to illustrate the 
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benefit of applying the proposed maximum risk reduction methodology.  In 2008, TMA resulted in 18 
fatalities, but was reduced by half in 2009. 
A further indication of safety failures used in overall safety performance evaluation is Signals Passed at 
Danger (SPAD). Records for the period 2002 - 2009 show a gradual fall in reported incidents from 382 to 
261. DfT (2010) states that the number of cases where a SPAD could have led to a potentially severe 
accident in that same period  fell by over 80% while non-significant cases increased by 16%.  Thus the 
number of severe cases dropped from 58% to 29% for all reported SPAD incidents. 
Despite these readily available empirical data and accident analysis reports, there is still a fast growing 
number of people claiming that the privatisation of the railway has resulted in the degradation of safety 
and non-conformance to regulatory policy.  Leading the rapidly increasing publications of the negative 
views are Wolmar (1996, 2001, 2005), Nash (2002), and Glaister (2002).  The public perception of the 
state of the railways after privatisation was matched by widely publicised arguments from transport 
economists and historians finding the culprit in the governmental policy.  The government’s inadequacy 
in setting appropriate standards for the industry and lack of delivery of value for the invested capital 
were highlighted further after the Hatfield crash.  Critics identified cost escalation (i.e. the excessive 
spending) on safety as a consequence of: 
 the absence or lack of a structured decision making process; 
 the poor service quality; 
 the deficiencies in the reconciliation of different stakeholders’ aspirations in the efficient planning 
of services and investment. 
The disparity in views from the public and opponents of railway privatisation, compared with the 
empirical analysis and other data mentioned above raises vital questions on the mismatch between the 
perception and the reality of current state of rail safety.  
Suggestions made by Evans (2007) that reports of images of fatal rail accidents at Southall, Ladbroke 
Grove, Hatfield and Potters Bar all figure prominently in the public perception of rail safety is supported 
by the Institute of Economic Affairs, IEA (2006).  The IEA publication on the relationship between the 
railways, government and market structure provides simple clues to these precise issues:  government 
interference, decision-making problems, in conjunction with the high expectation from passengers who 
are paying for these services.  At privatisation, the government imposed a structure upon the industry 
that might never have evolved if the market had been left without interference.  The splitting apart of the 
provision of track stations and signals from that of the rolling stock and the running of trains was a 
decision taken by government ministers, not business people.  The authors of the IEA report suggested 
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that the privatisation approach taken was akin to government officials walking into a hotel and 
demanding that it be owned by one company, the reception and reservations run by another and the 
beds leased from a third.  The report argues that the division of responsibilities might be appropriate in 
the railway industry, but queried whether the government should make these decisions.  As Newman 
(2003) pointed out, ‘the power of stories over statistics’ is fundamental to the belief that safety 
deteriorated after privatisation.  Accounts of railway accidents make exceptionally compelling and tragic 
reading and are easier to comprehend than a chart presented before the public. Newman notes that 
accounts of accidents are particularly persuasive when they come from those who were directly involved; 
these include not only the bereaved and injured, but railway staff, rescue workers, and other witnesses. 
In addition, the British people have always been rather sentimental and emotional about the railways. 
This might be one reason why railways have mistakenly been treated and regulated as monopolies from 
the early days. Further arguments demonstrate that the basic structure of the industry at privatisation 
was a workable way of introducing competition, but was marred by mistakes in implementation. 
Conclusions from the IEA report suggest that the restructuring and privatisation of British Rail were not as 
bad as the direst commentators claim: 
 Safety performance improved. 
 The passenger numbers and services increased.  
 The passenger increase resulted in a build-up of wear on the infrastructure at the same time as 
maintenance input was reduced. 
 The net result was a decline in infrastructure quality and a subsequent decline in both line speed 
and punctuality; 
 Rolling-stock quality improved.  
 The most notable failure was the escalating cost of operating the railway, directly affecting cost 
to passengers. The contractual and market structure that was imposed, introduced new risks and 
unreasonable incentives leading to some dissipation in railway-specific skills and a major increase 
in operating costs that was out of proportion to the increase in either the quantity or quality of 
outputs. 
To illustrate the safety improvement achieved pre- and post-privatisation, Evans (2005) presented an 
analysis (Figures 3 and 4) using accident data between 1967 and 2003.  The accidents are shown in the 
figures below as those that occurred in over 27 years, 1967 to 1993 (i.e. pre-privatisation) and those that 
occurred from 1993 to 2003, or during 10 years post-privatisation.  The significant train accident rate was 
falling at 4.3% per year between 1971 and 1993/94, but with the exception of 1994/95, all the later 
annual data points are better than that favourable trend.  This demonstrates that the fatal accidents that 
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have actually occurred since privatisation have been slightly fewer than those expected on the basis of 
the favourable trend established pre-privatisation.  Thus there is no evidence that the post-privatisation 
performance is worse than British Rail might have been expected to achieve.  
 
Figure 3: Fatal Train Accidents 1967 – 2003: Great Britain National Rail System. Extracted from Evans (2005) 
 
Figure 4: Significant Train Accidents 1971 – 2002/03: Great Britain. Extracted from Evans (2005) 
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2.3 Hazards and Risks in the Railway Industry 
This section introduces the hazards used to analyse the current state of the railways and provides a 
detailed insight into how the hazards are analysed and reported using the ASPR. 
There are some marked differences between the ways hazards are categorised for the different rail 
transport operators in the UK. Analysis of overall risk profiles for the mainline railways is undertaken by 
the Railway Safety and Standards Board (RSSB), published in their Risk Profile Bulletins and subsequently 
in the annual safety performance reports.  These two sets of data summarise total risk according to 
accident categories based on the railway Safety Risk Model (SRM).  The SRM analyses 120 hazardous 
events grouped under the four top events or major hazards:  Train Accidents, Train Movement Accidents, 
Non-movement Accidents and Trespass, while London Underground Quantitative Risk Assessments (LU 
QRA) focuses on a list of 20 contributors to safety risk.  These contributors called ‘Top Events’ derived 
from the LU QRA are defined in Table 1 below: 
Table 1: Major Hazards - Risk Models 
Accident Grouping  
(Top Event)  
Definition 
Collision Between 
Trains  
(addressed by Train 
accidents in the SRM) 
This is the risk from an incident where there is an impact between two trains. This 
includes: end on, side on and side swipe collisions between  passenger trains on London 
Underground (LU) and Network Rail (NR) infrastructure; collisions between runaway 
engineering trains and passenger trains; collisions between derailed/collided trains that 
initially did not involve a passenger train but there was a subsequent collision with a 
passenger train 
Derailment 
(addressed by Train 
accidents in the SRM) 
This is the risk from passenger train derailments on LU and NR infrastructure. The 
description of this risk includes all obstructions on track (including objects fallen from 
trains) or that infringe the kinematic envelope. It also includes all structural failures 
(that occur when a train is not present) that could result in the loss of integrity for the 
track or obstruction on the track. 
Collision Hazard  
(with object) 
This is the risk from incidents resulting from an impact between a train and an 
obstruction (including a fixed or mobile infrastructure). The description of this risk 
includes collisions with platform edges and terminal platforms, collisions with 
floodgates and line-side structures (including tunnel walls), but it excludes obstructions 
on track (which are included in the derailment risk) 
Passenger Train 
Interface (Platform) 
This risk of fatality arises from the platform edge where it interfaces with trains and is 
normally accessible to passengers.  The Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) model also 
reflects the failure modes that occur if the train moves off without adequate checks, 
when a person falls from the platform and driver fails to notice a person being trapped 
in the train doors 
Passenger Train 
Interface (On Train) 
This is the risk of fatality related to a passenger who has boarded a train. It includes 
items within station limits, such as unauthorised use of inter-car doors 
Train Fire This is the risk of fatality involving fire on any part of a train or its contents. 
Station Fire The Station Fire is the risk of fatality associated with fires in both the public and non-
public areas of the station; including disused areas and tenancies. 
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Accident Grouping  
(Top Event)  
Definition 
Tunnel Fire The Tunnel Fire risk of fatality involves fire in sub-surface or tube sections or open 
sections but not within the confines of the station head and tail walls. 
Arcing The Arcing risk of fatality arises from fire or electric burning from a short circuit or 
electrical fault on the traction supply, limited only by the resistance of the fault path 
and protected electrically only by sub-station circuit breakers. 
Unauthorised Access 
(also termed Trespass 
in the SRM) 
This is the risk of fatality arising from unauthorised people being on or around the track, 
who are not in the vicinity of a station / platform 
Loss of Power This models risk of fatality from any incident associated with major, system wide power 
loss, which affects, in particular, trains and stations. 
Ventilation risk 
(Subsurface and Tunnel 
sections) 
The risk to customers from being trapped on immobilised trains in sections (i.e. not at 
platforms) due to all causes except power failure. The conditions within the carriages 
are assumed to deteriorate by a combination of heat / humidity and the build-up of 
carbon dioxide. There is also a risk of fatality from self-detrainment (i.e. leaving the 
train) authorised detrainment without protection 
Understanding the classification and definition of these top events is pertinent to undertaking adequate 
safety analysis and building prediction models based on empirical data.  The resulting analyses help the 
decision-maker select the best options for future investments. These are published in the annual safety 
reports, easily accessible to the public to demonstrate improvements or failings on the operational 
railway. 
Other risks not identified and defined, such as Escalator Fire, Lift Fire, Explosion, Station Area accident are 
not considered within this thesis.  Some of the defined hazards are only briefly mentioned in later 
sections of the thesis. The focus of this thesis is on top events or risks that have the most significant 
impact on cost of failure and achieving maximum risk reduction. 
Recently, safety improvement programmes on the railway networks identified six priority residual safety 
risks that should instruct fundamental improvements to operational safety to achieve the maximum risk 
reduction objectives: 
 Reducing risks to customer accidents at the platform train interface 
 Reducing risks of derailment  
 Reducing the occurrence of signals passed at danger (SPADs) 
 Improving the effectiveness and quality of risk assessment models and related processes which 
form the effectiveness of risk control measures 
 Decreasing the risk of injury to employees and contractors working on the track 
 Minimising the impacts of stress and workplace violence on staff 
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The analyses of these hazards are usually undertaken by dedicated safety analysts within risks groups in 
each railway operator, who ensure that the risk models are frequently reviewed.  The operator’s in-house 
data base and the risk models with Top Events are updated to reflect the current state of the railway and 
to inform decisions promoting changes to the operational railway. 
The data used in this section of the thesis to illustrate this process of hazard analysis is largely derived 
from the annual safety reports. RSSB (2010) provides details on how the safety report is presented. The 
annual safety reports analyse safety in terms of fatalities, injuries, shock and trauma. Injuries are 
categorised according to the level of severity such as fatality, major injury and minor injuries. Fatalities, 
injuries, shock and trauma are combined into a single failure termed Fatalities and Weighted Injuries 
(FWI).  Each injury is categorised by the hazardous event that caused it and the major precursor or 
contributing event. The ASPR uses the same set of hazardous events and precursors as the RSSB SRM. 
The precursors allow risk and performance to be analysed in a number of different ways, for example by 
focussing on the type or cause of event, or the person type to whom it occurs , whether passenger, 
workforce or public. 
Table 2: Injury degrees and Weightings (Source: RSSB 2010) 
Injury Degree Definition Ratio 
Fatality Death occurs within one year of the accident 1 
Major Injury Injuries to passengers, staff or members of the public. This includes 
losing consciousness, most fractures, major dislocations and loss of 
sight (temporary or permanent) and other injuries that result in 
hospital attendance for more than 24 hours 
10 
RIDDOR – reportable minor 
injury 
A physical injury to a passenger, staff or member of the public that is 
neither a fatality nor a major injury. 
Minor injuries to the workforce are RIDDOR reportable if the injured 
person is incapacitated for work for more than three consecutive days. 
Minor injuries to the passengers and public are RIDDOR-reportable if 
the injured person was taken from the accident site to the hospital 
200 
Non-RIDDOR-reportable 
minor injury 
All other physical injuries 1000 
Class 1 shock/trauma Caused by witnessing a fatality or being involved in a collision, 
derailment or train fire 
200 
Class 2 shock/trauma Other causes such as verbal abuse and near misses 1000 
Analysis of trends in incident data is provided for each topic. This usually covers at least ten years of 
available consistently classified data. The safety analyst differentiates between real changes in underlying 
safety and statistical fluctuations that can occur from one year to the next.  For example, annual numbers 
of passenger fatalities can vary greatly, depending on the occurrence (or not) of low-frequency, high-
consequence events, such as train accidents. 
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However, a year without a train accident does not necessarily indicate improvement in passenger safety, 
and a year with such an accident does not necessarily imply deterioration.  To address this, longer-term 
trends can be assessed using moving averages, for example over five or ten years. Further understanding 
of changes in the underlying system risk is gained by looking at trends in accident precursors or ‘near 
misses’. 
Statistical significance testing is used to explain whether a genuine change has occurred or whether the 
data could be the result of random fluctuations. Where statistical testing has been used, the term 
‘significant’ refers to a change that is significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Poor data quality is undoubtedly the primary concern of most analysts. In safety analysis, this is at the top 
of requirements for a near-precise prediction or current state model that reflects the real world, as much 
as possible. The majority of the analysis is based on data from the industry’s Safety Management 
Information System (SMIS). Their models often do not depend on data quality nor do models apply 
techniques such as Monte Carlo simulation to expose the range of possible sensitivities and uncertainties. 
Data quality is a recurring theme in this thesis and rightfully so.  In a quest to ensure that the data quality 
is continuously improved and that the RSSB is currently leading a data quality project, backed by the SMIS 
Programme Board and Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) Operations Council.  The SMIS 
analysts use RIDDOR 95 as the legislative guide that helps determine the scope of events that are to be 
recorded. In addition, non-RIDDOR reportable incidents and accidents as defined in Table 2 are recorded. 
The current scope was widened to collect all physical injuries and cases of shock, non RIDDOR-reportable 
train accidents and a number of precursor events. 
2.4 Cost of Failure in the Railway Industry 
As a result of the new structure of the railways where engineering cuts across different levels from 
government to operator and sub-contractors, the cost of failure to a railway operator may be different 
from the cost of failure to the supplier or manufacturer of equipment. However, the general cost will 
include several components such as penalty payments, cost of lost production, cost of lost site access, 
insurance costs, cost of mobilisation of resources for emergency situations, cost of the loss of business 
due to low passenger confidence.  
According to Todinov (2007) losses from failure are often expressed in monetary units as cost of failure. A 
classification of losses from engineering failures is presented below: 
 Losses of life or damage to health 
 Losses associated with damage to the environment and the community infrastructure 
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 Financial losses including loss of production, loss of capital assets, loss of sales, cost of 
intervention and repair, compensation payments, penalty payments, legal costs, reduction in 
benefits, losses due to change of laws, product liability, cost overruns, inflation, capital costs 
changes, exchange rate changes, etc. 
 Loss of reputation including loss of market share, loss of customers, loss of contracts, impact on 
share value, loss of confidence in the business, etc. 
Given the definitions above and the classical relationship between the cost of failure, probability of 
failure and risk of failure as defined by Henley and Kumamoto (1981) and Vose (2000) presented below: 
              (2.1) 
where    is the probability of failure,    the cost of failure and  is the risk of failure. Equations 2.1 can 
be modified and used by the government for risk-based investment decisions, the operator for decision 
making on which safety systems to introduce into the operational railways to meet operational and 
safety targets, and sub-contractors for risk-based designs. 
The cost of failure in this section will be presented in terms of injuries and fatalities for simplicity and to 
explain data used for current accident analyses. In later sections discussions on the cost of failure are 
presented in monetary or financial terms in order to comprehensively address the decision-making 
challenges when investing in safety to minimise the occurrence of incidents, which could lead to loss of 
life, injury or damage to assets.  
The risk of death from road accidents is approximately 27 times greater than rail. Comparisons in terms 
of passenger hours per fatality indicate that the ratios are 16 to 1 against road, 5 to 1 against ferry and 18 
to 1 for air travel.  This demonstrates that rail travel is the safest mode of travel by any rational 
comparison method. However, statistics of this sort have been questioned, with claims that such 
comparisons are empirically unjustified. Evans (2005) noted that society could prevent more fatalities at 
the same cost by devoting relatively more resources to road safety and less to rail safety.  However, 
Flyvbjerg et al.’s (2002) study of the accuracy of cost estimates in transportation infrastructure planning 
found that for rail projects, actual costs turned out to be on average 44.7% higher than estimated costs, 
and for roads 20.4% higher.  Evaluation of publications on the cost of failure and its corresponding link to 
investment in transportation shows that a thorough study is yet to be undertaken. It is not surprising that 
decision making for investment in rail has not been definitive and productive as the public would expect. 
The results of extensive research into operator revenues, cost of safety investments and cost directly 
related to the failure of systems leading to fatalities or injuries are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  
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Table 3: Rail Systems Passenger Hours (Source: Transport Statistics Bulletin 2008; DfT2008) 
 
Table 4: Rail Systems Passenger Revenue (Source: Transport Statistics Bulletin 2008, DfT2008) 
 
The data presented above represents the different rail systems in the UK with passenger hours and 
revenue between 1997 and 2008.  These dates are significant when analysing improvements and 
investments, because of the railway reviews in 1994 and subsequent privatisation of the mainline railway 
in 1996.  Other privatisation initiatives soon followed with the Private Public Partnership (PPP) of the 
London Underground in 2002.  The PPP was adopted as the government’s preferred solution for investing 
in the Tube under a 30-year contract with three infrastructure companies (Infracos). 
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The three Infracos were responsible for the maintenance and renewal of London Underground's (LU) 
assets - its rolling stock, stations, tracks, tunnels and signals.  The Tube network is divided into three 
Infracos. Tube Lines remains responsible for the Jubilee, Northern and Piccadilly lines (JNP) under the PPP 
contract, and became a wholly owned subsidiary of Transport for London in 2010. The contract requires 
that they deliver a certain level of daily asset performance, and that they upgrade the assets to deliver 
improved capability in the longer term.  They are subject to financial incentives or penalties based on 
their delivery against the performance levels set out in the contract. 
The data is also affected by important dates such as the Tyne and Wear Metro Sunderland extension 
opening in March 2002, the West Midlands Metro (Centro) opened in 1999 and Nottingham Tram (NET) 
opened in March 2004. 20 stations were also transferred from the national rail network to the Altram 
Manchester Metrolink. 
 
Figure 5: Passenger Hours and Revenue – UK Railway Systems 
The data collated gives a total of 1,776 million passenger journeys in 1997/98 and 2,529 million 
passenger journeys in 2007/2008 indicating approximately 30% increase in the use of the railways over 
the 10 year period. The UK rail industry also saw a corresponding growth in revenue as a result of the 
30% increase in passenger journeys from £3,789 million to £7,251 million over the same 10 year period – 
a 48% increase.  
The question that follows is – has the industry invested in line with this growth to improve safety?  
According to the results given above, the logical answer to the question will be yes, considering the 
growth in usage of the railways.  One must now consider the safety and investments recorded over the 
10 year period. 
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These tables give the number of train accidents and casualties on all railway undertakings in Great 
Britain. Railway undertakings are required to report accidents, failures and dangerous occurrences to the 
Secretary of State for Transport, under the regulatory safety legislation. Beside the data for Network Rail 
and London Transport railways, the tables also cover accidents on Eurotunnel, tram systems and minor 
railways. 
Table 5: Investment in Rail Transport (Source: DfT 2008) 
Period Rail Infrastructure (£m) Rolling Stock/Trains (£m) 
National Rail Other Rail Networks National Rail Other Rail Networks 
1995/96 900 1,101 200 121 
1996/97 1,178 1,047 47 148 
1997/98 1,430 898 114 82 
1998/99 1,823 821 176 85 
1999/00 2,012 1,1623 236 84 
2000/01 2,404 386 554 75 
2001/02 3,148 504 922 75 
2002/03 3,756 485 566 75 
2003/04 4,722 464 774 177 
2004/05 3,543 729 897 165 
2005/06 3,237 1,219 557 166 
Table 5 shows the investment made on the rail transport industry covering rail systems infrastructure and 
rolling stock between 1995/96 and 2005/2006.  There is a demonstrable increase in the government-led 
investment on the railways with the aim of improving performance and safety as outlined in the Railways 
Act 2005 (RA 2005).  The chart below shows the 55% growth in investment on railway infrastructure and 
a similar growth in investments on rolling stock from 1995/96 to 2005/2006. 
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Figure 6: Rail Transport - Investment 
Table 6 is based on passenger casualties owing to train accidents and movement accidents. This is the 
basis for comparisons with other modes of transport.  Under the new Accidents Reporting Regulations 
(RIDDOR 95) brought into force from 1 April 1996, all injuries to members of the public are now reported 
as either minor injuries or fatalities/death. 
Table 6: Railway Movement Accidents: Passenger Casualties and Casualty Rates (Source: DfT 2008) 
     Number/rate per billion passenger kilometres 
Casualties 1997/98 1996/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Deaths 22 17 43 17 10 20 8 8 5 4 5 
Minor Injuries 807 708 859 788 594 684 637 623 602 545 620 
All casualties 829 725 902 806 604 704 645 631 607 549 625 
Casualty rates            
Deaths 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Minor Injuries 19.4 16.2 18.6 16.9 12.5 14.3 12.9 12.4 11.6 9.9 10.6 
All Casualties 19.9 16.6 19.5 17.3 12.7 14.7 13.1 12.5 11.7 10.0 10.7 
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Figure 7: Casualties 1997/98 – 2007/08  
The downward trend shown by the reduction in casualties, minor injuries and death over the 10 year 
period demonstrates the safety improvements made between 1997/98 and 2007/2008 supporting the 
argument that privatisation has made the railway safer to operate and use. 
Table 7 shows the total number of train accidents (collisions, derailments etc.) reported, irrespective of 
whether personal injury was involved. The figures include accidents on non-passenger lines and those 
closed to normal traffic while engineering work took place. 
Due to European regulations on the reporting of rail transport statistics, the rail accidents data now 
covers calendar years, rather than financial years.  As such, there is overlap between the 2002/03 data 
and the 2003 data, with accidents from 1 January 2003 to 31 March 2003 reported in both. However, 
each represents 12 full months. 
Table 7: Railway Accidents: Train Accidents (Source: DfT 2008) 
 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Collisions 127 121 94 106 101 69 61 60 27 20 23 
Derailments 93 117 89 93 88 67 63 62 64 46 47 
Level crossings 
& obstructions 
680 690 753 693 557 495 433 523 480 503 486 
Fires 344 343 340 301 291 292 271 323 187 163 141 
Damage to 
drivers’ cab 
windscreens 
619 564 617 607 665 498 409 368 299 328 309 
Miscellaneous 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 - 
All accidents 1863 1835 1895 1801 1704 1421 1237 1336 1057 1061 1006 
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Figure 8: Train Accidents 1997/98 – 2007/08  
Figure 8 indicates a downward trend in the different train accidents reported. The total number of 
reported accidents reduced from 1,863 in 1997/1998 to 1,006 in 2007/2007 demonstrating an 85% 
decrease in the number of recorded train accidents over the 10 year period. 
The tables and charts all show positive trends through the safety improvements made. Investments are 
generally in the right direction and are having the right effect. As we see the passenger journeys are 
increasing which strengthens the case for continued funding.  
The introduction of the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) in 2003 on the mainline railways 
may have contributed significantly to the reduced number of collisions, derailments and overruns. This 
thesis does not independently assess the effectiveness of the TPWS but considers in general within the 
limitations of available data, the overall effect of introduction of Automatic Train Protection Systems 
(ATP) and other railway safety systems as part of the investments made on improving safety and 
performance. 
Despite this positive trend and growth in the major factors that dictate the direction for future rail 
systems use and investment, the questions that arise are:  
Are we getting good value for the railway investment projects or for the introduction of new 
systems, considering the proposals for future renewal projects and new rail projects such as the 
highly publicised Crossrail and the High Speed 2 (HS2)?  
What confidence do we have that the rail projects, current and future will not only meet 
performance requirements but also comply with safety regulations? 
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 What methodologies are available to evaluate safety performance so that decisions made on rail 
system investments will be well informed and achieve a maximum risk reduction given a fixed 
budget? 
These are challenges faced by the government, rail operators and subcontractors/manufacturers and 
directly affect both passengers and the general public.  
2.5 Review of Major UK Railway Accidents - Lessons Learned.  
The evaluation of recent railway accidents (over the past two decades) demonstrates the effectiveness of 
the press coverage and the abrupt change in the public’s attitude to safety. This has invariably led to the 
intervention of the government, with active investigations and reviews of existing railway structures 
leading to well-publicised railway reviews and subsequent restructuring. 
The high profile accidents that led to these revolutionary railway changes outlined in Section 2.1 are: 
 The Watford South Junction train accident on 8th August, 1996; 
 The Southall train accident on 19th September, 1997; 
 The Ladbroke Grove train accident on 5th October, 1999; 
 The Hatfield train accident on 17th October, 2000. 
This section provides a brief outline of how all these accidents occurred, but its main focus is the two 
major accidents, the Southall and Ladbroke Groove train accidents that led to several publications by 
critics of the government’s privatisation policy and to official reports from the Health and Safety 
Executive for the series of inquiries conducted. 
In a joint inquiry into the Southall and Ladbroke Grove accidents, Professor John Uff and Lord Cullen duly 
noted (HSE 2001a) that ‘No one can be unaware of the strength of publicly expressed opinions about 
current safety issues, whether they concern railways, road traffic, industrial accidents or any other activity 
which poses a risk to the safety of the public.  Equally, anyone who has followed public attitudes for a 
decade or more cannot be unaware that this is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the past railway 
crashes, even very major ones, did not produce the level of public reaction which currently results from 
any rail accident involving casualties. Changes in public attitude have been reflected in, and perhaps 
influenced by, major changes in the law and practice relating to safety.’ 
Since these well-publicised train accidents, a number of studies have been undertaken by HSE and other 
organisations on behalf of the government. Prominent amongst these are the primary inquiries that led 
to the recommendations discussed in this section.  Such studies include the inquiry into the Southall Rail 
incident (HSE 2000a), HSE investigation into the train collision at Ladbroke Grove (HSE 2000a), the 
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Ladbroke Grove Rail reports for the Phase 1 and 2 inquiries (HSE 2000c, HSE 2001a), the Southall and 
Ladbroke Groove Joint Inquiry into the Train Protection Systems (HSE 2001a), study on Automatic Train 
Protection (RAE 2000), the assessment of Railtrack’s management of multi-SPAD signals (HSE 2002), study 
on the management of safety in Railtrack (HSE 2000d) and finally a report on the progress of 
recommendations on the above mentioned reports and studies. 
The Southall collision was the first major accident to occur within the UK rail network since its 
privatisation, which formally started with the transfer of the railway infrastructure to Railtrack on 1 April 
1994. 
The Southall rail accident took place at Southall East Junction on 19 September 1997 when the 10.35 high 
speed train from Swansea to London Paddington, operated by Great Western Train Company, was in 
collision with a freight train operated by English Welsh and Scottish Railway as it was crossing to Southall 
Yard.  Seven people died and a further 139 people were injured, some severely. 
The inquiry into the Southall Rail Accident was led by Professor John Uff.  The purpose was to determine 
why the accident happened, to ascertain the causes, and to identify any lessons which have relevance to 
those with responsibilities for securing railway safety and to make recommendations. 
Brief accounts of the Watford South Junction and Hatfield train accidents are documented in Beale 
(2002).  In the former, a passenger train passed a signal at danger and collided with an empty coaching 
stock train.  One passenger was killed; sixty nine passengers required hospital treatment and four train 
crew workers suffered injuries.  The key factors included: 
 The risk of human errors causing SPADs (Signals Passed At Danger) and technological options for 
reducing these risks with Automatic Train Protection (ATP) systems; 
 Confusion caused to train drivers due to a speed restriction sign being placed in an inappropriate 
position and the ambiguity in the railway signalling standard which contributed to the problem; 
 The shorter than normal safety margin for the signal that was passed at danger. 
In the case of the Hatfield train accident on 17 October 2000, a high speed passenger train was derailed 
when a section of damaged rail broke.  Four passengers were killed and 70 people were injured, including 
four seriously injured.  Large sections of the UK rail network were affected by subsequent track closures 
and speed limits as similar sections of track were investigated.  This caused transport chaos in the UK and 
led to the resignation of the Chief Executive of the rail infrastructure company.  The key factors 
associated with the accident were: 
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 Management and maintenance of the rail infrastructure and the systems for detecting and 
correcting fatigue cracks in rails; 
 The long delays in responding to identified cracked rails; 
 The fragmentation of the industry and resulting difficulties in completing essential work quickly 
when multiple independent organizations are involved, each with their own priorities and 
bureaucracy. 
The four major public inquiry reports were as a result of the two train crashes mentioned above.   
Professor Uff was appointed to chair the Public Inquiry into the Southall crash and published his report in 
February 2000, with 93 recommendations.  Lord Cullen was appointed to chair the public inquiry into the 
Ladbroke Grove crash, which he held in two parts: the Part 1 report (HSE 2000c) concerning the train 
crash was published in June 2001 with 89 recommendations, and the Part 2 report (HSE 2001b) relating 
to wider issues of safety management and the then current regulatory regime was published in 
September 2001 with 74 recommendations.  The Joint Inquiry into Train Protection Systems was 
established shortly after the Ladbroke Grove crash and during the course of the Southall Inquiry.  
Professor Uff and Lord Cullen acted as joint chairmen.  
Unusually, this Public Inquiry was not concerned with the facts of either crash but with broader questions 
relating to train protection and warning systems and measures to prevent or reduce the risks of signals 
being passed at danger.  The Inquiry report was published in March 2001 with 39 recommendations. 
The Public Inquiries led by Lord Cullen and Professor Uff took a fundamental look at the rail industry and 
examined in detail its generic safety issues. The Government agreed that the 295 recommendations from 
the four Public Inquiry reports established a convincing, necessary and challenging agenda for change.  
The scope of the Inquiry recommendations covered specific detailed technical issues to underlying 
conditions of culture and management practice.  Some are still fundamental to achieving overall 
improvements in the state of the industry’s safety management, whilst others are less wide ranging. 
Table 8: Inquiry Findings and Recommendations 
Significant Inquiry Findings and Recommendations  
(Southall and Ladbroke Grove) 
Notes / Source 
Driver Training - The most important lesson to be learned, in terms of driver training, is that while 
passenger safety continues to depend on the vigilance of drivers, and while SPADs continue to 
occur at a rate of around 2 per day, efforts must concentrate on all possible means of ensuring 
that drivers act with the maximum of vigilance and responsibility, and that any potential for 
irregular behaviour is eradicated. 
Further research should be carried out to develop the understanding of human factors as they 
relate to train driving. Signallers and drivers should jointly attend away days and other training 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove.  
Extracts from the HSE (2000a). 
The Southall Rail Accident Inquiry 
Report and HSE (2000c) - the 
Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry. Part 
1 Report 
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Significant Inquiry Findings and Recommendations  
(Southall and Ladbroke Grove) 
Notes / Source 
processes to develop their mutual understanding. 
Licensing – There should be a system for the licensing and central recording of those who are 
qualified for the driving of trains in respect of their knowledge of the rules and regulations and the 
traction for which they have been assessed as competent. Training providers or train operators 
should be accredited and common standards laid down for the purpose. Drivers’ licences should 
require to be revalidated every three years. 
There should be a similar system for licensing the central recording of qualified signalmen, based 
on an assessment of their knowledge of the rules and regulations. Revalidation every three years 
should be required. 
Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry HSE 
(2001b). Part 2 
Operating Rules - sections of the Rule Book and Group Standards which were examined and 
highlighted revealed an appalling lack of clarity relating particularly to Automatic Warning Systems 
(AWS) isolation. 
Southall. HSE(2000a) 
Fault reporting - the Southall accident revealed widespread failures of compliance with fault 
reporting procedures. This included lax performance by individuals of tasks which, at the time, 
they had no particular reason to regard as significant (but which acquired very high significance in 
the light of the accident). It revealed also failures to put in place systems that were likely to 
perform adequately when called upon. The lesson to be learned seems to be that compliance with 
Rules cannot be assumed in the absence of some positive system of monitoring which is likely to 
detect failure. 
Southall. HSE(2000a) 
Fleet maintenance - The major lessons to be learned from the experiences of the Southall crash is 
that potentially serious deficiencies may develop in detailed maintenance procedures which are 
not detected by conventional management procedures or by audit. Most surprising was the fact 
that management was apparently unaware of the unsatisfactory procedures which existed, both in 
terms of comprehensible maintenance procedures and equipment for the repair of reported AWS 
fault. 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
Infrastructure maintenance - Lessons to be learned in regard to the rail infrastructure are limited 
to the signals, where 2 out of 3 vital signals were found to be substantially misaligned, one being 
grossly misaligned. This revealed that errors must have occurred at the stage of installation which 
were not picked up by routine maintenance during the period of well over 2 years that they were 
in use before the Southall crash; nor in the period of some 18 months after they were handed back 
into normal maintenance. The failure to detect misalignment after installation shows that no 
adequate testing could have been performed at the time of commissioning. 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
Regulation - The lesson learnt in relation to regulation is that not all changes have safety 
implications. 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
Vehicle design and operation - The lessons to be learned in relation to crashworthiness were 
limited to questions of emergency access and procedures. The Southall crash revealed serious 
deficiencies in the means of getting out of a coach on its side, with lighting no longer functioning 
and internal doors jammed. 
Recommendations included a number of issues raised in relation to the operation of vehicles. 
Southall 
Research and Development - An important lesson learnt from a number of different aspects of the 
Inquiry proceedings is the inability of the rail industry to deal effectively with inter-company 
issues. 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
Automatic Train Protection - the lesson from the technical experiences of the ATP project was that 
the industry was over-optimistic both in terms of the time necessary to develop the new systems 
and the cost involved. In an industry based on privately raised finance, projections must be 
realistic and results must bear proper comparison with predictions. On the positive side, ATP was 
nearing formal acceptance. Its very high level of use represented a major safety advance on those 
Southall 
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Significant Inquiry Findings and Recommendations  
(Southall and Ladbroke Grove) 
Notes / Source 
sections of the Great Western lines fitted with ATP. 
General Safety Issues - the difference between appearance and reality in terms of the commitment 
to safety and systems intended to achieve safety. An important lesson to be learned from the 
Southall crash is that the difference persists and had not diminished in any way in its potency to 
mislead and create false assurance. 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
Accident investigations and inquiries- A thorough review of the process is urgently called for. The 
lesson learnt from the Southall crash was that accident investigation was not rendered more 
effective by duplicated and partial procedures. The reverse was the case. At Southall, unregulated 
and competing interests succeeded in duplicating and confusing both the investigation and 
inquiry. 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
Post-accident procedures - lessons are to be learned, however, in relation to a number of 
procedures which did not operate as they should have. These have generally been identified and 
improvement can be expected. 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
Safety Auditing - The safety audit process should be strengthened, and the quality of 
communication during the process should be improved. 
HSE (2000c). The Ladbroke Grove 
Rail Inquiry. Part 1 Report. 
Signal sighting - The standard on signal sighting should require that explicit consideration is to be 
given to the readability of a signal. The standard on signal sighting should deal explicitly with the 
additional time required for the reading of certain signals, including (but not necessarily limited to) 
those mounted on gantries The standard on signal sighting should define acceptable limits to the 
temporary obscuration of a signal, subject to the overriding right of a signal sighting committee to 
determine whether the nature and extent of the interruption in the individual case is such that the 
sighting is unacceptable. 
Signal sighting should form part of Railtrack’s safety management system that it is the 
responsibility of senior Zone operating and signal engineering management to decide whether the 
recommendations of a signal sighting committee under the Group Standard on SPADs are to be 
implemented and, if not, what alternative measures are to be taken, and relevant measures are 
implemented. 
Extracted from HSE 2000c. 
Applies to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
SPAD - The Group Standard on SPADs and its associated documentation should be reviewed to 
ensure that there is no presumption that driver error is the principal cause, or that any part played 
by the infrastructure is only a contributory factor. 
Persons who investigate, and make recommendations as a consequence of SPADs should be 
trained in the identification of human factors and in root cause analysis. Their competence in 
these areas should be formally recorded and developed by refresher courses.  
The analysis of SPAD data should be specifically directed to eliciting the part played by human 
factors and assessing the significance of the hazards.  
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
Signallers’ Training and Instructions - The instructions for signallers as to their response to a SPAD 
should be clarified; and set out in a single set of instructions, while if there are matters which are 
specific to a particular area they should be covered by separate local instructions. 
Railtrack should institute a system whereby all signallers in the signal box (or centre) are briefed by 
their line manager following a SPAD in their area, and there is appropriate dissemination of 
information which may be of assistance to signallers elsewhere. 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
IECC equipment - There should be a unique alarm for SPADs, which should sound until it is turned 
off. The speed with which signallers can take action to move points in an emergency should be 
improved. 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
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Significant Inquiry Findings and Recommendations  
(Southall and Ladbroke Grove) 
Notes / Source 
Automatic controls - There should be a study of the possibility of the automatic replacement of a 
signal to Danger where a SPAD has occurred and the layout is such that there is a significant 
danger of collision 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
Radio Communication - There should be a national system of direct radio communication between 
trains and signallers. 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
Preservation of data - Signallers, managers and maintenance staff working at IECCs should be 
instructed as to the need to preserve CSR data disks in the event of a SPAD taking place. 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
Crashworthiness - The enhancement of the cabs on HSTs to improve driver protection along with 
energy absorption and compatibility with other vehicles, and the enhancement of measures for 
the retention of bogies on the coaches of HSTs, should be considered, subject to an assessment of 
feasibility, costs and benefits, with a view to a possible retro-fitting. 
Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
Fire mitigation Ladbroke Grove Report 1 
Passenger protection, evacuation and escape Applied to both Southall and 
Ladbroke Grove 
The Ladbroke Grove train crash on 5 October 1999 resulted in 31 people losing their lives and with over 
400 injured. Part 2 report of the Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry HSE (2001b) makes additional 
recommendations on the following vital elements of safety management, including:  
 Research and development 
 The use of contractors 
 The role of the trade unions 
 Safety leadership within individual companies 
 Communications – two way communications between management and the workplace 
 Risk assessment - the greater use of risk assessment in the rail industry was commended 
 Railway Group Standards 
 Safety cases – endorsed the application of safety cases to the railways 
 The accreditation of suppliers and producers of services 
 Railtrack and Railway Safety 
 The safety regulator – HMRI to continue to fulfil the function of the rail regulator 
 Accident investigation - The responsibility of the HSE for the investigation of rail accidents should 
be transferred to an independent body, RAIB. 
The assessment of the management of multi-SPAD signals was the result of the collision between two 
trains at Ladbroke Grove.  The purpose was to assess the effectiveness of Railtrack's systems for avoiding 
the risks arising from signals passed repeatedly at danger (multi-SPAD signals).   The report contains 
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examples of the measures taken, or planned, at a number of specific signals to reduce the likelihood of 
further SPAD incidents occurring. 
Following the Ladbroke Grove train accident, David Davies (RAE 2000) examined the consequences of 
SPADs and recommended ways to minimise their effects including evaluating options for train protection. 
The report argues that although less than 1% of SPADs lead to accidents, they remain an area of serious 
concern for railway safety.  The SPAD phenomenon occurs in other countries; however, comparative 
statistics were not available owing to differences in signalling systems and data collection.  More research 
on human factors and driver operation was strongly recommended, augmented by an urgent programme 
of fitting enhanced forms of train protection.  Davies made long, medium and short-term 
recommendations which were wholly adopted during the inquiry on the Ladbroke Grove accident: 
 Longer term - Railway policy and implementation should aim at the European Railway Train 
Management System/European Train Control System (ETCS) as the best way forward. 
 Intermediate future.  Using the criteria of maximising safety by minimising the probability of 
SPAD related accidents over the next 10 to 15 years; this report concludes that the best solution 
(irrespective of cost) is to fit the Train Protection and Warning System. 
 Short term – As a result of the operational risks of relying on the TPWS, considering its known 
failures (i.e. 70% effective in terms of avoiding ATP preventable accidents for trains travelling 
above 75mph), it was recommended that a small pilot trial of a variant of TPWS called TPWS+ 
should be set up.  
The joint inquiry into the Southall and Ladbroke Grove Train Protection Systems (HSE 2001a) comes 
between the report into the Southall rail accident, and the report into the Ladbroke Grove accident.  The 
report is not concerned with the facts of either accident, but with broader issues of safety on the railways 
in order to track developments following the accidents.  This report reviews and assesses the value of all 
train protection systems which were currently or shortly to be available, and considers other means of 
preventing signals being passed at danger or of mitigating the effects. 
The management of safety in Railtrack HSE (2000d) is a report of the review of safety management 
arrangements within Railtrack carried out by HSE. In summary the key areas for attention as 
recommended were: 
 Railtrack could enhance its leadership role within the Railway Group by leading the development 
of Group Standards for key safety management system processes such as investigation, 
inspection and audit; 
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 Railtrack could improve the way it seeks to secure Train Operating Companies' (TOCs) 
compliance with their safety cases by: 
 Expanding the scope and nature of monitoring TOC performance, particularly at Railtrack 
Zone level; 
 Clarifying what constitutes unacceptable TOC performance and the means for securing 
remedial action; 
 Improving the co-ordination of activity and information on TOCs collected by Railtrack's 
Safety and Standards Department and Railtrack Line. 
Other important recommendations from this report include proposals for enhancing safety management 
within the Line, by improving: 
 The performance criteria for the key components of its safety management system; 
 The use of risk assessment both in establishing performance criteria and in proportionately 
allocating resources and prioritising safety management actions; 
 Active monitoring at corporate and Zone level by developing key performance indicators which 
enable an assessment of overall performance and permit real time re-allocation of resources 
according to emerging needs; 
 Investigation of accidents and incidents to establish underlying causes and consistent, 
comprehensive analysis of common causes and trends; auditing so that activity is targeted at 
need, co-ordinated across the organisation, reported in a helpful style, audit actions closed out 
speedily, and underlying causes analysed to achieve continuous improvement; 
 The information for review to enable an overall corporate picture of performance to be gauged 
so that better strategic decisions can be taken; 
 External benchmarking with other high hazard industries on safety management system 
documentation processes and safety culture as an aid to learning and continuous improvement 
in safety management practice. 
Progress reports were produced by the Health and Safety Commission to demonstrate that the 
recommendations had been implemented.  A final report from the Health and Safety Commission (HSE 
2005) showed some progress on the implementation of the 295 recommendations from the four public 
inquiries. This report, tenth in the series, confirmed that the public inquiries delivered results. 
Almost all the recommendations including recommendations in Table 8 have been implemented and the 
cited report shows the progress with the remaining recommendations. The key remaining 
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recommendations (continuing beyond 2005, date of the progress report) that require completion are 
summarised below: 
 Undertake pilot schemes using the European Train Control System (ETCS) 
 Advance selective fitment of the GSM-R radio prior to introduction of the ETCS 
 National system of direct radio communication – trains and signallers 
 Supply chain management and accreditation of contractors i.e. suppliers of safety-critical 
products or services.  
Whilst the four railway accidents identified earlier shaped the future of the UK railway industry, the 
Potter’s Bar railway accident, another significant derailment accident that occurred in May 2002 (ORR, 
2002) was instrumental in supporting the urgent need to implement existing recommendations from 
previous accidents. The rear coach of the passenger train derailed after passing over a set of points just 
outside the Potters Bar station. The derailment led to the loss of 7 lives and injuries to over 70 people. 
The independent investigation board set up under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 produced 
three reports into the accident and recommendations presented in ORR (2003). The Investigation Board 
was disbanded in 2008 following closure of all outstanding recommendations.       
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Chapter 3 Risk Assessment and Risk Management in the UK 
Railway Network 
This chapter focuses on the likely scenarios or primary factors that could lead to uncertainties and 
diminishing confidence in the current risk assessment techniques, tools and practices. The first section 
also presents robust reasons why careful considerations are required before using quantified risk 
assessments that are now a standard tool for predicting targets and desired system performance in the 
railway industry.  It also establishes the influence of assumptions in determining whether the results 
achieved are realistic or not.  It is also now widely accepted by engineering managers, project managers, 
risk analysts and railway industry decision makers that uncertainties are inevitable.  Will they always exist 
in the quantified risk assessment models? To what extent – if any; is this acceptable? 
The application and associated complexities of the concepts, tools and techniques such as failure 
identification methods, Precursor Indicator Model (PIM), Safety Risk Model (SRM), Fatalities and 
Weighted Injuries (FWI), classic risk equations, F-N curve, currently used to quantify risks are 
comprehensively discussed. This chapter finds that the one of the key fundamental challenges with the 
methods currently practiced is that they do not model the root causes of failure and the quantification of 
many of the events in the high consequence/low frequency categories such as train collision are based on 
very few past incidents and as such under-represented. This chapter lays the foundations for the 
concepts and methods introduced in future sections of this thesis as it identifies two basic errors often 
ignored during risk analysis i.e. over-estimation and application of empirical data from older systems 
which may not apply to newer systems with improved standards.   
3.1 Existing Techniques and Tools for Risk assessment and Risk 
Management 
On the mainline railways, introduction and implementation of the appropriate risk assessment 
techniques and tools for the distinct applications is a challenge and has significant cost implications. 
Introducing a not-for-purpose tool is in most cases more expensive than doing nothing - with incorrect 
assessment and subsequent costs of failure potentially catastrophic.  However, in the UK railways, these 
decisions are guided by the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and the ALARP criteria.   
Guidance and standards in the UK railway industry for conducting risk assessment is given in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: Guidance on selecting the most appropriate risk assessment methodology  
The application of classical safety analysis is hindered by the increasing complexity and corresponding 
cost of railway systems.  Fault trees and Failure Mode Effects Analyses are manageable for relatively 
simple systems. These conventional methods can quite easily become laborious and error prone, further 
making thorough assessment and interpretation of the results increasingly difficult within the time and 
budget constraints of most railway undertakings.  Furthermore, the results of the analyses are divorced 
from the design being analysed, so that the effects of any changes in the system design may only become 
apparent after another long and costly analysis. 
Identify requirement for risk 
assessment
Undertake review of 
operations subject to risk 
assessment
Is there a potential for fatalities 
during the system life (i.e. operation 
and maintenance)?
Are the operations similar and 
addressed by existing risk 
assessments?
Are the operations similar and 
“not addressed” by existing risk 
assessment?
Novel operation not addressed by 
existing risk assessment and 
management
Preliminary risk assessment 
supported by fault tree and 
event tree analysis
Undertake risk 
assessment
High level qualitative risk 
assessment
Quantitative risk assessment 
incorporating information from 
existing risk assessments
Semi-quantitative risk ranking 
assessment 
Is there a potential for 
identification of fatalities during 
the qualitative risk assessment
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
36 
 
With this in mind, this section looks at alternative methods that have been introduced on the railways. 
On mainline routes, the underlying risk of train accidents is measured by tracking changes in the 
occurrence of accidents using the Precursor Indicator Model (PIM).  The PIM was first developed in late 
1999 and has since been modified effectively. RSSB (2010) presents complete details of the PIM, with a 
comprehensive guide on its structure, usage and benefit.  The PIM monitors the risk from train 
derailments, train collisions, buffer stop collisions, train fires and trains striking road vehicles at level 
crossings.  The precursors covered by the PIM fall into six main groups, encompassing 28 separate 
subgroups and 46 lower level groups.  The irregular working and SPAD components of the PIM model 
were updated in early 2010 to incorporate risk ranking information. 
The PIM monitors train accident risk to passengers, the workforce, and members of the public, such as 
motorists on level crossings.  The PIM value is an annual moving average, so it reflects precursors during 
the previous 12 months. It is also normalised by train miles, to account for changes in the level of activity 
on the railway.  The PIM uses the classic risk Equation 2.1 presented in Section 2.4 where risk is a function 
of the frequency of the event and consequence.  
Frequency estimates are based on accident precursor data; consequence estimates are derived from the 
Safety Risk Model (SRM).  The SRM models hazardous events (i.e. those that could lead to harm on the 
railway).  Each is broken down into the precursors that could lead to its occurrence.  The risk associated 
with each hazardous event and its precursors is estimated, and the results presented in terms of 
Fatalities and Weighted Injuries (FWI) per year.  The SRM provides an estimate of the risk at a particular 
point in time and is updated periodically. Each month, the number of occurrences of each accident 
precursor is multiplied by the average consequences per event for that precursor (as estimated by the 
most recent version of the SRM) to give an estimate of the associated risk to be used in the PIM.  The risk 
from all precursors over the previous 12 months is then summed and normalised per million train miles.  
The normalised figures are subsequently validated against the annual average using a previous 
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standardised model. 
 
Figure 10: PIM Structure (Source: RSSB 2010) 
Train accident risk estimates from the SRM are used to measure performance against the High Level 
Output Specification (HLOS) safety metrics but the PIM provides interim information on trends in train 
accident risk. 
The PIM only analyses train accident risks.  As a complete railway risk assessment tool, the PIM is limited 
in its application. Movement/Non-movement risks as defined by the SRM are not within the scope of the 
PIM, making it a very expensive tool considering that train accidents account for a relatively small part of 
the overall railway system risks.  In using the PIM, it is assumed that accidents can be accurately 
predicted and avoided by simply acting on the predictions from models that employ PIM information. 
Perrow (1999) argues that accidents are inevitable in any system of sufficient complexity.  However, this 
assumption, built into the PIM indicates a limitation in the use of accident precursor models as it 
currently under represents the reality of accidents. The PIM relies on incident reporting from the Safety 
Management Information System (SMIS). As with most safety models in current use, the incident 
reporting schemes are subject to several potential flaws.  Reporting bias and under-reporting can 
undermine the veracity of the data and the danger that these schemes have significantly over-estimated 
the impact they can have on the operation of complex, safety-critical systems (Johnson 2002).   The 
challenges with data quality used in prediction models are introduced in Section 2.3 and addressed in 
detail in Chapter 4. 
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F-N (F – frequency of occurrence; N – number of fatalities or persons harmed) curves or criterion lines 
have been used in various countries and in various contexts for over 30 years. Ball and Floyd (1998) 
reviewed the use of F-N curves for the HSE for risk target setting.  The HSE does not explicitly recommend 
the use of F-N curves in this area. However, the HSE document Reducing Risk Protecting People (HSE, 
2001c) cautiously recommends at least an F-N-criterion point.  On an F-N criterion, if a system under 
investigation using F-N curves generates lines that lie wholly below the criterion line, the system is 
regarded as tolerable. Safety measures to lower the F-N curve are then required. 
The Railway Safety’s Safety Risk Model (SRM) provides in the Risk Profile Bulletin (Railway Safety 2003) an 
F-N curve for multiple fatalities railway accidents. The F-N curves from Railway Safety covers train 
accidents with the potential for multiple fatalities with data derived from modelling the precursors and 
consequences of fatal accident sequences.  The categories modelled include: 
 Train derailments 
 Collisions 
 Overruns 
 Collisions between trains and road vehicles (mostly at level crossings)  
 Train fires 
These are collectively considered as train accidents. It is worth noting that other non-train accidents such 
as station fires were not taken into consideration in generating the SRM but also have a potential for 
causing multiple fatalities. Risk reduction at level crossings has been a significant challenge to policy 
makers, railway infrastructure owners, operators and contractors. HC (2014) provides that the safety 
record of Great Britain’s level crossings has improved in recent times however also highlights that nine 
fatalities, seven major injuries, fifty-three minor injuries and seventeen cases of shock or trauma were 
reported in 2012-13. This generally accounted for half of the fatalities on the UK railways in the period 
from 2008-09 to 2012-13. 
Andrew W. Evans (2005) reviewed railway risks between 1967 and 2001, focusing on fatal collisions, 
derailments and overruns on running lines of the UK national railway system.  The results,  based on 
empirical data as part of a NERA report, was used by the Office of Railway Regulation as a suitable 
comparator for the SRM F-N curve for all main train accidents in 2001. The report indicated that for much 
of its length, the SRM F-N curve is above the empirical curve.  
The estimates of the SRM tend to be higher than those attained directly from accident data partly 
because the SRM curve has a wider coverage.  However, the NERA report discovered that the two curves 
come close together at the high fatality end of the range (i.e. 50 – 100 fatalities).  The SRM curve 
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continues above the 100-fatality level to include the possibility of accidents larger than any that have 
been recorded or have occurred in Western Europe in the last 35 years.  At this level, the frequencies 
reach such insignificant levels that the overall risk is negligible.  Despite these differences, Railway Safety 
believes that the curve is an accurate representation of the SRM for frequencies of accidents with 5 or 
more fatalities. 
It can be argued that the use of empirical data may not be adequate in setting F-N criterion for 
accidents/fatalities because of the weakness of available main-line train accidents data.  There were 3 
accidents with more than 20 fatalities between 1967 and 2001.  This means that an estimation of the 
train accidents on the FN curve will only be adequately generated at the upper end of the fatality 
distribution from British operational railway accident data. 
Evans and Verlander (1997) undertook research into the use of the F-N criterion lines and considered 
them inconsistent.  Their objections included: 
1. FN-criterion lines were conceived as an analogy to individual risk criteria.  The justification for 
individual risk criteria is essentially equity: it is unfair to impose too high risks on particular 
individuals, whatever the benefits may be. However, there is no corresponding equity argument 
for accidents as distinct from individuals and therefore the analogy is false. 
2. Even if limits to the tolerable frequencies of accidents of different sizes were desirable, they 
would need to be based on clear and preferably empirically derived criteria.  There are at present 
no such criteria. 
3. Even if such criteria could be derived, FN-criterion lines are a technically incorrect method of 
implementing them, because they do not meet the requirements for consistency in decision 
making under uncertainty. 
The shortfalls in the use of conventional risk assessment tools for system safety applications such as fault 
trees and failure modes and effects analysis techniques led to an emergence of automated risk 
assessment tools in the 1990s.  These developments and the application of new risk assessment tools to 
replace them have been in and out of the industry largely due to the lack of investment to enhance them 
for use in the railway industry.  In short, these risk assessment tools were simply not modifiable for 
complete system risk analysis and evaluation, or for system optimisation. As a result, the railway 
application limitations made them practically unusable. 
Other risk assessment tools and novel techniques have been introduced to the railway industry from 
other high hazard industries. Some that are undergoing pilot studies and application test runs but have 
not yet been accepted include: 
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 The Functional Resonance Accident Models (FRAM). 
 The Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies (Hip-HOPS). 
 Failure Propagation and Transformation techniques such as the Failure Propagation and 
Transformation Notation and the Failure Propagation and Transformation Calculus (FTPN and 
FTPC)  
 State Event and Component Fault Trees  
Papadopoulos et al. (2011) present the Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin & Propagation Studies, a 
computerised system safety analysis tool developed to meet the challenges of the application of rule-
based design and classical safety and reliability analysis techniques that are common with new railway 
system technologies. The tool addresses the introduction of complex failure modes associated with new 
railway system technologies that are increasingly difficult to analyse by using classical manual system 
analysis. This key feature is claimed to resolve the challenges of related errors in the analysis.  The central 
capability of this tool is the automatic synthesis of Fault Trees and Failure Modes and Effects Analyses by 
interpreting reusable specifications of component failure in the context of a system model.  The analysis 
is largely automated, requiring only the initial component failure data to be provided, therefore reducing 
the manual effort required to examine safety.  At the same time, the underlying algorithms can scale up 
to analyse complex systems relatively quickly, enabling the analysis of systems that would otherwise 
require partial or fragmented manual analyses.  HiP-HOPS employs genetic algorithms to evolve initial 
non-optimal designs into new versions that better achieve reliability requirements at minimal cost.  By 
selecting different component implementations with different reliability and cost characteristics, or by 
substituting alternative subsystem architectures with more robust patterns of failure behaviour, many 
solutions from a large design space can be explored and evaluated quickly. 
HiP-HOPS is prone to combinatorial explosion. The system cannot be effectively applied to optimise 
design (and associated cost) as it uses computationally expensive meta-heuristics. It is highly reliant on 
the integration of simplified forms of safety and reliability analysis techniques and tools such as Fault 
Tree Analysis. The tool is relatively new and its use has only been illustrated by using case studies from 
the shipping industry. 
Fenelon and McDermid (1993) present the Failure Propagation and Transformation Notation (FPTN).  This 
is a graphical description of the failure behaviour of a system. FPTN is developed with the concept of 
describing the generation and propagation of component failures in a given system using component 
modules.  These are connected via inputs and outputs to other modules, allowing combination and 
propagation of failures from one module to another, and they can be aggregated into subsystems in 
order to build a system hierarchy.  FPTN was designed to provide a bridge between the deductive FTA 
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and inductive FMEA processes, allowing both cause and effect to be studied.  However, FPTN’s 
component-module approach requires building an error model that is separate from the system model, 
which is then prone to becoming desynchronised from the original system it represents as the design 
evolves.  The Failure Propagation and Transformation Calculus is an advancement of the original FPTN 
but lacks the capability to achieve the required risk assessment and system optimisation analysis that 
would assist the decision maker on system options to maximise risk reduction. 
Details of the State-Event Fault Trees (SEFTs) and Component Fault Trees (CFTs) are documented in Ge et 
al. (2009), Kaiser et al. (2007), Grunske and Kaiser (2005) and Grunske and Neumann (2002).  These were 
developed from the FPTN series. CFTs are less prone to combinatorial explosions that affect the FPTN, 
FPTC and HipHOPS because they are developed based on fault trees and have the capability to build very 
large component fault trees via a system hierarchy for overall system analysis. Papadopoulos et al. (2011) 
note that SEFTs are better suited to analysing software systems or hardware systems with more complex 
dynamic behaviour due to the ability to distinguish between a system being in a certain state (which is a 
condition that is true over a period of time) and an event that triggers a state transition (which is an 
instantaneous occurrence). Failure behaviour is modelled at the component level, but the simple Boolean 
logic of FPTC is extended to enable the representation of sequences and histories of events, as well as the 
concept of negation (i.e., an event that has not yet happened) using the NOT gate.  However, this more 
complex logic means that analysis of SEFTs is not possible using traditional FTA algorithms, but relies on a 
conversion to Deterministic Stochastic Petri Nets (DSPNs). These DSPNs can then be quantitatively 
analysed using Petri Net tools like Time-NET.  The disadvantages of modelling different states are the 
difficulties in applying sensitivity techniques and the fact that the state-space can grow exponentially in 
larger models, reducing the scalability of the SEFT approach. This further significantly reduces the 
effectiveness of the system in applying a reasonable degree of sensitivity analysis. 
3.1.1 UK Regulatory Framework, Risk Acceptance Criteria and Risk Targets 
The provisions of safety following the initial directives that were established as the first steps towards 
regulation and opening up of the European railway transport market were insufficient. Significant 
differences between safety requirements were unresolved. These directives, now superseded were: 
 The European council directive 91/440/EEC of 29th July 1991; 
 The council directive 95/18/EC of 19th June 1995 on the licensing for railway undertakings; 
 The directive 2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 26th February 2001 on the 
allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway 
infrastructure and safety certification.    
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The need to harmonise the content of safety rules; safety certification; roles/responsibilities of safety 
authorities and investigation of railway accidents led to the establishment of The European Railway 
Safety Directive (2004/49). The Directive 2004/49/EC has been amended by Directive 2008/57/EC and 
Directive 2008/110/EC. 
The directives establish a common framework for railway safety as a means of eliminating the differences 
in principles, approach and culture that made it difficult to break through technical barriers between 
European Member States and establish national transport operations.  It is clearly understandable that 
the directive‘s key concepts and structures such as Safety Management Systems, Safety Cases 
(Certificates), Safety Targets (Objectives) and a safety authority (Office of Rail Regulation) were aligned to 
the UK regulatory and enforcement policies at the time of establishment, due to the railway privatisation 
and restructuring phases that the UK railway had undergone. Despite the similarities with the existing UK 
regulation, the differences required resolution which led to the transposition of the European Railway 
Safety Directive (RSD) 2004/49/EC into UK legislation via the Railways and Other Guided Transport 
Systems (Safety) Regulations 2013 (ROGS).  
The Safety Directive specifically requires, as interpreted and summarised by the Railway Safety and 
Standards Board (RSSB Europe Safety Management 2011) that: 
 Railway companies are responsible for the safety of their part of the railway system; 
 The European Rail Agency (ERA) is responsible for harmonising safety standards and 
requirements through the development of Common Safety Targets (CSTs) and Common Safety 
Methods for the railway system.  
Common Safety Indicators (CSIs) and Common Safety targets (CSTs) were developed to help ensure 
consistency in the measurement, application and benchmarking of safety levels across Europe. Common 
Safety Targets are minimum safety levels for different parts of the system and are expressed in terms of 
risk acceptance criteria.  As provided by the directive, member states can achieve this by ensuring that 
current levels of safety are maintained where reasonably practicable, and improved with a view to 
gradually harmonising safety performance across the European Community railway.  The ROGS regulation 
which requires each transport operator to have a safety management system ensures that the mainline 
railway achieves its CSTs. The CSIs in the directive are categorised to address the key areas of accidents, 
consequences, incidents and near misses, the technical safety of infrastructure and the management of 
safety.  
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The European Commission adopted the first set of Common Safety Targets (CSTs) and the first set of 
National Reference Values (NRVs) for the 25 member states with railways. NRVs and CSTs are defined in 
terms of fatalities and weighted serious injuries (FWSI), a reporting measure adopted in the annual safety 
performance reports as shown in Section 2.3.  The CST in each category is equal to the lower of the 
highest NRV value and ten times the average NRV for all member states. The CSTs cover approximately 
40% of the overall risk on the railway (RSSB 2010). 
Infrastructure managers (IMs) and railway undertakings (RUs) are responsible for managing their 
operations and are required to cooperate where they interface with other IMs or RUs, in order to deliver 
a safe operation. As part of compliance with regulations set out by the directive, RUs are required to have 
two-part safety certificates. Part ‘A’ is certification confirming the acceptance of the safety management 
system (SMS) and is issued by the member state in which the RU is based.  Part ‘B’ is certification 
confirming the acceptance of the provisions adopted by the RU to meet the requirements necessary for 
safe operation over the relevant network.  It is issued by the member state in which the RU plans to 
operate. IMs are required to hold a two-part safety authorisation issued by the member state where the 
IM is established including demonstrating an acceptance of the SMS and acceptance of the provisions to 
meet the requirements necessary for the safe design, maintenance and operation of the infrastructure 
including  the traffic control and signalling system.  The other noteworthy requirements are the 
establishment of safety authorities independent of the IMs and RUs, with the specific tasks of regulation 
and supervision of safety and also an independent national accident investigation body. 
On this background, we establish that decisions on operational railway safety, based on risk analysis, 
must be against some form of criteria for risk acceptance.  These criteria are used in relation to risk 
analysis and express the level of risk which the railway operator will accept for the activity.  The term is 
related to the high level expressions of risk requirements and is also applicable and relevant to lower 
levels. Risk Acceptance Criteria used on the UK railways are usually defined at the operator level. A 
defined process is typically outlined for apportionment of the safety targets or goals which depend on the 
criteria for individual risk and whether risk has been reduced to a level which is As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP).  
The CENELEC (European Committee for Electro-technical Standardization) Standard 50126 provides risk 
assessment and acceptance principles for the European railways in line with European Railway Safety 
Directives presented earlier in this section. These principles include:  
1. The “As Low As Reasonably Practicable” principle. ALARP is a measure of good engineering 
practice utilised in the railway industry in the UK and U.S is the only method described in IEC 
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61508. Subsequent sections of this thesis provide extensive insight into the application of the 
ALARP principle in the UK industry in subsequent.  
2. The Minimum Endogenous Mortality (MEM) principle used in the German Railways. The MEM 
principle sets a global safety objective or target with reference to the endogenous mortality of 
an individual (i.e. the ambient risk, RMEM for a person from five to fifteen years old fixed at 2x10
-4 
per year). A 5% contributory risk has been estimated for technical systems to the individual risk 
consequently resulting in a tolerated risk of 0.005 x RMEM. The degree of tolerated risk becomes 
more stringent as the size of the population that could be affected increases. 
3. The “Globalement au moins equivalent” principle, also known as GAME or GAMAB (Globally at 
least equivalent) requires that new systems fulfil the same requirements as those attained by an 
existing similar system. The GAMAB principle requires knowledge of safety objectives and 
behaviour of a reference system. 
Generally, international railway safety practice employ these principles as defined in Šimić, et al (2007), 
Nordland (2001), HSE (2001c) and IEC 61508 (2010). These are applied to all guided transport systems. 
The risk acceptance criteria that are applicable for use in the UK railway industry based on ALARP 
principles are usually quantitative or semi-quantitative. These criteria enable reflection on many different 
scenarios and the aggregation of these into one or a few characteristic values. 
The basis for the formulation of risk acceptance criteria includes:  
 The regulations that control safety within the activities 
 The recognised norms for the activity 
 Requirements for risk reducing measures 
 The knowledge about accidents, incidents and their consequences  
 Experience from own or similar activity 
Risk acceptance criteria are subdivided in categories according to the purpose and level of detail of the 
analysis. The most common framework  divides risks into three bands (HSE 2001c) as shown in Figure 11 
and in related descriptions in this section that apply to the railway industry. Definitions of the maximum 
tolerable (upper) criterion and the broadly acceptable (lower) criterion for individual risk and societal risk 
are also presented. 
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Figure 11: Tolerability of Risk Framework 
The Health and Safety at Works Act 1974 and the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) 
Regulations 2006 generally provide guidance on the ALARP principle and its use as a risk acceptance 
criterion.  The HSW Act 1974 requires that a risk assessment is completed for any undertaking.  An 
example of this is the undertaking of a railway renewal project.  If risk assessment shows that the annual 
risk of death is above 1 in 1,000 for workers, or 1 in 10,000 per annum for the public, then this risk is 
considered unacceptable.  These values are representative of worker risk levels that may be observed in 
certain industries and of risks faced by the general public. The HSE specifies that an annual risk of death 
of less than 1 in one million may be classed as broadly acceptable.  In setting this boundary, the HSE note 
that this level of risk is extremely low compared with the background level of risk that the public in 
general choose to be exposed to. The background level of risk is estimated at an annual risk of death of 1 
in 100.  Between these extremes lies the Tolerable region.  Risks that fall into this category are again 
assessed on an ALARP basis.  In providing advice on the meaning of ALARP, the HSE refer to case law 
which states:  
a computation must be made in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice, 
whether in money, time or trouble, involved in the measures necessary to avert the risk is placed in the 
other; and that, if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them, the risk being 
insignificant in relation to the sacrifice, the person upon whom the duty is laid discharges the burden of 
proving that compliance was not reasonably practicable. 
For effective risk assessment and risk-based decision-making, the risk for acceptance against the 
Tolerability of Risk framework described above is distinguished as individual or societal risk. In the HSE 
document, Reducing Risk Protecting People (2001c), risk characterisation is the second stage of the 
approach to reaching safety decisions.  It describes this as: 
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The proper characterisation of the risk is important to the effective application of the preferred risk 
control hierarchy promoted by HSC/E and the EU.  The hierarchy covers controls on hazards as well as the 
resulting risks. At the top of the hierarchy, and consistent with the general duty to secure health and 
safety, is the consideration of measures or alternatives that will avoid the hazard in the first place.  This 
might involve substitution or the adoption of processes that conform to principles aimed at ensuring that 
a design is inherently safer.  Lower down the hierarchy is the consideration of measures that will reduce 
the risks, given that there are no viable alternatives to accepting the hazard. (HSE 2001c) 
(HSE 2001c) also suggests that the framing of the safety issue may point to it being one where a decision 
on proportionality of action requires information on the risks.  In such cases, we need to characterise the 
risk quantitatively and qualitatively, to describe how it arises and what impact it has on those affected 
and society at large.  Such information is needed in order to inform later consideration of options for risk 
reduction.  Safety risk on the railways is often presented in two distinct ways, depending somewhat on 
the level of detail in the analysis and the objectives of the study.  In most cases, specified criteria exist 
against which the risk characterisation option chosen will have to be compared.  For effective 
communication of risk results, an overall view of the risk is essential. The individual risk criteria are 
presented in the table below, according to the 2009 safety targets.  
Table 9: 2009 Individual Risk Criteria 
Risk Group Upper Limit of Tolerability 
(probability of fatality per year) 
Annual Safety Targets (2009) Broadly Acceptable 
(probability of fatality per 
year) 
Individual passenger 
risk (regular traveller) 
1 x 10-4 
(1 in 10,000 per year) 
3.75 x 10-6 
(1 in 133 million passenger journeys 
based on 500 journeys/year) 
1 x 10-6 
(1 in 1,000,000 per year) 
Individual employee 
risk  
1 x 10-3 
(1 in 1000 per year) 
5 x 10-5 
(1 in 20,000 per year) 
1 x 10-6 
(1 in 1,000,000 per year) 
Individual member of 
the public risk (railway 
‘neighbour’) 
1 x 10-4 
(1 in 10,000 per year) 
1 x 10-6  
1 in 1,000,000 per year based on an 
average member of the UK 
population 
1 x 10-6 
(1 in 1,000,000 per year) 
Considine (1984) defines individual risk as the risk to a person in the vicinity of a hazard.  This includes the 
nature of the injury to the individual, the likelihood of the injury occurring, and the time period over 
which the injury might occur (exposure time).  Widely used forms of presentation of individual risk are 
risk contours and individual risk profiles.  Societal Risk is frequently used as it best represents risk to 
passengers and the wider public:  it addresses the number of people who might be affected by hazardous 
incidents. A widely used form of societal risk is the F-N (Frequency-Number) curve, introduced previously 
in this section, a plot of cumulative frequency versus consequences (expressed as a number of fatalities).   
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Figure 12: F-N Curve (Extracted from Evans, 2003) 
This presentation of societal risks is very useful as it very clearly identifies major risk contributors. The 
apportionment of quantitative safety goals is usually achieved through rigorous mathematical modelling 
and in some cases relies on engineering judgement.  A combination of the two is frequently practised.  
Techniques such as the risk matrix provide an alternative method for achieving the apportionment of Risk 
Acceptance Criteria. 
Aven et al. (2006) challenge the widely held view in risk management that risk analyses cannot be 
conducted in a meaningful way without the use of risk assessment criteria.  The authors argue that the 
use of such criteria is inconsistent with an efficient risk management strategy and should be replaced by a 
risk analysis regime that emphasizes the generation of alternatives, cost-effectiveness, and the 
involvement of management in the decision-making process.  The study also argues that risk acceptance 
criteria have played a more active role in the assessment processes than ALARP.  In practice, the latter is 
usually also carried out in a mechanistic manner, and is associated with the identification of potential 
improvements, however prone it may be to inaccurate use when the cost-benefit (cost-effectiveness) 
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analysis technique is considered for safety decision-making.  This analysis is often perfunctory, or very 
coarse.   
From a decision making point of view, satisfying the upper limit risk criteria is a different approach from 
an ALARP evaluation.  Satisfying upper limit risk criteria is a kind of binary decision making:  is this an 
acceptable technical solution or not?  An ALARP evaluation represents a more complex situation, 
requiring more involvement from managers and technical/professional disciplines in order to find an 
optimum solution, taking economic factors, time, safety issues, and other constraints into consideration. 
Kletz (2005) has suggested that by making industrial risks “ALARP risks”, we inadvertently increase other 
risks. In other words, ALARP has served us well for many years but the time has come to move on and 
supplement it by considering also whether or not there is a net increase or decrease in safety.  An 
illustration of the practical difficulty of the ALARP framework is the publicity that accidents on railways 
generate, which has led to politicians making promises of investment on railway safety. This leads to 
proposals supporting changes in line with stringent risk acceptance criteria that may not necessarily 
achieve the required risk reduction at a reasonable cost.  However, excessive speed restrictions, 
extended interruptions to service, and ignorance of relative risks all drive the public on the roads, even 
when statistics show that highways are worse than railways in terms of safety.   
Railway operations are initially associated with levels of risk that are considered intolerable based on 
assessments against regulatory standards or requirements where these are established.  In a few 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, regulations include definitions of intolerable levels of risk.  More 
commonly, internal standards of tolerability are based on the incident-related costs that an organization 
can bear each year, as well as the levels of risk that a given society, and its investors in particular, will 
tolerate.  Even when the tolerability standard is met, additional risk reduction measures may be justified 
if the benefits outweigh the costs.  Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) often includes QRA - selected risk 
reduction alternatives.  In these cases, internal investment criteria may be applied to select measures for 
implementation. A wide range of options to reduce risk is usually available.  However, it takes skill to 
select the most cost-effective alternative. Is it better to go after a multitude of easily implemented 
modifications or a few options that are more effective but expensive?  What to include in the overall risk 
must also be considered.   
3.1.2 Railway Safety Risk Model 
The DfT, the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) and the industry itself have agreed that the mainline railway 
safety metrics will be monitored by using the SRM (RSSB 2010).  The RSSB developed the Safety Risk 
Model (SRM), which is a comprehensive mathematical representation of more than 120 hazardous 
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events that could lead directly to injury or fatality on the mainline railway.  The causes and consequences 
of each event are modelled in detail, considering the railway as a whole rather than concentrating on a 
particular route or operator. This provides the context for each company’s management of safety, acting 
as a guide to the overall risk situation on the network.  
The SRM has been designed to take full account both of high-frequency, low-consequence events, and 
low-frequency, high-consequence events.  It was developed using recognised modelling techniques such 
as fault tree, event tree and consequence models, together with informed expert judgement.  This 
reduces the problems that can arise with using examples from recent history which may be insufficiently 
representative of the underlying level of risk.  The majority of the data used to populate the SRM comes 
from SMIS. 
Taking the risk from all hazardous events together, the SRM provides estimates of the average number of 
fatalities and weighted injuries per year from all sources.  Charts and risk estimates based on the SRM are 
used within the ASPR to set the context for a particular area or topic.  Due to the large number of 
hazardous events within the SRM, ranging from minor slips, trips and falls to major collisions between 
trains, hazardous events of a similar type are often grouped together within the charts in the ASPR to 
reduce the complexity.  
 
Figure 13: Sample SRM Passenger Risk Profile (Source: RSSB 2008) 
Data reporting issues with the SIMS and subsequently, affecting the correctness of the SRM, are well 
documented in the ASPR for 2005 (RSSB 2005b).  These include under-reporting, time issues, duplicates, 
wrong reporting and incomplete information.  Under-reporting is difficult to identify and can have a 
significant impact.  Missing records weaken the analysis and conclusions drawn may well be wrong. 
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Substantial under-reporting potentially leads to an underestimated risk.  If the level of under-reporting 
changes over time, any estimates of trends may be misleading.  Missing records occur because of a lack 
of understanding, training, guidance, or poor resources.  Under-reporting is more of a concern for minor 
events, and the weighting that is attached to non-reportable minor injuries in part accounts for this.  The 
consequence of late reporting is that events could be missed from an analysis.  Late reporting is often 
down to problems with a reporting process, although most of it in SMIS is due to passengers making 
reports to train operators sometime after an event. An event may entered by two different organisations 
(or even by a single organisation twice) which can be hard to detect without manual review and can lead 
to an overestimation of risk. If the level of duplication changes over time, any estimates of trends will 
again be misleading. 
Wrong reporting into the SMIS generally refers to the incorrect categorisation of events. SMIS mainly 
uses drop-down fields alongside a free form narrative to record event details.  These types of errors can 
occur in any of the fields: person type, cause, or whether an event is RIDDOR-reportable. Additionally, 
wrong reporting can refer to a lack of sufficient information to drill down to causes.  Without access to 
the original record, the types of checks that can be carried out are limited to checks for consistency (i.e. 
the coded fields tie in with the narrative description) and that different parts of the event are described 
consistently. 
3.1.3 London Underground QRA 
The London Underground Limited Quantified Risk Assessment (LUL QRA) assesses the risk of major 
hazards with the potential to cause fatality to customers and other members of the public.  This includes 
risks imported to LUL operations through the activities of other LUL Group members, other train 
operating companies, other station operating companies and/or mainline railways.  An overview of the 
LU Quantified Risk Assessment methods and models is provided in LUL (2012). As with the SRM, the LUL 
QRA excludes suicides and medical fatalities.  Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) in general is a 
mathematical technique used to predict risks of accidents and to inform decisions on minimising them.  
The main objective of the risk assessment is to promote an understanding of the nature of these risks and 
provide a basis for: 
 Identifying whether adequate controls are in place; and 
 Identifying if any further controls are reasonably practicable 
The sequence of events leading to major hazards is grouped according to their similar outcomes. These 
outcomes are known as ‘Top Events’ and are presented in Section 2.3. 
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The risk from each of model is calculated using the Fault Tree+ software tool. An Incident Capture and 
Analysis database (INCA) is used by LU to record incidents that occur on the London Underground Limited 
infrastructure.  Information has been entered into this database since 1992. Incident data is entered 
under a particular classification, of which there are 105 different categories. The QRA models are 
primarily used for risk assessments and results used in the following ways: 
 The QRA models provide a valuable input to the London Underground safety improvement plans 
and safety management, assurance activities and its results are used to inform business and 
planning decisions.  
 The results of the LUL QRA contribute to the safety decision-making process (Cost-Benefit 
Analysis) but do not substitute for it  
 The QRA model is used to determine the contribution of specific asset groups such as signalling 
or rolling stock to the total risk for a particular hazard, i.e. to support ALARP arguments. This 
relative risk contribution is used to demonstrate that the risk to passengers from the specific 
hazards under consideration is a small factor in the overall risk, and hence support an ALARP 
argument. This is then used in conjunction with a set of qualitative safety requirements to ensure 
that that the levels of risk after the upgrade shall be ALARP and no greater than the current level 
of risk 
 The QRA models are also used to set safety targets for aspects and functions of the systems.  This 
ensures that the risk is managed at a level no worse than the current state, making the results 
useful as a baseline for engineering renewal projects.  The model provides a valuable base-line 
measurement of current safety standards against which any proposed change to equipment, 
procedure, organisation or any other aspect of operation can be judged in terms of its effect on 
safety.  
It may be argued that QRA applied in the Railway industry as a decision support tool is somewhat 
unsophisticated as it has been simplified somewhat with readily available easy-to-use tools for risk 
quantification.  There has been a tendency for QRA to be treated as an isolated analytical exercise, with 
only a loose link to other risk management activities, despite the use of QRA for risk measurement and as 
part of risk assessment process to meet industry, regulatory and in some cases cost targets.  On the other 
hand, some engineering safety professionals may argue that QRA can be regarded as a key method of 
‘scientifically’ attempting to characterise the uncertainty that surrounds hazard and exposure assessment 
processes.  Notwithstanding the ‘scientific’ tag attached to QRA, some regard it as an immature and 
highly judgemental technique, with results that have a substantial degree of uncertainty (Spouge, 1999).  
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The RiskVu and Fault Tree+ tools have been developed to assist in estimating the safety impact of any 
change affecting the LUL QRA.  The estimation of risk for a particular Top Event is achieved by the 
evaluation of the likelihood and the consequences of the hazardous event under consideration. 
To determine the likelihood of the Top Event occurring, the contributory causes of each of the major 
hazards are identified and the frequency or probability of the event is determined.  The latter is 
determined through fault tree analysis.  The consequences of a hazard are defined in terms of the 
theoretical number of deaths arising. 
This severity and the probability of occurrence of the Top Event are combined (using event tree analysis) 
to determine the risk associated with each Top Event.  This is summed to determine the total risk for 
each of the Operating lines, each Business Unit and the LUL network. 
The level of risk is expressed as fatalities per year.  This figure is the aggregate of a number of possible 
consequence outcomes for a given Top Event. It takes into consideration the possibility that realisation of 
a hazardous event does not always result in the worst case consequences but may have a number of 
different outcomes, including in some circumstances no fatalities. It also takes into consideration the 
probability that an incident may occur at any time. Thus the risk estimated by the LUL QRA is the 
aggregate of these possible frequency and consequence outcomes. 
The actual number of consequences in terms of fatalities used in the LUL QRA model are derived from a 
combination of historical incident data, consequence analyses (where available) and expert judgement.  
The results of the LUL QRA are presented in the form of a ‘Risk Profile’, a ‘Summary Table’ and, for the 
LUL Network only, an ‘F-N Curve’. A Risk Profile [Figure 13] is a graphical representation of the risk 
attributed to each Top Event. It allows these dominant major hazards to be easily determined. Line Risk 
Profiles are produced for each of the LUL Operating lines, for each Business Unit, and for the LUL 
Network. Summary tables provide a breakdown of the risk for each Top Event and typically used to 
support the risk profiles.  The major hazards are listed in order of dominance, with the percentage 
contribution of the Top Event to the overall LUL Network risk also shown.  The main scenarios which 
make up each Top Event are also listed in order of dominance with their percentage contribution to the 
Top Event indicated. F-N Curves and presentations of risk profiles using F-N Curves are discussed in 
Section 3.1. 
The use of fault trees and similar techniques for risk analysis which inform risk-based decisions come with 
disadvantages which may be catastrophic. Their use in a high hazard industry such as the railway network 
should be supported by thorough assessment and validation.  The report by Turner et al. (2002) 
highlighted some weaknesses in the software tools used to build event and fault trees.  
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 Large event trees cannot be scrolled around and are therefore difficult to read, with a potential 
to introduce errors into the models; 
 Fault Tree+ allows the use of partial event failure nodes in the event trees.  This gives the analyst 
flexibility although it does not check that the sum of the partial event probabilities for a specific 
sequence is equal to 1. 
 Not all identified contributing events to the accidents are included in the fault tree models in 
order to manage the level of detail required for analysis.  In so doing, only high-level contributing 
events are included because of limited data on the root causes of some failures.  The concern 
here is that the methods employed for deciding whether particular identified contributing events 
should have been included into the fault tree models or not are usually very subjective and 
without structure or logic.  This opens a debate on the likelihood that the results for the railway 
operation quantified risk assessments omit some scenarios in which a particular hazardous event 
may occur. 
However, Turner et al. (2002) found that the errors are minimised because the risk models were 
constructed at a relatively high level.  The SRM does not model the root causes of failures. Models of 
significant size and complexity similar to the SRM are not expected to be totally error free. 
Where data was available, detailed models with identified contributing events were incorporated into the 
risk models.  These acknowledged modelling limitations indicate that the risk models can only support 
safety decisions at a relatively high level.  The findings also indicate that no modelling of controls was 
undertaken in the risk models, so that it was difficult to predict the link between the contributing events, 
controls and the safety management system. 
The basic events that are quantified as frequencies (events per mile) are modelled in the fault trees as 
probabilities.  This is inaccurate because when a fault tree is quantified, these frequencies are multiplied 
together (cross-product terms) resulting in an inaccurate probability of the Top Event. Quantification of 
many of the events in the high consequence/low frequency classification such as train accidents are 
based on very few past incidents, sometimes as low as only one or two.  This supports the case presented 
in Turner et al. (2002) that high consequence, low frequency accidents are underrepresented in the SRM. 
With the limited data available, particularly for high consequence/ low frequency type train accidents and 
even where this data exists, the quality becomes an issue.  Consequence data used in the risk models are 
therefore subject to great uncertainty.  Most analysts will quickly express concern about the lack of 
historical data available for a comprehensive analysis.  These methods of risk analyses are viewed as 
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flawed because they depend heavily on incorrect data (Weli and Todinov, 2013a). Other factors that 
influence the accuracy of the data are the experience of the analyst and expert opinion/judgement for 
estimating event frequency and consequence. 
3.1.4 Human Error Assessments 
In general, human error estimates are deduced from human reliability techniques such as the Human 
Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART).  These remain questionable. Human error related 
events are modelled as contributing events in fault trees and consequence models.  In the SRM, HEART or 
expert judgement are used to produce estimates of human error probabilities. HEART was not developed 
specifically for the railway industry; Kirwan (1994) points out that this technique fails to consider crucial 
factors such as dependence. The SRM considers major and minor injuries and is therefore quantified in 
terms of equivalent fatalities. However, the findings indicated a small concern that there was no clarity 
on the rationale for the ratios used to convert a major and a minor injury into an equivalent fatality.  This 
is an industry-wide concern as this technique was in use before the SRM and to date; no strong argument 
has been put forward for the ratios. The findings show that a considerable analytical effort needs to be 
applied to understanding the role of uncertainty in developing the SRM, leading to the conclusion that 
the SRM is largely based on pessimistic judgements. 
For decision making on delicate issues such as  the safety of persons / passengers on UK railways that 
may potentially have adverse effects on the safety and risk sensitivity of the society, a company’s 
adopted risk management process must also address an ethical and value-driven commitment to risk 
reduction.  HMRI (2006) requires that intolerable risks on the railway be eliminated and all remaining 
risks to be reduced to as low a level as reasonably practicable (ALARP).  HSE (1999) further requires that 
‘suitable and sufficient’ risk assessments be undertaken.  This often leads to the question - does a 
qualitative risk assessment meet legislative requirements taking into account the uncertainty associated 
with quantitative risk assessment? Are we sufficiently meeting legislative requirements by using both? 
In view of the broad scope of the risk models used for decision making and safety planning and despite 
the weaknesses highlighted, the risk models do meet the high-level objectives of analysing and 
presenting quantified safety risks on the UK railways.  The improvements to be made will be capital and 
time intensive. In a statement clarifying the effort put into these models, the board known as Railway 
Safety (now the Railway Safety and Standards Board) stated and quoted in the Health and Safety 
Laboratory’s Review of Railway Safety’s Safety Risk Model by Turner et al. (2002) that ‘many person 
months of effort were expended in resolving the fault trees as far as possible but were ultimately limited 
by the availability of suitable data. And indeed, the collision models do include some 500 individual cause 
precursors.’  
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The two main railway operators with responsibilities to the Organisation for Rail Regulation (ORR) for 
applying a robust Safety Management System and meeting specifications in Railway Operators’ Safety 
Cases extensively use these methods to support their case for safe operations. Considering the above and 
the extensive use of QRA as a risk assessment tool on these two major railway operators in the UK, it is 
worthwhile evaluating further the practice and application of QRA and risk assessment on UK railways. 
3.2 Impact of Accidents on the Existing Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management Strategy 
The major accidents discussed in Section 2.5 highlighted that the most critical challenge faced in 
achieving rational risk reduction through existing railway safety risk assessment and management 
strategy has been the decision-making process.  This subsequently resulted in: 
 Significant changes in operational procedures;  
 Introduction of onerous requirements for introducing systems into the operational railways and 
subsequently;  
 Encouraging specific amendments to the techniques for risk assessment and management. 
One such vital amendment was the replacement of three key railway safety regulations, the Railways 
(Safety Case) Regulations 2000; Railways (Safety Critical work) Regulations 1994; and the Railways and 
Other Transport Systems (Approval of Works, Plant and Equipment) Regulations 1994 with the Railway 
and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2013 (ORR, 2013).  
These three major regulations set the baseline for all risk assessment and management strategies to be 
adopted by railway operators, infrastructure controllers, station operating companies and infrastructure 
maintenance contractors.  The Railway (Safety Case) Regulations 2000 was introduced to ensure that 
safety is established and managed as an inherent part of the operation of trains and set out well defined 
requirements for developing and maintaining a Railway Safety Case (RSC). Under this strategy, the 
railway safety case was assessed and accepted by the HSE giving confidence that the operator has the 
ability, commitment and resources to effectively assess and manage the potential risks to the health and 
safety of staff, contractors, passengers and the public. The railway safety case should clearly define: 
 The nature and extent of the operations to be undertaken; 
 The safety risk associated with these operations; 
 The procedures and arrangements by which the risk is controlled; 
 The organisation in place for implementing these procedures and arrangements; 
Guidance notes and standards within the railway all adopted the RSC 2000 regulations but in line with 
new regulations were withdrawn.  It is worth noting however, that despite the new regime of regulations, 
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the industry-wide risk assessment techniques have generally remained unchanged, because risk 
assessments to support railway operations are still subject to the Health and Safety at Work etc. Acts 
1974, and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, from which the requirements 
to undertake risk assessments originated.  
The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations, herein referred to as ROGS, was 
introduced to put the requirements of the 2004 European Railway Safety Directive into practice.  The 
directive aims to continue to remove barriers to providing international transport services by creating a 
common framework for railway safety across the European Union.  This sits alongside the European 
Interoperability Directive, which aims to remove the technical problems involved in running trains 
between member states. ROGS puts in place some of the main requirements of the safety directive in 
Great Britain. 
The main objectives of the Railway and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) (Amendment) 
Regulations, 2013 are to: 
 Change the industry’s system of railway safety cases to a system of safety certification and 
authorisation and ensuring that Common Safety Targets are understood and met; 
 Produce a minimum set of requirements for a Safety Management System so that safety 
certification is simplistic without having to get through layers of government or authorising 
bodies; 
 Ensure that transport operators and infrastructure managers work together to provide required 
system safety; 
 Redirect inspection towards checking to ensure that operators are managing their operational 
risks; 
 [Operators to] Institute adequate cooperation methods that complement the measures they are 
taking to comply with their own safety duties – interface risk management; 
 Replace the approval of new or altered works, plant or equipment with safety verification from 
an independent competent person (ICP); 
 [Ensure that] competency management and  safety-critical work is undertaken by a person 
assessed as being fit, change the system of controlling hours for preventing fatigue to the control 
of risks resulting from pattern of working hours and roster design. 
The ORR commissioned an evaluation into the effectiveness of ROGS presented in ORR (2010).  The 
evaluation methodology was based on establishing the ultimate and subsidiary objectives of ROGS as 
outlined in this section and on collecting a range of evidence over a three-year period using industry data 
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from duty holders and non-duty holders to help assess whether or not the Regulations had achieved their 
intended objectives.  This addressed the most important parts of ROGS such as Safety Management 
Systems, Safety Verification, Safety Certification, Safety Authorisation, Risk Assessment, the Annual 
Safety Report, Duty of Cooperation and Safety-Critical Work that significantly influence existing railway 
industry risk assessment and risk management strategy.  The industry survey indicated the following key 
findings: 
1. In terms of awareness and understanding of ROGS, the survey showed that 57% of the 
respondents to the survey required guidance in understanding and implementing ROGS. 
2. Most respondents did not understand ROGS near-miss reporting and lacked adequate 
understanding of work-related risk. 
3. Perceptions of management getting staff involved in safety-related decision-making and safety 
being a key priority was positive. 
4. A considerable percentage, 35%, agreed that they are placed under pressure to meet operational 
performance objectives and that such pressure affected safety. 
5. A majority of respondents confirmed that ROGS had changed the way that safety is managed, 
while 43% felt that safety-related decision-making had been influenced by ROGS. However, a 
majority agreed that standards of safety are the same under ROGS. 
6. About 83% of duty holders reported having a Safety Management System (SMS) in place. 
7. Over half of the respondents stated that the cost of maintaining a SMS is similar to the cost of a 
safety case. 
8. It was found that the most common challenge of maintaining a SMS was ‘communicating the 
SMS to the organisation’. 
9. In terms of introducing new / altered infrastructure or rolling stock, the majority of duty holders 
had either SMS change management process or safety verification under ROGS. However, 
identifying and appointing an ICP and knowing when to apply safety verification were the most 
common challenges cited by the respondents.  The majority of the responses indicated that 
safety has not changed because of safety verification. 
10. There has been an increase in the number of respondents who reported that their organisation 
had completed each stage of the safety certification process and that less time is spent in the 
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ROGS certification process against Railway Safety Case applications.  Comparing the cost of ROGS 
safety certification against Railway Safety Case applications, the majority of respondents 
confirmed that the costs were less under the former.  The majority of final year respondents 
indicated that there had been ‘no change’ to safety due to safety certification under ROGS.  The 
majority of the respondents confirmed that it takes less time to undertake safety authorisation 
applications than Railway Safety Case applications. However, the most common challenge 
reported by the final year respondents in acquiring safety authorisation was ‘understanding the 
requirements’ and that ‘safety authorisation had not affected safety’. 
11. Many respondents indicated that there have been no challenges encountered in adapting 
existing risk assessment arrangements to meet the requirements of Regulation 19.  The majority 
of respondents (88%) indicated that there had been no change to safety as a result of changes to 
risk assessment. 
12. The majority of respondents felt there had been no change to safety as a result of the 
introduction of the duty of co-operation. 
13. Encouragingly, when asked about the challenges encountered in meeting the safety critical work 
duty, the most common response was ‘no challenges’.  Apart from this, ‘training staff and 
managers’ and ‘understanding the requirements’ were the most commonly cited challenges. 
14. 88% of respondents indicated that there had been no change in safety as a result of the safety 
critical work duty. 
These findings, mapped against each one of the ROGS objectives for improving safety on the railways 
through amendments to the existing risk assessment and management framework indicate that ROGS 
had either achieved the original objectives or progress has been made in achieving them.  The findings 
also indicate that the introduction of ROGS had not increased the financial burden to the industry and in 
some cases had actually been more cost effective than the previous strategy.  However, when the 
question was posed on safety improvements since the introduction of ROGS, the general view of duty 
holders was that ROGS had not brought any changes.  This is the underlying criticism of ROGS, a conflict 
of cost against safety improvement leading to the question: Has ROGS really been beneficial?  The 
difficulty in deciding whether the ROGS strategy is enough or requires substantial overhaul in terms of 
the key elements of ROGS (i.e. Safety Management System, Safety Certification, Safety Verification, 
Safety Authorisation, Risk Assessment, Annual Safety Reports, the Duty of Cooperation and Safety Critical 
Work Duty) has recently led to the Railway and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2013 (ROGS).   
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3.3 Existing Risk Assessment and Risk Management in the Operational 
Railway 
Risk assessment leading up to safety benefit analysis in high-level decision-making terms is largely driven 
by concern with health hazards. For the public, it is the key assessment of risks associated with the 
operation of a railway network.  The Management of Health and Safety at Works Regulations 1999 makes 
reference to the need for risk assessment to be ‘suitable and sufficient’ depending on the nature of the 
undertaking and the type and extent of the hazardous events and other factors that exist.  The definition 
of ‘suitable and sufficient’ has historically been difficult to establish due to the broad application of risk 
assessments and of the operations requiring them.   The process for risk assessment has been widely 
studied and documented.  A thorough review of withdrawn and existing internal railway industry 
guidance notes and standards has ensured that the appropriate level of risk assessment is performed for 
any railway, as shown in Figure 14 below. 
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Figure 14: Generic Risk Assessment Methodology  
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Steven G. Gilbert suggests a 4-step process for risk assessment in his paper ‘The Precautionary 
Assessment: Getting out of the Risk Assessment Box’ (November 2006).  Borysiewicz et al.’s report on 
Quantified Risk Assessment for the Institute of Atomic Energy (2004) outlines relevant steps in the major 
accidents risk assessment process.  The Yellow Book (RSSB, 2007b) published by the UK Rail Safety and 
Standard Board, which sets out the fundamentals of Engineering Safety Management on the railways, 
also provides guidance, defining a 7-stage process for risk assessment.  In a similar pattern, other risk 
assessment books and articles from specialists in different industries, including Chemical, Medical, 
Energy, Transport and Construction sectors have outlined steps for complete risk assessment, as 
summarised below:  
1 Hazard Identification; 
2 Estimation of the frequency and consequence of accidents. The Yellow Book further breaks 
this down into Causal, Consequence and Loss Analysis.  Estimation of the consequences of 
each possible event often requires some form of computer modelling but in some cases is 
based on accident experience or judgements if appropriate; 
3 Risk Characterisation following modelling could involve the presentation of risk in various 
forms. The representation of risk to life takes two different forms: 
 Individual Risk – the risk expressed by one person exposed to the hazard 
 Societal or Group Risk – the risk experienced by the whole group of people exposed to 
the hazard being analysed. 
Hazard identification is the first and most important step employed if the overall risk is to be adequately 
analysed. It involves the identification of all relevant hazards and initiating events applicable to the 
system under review.  Identified hazards will then be assessed to extract events which may potentially 
lead to the main hazard or an accident on the operational railway (LU Top Event or SRM Hazards). A 
preliminary estimation of the likelihood of identified events which may potentially lead to an accident is 
then undertaken.  
The Yellow book as a fundamental guide for Engineering Safety Management on the Railways makes a 
simple statement on hazard identification: ‘Your organisation must make a systematic and vigorous 
attempt to identify all possible hazards related to its activities and responsibilities.’  There is no rigid or 
sequential technique stipulated for hazard identification. Several guidelines and techniques exist and 
these can be used in various combinations to improve hazard identification.  
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The reasons for systematic and complete hazard identification at the onset of all risk assessment 
processes are  
 To Identify system hazards at the concept and feasibility stages of a system design or 
operation that flow back into design or operation, allowing early implementation of 
design or operational changes; 
 Support comprehensive and acceptable risk estimation and quantification; 
 Facilitate the generation of appropriate mitigation measures, actions and safety 
requirements. 
One key relevance of the hazard identification process as part of the wider quantified risk assessment, 
referred to earlier is the ‘classification and selection of initiating events’.  An understanding of these 
initiating events through existing data and past experience can assist in simplifying the overall 
quantification of risk.   
Confidence in the degree of accuracy and uncertainty of accident/hazard frequency estimation (which are 
part of the risk assessment process utilised in fault tree analysis, event tree analysis and consequence 
modelling in both the LU QRA and SRM, as presented in Section 3.1.) is the subject of many deliberations 
amongst safety risk professionals.  The loopholes in estimation techniques currently in use, and their 
possible future developments are presented in this section. 
Event probability estimation can be derived from two distinct but related resources: 
 Historical data 
 Analytical techniques 
The historical data method involves the use of statistical data or empirical data from existing system or 
similar systems.  This method is often used on railways where massive collections of empirical data 
already exist. A .W. Evans (2003) used data from as far back as 1967. Where there is significant and 
trustworthy empirical data, the analysis tends to be straightforward.  Such data often include all 
contributors to the accident under review, with other factors such as 
1. System reliability 
2. Operational processes 
3. Quality Assurance 
4. Human Factors 
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5. Environment 
6. Maintenance / Maintainability 
In cases where the historical data is inadequate, a combination of sub-events is used and the predicted 
event probability is tested against existing data. This determines whether the combined sub-events and 
existing data are comparable. Basic errors made when using historical data, which are often ignored 
during risk analysis, are: 
 Over-estimation caused by inclusion of contributory factors not necessarily applicable to the 
analysis; 
 Empirical data from old systems which may not apply to the newer systems with improved 
standards. 
The analytical technique is adopted where the historical data is inadequate, unavailable, or the system 
failure/accident probability is different from that indicated by the historical data.  The analytical 
technique uses either a logic top-down or bottom-up approach by breaking a Top Event or accident down 
into its contributory sub-events or causes.  These sub-events, with failure or accident data will then be 
combined through mathematical functions, built into the models, leading to a resultant Top Event or 
accident. 
The analytical techniques employed by the safety expert or risk analyst in the railway industry rely on 
logical combinations or a sequence of events which ultimately lead to an accident, or Top Event.  When a 
bottom-up and top-down combination is used in the analysis, omissions are easily detected and 
corrected. 
Where the sub-events have no related data, expert opinion on accident frequency estimation is sought. 
In cases where expert opinion has been employed, usually during quantified risk assessment workshops 
or sessions, tree logic and data evaluation are brought in.  The use of expert opinion, despite being the 
only alternative at this stage, results in a degree of scepticism about the accuracy of the results. 
The breakdown of events into sub-events aims to improve judgement on the likelihood of an event. The 
event is sub-divided into smaller units for easier estimation. This is achieved by a further enquiry of the 
participating experts.  It is then assumed with some degree of confidence that the overall outcome is less 
sensitive to any one particular judgement or input from an expert.  However, this technique has some 
crucial disadvantages: 
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 Inappropriate interchanging and combination of frequency and probability in the analysis – 
this is down to the expert analyst although adequate review of the models can easily identify 
these types of errors for smaller models.  Becomes extremely difficult for larger models. as a 
single change can introduce an alteration of the entire work; 
 Rationality of the experts providing estimates – the rather optimistic assumption that the 
individuals or expert undertaking the analysis will choose the best options (events, combinations, 
logic etc.) leading to the Top event or accident; 
 Availability bias – a phenomenon which may result in cognitive bias in which people predict the 
frequency of an event based on how easily an event can be remembered; 
 Quantified consequences are mostly pessimistic as a result of the consideration of conservative 
assumptions made in each part of the logic chain of consequence analysis. 
The neglect of human factors may also affect the level of uncertainty in the analysis especially when 
analytical techniques such as fault tree analysis are used for estimation. Experience indicates that a good 
percentage of system failures or accidents are usually linked to human error (i.e. installation, 
maintenance, operational errors). There is usually a great degree of assumption (at what level we can 
only imagine) that compromises the quality of assessments for human factors.  
The level of confidence in the deficiencies of these models and their use is further compounded by the 
measure of accuracy of a probability estimate based on data.  Inaccurate data can lead to a misleading 
failure rate, resulting in inaccurate estimation of the accident probability. Questions arising when 
determining the level of accuracy of a quantified risk assessment may include but are not limited to: 
 Have all sub-events been included in the risk models? 
 Can we trust the data and the source? 
 Have all failure modes been identified and their criticality and combination adequately checked? 
It is easier to identify and evaluate single failures using qualitative means, but combining the sets 
contributing to a Top Event or accident requires in-depth reviews, often from different 
reviewer(s). 
 Is the accident an extremely rare event?  Rare events usually have a higher degree of uncertainty 
as it is difficult to deduce accident frequencies or probabilities and hence the need for heavy 
reliance on expert judgement. 
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In a review of system reliability estimates, Lees and Frank (1996) showed that estimates of system 
reliability were fairly accurate. In a study of 130 diverse systems and equipment, 63% of the predictions 
were within a factor of 2 of the observations and 93% were within a factor of 4. However, Weli and 
Todinov (2013a) have illustrated the inadequacies of accident data estimates specifically in railway risk 
reduction applications. 
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Chapter 4 Economics of Safety and Safety Budgets 
There is very limited published material on the economics of safety and safety budgets that directly 
applies to the railways. Extensive research is undertaken into the economics of safety from the 
government, regulatory bodies and operators that play a key role in the allocation of funds based on risk 
targets for the railways.  This section also demonstrates the link between the government, railway 
operators or sub-contractors in the application of safety economics, its impact on the public, and its 
overall effect on the operation of the railways. 
Extensive work to support a framework development in the field of safety economics and safety 
investment decisions has been undertaken by Arrow and Lind (1970), Jones-Lee and Loomes (1995), D. 
Currie (2000), Veltri and Ramsay (2009), Fischoff et al. (1981), and Todinov (2001). The findings of other 
notable scholars in economics with work directly related to safety are also carefully studied and 
presented here.  These studies were useful references and very extensive, but they do not address the 
issue of optimising risk reduction measures. However, they lay the foundation for developing the 
framework for achieving maximum risk reduction with budget constraints. The operational rail network, 
in the opinion of the author, needs this fundamental study to ensure railway safety improvement and 
considerably reduce the costs which invariably leads to increase in customer benefit.   
With the objective of maximising risk reduction, this chapter considers in depth, how decisions to support 
optimisation of risk reduction with budget allocations are made by providing a general yet thorough 
overview of the application of basic economic concepts in railway safety. This includes the application of 
Cost Benefit Analysis. The chapter concludes that the current limitations of applying these concepts to 
engineering safety risk reduction are mainly due to lack of understanding of application objectives and 
poor link between the different phases of the engineering lifecycle i.e. concept to decommissioning.  
4.1 Economics of Safety 
Excerpts from a Department for Transport publication on the Cost of Railway Incidents entitled 
‘Proposed Amendments to the Railways (Safety Case) Regulations 2000 Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(Post Consultation)’, provisionally estimate that the total annual losses from railway incidents (of all 
types) is £120 million each year at current price.  At the time of developing this thesis, the research was 
not yet finalised, and may be subject to change.  The figure of £120 million should be taken as a good 
central estimate although it is subject to uncertainty in the data.  The estimate includes all the losses 
associated with accidents, including valuations for fatalities and injuries, which follow the DfT’s valuation 
of fatality prevention (based on the willingness to pay among a wide group to avoid a small increase in 
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personal risk, equivalent to one fatality amongst the whole group).  The cost of public inquiries that may 
arise from major incidents is not included. 
A study of the accuracy of cost estimates in transportation infrastructure planning found that for rail 
projects, actual costs turned out to be on average 44.7 percent higher than estimated costs, and for 
roads 20.4 percent higher (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002).  
These costs or losses (in some cases, very significant) provide the case for the industry’s urgent 
requirement of robust risk reduction techniques for prioritising and optimising safety investments across 
all operational railway systems. This would effectively develop the means of adequately assessing safety 
return on investment and, through the adoption of risk tolerability thresholds and the value of preventing 
fatality criteria.  
In most safety critical projects (including the railways), decisions on future projects are made based on 
answers to questions such as: 
 Will the investments on safety contribute to economic performance – short and long term?   
 How much do we invest considering budget limitations?   
 What products / services do we invest in to maximise safety and economic benefit?  
The management of current railway operations management takes the view that safety investments are 
costs to be controlled primarily because of regulatory constraints. Nave & Veltri (2004) and Veltri, et al. 
(2003a,b), point to the need for traditional approaches to justify safety investments in order to yield a 
new and more economical way of thinking.  Applied to this study, this means the development of a 
framework, techniques, tools and practices that wholly consider the necessary facets of regulations, 
technology and commerce to achieve efficiency. In a world where finance and the availability of funds are 
crucial, making a business case for the introduction of safety measures and methods within a fixed 
budget will require a methodology that optimises the investment on risk reduction, ultimately helping 
the duty holder to understand where the greatest operational risks lie, what accurate risk reduction 
measures to apply, what precise budget requirements are needed and what is the expected benefit.  
The application of optimum risk reduction techniques, tools and practices supports the railway safety 
case and safety management systems.  This further assists the duty holder in the process of 
demonstrating safety adequacy to the safety regulator.  
Currently, CBA is the methodology employed when considering benefits of introducing risk reduction 
measures.  Although it is relatively easy and simple to apply, there are many arguments against its use 
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because of the potential for inaccurate results.  On safety-critical systems or industries such as the 
railways, oil and gas, nuclear, utilities, medical etc., wrong decisions based on CBA may be catastrophic.  
These are a result of the high level of errors introduced and the uncertainty posed by this method. There 
is therefore an urgent need to develop a new framework. 
The Railway Safety and Standards Board, as part of their Safety Decisions Programme documented in 
RSSB (2007), present a common understanding amongst railway industry stakeholders as to what the 
railway is expected to deliver with regard to safety.  Some vital extracts from this document are 
presented below.  
The legal duties that rail companies must discharge in the UK when taking decisions that affect safety are 
based on a complex mixture of case and statute law.  In particular, sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA) require all employers, including railway companies, to reduce risk so far 
as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP).  There is the potential for conflicting views about how to interpret 
the law. However, key rulings (one of which is presented in this section) help clarify how the railways can 
determine what measures are reasonably practicable.  Ultimately, each decision taker is responsible for 
assessing if the proposed course of action is reasonable and if necessary, has to defend that decision in 
court. The duty holder(s) must satisfy themselves that a particular safety measure is reasonably 
practicable.  If a decision were ever to be questioned in court, a magistrate or jury would apply the 
reasonable practicability test.   
A key case that clarifies a company’s legal duty is Edwards v. the National Coal Board [1949] 1 All ER 743.  
The ruling in this case states that: 
 … a computation must be made in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice 
involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, time or trouble) is placed in 
the other, and that, if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them - the risk being 
insignificant in relation to the sacrifice - the defendants discharge the onus on them. 
In defining the factor or algorithm for what constitutes grossness, the Health and Safety Executive states 
in HSE (1988) Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations (TOR) that: 
Precise values for this multiplier have never been defined by the courts and neither the regulator nor the 
regulated have sought this; both recognise the drawbacks associated with trying to regulate by means of 
(arbitrary) numbers… 
When safety improvements are being considered and the cost is less than the monetary value of the 
safety benefit determined by applying the VPF, duty holders generally implement the improvement. 
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Where the cost is above the monetary value of the safety benefit, professional judgement is applied in 
determining whether the cost is grossly disproportionate to the safety benefit and it is reasonably 
practicable to implement the improvement.  In making this judgement, particular attention is paid to: 
 The degree of uncertainty in the assessment of costs and safety benefits 
 The range of potential safety consequences. 
For a quantitative analysis, the CBA approach is to compare the cost per statistical fatality avoided (CPF) 
with the value of preventing a fatality (VPF).  If the cost is less than the monetary value of the safety 
benefit determined by applying the VPF, we generally implement the improvement.  Where the cost is 
above the monetary value of the safety benefit, we apply professional judgement in determining whether 
the cost is grossly disproportionate to the safety benefit and whether it is reasonably practicable to 
implement the improvement.  The VPF is derived from Willingness to Pay (WTP) studies involving 
members of the public.  
The VPF is usually defined as the amount that the average member of the general public is willing to pay 
to reduce the average level of risk to the average victim.  This may be estimated by asking a 
representative sample of the public how much they would be willing to pay to reduce the probability of 
various low-frequency harmful events, then weighting this finding to calculate the amount that should be 
spent to avoid one statistical fatality.  In principle, it is a robust and logical definition, and, because it uses 
people’s opinions on situations that might affect them or others, it is a direct measure of societal values.   
There is broad consensus in the industry that risk assessment is an uncertain process, and that this 
uncertainty must be taken into account when making a judgement about the relative balance to be struck 
between costs and risks.  This view is also reflected in the HSE (2001), which states that: 
The quality of the modelling and the data will affect the robustness of the numerical estimate, and the 
uncertainties in it must always be borne in mind when using the estimate in risk management decisions.  
The use of numerical estimates of risk by themselves can, for several reasons including those above, be 
misleading and lead to decisions which do not meet adequate levels of safety.  In general, qualitative 
learning and numerical risk estimates from QRA should be combined with other information from 
engineering and operational analyses in making an overall decision. 
The Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) stipulates that expenditure to reduce hazards must be incurred 
up to the point where the remaining risk is ‘as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)’.  The ‘Safety 
Justification and ALARP’ standard describes the approach to demonstrating ALARP, and the method and 
parameters to be used when assessing the value of safety benefits. 
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Expenditure on safety to minimise the occurrence of incidents, which could lead to loss of life, injury, or 
damage to assets is expressed in financial terms.  In order to compare the magnitude of the safety 
benefits with the expenditure and arrive at an estimate of whether or not the expenditure is worthwhile, 
the benefits must also be expressed in financial terms.  On the railways, a simple approach is utilised for 
project cost valuations. If the probable frequency (expressed as the number per annum) of an event 
occurring and the probable impact if the event occurred (expressed financially) are known, then the 
product of these two numbers is the expected  cost per annum of the risk.  If as a result of the 
expenditure the magnitude of either or both of these two quantities is reduced, then the reduction in 
annual costs can be ascertained and used in appraisal calculations in the same manner as any other 
benefit. The allocation of funds and resources to safety then raises a topical debate on the interface 
between safety and commercial aims on any project or programme. 
Following extensive research on railway organisations’ internal practices, it became clear that in today’s 
railway safety two methods are used to integrate safety and commercial objectives on a project: 
 The Cost Benefit Analysis approach 
 The Target Setting Approach 
The two methods are standard ways that facilitate decisions on project safety investments on the 
railways and will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter. Although these are useful methods in 
analysing investment decisions, their exclusive use can result in incorrect decisions such as accepting 
project proposals that lose money or rejecting proposals that may represent financial opportunities. One 
of such CBA-based methods or tools is the SH&E Economic Analysis Model proposed by Veltri & Ramsay 
(2009). The model is an abridged CBA analysis with similar inherent limitations (discussed further in 
Section 4.2).  The foundation of the proposed condensed model as presented in Veltri & Ramsay (2009), 
is based on the unabridged framework developed by the Society of Environmental Toxicology and 
Chemistry.  The objective of the model is to help answer questions on organisational Safety Health and 
Environmental investment allocation. These include: 
 Which products, technologies, processes and services tend to drive SH&E life cycle cost? 
 Which SH&E management strategies and technical tactics should be pursued and what level of 
investment will be required? 
 What is the potential business contribution over the short and long term? 
Present value financial analysis is used in this case to provide a means of: 
 Comparing the financial performance of mutually exclusive alternatives; 
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 Delineating the long-term financial impact of SH&E investments by presenting the after-tax cash 
flow and the present-cost value of the investment over a sufficient time horizon.   
The rationale for using net present value financial analysis is that many of the traditional financial analysis 
techniques employed by SH&E specialists, such as payback and rate of return on investment, fail to take 
the time value of money into consideration.   
The business case development manuals used by railway operators set guidelines on presenting a safety 
business case based on CBA.  Proposals for change or implementation of a new system, product or 
resources must be presented with a Business Case.  The business case enables authorising bodies or 
personnel to make informed decisions for change or system introduction including risk reduction 
measures for sustainability, profitability and best use of limited funds. A basic checklist is outlined in the 
manuals that satisfy the subject of ‘Is this cost necessary?’  
 Compulsion – statutory requirement 
 Cost effectiveness 
 Risk avoidance 
 Risk tolerance – removal or reduction  
 Profitability and Sustainability 
 Miscellaneous expenditure – what we might call running costs 
As outlined in the manuals, appraisals on a business case is undertaken to identify the impact that an 
action will have on the finances of an organisation and in achieving efficiency, economy and safe 
operation of the railway. Essentially, a base case is presented as one of the options and other options will 
be to implement a change with expected returns.  The options provided should be able to show that the 
implementation of the change or introduction of a new measure will bring total benefits that surpass the 
cost of implementation.  The appraisal will need to show that the base case can be demonstrated to meet 
ALARP.  
In a review of the practices in the Oil and Gas sector, a DNV Technica (1999) report also indicates the use 
of CBA as the methodology for costing safety measures through a simple yet structured process similar to 
the UK railway model.  
With the comprehensive review of the UK railways duty holder’s practices, it is found that there are four 
main steps established in their guidelines and standards. These steps are traditionally used for 
determination of safety benefits for the implementation of a system on the operational railways. These 
include: 
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 Quantification of the safety risk 
 Valuation of safety benefit 
 Comparison of options and prioritisation of safety programme 
 Option selection and integration into overall project costs 
The research into these standards and practices also showed that safety benefits are determined through 
risk reduction measures targeted at: 
 Injuries or fatalities to passengers 
 Injuries or fatalities to staff 
 Material damage and service disruption 
The existing practice of option selection and implementation places a Value of Preventing a Fatality (VPF) 
based on current VPF values.  The approach used simply applies a possible multiplier of 3 to the VPF 
depending on the maximum risk to an individual.  The multiplier of 3, depending on the above factor, 
addresses the aspect of the ALARP principle which requires safety measures to be implemented unless 
the cost etc. is disproportionately greater than the safety benefit obtained. 
Other studies, such as Komljenovic (2008), Liming (2002) and the practices of the mining and nuclear 
industries also illustrate the broad use of CBA-related methods.  These show the use of probabilistic risk 
assessment to identify high risk items and the application of Net Present Value to support decisions 
affecting the allocation and management of plant resources. These studies are not optimisation 
techniques for risk reduction, but are suggested best practices for attaining cost effective risk reduction.  
The goals of these techniques (i.e. Risk Informed Asset Management or RIAM models) are geared 
towards general asset management. RIAM is a process by which analysts review historical performance 
and develop logic models and data analyses to predict critical decision support figures-of-merit (or 
metrics) for station managers and executives of electric generation and utility companies.  RIAM applies 
probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques and generates predictions probabilistically so that 
metrics information can be supplied to managers in terms of probability distributions as well as point 
estimates. This enables the managers to apply the concept of “confidence levels” in their critical decision-
making processes. These metrics include, but are not limited to, the following:  
 Profitability 
 Projected revenue 
 Projected costs 
 Asset value 
 Safety (catastrophic facility damage frequency and consequences, etc.) 
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 Power production availability (capacity factor, etc.) 
 Efficiency (heat rate), and others 
4.2 CBA and Risk Reduction 
Applications of CBA in decision making include the use of CBA in Weale (2009) for exploring the effect of 
cataract operations on eyesight; for public project appraisals Brzozowska (2007); and proposals for 
transport Elhorst & Oosterhaven (2008). There are even plans for applying CBA to Submarine Decision 
Support Systems (Bhattacharjee, 2007).  Admittedly, CBA has wide and various uses as discussed in 
Hammond (1966). 
This section is not a critique of CBA in all of its applications but makes particular reference to its use in 
optimising risk reduction with particular emphasis on major engineering projects (in this case risk 
reduction on the railways). In keeping with the overall objective of this chapter, this section 
demonstrates in more detail the limitations of CBA in the railway application.  The current practice of CBA 
for safety decision-making is shown to be incapable of dealing with the added complexities of ALARP and 
financial constraints.  It proposes that a comprehensive and systematic function in place of the existing 
approaches is required to determine efficient risk reduction within budget constraints and in line with 
regulatory requirements. 
Numerous texts and articles have consistently provided topical discussions on the limitations and 
advantages of applying CBA as we know it today.  From a public, government or regulatory standpoint, 
this is a technique applied to determine the collective alteration from the implementation of a public 
policy or project with the aim of increasing the quality of public policy decisions using a monetary metric.  
In CBA measurements, individual welfare is assumed to depend on the satisfaction of individual 
preferences and social welfare change is measured by observing how much individuals are willing to pay 
to implement the policy or project.  The Willingness to Pay (WTP) approach is used to help inform 
decisions to go’ or ‘not go’ ahead with a particular policy.  The WTP currently applied to market and non-
market ‘public goods’ such as safety risk reduction in critical industries has proved to be a challenge.  Cost 
Effectiveness analysis (CEA) is a subset of the CBA whereby the objective effort of a given policy (e.g. 
reduction of risk of fatalities on the railways) is directed towards obtaining the lowest cost of reaching 
the policy goal considering the benefits from other feasible alternatives to a baseline policy. 
Most criticism of CBA and associated techniques for achieving cost-effectiveness has centred on CBA’s 
preference-based approach and the view of CBA proponents and analysts alike that system efficacy 
(mutual risk reduction benefit as a result of the introduction and implementation of a policy or system) 
can simply be expressed as a comparison of the benefit of the risk reduction in monetary measure and 
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the cost of the risk reduction measure as is currently practised.  Objections have mostly been 
philosophical, claiming that CBA in engineering applications does not incorporate all factors that 
influence judgements on the right choice of system. In the past decade, there has been some dynamic 
movement in the area of research to develop a methodology that addresses the mathematical or 
scientific concerns that engineering applications of CBA pose when determining a precise economic 
value.  In the wake of the recent economic downturn, the cost of risk reduction measures for recent 
major investments in infrastructure is more pronounced. It is now common and a key requirement that a 
decision-maker provide solid reasons for any alteration in a public policy or project. 
In estimating the value (benefit/cost) of implementing a system that meet the above requirements, the 
use of measures based on economic theories (which were initially developed to tackle strictly financial 
and economic operations) is highly questionable.  The flaws resulting from applying these theories to 
safety critical industries may be disastrous.  Other concerns include the use of inappropriate and 
inconsistent baseline assumptions; application to a wide range of alternatives using simple benefit-cost 
ratios in place of scientific measurement, discounting measures used in accounting for future benefits 
and costs, and the  monetisation of unquantifiable benefit factors.  In exploring the basics of CBA in 
mainstream publications by Jones Lee (1989), Campbell & Brown (2003), Dasgputa & Pearce (1972), 
Boardman et al. (2001), Adler and Posner (2000), Schmid (1989), Mishan & Quah (2007), Layard & 
Glaister (1994), Brent (2006), Dreze & Stern (1987), it is easy to extract that fundamentals of CBA are 
entrenched in economics and most such theories assume that the satisfaction of individual preferences 
gives rise to individual well-being. 
If the economic theories underlying most of the outstanding work on economic analysis were to be 
applied to engineering without the application of adequate comprehensive integration of engineering 
properties, the models will be inaccurate and impracticable. Li et al. (2009) proposed models where 
expected utility is used as an alternative to CBA in this field. This introduces the risk of equating the 
introduction of systems (where exposure to risk is not a private matter but a public concern, such as 
buying cheaper cigarettes).  
The concept of utility in most cases when applied to major investment projects in engineering, medical 
and other safety critical industries has been formed without the concept of ‘value judgement with precise 
measurements’ – that is, a statement clearly implying that a system X is either good or bad. The 
numerous ethical criticisms of CBA, ranging from public policies to occupational health and safety issues 
rage on. Kelman (1981) discusses at length the ethical issues surrounding the use of CBA, specifically on 
environmental, safety, and health regulation.  
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The HM Treasury Quantitative Assessment User Guide demands that a full analysis accounts for the 
impact of uncertainty which leads to Optimism Bias (HM Treasury, 2003). This is defined in the HM 
Treasury (2003, p.29) as ‘a demonstrated systematic tendency for project appraisers to be overly 
optimistic’, which   results in an underestimation of scheme costs. Many project parameters are affected 
by optimism. This is also illustrated in current risk assessment practice (see Chapter 3) where it is 
established that expert judgements tend to be optimistic.  For example, expert analysts tend to overstate 
benefits and underestimate the timing and level of both capital and operating costs.    As expert analysts 
are uncertain about the future, they naturally tend to ignore new objectives, requirements and risks. 
However, experience suggests that new objectives, requirements and risks do typically emerge during the 
course of a project and therefore this tendency should be expected and planned for. The HM Treasury 
(2003) requires expert analysts to make explicit adjustments for this bias. Conversely, certainty tends to 
increase progressively from the tender submission to the construction stages of a project. As a result, 
Optimism Bias is greater earlier in a project’s development. 
The Department for Transport’s Transport Analysis Guidance defines risk as ‘the identifiable future 
situations that could cause overspend or underspend to occur’ (Dft, 2013). Risks that could cause 
underspend are sometimes referred to as opportunities whilst risks that could lead to overspend are 
sometimes referred to as 'threats'.  
A philosophical problem of rationality arises when attempting to establish the ‘probability’ of an event 
using expert engineering judgement.  Just as we need some level of rationality for willingness to pay 
under uncertainty as well as certainty, we need rationality hypotheses about probability judgements.  
These are usually achieved by the theory of subjective probabilities and applications of Bayes’ Theorem.  
The question often asked is – what if the decision makers on railway safety issues do not make their 
probability judgement in this manner?  
4.3 Review of existing strategies for Rational and Optimal Budget allocation 
to achieve Maximum Risk Reduction 
The problem of optimising risk reduction within a fixed budget and regulatory framework is not the 
classical economic problem of risk under uncertainty. Thus they cannot be solved by the economic 
theories that are rife and predominant in the financial world and gradually creeping into the safety 
critical industries. 
In an attempt to address uncertainties related to the application of CBA, Li et al. (2009) apply the 
expected utility theory. This is an alternative approach to optimising risk reduction and a solution to the 
problem of regulatory decision-making.  
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4.3.1 Expected Utility – Limitations in use for railway risk reduction applications  
It is quite widely accepted in decision analysis that the normative model for expected utility is the theory 
proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern.  This view is clearly supported in works by Hammond 
(1988), Harsanyi (1955), Kahneman & Tversky (1979), Eeckout (1996), Broome (1991), de Finetti (1937).  
Despite being the paradigm for individual choice under objective and subjective uncertainty, experiments 
by psychologists and economists have discovered several systematic discrepancies leading to the 
development of alternative models of preferences over uncertain prospects. Notable critical work can be 
seen in Schmeidler (1989), Allais (1953), Ellsberg (1961), Loomes and Sugden (1982). 
Several criticisms, notably Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) criticise the use of expected utility theory for 
describing the valuation of uncertain outcomes.  They also reject the method of comparing distributions 
of net benefits in which each potential state of the world initiates a particular net benefit and the utility 
of these net benefits is weighted by their likelihood of occurrence and summed.  Their argument is based 
on the following: 
 Individuals tend to systematically underestimate low probability, and high consequence events; 
  Individuals’ valuation of risk is influenced by their frames of reference and heuristics; 
Perceptions of risky outcomes as well as expected utility are based on the individual’s past.   
Todinov (2010) demonstrates that the risk of a net loss from risky prospects depends strongly on the 
number of risk-reward bets in the risky prospect. He demonstrated that two risky prospect with the same 
expected profit can be associated with very different levels of risk due to the number of risk-reward bets 
in them. Todinov also demonstrated that the risk associated with a risky prospect can be reduced 
significantly by splitting it into a number of risk-reward bets, each characterised by the same probability 
of success but by a proportionally smaller benefit and cost.  This study shows that even with a full 
knowledge related to the likelihood of an event and its consequences, and without the existence of 
subjective bias when making a decision, the maximum expected utility principle proposed for optimising 
risk reduction in Li J et al. (2009) is fundamentally flawed. This results in the acceptance of significant 
risks, associated with grave losses in the case of a small number of risk-reward bets in a risky prospect.  
The statistical law of large numbers supports this argument.  If we consider a number of independent but 
broadly similar risk-reward bets. In some cases, the net benefit may fall short of its expected value, in 
other cases; the net benefit may exceed expected value.  A large number of risk-reward bets will tend to 
balance out loss and gains resulting in net gain not far from the expected value. For small number of risk-
reward bets, this is not guaranteed and large deviations are to be expected. 
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Dasgputa & Pearce (1972) used examples involving expected utility, variance and law of large numbers to 
express a similar view. Let us consider  as the utility of a possible outcome and  its probability of 
occurrence if a particular decision is taken.  The first moment of probability of the decision, which is a 
measure of central tendency called the arithmetic mean or expected value can be expressed as 
 ∑                   (4.1)  
The second moment of probability, the variance, can be expressed as ∑        
 . The      moment is 
then defined as: 
 ∑        
                                                                                   (4.2)  
For most practical applications, we can effectively use the first two moments for comparisons as 
practised in expected utility theory and some CBA applications.  
One of Marschak’s axioms on expected utility also implies that there must be at least four similar 
prospects to prove the Expected Utility Theorem (Marschak, 1950).  Dasgputa & Pearce (1972) cite other 
notable expected utility critiques and conclude that in practice, economists generally confine their 
attention to more routine situations.  This means that the utility function is bounded.  The assumption of 
bounded utility automatically excludes choice among alternatives involving consequences significantly 
worse or better than others.   
On the upside, there has been extensive work done discussing and attempting to address biases in 
subjective measurements of risk in economics and engineering. These include work presented in Jones-
Lee (1976), Trevor et al. (1998), Beattie et al. (1998), Olivier et al. (2004), RSSB (2006), Lind et al. (1997), 
Arkes (1991), Fischhoff (1982). These may apply to the derivation of quantities from hazard management 
to quantified risk assessments and policy or risk regulations.   
Economics theory on the expected utility has evolved significantly since proposed by von Neuman & 
Morgenstein (1947). Notable economists who have made attempts at improving the Expected Utility 
Theory include Markowitz (1952), Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Markowitz proposed a new model of 
utility. Markowitz’s model, unlike in standard expected utility theory assumes that the decision maker 
was initially risk-loving then risk-averse over gains whilst initially risk-averse then risk-seeking over losses. 
Though perhaps not widely appreciated, the decision maker was also assumed to be loss averse.  
Markowitz model explains a variety of experimental evidence not consistent with the expected utility 
theory. Cumulative Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is considered to be the major 
alternative to expected utility theory having superseded Markowitz’s model.  
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4.3.2 Cost Benefit Analysis – Limitations  
CBA in its pure form requires that all impacts relevant to efficiency be quantified and made 
commensurate through monetisation to make use of the Pareto principle through the calculation of 
benefits.  This makes CBA difficult as limitations in theory; data or analytical resources may make it 
impossible to measure and value the impacts of the introduction of a system.  Empirical measures can 
have varying degrees of accuracy and the decision to quantify and with what degree of effort, should 
reflect the value of the increased precision that can be obtained and the costs of obtaining it.  CEA , used 
when all the impacts cannot be monetised in a CBA, is an alternative, abridged version, that lacks the 
science to provide a decision-making framework for selecting efficient risk reduction measures. In the 
case of distributionally-weighted CBA used for achieving maximisation of net benefits, the analyst’s major 
problem is obtaining an appropriate and acceptable set of weights. 
The accuracy of a CBA depends for the most part on the stage of the project on which it is undertaken 
(Todinov, 2001). Errors in CBA decline as the analysis is undertaken during the latter stages of a project.  
A CBA conducted at the concept stage is subject to numerous compounded errors.  These may arise for 
many reasons most commonly, where managers systematically overestimate benefits and underestimate 
costs, which are termed strategic bias. However, logically and in practice, most CBA occur at the initiation 
or concept stage. This exposes the project or undertaking to some significant losses, considering the 
inadequacies already outlined in this chapter. Weli and Todinov (2013b) also provide some exhaustive 
information on the impact of incorrect application of techniques at these initial stages. Boardman et al. 
(2006) highlight four fundamental CBA flaws including: 
 Omission errors;  
 Forecasting errors arising from inherent difficulties and due to factors such as predicting 
technological change, cognitive bias, changing project specifications and for strategic reasons; 
 Valuation errors as a result of inaccurate estimates of the value of criteria such as time, lives 
saved and valuation errors from unanticipated relative price changes etc.;  
 Measurement errors with a tendency to assume that once an impact has occurred, all 
uncertainty associated with the impact is removed.  The extent of problems resulting from 
measurement errors largely depends on the equipment or technology used and on the 
robustness of the statistical or econometric methods.   
Boardman et al. (2006) acknowledge that these problems have received little specific attention within 
CBA. This is likely due to the difficulty of addressing stringent data requirements and the need for strong 
underlying assumptions placed on statistical methods used for handling the errors. 
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Other well reported problems in the use of CBA are highlighted in Maciariello (1975). In particular, this 
study discussed the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, underlining the difficulty in measuring 
utility and the incorrect approximations when using benefits to quantify utility. The change in monetary 
benefits as a proxy for a change in utility results in substantial inaccuracies with the application of CBA.  
This problem was illustrated using the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which runs into utility comparison 
problems. These analyses showed how CBA may move us away from, rather than towards an optimum 
value. Maciariello further concludes that the requirements of pure economic theory are simply too 
demanding for most practical benefit-cost studies and that compromises are required at virtually every 
step of a typical study. In a rather distinctive way, Kelman (1981) further provides an ethical critique of 
CBA including its misuse in areas of environmental, safety and health regulations.  
4.3.3 Cost Benefit Analysis – railway risk reduction application constraints 
By introducing the economic cost-benefit analysis method, railway decision-makers and safety analysts 
consider the accident costs and risk reduction using ‘Do-something’ and ‘Do-nothing’ scenarios.  This 
methodology in practice does not require prioritisation and in some business cases it adopts the 
prevention-first method, i.e. only considers measures for reducing the likelihood of failure with the 
consequences in such an event treated as an after-thought.  The economic cost-benefit approach uses a 
simple ratio to review potential risk reduction measures and selection is made on the basis of 
comparisons between the net costs of the risk reduction measure and the benefits.  If the net benefits 
outweigh the costs, the introduction of the risk reduction measure is beneficial to the railways and 
passengers. The risk reduction measures are subsequently ranked according to the estimated cost-
benefit ratio. 
Figure 15 shows the steps for deriving the benefit and cost ratio.  The events and contributors to the 
railway major accidents are extracted from existing safety analysis such as quantified risk assessments, 
hazard and operability studies or workshops. In some cases existing accident data is filtered and those 
relevant to the specific application are identified and used. 
The distribution of contributions to the overall accident is potentially a challenge as this may not be 
adequately captured in fault trees or in data provided for risk reduction analysis.  This analysis however 
assumes that the set of risk contributors used provides a sufficient representation of the accident as the 
information is extracted from different studies with corresponding data.  
The costs of implementation are provided from economic safety studies undertaken for a recent project 
on the line section under study. The data covers signalling, communications, trains and other systems. 
The cost data is a combination of acquisition, installation and implementation and where available, the 
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maintenance of the safety system under consideration. To ensure economic calculations for removed risk 
are based on the same premise as the estimated costs, the risk reduction as a measure of likelihood and 
consequence (cost) is provided in monetary terms. The VPF value of £1.7 million (i.e. for 2012 values) and 
fatality rates for the different accidents are employed for estimating the cost of accidents. The removed 
risk is then the benefit of implementing the measure and provided as the difference between the cost of 
accident and cost of risk reduction. 
Applying risk reduction measures to different accident contributors will have different effect on the 
accident risk reduction.  A good example is the application of ‘Overlap Extensions’. These  can be used to 
effectively reduce the contributions to Collisions between Trains such as SPADs, compromised overlaps, 
poor wheel-rail friction/interface, failure of emergency braking, wrong direction movements, speeding 
(signal) overruns, etc. However, the overlap extension will also have variations in the magnitude of risk 
reduction provided to the different contributors to collision between trains, and is, therefore, potentially 
only cost effective in some scenarios, not all. 
 
 Figure 15: Cost Benefit Analysis – selection of systems for risk reduction 
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The flaws with this approach are significant and could lead to significant inaccuracies in the results.  
Currently, it fails to consider all risk reducing measures as integrated measures to achieve effective risk 
reduction.  The obvious practical flaw with the application of this method is that the preventive measures 
only target the minimisation of the likelihood of risk actualisation.  Considering the inevitable 
uncertainties in accident or reliability data and the level of engineering expert judgement needed in these 
evaluations, the resulting decisions will often be incorrect and potentially catastrophic. Any confidence in 
the effectiveness of the risk reduction measures selected as a result of this approach is also dampened by 
the heavy reliance on quantified estimates associated with large uncertainty.  The uncertainty varies and 
increases with the extensive use of the estimates.  For quantification to accurately play a major part in 
any risk evaluation, a study that provides a degree of confidence must be derived from extensive and 
trustworthy accident data collected over a period of time, within a similar environment.  This suggests a 
reactive approach to accident risk reduction and raises the question of how railway modifications with 
associated interfaces (new and existing systems) will be captured. This adds to an erosion of confidence 
in data collection, recording and usage.   
For a practical illustration, let us consider a set of risk reduction options addressing one of the most 
common and most researched incidents: signals passed at danger (SPAD) or signal overruns, potentially 
leading to a collision.  
1. Automatic Train Operation – Train control and protection systems (by removing requirement for 
signals and driver related failures) 
2. Overlap extension 
3. SPAD incident response plan/system – operating procedures and availability of first aid 
4. Signalling modifications to align with sighting constraints 
5. Speed restrictions 
6. Driver and line controller training 
7. Adhesion/wheel slide protection systems 
8. Trip-cock positions re-examined and potentially relocated 
9. Introduction of efficient speed control systems  
10. Introduction of more reliable brake control systems  
11. In-cab design – improvements to train cab ergonomics 
12. Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) 
13. Modifications to testing and maintenance regime – extend operational testing for existing 
infrastructure 
14. Emergency timetable for addressing severe disruption following an incident 
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The options presented have varying risk reduction benefits at different costs. Some are preventive risk 
reduction measures.  The primary task of these measures is to reduce the likelihood of SPADs 
contributing to the risk of collisions.  The current practice of risk reduction raises many questions which 
are not limited to the list below:  
 Considering a fixed and in some cases, diminishing budget, what assurance can be obtained from 
a decision based on risk reduction if the preventive measures alone are considered? 
 What level of confidence can we achieve with the use of any of these considering that the 
existing methodology is heavily based on quantitative targets with an increasing degree of 
uncertainty as reliability, accident and statistical data are employed to demonstrate tolerability 
and ALARP? 
 If effectiveness is only considered on prevention-first methods with minimal consideration of 
protective measures, what level of uncertainty in the initial analysis is representative of 
consequence/cost for considering protection measures, i.e. what level of prevention can we 
ideally look to achieve (or is permitted) prior to the use of protection measures?  
 If a measure regarded as preventive is selected, what criteria support the selection? Is it enough 
to use the cost vs. risk reduction benefit to make the decision on which risk reduction measure 
to select?  
 The first and most pressing question is – on what grounds have we classified these as preventive 
or protective?  
As shown in previous discussions in this chapter, the norm is to extract data from historical data of similar 
systems, standards and operational environment.  However, for many events, appropriate historical data 
is unlikely to be available. Without sufficient and thorough assessment of the application, the use of tools 
in options selection that relies heavily on historical data could potentially derail a decision-maker and 
lead to catastrophic consequences. The detrimental effect of such cases is addressed in Weli and Todinov 
(2013a). The paper presents a real-life scenario which has been an issue in all UK applications of the axle 
counter product for over 10 years. The introduction of axle counters to achieve position detection for 
trains as a replacement for ‘track circuits’ is an illustration of the catastrophic effect of a cost–benefit 
approach reliant on historical data. Train position detection is a primary requirement for a safe operation 
of the railways. Due to lack of historical data regarding the frequency of failure of the axle counters, the 
accident history of the track circuit was used in the cost–benefit analysis. This revealed a net benefit of 
£500 per unit from this use. However, the historical data related to track circuits failed to reveal the 
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following dangerous failure scenarios: (i) broken rails could easily be detected by the track circuit device 
but not by the axle counters; and (ii) rail grinding wagons frequently brake axle counter heads, which 
makes them unsuitable for operation.  The problems arise from an inability to detect broken tracks and, 
in addition, the axle counter heads have to be re-calibrated and re-installed after grinding operations. 
The result is increased risk levels for passengers, delays and other severe operational challenges. 
4.4 Existing Railway Safety Budget allocation Strategy 
A major and on-going criticism of existing safety decision-making by analysts, regulatory bodies and 
organisations, is the conventional estimation of multiple-goal activities by single, technically convenient 
measures.  The challenge in safety budget allocation is a multi-objective problem (similarly encountered 
in daily industry investment and other critical decision making activities). It potentially involves an array 
of conflicting objectives such as cost, time, regulatory policies, profitability and interface risks, short-
term, intermediate and long-term consequences. This supports the case that only a systematic and 
comprehensive approach can deliver the required maximum risk reduction.  
Most railway safety decision-making company guidelines in this specific area apply the prevention-first 
principle.  This ensures that by eliminating the likelihood of risk materialisation, the risk of the accident 
can be significantly reduced.  This prioritisation of preventive risk reduction measures, as rudimentary as 
it seems, is provided in the HSE document R2P2 (HSE, 2001c) and widely used in current practice.  It is 
unsuitable for safety-critical industries such as railways as it is used to determine the vital factors that 
influence the risk reduction, without complete consideration of other potentially effective risk reduction 
measures.  For example, protection measures are only considered if the preventive measures do not 
reduce the risk to a tolerable level in line with ALARP principles.  The selected risk reduction measures are 
then taken forward for cost considerations i.e., the risk reduction measures with greater impact on 
preventing the accident are then assessed based on their cost and magnitude of risk reduction. The risk 
of neglecting some essential properties of other measures is significant. If we are provided with two 
preventive risk reduction measures at a cost of £4 million with combined risk reduction of £1 million, six 
protection measures at a cost of £1 million, and associated risk reduction of £4 million, the prevention-
first principle could theoretically be blindly applied.  Failure to consider risk protection measures is a vital 
weakness which increases the overall risk in cases where the potential hazards cannot be properly 
evaluated (unknown unknowns) and the only mitigating barrier against accidents caused by them is the 
risk protection option. 
4.4.1 The business case for risk reduction 
Business cases for safety projects require that both the willingness to pay and the cost of alternative 
measure(s) are considered.  Cost Benefit Analysis is used extensively on the railways for providing a 
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business case enabling authorising bodies within the industry to make informed decisions on whether to 
approve proposals for change.  Business case appraisals are often part of operating most successful 
businesses worldwide, not least the UK railway industry with its enormous size and importance.  
A standard requirement from railway operators is that any case put forward must be argued on its merits 
and on the features of the options to be evaluated.  All cases are required in quantified formats although 
the methods of quantification may be different for each case. In reducing the occurrence of incidents 
which could lead to loss of life or injury, CBA is used as part of the risk assessment process, which may 
lead to major operational changes (see Figure 16).  The cost of an accident or incident in this case is 
expressed in financial terms, facilitating comparisons between safety benefits with expenditure and 
arriving at an estimate of whether or not the latter is worthwhile. HSE (1974) stipulates that the cost of 
reducing hazards must be increased to the point where the residual risk is ALARP. 
As surmised in one of the UK railway operator business development manuals, CBA related to safety risk 
is presented using this simple statement: 
“If the probable frequency (expressed in number per annum) of an event occurring and the 
probable outcome (expressed financially) if the event occurred are known, then the product of 
these two numbers is the probable cost per annum of the risk.  If as a result of the expenditure, 
the magnitude of either or both of these two quantities is reduced, then the reduction in annual 
costs can be determined.  The cost determined can then be compared against the cost of 
eliminating the hazard and the overall system operational effect.” 
HM Treasury (2003) also known as the Green Book is designed to promote efficient policy development 
and resource allocation across government and government agencies. The Green Book supports effective 
resource allocation by ensuring that decision-making on policies, programmes or projects are improved 
through alignment with government priorities and public expectations – usually a difficult balance to 
achieve. As provided in the Green Book, this is achieved through: 
 Identifying other possible approaches which may achieve similar results; 
 Wherever feasible, attributing monetary values to all impacts of any proposed policy, project or 
programme; 
 Performing an assessment of the costs and benefits for relevant options 
HSE (2001c), RSSB (2007b) and railway industry standards in their guidelines for risk management and 
cost valuations of risk, propose basic steps to adequately reduce risks on projects.  The UK railways apply 
six basic steps for achieving optimal risk reduction, which informs decisions for option selection and are 
summarised below as:  
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 Understand Project Purpose and Aims 
 Hazard Identification 
 Risk Quantification (likelihood and consequence) 
 Risk Evaluation (in terms of ALARP or risk ranking) 
 Identify Risk Mitigation Options (and costs and residual risks) 
 Determine optimal Option (by cost benefit analysis) 
 
Figure 16: Engineering Lifecycle and CBA application 
The approach to risk mitigation depends on the steps taken prior to option selection through the 
engineering lifecycle as shown in Figure 16. Options for risk mitigation should be considered together 
with their benefit (in terms of risk reduction and the resulting residual risk) and the cost, time and 
implementation effort.  
From a number of possible options (which will include a ‘Do Nothing’ option) optimum risk mitigation (or 
combination of risk reduction measures) is chosen for implementation.  Furthermore, synergies between 
risk reduction measures should be taken into account. In some cases, one option can reduce various risks.  
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The residual (i.e. remaining) risk and the cost of the risk reduction measure is also taken into 
consideration.  Risk reduction is normally considered to fall into the following categories: 
 Avoid (i.e. do something else) 
 Transfer (e.g. insure, sub-contract, transfer to another party in the contract, etc. Note that the 
duty holder cannot transfer Health and Safety or environmental risks.) 
 Retain (hold i.e. do nothing) 
 Reduce: 
 Reduce the Likelihood of occurrence (e.g. use greater Factor of Safety) 
 Reduce the Impact if failure occurs 
 Rescue (e.g. emergency planning) 
In theory, the evaluation of risk and cost should be more definite and precise as a project progresses.   
With the current practice for selecting most cost effective measures for risk reduction, the question 
remains – is the CBA methodology currently practised adequately optimising risk reduction considering 
the lapses and flaws inherent in the information used for CBA? Is the CBA methodology currently in 
practice appropriately optimising options identified? 
The limitations of the current budget allocation technique and practices have been demonstrated in this 
chapter to be a challenge with the widely adopted CBA. Brent (2006) presents different methods of 
measurement of tangibles and intangibles during a CBA study: the travel cost method and the revealed 
preference approach using random utility theory.  Brent also surveys the contentious realm of valuing 
human life by the traditional methods, which are variants of the human capital approach. However, 
Mishan (1976) maintains that neither of the traditional methods corresponds with the individualistic 
value judgement behind CBA.  The valuation of human life using cost-benefit issues is prominent in health 
regulations, safety regulations, welfare policy, disease inoculation, research and development into many 
kinds of new products, and in many other areas of government policy that affect decisions about who 
lives and who dies.  CBA usually treats the value of life by measuring the value of risks of death.  
Economists can examine how much an individual will pay to lower the risk of dying in a car accident or a 
flight.  Several critics have questioned the suitability of using these procedures.  These critics question 
whether we do in fact have good measures of the value of risk reduction.  Data are usually taken from 
market demands for safety equipment (such as helmets) or salary for especially risky jobs. Neither of 
these can provide an accurate assessment of risk reduction. 
The cost-benefit method that suggests using either willingness to pay or willingness to be paid criteria is 
shown in a typical example of health economics where a mountaineer is lost and resources are being 
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devoted to rescue.  How far should society go in saving a set of known victims and in a case where the 
victim knowingly took the risk?  If an individual or group of individuals suffers from a potentially fatal 
disease, how much resources should be devoted to trying to find a cure?  Star (1969) observes that 
people accept 1,000 times more risk when they choose the activity; hence pay more than when it occurs 
as a result of others’ actions.  The emphasis on the value of risk reduction by the economist using CBA 
presents a fundamental difficulty for cost benefit methods.  Typical risk reduction options involve cases 
where we know that an identifiable individual will die unless specific action is taken to prevent this 
outcome.  The inability of CBA to handle cases of certain death raises questions about potential death as 
well, that is, about valuing risk reduction.  Economic methods for valuing human life therefore represent 
a value judgment on the part of the economist, rather than a fully objective application of the cost-
benefit method.   
Several authors, researchers and organisations have undertaken studies on the business case and 
allocation of budgets in different fields and cite CBA, as it is widely used in all areas of business.  These 
include Blackorby & Donaldson (1990), Dreze & Stern (1987), Robin (1974), Adler & Posner (2000) and 
Jones-Lee (1976). In the selection and allocation of budgets for risk reduction, any additional safety 
measures on a project are considered by comparing: 
 The cost of implementing the measure. 
 The benefit of the measure, in terms of the risk-factored cost of the accidents it would avert. 
Recently, attempts have been made to make the comparison in terms of risks to life, but these are not 
yet generally accepted. The determination of the total annual cost of risk reduction measures employed 
usually includes: 
 Costs of capital investment (e.g. purchase and installation of new safety hardware) written-off 
over an assumed working lifetime at an appropriate discount  
 Operating expenditure (e.g. on annual safety training, extra staff, maintenance etc.). 
 Lost profits (before tax) if the measure involves withdrawing from an activity altogether. 
 Extra operating costs from safer working practices are not normally included, as they are 
assumed to be balanced by cost savings from the generally more efficient operation. 
The cost of accidents averted by the risk reducing measures includes: 
 The value of life of people killed; 
 The cost of hospital treatment, lost production and human costs to people injured. 
 The cost of damage to property; 
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 The business interruption costs, mainly lost production, but also including the damage to 
company reputation resulting from a major accident.  These may be large and particularly 
difficult to estimate. 
Some approaches to CBA incorporate such factors for gross disproportion in the valuation of risk.  Others 
use a baseline valuation and separate gross disproportion factors. 
4.5 Evaluation of the Existing Railway Safety Budget allocation Strategy 
At the request of the ORR, the Health and Safety Laboratory researched the development of an asset 
management model for UK railway safety allowing the UK to allocate spending on rail safety to maximum 
economic effect.  This resulted in the report by the Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL, 2005) proposing 
an asset management model focussed on the UK railways.  The report proposes an outline for a robust 
model to support safety budget allocation and suggests eight key steps:  
 Safety Policy – The establishment of high-level safety targets for the UK rail industry, which will 
necessarily require top management commitment.  
 Identification and prioritisation – The use of Quantified Risk Assessment to identify assets 
critical to achieving the high level safety targets  
 Setting Performance Objectives – Deducing the performance required of an asset in order to 
meet the high-level safety targets.  
 Maintenance Tasks and Procurement – At this stage, the different approaches to maintenance 
and procurement i.e. life-cycle assessment is considered.  
 Immediate Review - This step allows a high level ALARP assessment to be made, with policy (and 
perhaps legal) implications for HMRI  
 Audit – This gives confidence that the model has been implemented consistently and correctly 
across the rail system.  
 Implementation  
 Periodic Review – This is particularly relevant to this study as it underlines the required task of 
reviewing existing systems / processes when there are major changes to the railway e.g. the 
introduction of new regulations, drastic changes in budget or priority, new infrastructure. 
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Despite the benefits outlined in the report, the model is similar in theory and practice to the Health and 
Safety Executive publication ‘Successful Health and Safety Management’ based on the plan-do-check 
management model (HSE, 1997).  This also represents the principle of continual improvement as denoted 
in the British Standard for quality assurance systems, a standard format for existing Safety Cases in 
accordance with Railway (Safety Case) 2000 Regulations (ORR, 2013) and general safety cases used in the 
high-risk engineering industry.  However, the model and report fail to make good on claims of proposing 
an optimal approach to managing assets with great potential for saving resources or deploying them 
effectively. 
The report lacks the depth required to claim that the proposed framework is a ‘grand unifying theory’ for 
optimising spending on the railways as railway safety is not comprehensively addressed.  The report 
however sheds some light at a peripheral level on the connection between policy and regulatory changes 
to railway safety business decisions which requires further study to highlight the need for aligning safety 
investments to safety targets and subsequently to government or industry regulations. In spite of the 
report’s high level approach to asset management regarding safety, it does note that an understanding of 
key features affecting safety performance (i.e. the need for lower level activities such as asset registers, 
QRA, accurate costing and procurement to support maintenance and downtime) is required to optimise 
safety costs.  This, as noted rather than emphasised in the report, is the essential bottom-up approach to 
safety budgeting to ensure a truly ‘unifying’ framework for safety budgeting.  
4.6 Decisions to support maximum risk reduction and budget allocation  
In Chapters 3 and 4, this thesis extensively highlighted the key areas that distort risk management on the 
railways. These are currently the practices, processes and tools that misrepresent railway risks and risk 
reduction. This necessitates a fundamental change to risk management in order to effectively support the 
railway operational safety case. 
The main challenge is the development of a framework that gives the decision maker confidence that the 
effective risk reduction measures are considered – including the correct application of risk reduction 
measures at a reasonable cost.  When embarking on this study, some careful thought was given to the 
typical questions that inundate a decision-maker in this area.  The questions are comprehensive, however 
not exhaustive, and in no particular order. These are presented as an overview of some of the 
fundamental challenges to applying risk reduction measures which have not been addressed in current 
practice:  
1. Is there a clear understanding of what preventive and protective risk reduction measures apply, 
and in what cases are these measures applied for cost effective risk reduction? 
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2. What risk reduction measures do we invest in and how is this achieved for particular railway 
accidents or accident scenarios? 
3. Assuming we have identified and know the risks or contributors to a major accident, is the 
introduction and implementation of only preventive risk reducing measures sufficient to reduce 
the risk to ALARP? 
4. In cases where the risk cannot be easily quantified, how are risk reduction measures applied? 
5. With varying degrees of uncertainty in data and subsequent sensitivity analysis, what methods 
reduce the underestimation or overestimation of the magnitude of risk reduction and costs 
associated with selecting the risk-reduction measures? 
6. In new railway developments with associated scrutiny on costs, is it worth investing more in 
measures that prevent the risk or protect against the risks of accidents? 
7. What is the most effective way of allocating budgets: how are the preventive and protective risk 
reduction measures for a particular risk distributed or allocated? 
8. How are risk reduction measures which act in parallel to other measures determined, and what 
is the contribution of these parallel measures to the overall risk reduction objective? 
9. In marginal reduction cases, mostly cases encountered on the railways, how are preventive or 
protective measures appropriately employed? 
10. What important cost considerations drive the decisions on preventive or protective measures? 
In order to achieve cost effective risk reduction as a minimum, the effort required for supporting the 
selection and implementation of measures must be directed towards ensuring a structure and clarity to 
the risk reduction measures. By emphasising a better understanding of the measures based on underlying 
generic principles, allocating appropriate measures to particular risks or risk scenarios for effective 
reduction can be achieved.  Without this fundamental clarity and systematisation, it is impossible to see 
how the aspects of successful risk management can be efficiently addressed. 
Consequently, Chapters 5 and 6 present the fundamentals that can adequately support any claims to cost 
effective risk reduction. This comprehensive baseline study offers the required guidance for the essential 
understanding of risk reduction measures in railway applications. Chapters 5 and 6 establish the basis for 
an assured selection of maximum risk reduction measures within budget constraints.   
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Chapter 5 Preventive Principles and Techniques for Reducing the 
Risk in the Railway Industry 
Chapters 5 and 6 present the basics (i.e. fundamentals of risk reduction application) that can support 
further efforts on cost effective risk reduction and subsequently, their maximisation under budget 
constraints. Chapter 5 specifically focuses on preventive risk reduction measures.  Preventive risk 
reduction measures are applied to reduce the likelihood of an event/accident. As established in chapters 
3 and 4, the selection of measures to provide practical and verifiable cost effective risk reduction based 
on essential railway risk reduction requirements is necessary to achieve maximum risk reduction.  
Using generic risk reduction principles, the measures applied within the railway network are clearly 
outlined. This provides the decision-maker with the vital understanding for effective application of risk 
reduction measures in specific applications (reducing the likelihood of an event/accident). 
The distinct mapping of railway preventive risk reduction measures to preventive risk reduction principles 
is a first for the UK railway industry. This chapter goes further to present the generic costs, constraints 
and considerations associated with implementing separate measures for the major accidents – Platform 
Train Incidents (PTI), Collision Between Trains (CBT) and Derailments.  
5.1 Fundamentals to maximising risk reduction given fixed budget 
Currently, no practical and verifiable alternative exists for selecting risk-reduction measures. This study 
moves on to the systematic and comprehensive approaches that avoid the existing heavy reliance on 
historical accident or failure data.  In order to demonstrate approaches that will support the decision 
maker in selecting and optimising cost effective risk reduction measures that consider budget constraints, 
the essential principles adopted in this thesis as fundamental assumptions in cost effective risk reduction 
are:    
1. The selection and effective application of risk reduction measures will depend on a thorough 
understanding of: 
o The risk reduction measures’ strengths and weaknesses 
o The application environment  
o Interaction between the risk reduction measure and the application 
2. Some risk reduction measures have both preventive and protective characteristics. The feature 
that dominates the specific risk reduction objective is the guidance on the effective application 
of such measures. 
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3. Risk reduction achieved during the initiation or evaluation stages of a project must be sustained 
throughout the operational stages.   The functional interfaces and dependencies between 
people, processes and equipment must be well understood and incorporated in the initial 
evaluations and carried through implementation.   
5.2 Preventive Risk Reduction Requirements, Principles and Systems 
The basic UK railway safety processes and practices are developed from a combination of regulatory and 
specific infrastructure owner requirements.  These requirements are designed to ensure that the major 
accident risks or top-level events are prevented by the application of the ALARP principle. The safe 
operation of a train is a fundamental requirement. This becomes more complex when modifications and 
new technologies are introduced.   
5.2.1 Risk Reduction Requirements 
As the recent improvements in railway technology contribute to automation in fixed and moving block 
systems, the latter being more of the case today, the operational safety philosophy i.e. a checked-
redundant, fail-safe principle is built into the design and development of these systems.  The overarching 
requirement of ‘safe operation’ of trains can be further analysed by re-classifying functions: 
 Implementation of effective train separation 
 Enforcement of train speed limit and travel direction 
 Control of platform and train doors 
 Train location through point and route locking 
Reducing the major accident risks is achieved by reducing the likelihood of the accidents by: 
 Preventing risks such as collision between trains,  
 Preventing risks of collision between trains and fixed objects,  
 Preventing risks of derailments due to over-speed and  
 Prevention of safety risks to staff and passengers. 
To further explain and validate these primary functions or relationships, we consider the 2008 accident 
data for a given railway line presented in Figure 17.  The data is based on a 70km railway line with 34 
stations, approximately 33 - 35 trains operating daily, 60 – 70km/hour line speed and 54 million journeys 
per year. 
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Figure 17: Railway Line Risk Profile (2008) 
Figure 17 illustrates that the most significant accident risks – Collision between trains, Derailment and 
Platform Train Interface (Platform incidents) are the consequences of deviations from the primary 
functions.  This suggests that for effective risk reduction on the line section used for this study, a 
thorough assessment of the preventive measures that reduce the likelihood of these primary accident 
risks is required. The assessment will help facilitate further understanding of risk reduction within the 
application. Subsequently, a robust strategy to support maximum risk reduction within constraints such 
as budgets is developed.   
In the analysis of a system for accident prevention, all elements must be taken into consideration, i.e. 
software, hardware, human factors, socio-political influences and environmental issues, throughout the 
life cycle of the system.  Information should be reliable and complete.  Any effort towards developing a 
framework for maximum risk reduction must consider systems and human failures in the application of 
preventive measures.  This approach is further supported by considering typical contributory events 
presented in the Tables 10 to 12: 
Table 10: Contributors to the Collision Between Trains 
Major Accident  Example Risk Contributors 
Collision Between Trains Brake Trigger System Failure 
Train runs away 
Speed Control After Trip (SCAT) failure 
Signal Wrong Side Failure (WSF). A ‘wrong side failure’ is a signal failure that leads to an 
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Major Accident  Example Risk Contributors 
incident/accident. 
Compromised overlap. An overlap is the distance provided for a train to stop short of 
any obstruction if it fails to stop at the signal  
Poor wheel/rail friction 
Driver or operator error 
Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD) 
Collision subsequent to a collision 
Train radio system/communications failure 
Emergency brake failure 
Track circuit/train position detection failure 
Wrong direction train movement 
Table 11: Contributors to the Derailment accident 
Major Accident  Example Risk Contributors 
Derailment Defective wheel 
Excessive speed 
Suspension failure 
Emergency exit 
Side swipe  
Poor wheel/rail friction 
Track buckle 
Shoe caught under the conductor rail 
Loss of train detection 
Collision with object – object on track 
Table 12: Contributors to Platform Train Incidents (Platform only accidents) 
Major Accident  Example Risk Contributors 
Platform Train Incidents Crowded platform – inhibits driver’s view 
Curved platform – inhibits driver’s view 
Door dampener failure – doors closing with excessive force 
Passenger falls from platform 
Passenger falls between cars  
Falls onto platform from train 
Trespass 
Passenger strikes/falls against train 
Person pushed from platform 
Failure to activate emergency stop buttons or alarms 
Additional application definitions of these contributors are presented in discussions on the preventive 
measures in this chapter, and protective risk reduction measures in Chapter 6. An introduction to 
fundamental principles, associated processes, systems and applications are presented. Section 5.2.2 
introduces generic preventive principles and their connection to the fundamental railway safety 
requirements.     
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5.2.2 Preventive Risk Reduction Principles 
Figure 18 presents a set of preventive risk reduction principles. Subsequent sections provide detailed 
examples with additional evidence of application limitations and strengths. 
 
  Figure 18: Generic principles for reducing the likelihood of an accident 
The position established by the descriptive work in subsequent sections of Chapter 5 is that by 
demonstrating the implementation of these preventive principles in specific risk reduction applications, 
the decision-maker or safety analyst can easily identify and assure that measures selected will effectively 
achieve the risk reduction requirements (either as preventive or protective measures). Furthermore, a 
combination of this understanding with comprehensive studies on cost and magnitude of removed risk 
can adequately support and guide a selection process that also addresses constraints such as a fixed 
budget. 
5.2.3 Typical Preventive Risk Reduction Systems 
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applied using the same preventive risk reduction principles for the provision of safe operations. The 
railway risk reduction requirements ensure that safety systems introduced to operational railways for 
major train control and operations systems achieve the following functions: 
 Perform train separation; 
 Point and route locking with respect to train location; 
 Platform and train door control; 
 Fulfilment of requirements on train speed control and travel direction; 
These primary railway operational risk reduction requirements are implemented with the use of safety-
related systems on the trains, specified trackside locations, system control centres and at point 
interlocking locations.  By incorporating ALARP principles, the risk reduction requirements also include 
that in the event of failures, the safety performance of the railways against agreed safety benchmarks is 
not compromised.  
Train separation is achieved when the railway control system maintains an assigned ‘Safety Distance’ 
between all trains and obstacles.  This is the distance between the commanded stopping point of a 
moving train and the confirmed position of the rear of the preceding train or obstacle, such as buffer 
stops and misaligned points.  This distance is calculated and assigned allowing for worse case scenarios 
where the safe separation is still maintained. 
The typical train control centre is responsible for the control and interlocking of all points.  It receives 
status point from the point monitoring systems and performs the point interlock function based on the 
status, reservation and occupancy reports for the points.  Once the train control centre receives 
communication of set and locked points in the correct position, a train can be cleared to move over the 
points and the stopping point for the moving train will also progress, as it is a moving target train 
stopping system. 
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Figure 19: Railway Systems Levels of Control 
Different railway infrastructure owners, operators and suppliers use diverse systems for these primary 
functions.  However, an outline of subsystems used to achieve preventive logic risk reduction that further 
support the railway safety case is presented in Figure 19 above. Some of the fundamental systems 
include: 
 Axle counters provide point dead locking and tracking of trains by counting the number of axles 
so that trains are detected and tracked as they enter or leave block sections, or guide-ways in the 
case of moving block systems. 
 APR (Absolute Position Reference) Transponders are passive devices located between the 
running rails or track used by the train as an absolute position locator. 
 ATC means Automatic Train Control which comprises the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) and 
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 ATO is the Automatic Train Operation system, a subsystem of the ATC as defined above. In 
normal operation, the ATO system is responsible for automatic driving of trains.  
 ATP denotes the Automatic Train Protection system, a subsystem of the ATC.  The ATP ensures 
that the train does not exceed the enforced or stipulated movements and distances between 
trains.  Proper application of the ATP must take speed restrictions into account with the design 
objective based on the fail-safe principles in accordance with railway risk reduction 
requirements.  
 Position detectors are trackside devices used to detect a train wheel to give an indication of the 
train or vehicle position within sections of the railway network.  This provides information on the 
state of occupancy (i.e. occupied, clear or undefined) to the signalling system. 
 A track circuit block system consists of block signals, non-block signals, overlaps, signal sections 
and track circuits.  A track circuit is a section of a railway line with fixed boundaries providing 
information on its state of occupancy to the signalling system.  The overlap within a track circuit 
block system is the distance ahead of a stop signal up to which the line must be clear or locked 
for the following signal to clear for train movement. 
 Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) is a safety system that automatically applies a 
train's brakes if it approaches a signal too fast, or if it fails to stop at a signal set to danger. 
 Trainstops are devices, controlled by the signalling and only operate a trip-cock when a signal is 
passed at danger. 
 Trip-cock is a device attached to the leading right hand positive shoe beam operated by an arm 
which, when pushed back by a train stop in the up position, causes the automatic operation of 
the train’s brakes. 
 Correct Side Door Enable is used to inhibit the release or opening of train doors if the doors are 
on the wrong side or the non-platform side to prevent passengers falling onto the track.  This 
function is normally included in the specifications for selective door operation capability. 
 Selective Door Operation is used for selectively opening of power doors and the inhibition of 
other doors.  This can be undertaken manually or via the use of automatic door selection 
devices.  This is particularly used when a train extends over a shorter platform for passengers to 
safely disembark 
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 Point System (or Point Machines) in some applications, are all electric with integral lock and 
independent lock and switch blade detection used for operating railway turnouts.  Some 
applications use electro-hydraulic point drive units.  
 Train arrestors are devices designed to decelerate a slow moving train to minimise injury to staff 
and customers or damage to the train overrunning the correct stopping position at a terminal 
 The standard brake systems used in railway applications are fail-safe designs.  Most brake 
systems use compressed air, known as air brakes.  When acted on, the compressed air 
pressurises blocks on wheels or pads on discs to initiate train-braking action.  Electro-pneumatic 
brake control systems are digital control systems with fail-safe features only used on multiple 
unit trains.  The fail-safe feature is energised to release and de-energised to brake. The digital 
control system for braking eliminates the need for a brake pipe typical of pneumatic systems. 
 Wheel-slip/Wheel-slide Protection system (WSP) is a train system for detection and rectification 
of wheel slip during authorised movement and skids during braking. 
Other systems, processes and applications are defined in the following sections. In addition, assessment 
of the risk reduction measures, and the attributes and capabilities for reducing the likelihood of accidents 
are further highlighted.  This exercise is required for understanding the applications and application 
strengths of the risk reduction measures prior to use in cost effectiveness studies which support the 
selection of risk reduction measures. 
5.3 Application of Preventive Risk Reduction Principles  
The preventive risk reduction principles outlined in 5.2.2 are essentially those that provide guidance to 
the effective use of the measures. By clearly mapping the measure to be selected to the corresponding 
principle, insight into each measure’s preventive properties (limitations or strengths) for specific risk 
reduction applications is determined. Subsequently, the comprehensive understanding of the limitations 
or strengths of the preventive measure within the application generates requirements for introducing 
additional or supplementary measures. This is particularly useful when a large number of measures or 
combinations of measures are considered for a given set of risks. A good example of its effectiveness is 
provided in the assessment for the introduction of axle counters (Weli and Todinov, 2013a). 
5.3.1 Built-in Redundancy 
Built-in redundancy is an effective design feature targeted at the prevention of failures and consequently 
major accidents on the railways.  Its use in railway application, though effective, also results in design 
complexities which increase the risk of failures.  Built-in redundancy as a preventive risk reduction 
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principle is most effective when there are no common causes simultaneously degrading the redundant 
components.  The benefits of built-in redundancy for major accidents are primarily: 
 Increasing reliability and reducing the frequency of accidents (safety) 
 Increasing the operational time  (increasing the system availability) 
The general concept for developing fault-tolerant fail-safe systems for railway signalling systems is 
outlined in Chakraborty (2009).  Design-related failures require a different strategy for the effective 
implementation of the options with built-in redundant features.  The implementation of a robust quality 
management system enhances a fault-free design helping ensure that the redundant system is effective 
and achieves its risk reduction objective.  Employing redundancy enhances the fault tolerance of the 
systems by eliminating single point failures.  The built-in redundancy feature of the renewal of brake 
valve systems is effective for managing random failures leading to an accident such as collision between 
trains.  
Several applications of ‘built-in redundancy’ on the railways as preventive measures can be associated 
with design options for risk reduction. These include: 
 Brake systems and subsystems such as automatic braking systems, brake valves, controllers, 
failure detection and alarms 
 Route locking systems 
 Position detection systems such as track circuits and axle counters 
 Train door units 
 Power supply units 
 Radio, communications and control systems 
The use of this risk-reduction principle makes requires a thorough assessment to be undertaken on its 
benefits in specific risk reduction applications.  An example of the need to assess the suitability of this 
feature is obvious in the use of redundancy in the design of points on railway networks. Point systems 
failures represent single critical points of failure on railway networks and are major contributors to 
accident risks such as collision, derailments, delays and cancellations. 
 The REPOINT Project (Bemment et al. 2012) investigated the potential benefits of redesigning points and 
incorporating redundancy methods that are used in other safety critical industries such as aviation.  . 
Building additional redundancy in existing point systems is potentially cost intensive without resulting in a 
proportionate risk reduction benefit. The study shows that the effectiveness of built-in redundancy to 
reduce the risks associated with points failure is achieved with changes to operating rules.  The 
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application of ‘built-in redundancy’ through physical re-designs and installation of new railway lines as a 
preventive risk reduction measure may not be effective (disproportionately expensive compared to 
benefit).  This study illustrates a typical example where built-in redundancy can provide the cost effective 
solution through unconventional means (i.e. operating procedure/rules).  
5.3.2 Increased Connectivity (Networks and Operations) 
The risk of failure of a system used for safe applications on the railway is significantly reduced when 
cross-links are introduced in the design.  Introducing cross links in reliability network reduces the 
sensitivity to failure of single links thereby reducing the risk of system failure. For example, a mesh-like 
network is less sensitive to failure of a single link compared to a tree-like network. A single failure of a link 
in tree-like network causes the communication with the system after the failed link to be lost. The 
communications in a mesh-type network are retained event after several simultaneous link failures. 
Several topologies are used in signalling and control networks for railway systems development and 
applications, to enhance reliability and safety functionality.  These include their use in track circuit signal 
devices, passenger information systems, video surveillance, position detection and on-board train units.  
The basic topologies are: 
 Point-to-point network designs
 Point-to-point with fault tolerance (additional channels for safety and reliability)
 Star network designs
 Ring structure network designs resulting in increased redundancy using optical connections
 Compressed ring structure i.e. Ring in linear network design
 Mesh structures
 Chain with bridged taps
 Ring structure (increased redundancy using a backbone network)
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Point to Point
Chain Structure
Ring Structure
Ring or Chain structure with bridged tap  
Figure 20: Network topologies used on railway control systems 
Designing with modularity and configurability in mind is vital to cost and risk reduction.  To accommodate 
these network designs with performance and safety benefits, developments of safety critical systems are 
progressing towards Ethernet/IP-based network structures rather than serial transmission networks 
(point-to-point networks). 
These different topologies come at varying product lifecycle costs.  The effectiveness of the designs can 
only be determined on application to specific risk reduction cases. However, the assured reliability and 
availability of a robust network, insensitive to failures of individual links, must drive implementation 
decisions especially in cases where delay and safety costs far outweigh design and implementation costs.  
Another effective use of connectivity principle is its capability to facilitate the design and implementation 
of timetables to address emergency situations such as degraded mode operations and subsequent 
accident prevention.  This application of the principle is essential for effective risk reduction.  The 
implementation of timetable simulation tools for safety and performance modelling provides forecasts of 
failures, delays and accidents. Essential features within these tools include: 
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Train length; 
Passenger connections; 
Stabling points or depots; 
First and last dwelling points and time;  
Peak and off-peak times; 
Forecasted lost customer hours with predicted system failures/failure rates; 
Expected passenger loadings. 
Improved connectivity supplies fast information where it is needed for quick design of emergency 
timetables, which in turn reduce the possibility for overcrowding. Reduced overcrowding of platforms 
reduces significantly the likelihood of train platform accidents.  Adoption of the principle of connectivity 
of systems and networks for railway designs prior to major railway projects greatly reduces the risk of 
disruption of the railway service. 
Platform Control 1
Occupied
Platform Control 3
Platform Control 4
In/Out point
Timetabling point
 (station case)
Open/Available 
Tracks Re-route
Conflict
 
Figure 21: Simplified connectivity of timetabling points on a train network 
5.3.3 Voting System / Technology 
Voting systems on the railways are significantly applied on trackside systems by the use of complex 
microprocessors.  Railway interlocking systems for safe train operation are typical examples.  The 
interlocking systems control the signals and switches on a railway line.  
A risk reduction measure incorporating a voting system can be used to significantly reduce the probability 
of an accident by eliminating operator’s error. The fundamental functionality of voting is based on 
replicating the initial component A to n identical and independent components, each of which receives 
the same input as the original component.  The output of the voting system is usually determined by a 
majority vote of the independent signals. Even though the individual component may be associated with 
a significant probability of an error, the voting system reduces by orders of magnitude the probability of a 
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n erroneous output. This significant reduction of the probability of erroneous output (system error) 
significantly improves safety and reliability.  
The voting features for risk reduction are found in complex systems such as axle counters, on-board 
processors for train control, and field element controllers.  These systems in risk reduction applications 
are nominally developed to the highest safety integrity levels. Figure 22 provides three controls software 
platform architecture variants for generic train control systems to achieve required risk reduction.  
Application(s)
Train & Signalling 
Control Platform
Application(s)
Train & Signalling 
Control Platform
Application(s)
Train & Signalling 
Control Platform
Application(s)
Train & Signalling 
Control Platform
Application(s)
Train & Signalling 
Control Platform
Application(s)
Train & Signalling 
Control Platform
2oo3
2oo2
1oo1 or simplex  
Figure 22: Software platform architectures used for railway safety systems 
The two-out-of-three (2oo3) architecture provides a configuration for the core controls platform.  This is 
employed for high integrity safety applications to achieve both safety and fault-tolerance requirements 
by, using the majority-voting feature to effectively reduce the probability of failures.  The 2oo2 
architecture provides a lower level of safety, however a reduced low nuisance trip rate.  The 1oo1 
configuration is used for safe operation on a single channel with diversity within the controls subsystems. 
5.3.4 Reducing Sensitivity to single failures (Systems and Operations) 
Sensitivity to failure of single systems or the potential effect of single operational failures is a weakness in 
railway applications.  They also result in a chain of failures (i.e. domino-effect) and ultimately lead to 
major catastrophes such as railway accidents.  Common methodologies employed in the railway industry 
to tackle sensitive designs include: 
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 Introducing design redundancy in train control and signalling systems for reducing single failures 
which can cascade into catastrophic accidents 
 Robust isolation, screening, filtering, earthing, segregation, detection and fail-safe techniques 
against electromagnetic interference.  A ‘block/section clear signal’ is the result of a single 
system failure such as disturbance effects on line-side telecommunications or electronic circuits 
potentially cascading to an operational failure or accident.  Hill (1997) illustrates the vulnerability 
of railway systems to electromagnetic interference.  Mauriello and Clarke (1983) also provide 
predictions for severe levels of train electromagnetic interference resulting in degraded 
operations. 
 Reducing design and operational safety functionality that heavily relies on a sequence of 
operations and human interference to meet its overall risk reduction objective: e.g. Signal passed 
at danger (SPAD) incidents that may lead to accidents.   
On some railway networks, a SPAD incident currently requires a sequence of actions to make the railway 
safe.  These actions introduce significant system and human risks of failure.  A thorough review of several 
studies on SPAD brings to light some noteworthy views on the effectiveness of proposed and current 
solutions to SPAD. Evans (1996) outlines how the introduction of Automatic Train Protection (ATP) 
systems reduces the risks associated with SPADs. However the cost of implementation far outweighs its 
benefit. Davies (2000) supports this and argues that despite the relatively high frequency of SPADs, less 
that 1% of SPAD incidents result in accidents.  His study also proposes that the best solution to SPAD 
related incidents is to fit the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) at only the highest areas of risk 
within the network, rather than the European Railway Train Management System /European Train 
Control System (ETCS), which is a form of automatic train protection.  
A similar, yet different principle is “reducing the sensitivity to common cause failures”. A common cause 
failure (CCF) is the simultaneous malfunction of several elements of the system or operation triggered by 
a single source. Unlike the single failures, CCF cannot be addressed by redundancy. Where redundant 
control systems are vulnerable to CCF, system diversity is applied as an effective means of reducing risks 
from common cause failures.  Li et al (2013) considers the common cause failure of train rear-end 
collision accident using fault tree analysis. The result of the study shows the significant influence of CCF 
on the system reliability.  The minimal use of diversity in safety-critical industries appears to be driven by 
reliance on high-quality practices and procedures, nature of the applications and behaviour of the 
processes, implementation constraints such as cost and acceptability of risk (Wood, 2010). 
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An example of the effective application of system diversity through diverse programming for railway 
interlocking systems is described by Dumus et al (2011).  
5.3.5 De-rating 
De-rating is widely employed to reduce the level of operational stress significantly below its nominal 
value. This is achieved by limiting the stress (electrical, mechanical, thermal) on railway systems exposed 
to temperature and operating extremes. Derating is a form of design safety that has applications in 
railway safety-critical systems such as track de-stressing, temperature adjustments on train detector 
devices, conductor rail power adjustments and safety design adjustments due to vibration, shock and 
environmental constraints.  Its application is generally in cases where there are uncertainties regarding 
the variation in strength and load.  It can be effectively used to reduce the risk of failure of railway safety 
systems. 
 
Figure 23: Example of stress failure analysis for an electronic component – illustration of stress and strength 
de-rating 
De-rating as a preventive risk reduction feature on railway safety systems can be identified in basic 
applications such as managing temperature effects that lead to voltage imbalance in track circuits and 
position detection systems.  Shaofeng Lu (2011) illustrates the use of derating in 3kV DC railway current 
source inverters and for speed control of AC motors in railway traction systems. 
5.3.6 Simplifying Railway Safety Systems or Operations 
Simplifying systems and operations can be effectively achieved on the railways by reducing: 
 The number of systems or operations used in safety related actions  
 The systems and operational interfaces  
 Separation of safety-critical and not safety-critical systems or operations 
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The simplification of systems and operational functionality of risk reduction measures is frequently seen 
in the use of software-based systems to simplify safety application requirements.  Examples include: 
 Electro-pneumatic braking systems with with fewer components and simplified control ‘fail-safe’ 
systems, to enhance braking performance,  
 Use of moving block systems (usually level-3 ATP), substantially reducing the number of systems 
required such as line-side signals, train stops or manual (driver) interventions.   
The adoption of this principle significantly reduces bulky, complex designs and correspondingly, the 
failures associated with the complex designs and overloading of systems and railway operations. The 
introduction of new technologies as outlined does not preclude the use of other risk reduction measures 
to supplement safe operations of the railway.  The introduction of such systems will bring specific risks, 
which also require safe failure isolation techniques, working rules and procedures with adequate 
administrative controls to ensure their effective implementation.  
Other potentially overlooked applications of this preventive risk reduction principle are the introduction 
of new trains with improved seat designs to minimise passenger injuries, the simplification of platform 
and station area designs for effective security (passenger safety) and crowd control, and possibility for 
introducing more signals and warnings. 
5.3.7 Reducing Weak Links, Connections and Interfaces in Systems or Operations 
A high number of interfaces and connections invariably results in weak links in railway system designs 
and operations.  The move towards the introduction of communication-based train control systems as a 
solution in the conventional fixed block system does have its challenges.  At the system level, the primary 
risk of radio-based moving block systems is communications loss.  This loss or failure can be a result of 
component (subsystem) malfunctions, weak signal strength, electromagnetic interference or overloading 
of the vital communications unit.  Such failure does result in emergency braking. The increased frequency 
of such events leads to service delays and risk of collision. 
In practice, increasing the number of transponders, induction loops or line-side communications units 
addresses most cases of weak signal strength due to bandwidth limitations.  Another reliable solution in 
areas such as tunnels is the use of leaky feeder cables.  The effectiveness of the leaky feeder cables as a 
solution for tunnel radio-based transmission systems has to be balanced against the material, installation 
and maintenance costs.  
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Figure 24: Use of open communications systems and cyber attack 
An interlocking software system consists of four parts.  These are the tools that specify  
 Station topology data  
 Generating the interlocking logic 
 The supervising software that runs on the human–machine interface 
 The executive software runs on the computer-based interlocking controller. 
 
Figure 25: Generic Communications based train control system architecture 
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Train control systems that employ open standards for wireless communications are subject to 
communications network intrusions and hacking due to the vulnerabilities associated with open 
networks.  The greatest risk from these issues on safety critical equipment is the increased likelihood of a 
safety hazard.  Effective risk reduction is achieved by additional defensive techniques, which mitigate 
against attacks using reliable security controls for safety applications. 
Systems design and architecture that can reduce weak links in railway control systems that are used for 
safe railway functionalities is published in Druschel et al (1993); Kreitz et al. (1998). Liu et al. (1999) 
illustrate how correct protocol stacks can be configured from Ensemble’s micro-protocol components, 
and how the performance of the resulting system can be significantly improved.  In Paleska et al. (2012), 
a threat analysis is performed, identifying both safety and security hazards that may be common to all 
model-based development paradigms for safety-critical railway control systems, or specific to the 
openETCS approach.  In the original rationale for the openETCS initiative, Hase (2011) relates security 
issues observed in standard software products directly to threats expected in ETCS developments.  For 
example, the paper argues that if backdoors could be integrated into standard commercial closed source 
products, the same could happen to railway control systems software. 
5.3.7.1 Compatibility and Interoperability 
Significant interface challenges with implementing radio-based train control systems (especially as a layer 
on existing conventional systems with future migration plans) are compatibility and interoperability.  This 
is also a significant issue in complex railway systems where different operators with different train 
control systems cross paths.  The validation activity to demonstrate that this weak link has been designed 
out is heavily weighted on extensive migration and pre-operational testing.  Ebrecht and Meyer zu Hörste 
(2012) use existing test methods to prove technical as well as operational interoperability.  The stepwise 
integration of testing considers three layers for a communications-based train control system: 
 Testing to validate conformity of a single component – the on-board unit (OBU) of the European 
Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS). 
 Integration test for assemblies, the complete on-board equipment. 
 Tests for the validation of operational serviceability.  
5.3.8 Maintaining Continuity of Action and Resistive Forces 
Maintaining the continuity of motion and capability to stop a train in an emergency (on demand, 
including maintaining stopping/parking) are two primary requirements of railway operations (Section 
5.2.1).  This principle is demonstrated by the wheel-slip and wheel-slide applications.  Typically, 
specifications clearly state that a wheel/rail adhesion greater than 0.15 at any axle is required to permit 
the axle to rotate rather than slide.  Adhesion failures contribute to a significant amount of railway 
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incidents including platform overruns, SPADs, collisions and derailment accidents. Examples of adhesion 
risk reduction measures with this preventive measure include: 
Vegetation management 
Fitting of wheel slip protection or adhesion improvers (wheel-slip and wheel-slide protection 
system – WSP) 
On-board sanding and fitted sander (service brake failure) 
In most railway operations, integration of all three risk-reducing measures is employed for optimising 
adhesion.  In order to achieve the greatest benefit from adhesion management systems for risk 
reduction, there needs to be an integration of the friction coefficient with the wheel-rail management 
system such as grinding schedules used in wheel and rail maintenance.  Other primary considerations for 
effective risk management are materials, dynamics, friction, and application environment. Figure 26 
presents the factors and interactions that influence adhesion management.   
Failure Modes
Thermal Cracks
Wear
Rail rollover
RCF
Plastic Flow
Hollow wheels
Contact Mechanics Wheel-set Dynamics
Wheel/Rail Material
Friction Management
Maintenance 
Costs Down
Rail and Wheel Life 
Up
Profit Up
Spending Down
Risk Reduction
Accidents/Incidents 
Down
 
Figure 26: Adhesion risk management 
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Figure 27: Wheel/Rail friction. Extracted from Lewis & Dwyer-Joyce (2006) 
Figure 27 illustrates the contact area between a wheel and rail. The diagram highlights adhesion effects 
using slip and non-slip regions.  With increased tractive force, the slip region increases and non-slip 
decreases leading to a rolling and sliding contact.  At the saturation point, the non-slip is zero and the 
contact area is in complete slide mode.  The curve can be influenced by application of adhesion risk 
reduction measures as outlined above or by lubricants (if desired) to control friction at the rail wheel 
interface. 
 
Figure 28: Adhesion/creep (railway train friction management) – extracted from Railway train friction 
management and control system and method http://www.freepatentsonline.com/6893058.html. 14-02-12. 
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Figure 28 is a further demonstration of the wheel slip and slide studies on railway train adhesion and 
provide fundamental guidance to decision makers on applications that support risk reduction: 
 300 – Illustrates a typical adhesion creep curve 
 302 – Adhesion characteristics of dry sand that provides the highest level of adhesion for each 
level of per unit creep 
 304 – Wet sand higher level of adhesion than dry rail 
 306 – Dry rail  
 308 – Oil/lubricant rail for applications where less friction is required. Provides the least adhesion 
level 
 310 – Adhesion curve for water. This also provides improved reduced adhesion when compared 
to dry rail. 
For adhesion management schemes to work effectively, supplementary options or combinations of the 
following may be required for preventing accidents: 
 testing the brakes (run extended brake tests to assess the adhesion condition), 
 maintenance; 
 training of drivers (including enhanced monitoring of sand hoppers); 
 communications procedures for alerting control room/drivers of reduced adhesion conditions on 
the network or the particular line; 
 train release procedures, braking procedures, use of redundant and reliable braking systems; 
 inspection regimes for tracks (e.g. use of DVT vehicles); 
 control system fitted to trains to prevent locking of wheels;  
 improved prediction tools for accurate forecasting of the behaviour of a train in low adhesion 
conditions and tool must consider rail head conditioning;  
 influence of sanding and simulations of more than one vehicle; 
 signalling modifications such as extension of overlaps; 
 operational restrictions such as restrictions on the use of specific high risk junctions, sharp 
gradients and level crossings. 
5.3.9 Opposite-Effect Modifications (Introducing Modifications with Opposing Effects to 
Failure-Related Changes) 
Speed restrictions are imposed at extreme temperatures as a result of high risk of buckling. However, this 
comes at a cost to the operator. The decisions made to enforce speed restrictions are to ensure 
passenger safety.  Stressing of railway tracks is a good example of the application of forces to negate 
conditions that result in track buckling and potentially derailments.  With high-speed derailments, there 
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is a significantly increased likelihood of subsequent loss of life, direct costs of compensation, repairs, and 
loss of business.  
Rail de-stressing otherwise termed “track stressing” is used to reduce track buckling. Track buckling is 
caused by shrinking or expanding large sections of steel due to temperature variations.  Track stressing as 
a preventive risk reduction measure is generally considered a cost effective way of reducing the need for 
speed restrictions, buckling and subsequently accidents.  However, the cost of stressing a track results in 
disruptions, introduces additional welds and associated risks, heavy hydraulic tensioning equipment, 
welding equipment, and extensive labour including stressing engineers and welders.  This cost can be 
minimised by developing and implementing logical condition monitoring strategies that can direct 
stressing effort to high risk areas especially in situations of financial and budget constraints. 
 
Figure 29: Track buckling risk contributor to derailment accidents 
Current risk management strategies for reducing the risk of rail buckling and associated failures 
incorporate inspections and track stressing for effective reduction of risk and invariably, cost. Risk-based 
inspections are used for monitoring and measuring the quality of sections of track. Static checks 
undertaken by track personnel in some cases use supersonic measuring devices and dynamic checks are 
mostly executed by special track condition monitoring trains.  The use of monitoring vehicles depends on 
the frequency of use of the track section.  This varies from the legal minimum of once per year to weekly 
checks for tracks used regularly. 
The stress free temperature (SFT) of 27 degrees is the temperature at which tracks are installed in the 
UK. Chapman et al. (2008) maps the variability or rail temperature along different sections of track and 
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presents the UK railway guide for critical rail temperature values for standard track in different states 
based on overall track structure. 
 
Figure 30: Speed Restrictions and Track Condition (adapted from Dobney et al, 2010) 
The chart above indicates the reducing permitted speed imposed on the railways with increasing 
temperature for good and low-grade track conditions.  Dobney et al (2010) suggests that an improvement 
in the quality of track, track-bed and subgrade is required for challenging temperature extremes in order 
to prevent the buckles and delays that could increase in cost by 800% over seventy years.  This 
assessment only covers the cost of buckling and delays.  
Relevant discipline leaders within track, signalling, operations and maintenance ensure the stressing of 
the track, track circuitry testing and track inspections are signed off and that a certificate is issued to 
confirm that the track is ready for operational use.  This is an effective additional preventive risk-
reduction measure as a means of establishing that the track is fit for operational use. 
Other risk reduction measures that reduce derailments and effectively support the track stressing include 
training, speed restrictions, track alignments and refurbishment.  For track stressing to be cost effective 
as well as to minimise the risk of buckling, a robust track inspection strategy must include: 
Use of more accurate systems such as train mounted equipment 
Follow-up with track walks in high risk areas 
Regular meetings between track-related disciplines  
Proactive programme of track refurbishment including track stressing 
5.3.10 Operations Frequency 
The frequency of train operations on a network can be used to prevent and attenuate the impact of 
accidents such as derailment or collisions. A practical example is the introduction into service of 
additional trains to reduce overcrowding. 
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Overcrowding potentially results in passenger crushing at the station or platform; train overcrowding 
resulting in movement accidents and platform/train interface accidents.  This leads to further increased 
risks in the event of an accident, and potentially leads to health problems due to high temperatures and 
lack of ventilation.  
Supplementary measures to support effective use of the operations frequency principle in this 
application (via increased train frequency) include station emergency and congestion plans, which set out 
the point at which the station is congested and the emergency procedures to follow. As part of the 
emergency and congestion planning, station staff are trained in crowd control procedures in the event 
that the station reaches its congestion limits. It goes without saying that operational changes (in this case 
increase of train frequency) can result in additional risks. However, such risks can be avoided by ensuring 
that an adequate level of emergency planning and training is implemented. 
5.3.11 Testing (Revealing latent faults) 
Railway safety systems are designed with high safety integrity levels as a result of customer and staff 
exposure to realisation of risks.  To approve these systems for railway operations, a key requirement is 
that design safety features such as monitoring, diagnostics, alarms, trips (automatic or manual), and fail-
safe must be demonstrated. These features address potential faults and the handling of the faults within 
the system. In addition, operational testing and proof tests are predominant requirements to ensure the 
safety system’s integrity and its maintenance, so that it is not compromised by any latent faults. 
Regular reliability tests on railway systems prior to operational use are safety case requirements. They 
aim to demonstrate and verify that claims for monitoring systems, diagnostics, alarms, trips, fail-safe 
systems with high integrity are accurate for the application/operational use. The aging of systems may 
contribute to increased risk of accidents if not properly addressed. Without a preventive objective and 
programme of testing (operations and maintenance), the effectiveness of measures such as emergency 
braking systems, trip-cocks and similar safety-critical systems is jeopardised.  
Even risk reduction measures considered robust may be ineffective if they are not subject to regular 
tests. For example, in a real-life emergency situation, a train driver activated the correct side door enable 
system. However a spurious failure of the system resulted in all doors opening, exposing the passengers 
to falls, and additional risks from live conductor rails (electrocution) or being struck by trains running on 
the adjacent line. In emergencies such as these, details forgotten in planning or before operational use 
may result in additional or heightened risks. In theory, all trains have periodic testing programmed into 
the maintenance strategy. However; additional proof tests by the train driver (in this particular scenario) 
could have identified the faulty door system. 
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A reliance on carefully developed plans without a test strategy to support them is ineffective in most risk 
reduction cases. For example, an alarm plan may prove to be so complicated that in an actual crisis 
situation, it cannot be implemented correctly.  This type of scenario could result in an accident, or 
significantly aggravate one.  Complex cases of software reliability and assurance are particularly 
important considering the large amount of novel systems being introduced into the railway network. In 
order to reduce the likelihood of failures and the subsequent risk of system failures or accidents, self-
developed systems and off-the-shelf software must also undergo testing before their operational use. 
Training of users of safety critical systems, including test teams, is essential for risk reduction and the 
realisation of the full benefit of testing.    
Latent faults within a system or its operation are not always considered as relating only to physical 
systems:  a totally different route is taken by experts in human factors. 
Reason (1990, 1997) proposes that latent faults leading to accidents are in large part due to latent 
organisational conditions, effectively making the human error a 100% contributor to accidents and 
incidents. However, Young et al. (2004) whilst supportive of this factor throughout the accident sequence 
are critical of the insistence on identifying latent conditions, when active failures may have played a 
majority part.  The above discussion naturally leads to the next section on human errors that require risk 
reduction measures.  
5.3.12 Human Errors 
HSE (2007) categorises human factors as environmental, organisational and work-related factors, 
together with individual characteristics.  All or any of these may influence behaviour at work that can 
affect health and safety.  
 
Figure 31: Human Factors (adapted from HSE 2007) 
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Human errors are identifiable in every aspect of railway operations from planning, statistical analysis, 
simulations and predictions, organisational structure, design, testing, manufacture, and maintenance.  
Practical examples include errors in activating braking systems, leading to collisions; failure of 
maintenance staff to adequately assess and hand over track before a first train, leading to derailment; or 
a passenger failing to note warning signs leading to sideswipe or platform-related accidents. 
An increased likelihood of human error occurs in cases of a degraded mode of operation, where the 
safety of passenger and staff heavily depends on safety critical personnel such as train drivers, 
platform/station supervisors and line controllers.  It is also important to note that for the effective 
prevention of risks due to human error, the passenger has a significant role to play in averting accidents.  
Indeed, very considerable percentage of passenger safety relies on the passengers.  RSSB (2008) suggests 
that design is by far the cheapest and most effective way for a system or organisation to pay attention to 
or benefit from human factors.  If a system delivers exactly the results required by an organisation, it 
represents a happy convergence of user requirements, designers’ intentions and practical 
implementation. 
With this consideration, a robust management strategy for risk reduction must ensure that less effort is 
directed at modifying human nature.  Such attempts go down a long and costly road when the increased 
likelihood of resource turnover (e.g., constantly changing personnel undertaking specific tasks), is 
factored in.  If design modifications are unavailable, an alternative and effective method is to improve 
and adapt working procedures and the environment.  If combined with control measures determined by 
anticipating errors (risk assessments), results improve further. Figure 32 presents the key generic factors 
influencing the relationship between human performance and design for risk reduction. 
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   Figure 32: Design and Human Performance for risk reduction 
The human error risk-reducing capabilities of generic systems are preventive as well as protective. These 
include: 
Interlocking systems 
Containment systems 
Surveillance systems 
Personal Protective Equipment 
Work Authorisation and Permits 
Self-Assessment methodologies 
Supervision  
Regulations  
Training 
A lack of verifiable data and analysis has made the study of human factors on the railway fundamentally 
qualitative. The bulk of the analysis has been very comprehensive with its benefits.  However, the 
CENELEC (European Committee for Electro-technical Standardization) standard EN 50129 requires the use of 
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quantitative risk analysis for determining Tolerable Hazard Rates (THR). Human error probability as a 
measure of human reliability is simply estimated as: 
                  (5.1) 
Where n is the number of observed errors and N the total number of actions undertaken. 
 
Figure 33: Human effectiveness versus stress curve (adapted from De Felice et al. (2011)) 
Human influence on the safe operation of the railways is a widely studied area; there are no publications 
that showcase measures with the desired preventive risk reduction attribute.  The need to understand 
and highlight these attributes in existing and new measures is important in order to effectively utilise 
them in overall safety applications on the railways. 
Baysari et al. (2008); Gaur (2005); Hickling (2007) provide comprehensive details in support of the 
argument that human error contributes to the majority of incidents in safety critical industries including 
railway operations. In their consideration of human errors as a contributor to 70% to 90% of 
transportation related accidents, De Felice et al. (2011) propose a 5-step methodological approach to 
improving railway transport system reliability based on Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) and Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). Kumar and Sinha (2008) present a general theory of 
human errors, and stress the need to adopt optimisation in railway operations to the maximum possible 
extent and to develop a continuous monitoring system for the physical and psychological status of 
railway workers.  Feldman et al. (2008) also present an approach to improve the determination of 
appropriate human error probabilities.  Hockey and Carrigan (2003) argue that neither the railway 
industry nor the human factors field has advanced much, given the piecemeal and ad-hoc way in which 
safety problems have been approached. They regard this as a failure to develop a systematic strategy for 
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the contribution of human factors to safety research for railway operations. In a study based on 
distributed cognition principles, Busby and Hibberd (2004) reveal how organisational artefacts such as 
rules, practices and authority structures can be undermined, resulting in catastrophic failures of railway 
systems. The study reveals two patterns of failure: the first involves artefacts that support the kind of 
sense-making that people engage in. The second pattern is seen when the function of artefacts is 
undermined by the sense-making activity, or vice-versa.  
Lenoir (1993) reviews safety critical operations of train dispatchers drawing parallels between cognitive 
processes in the behaviour of the dispatchers and the ways of working shown by test subjects in complex 
problem solving experiments.  Lenoir discovered that dispatchers tend not to plan ahead as a result of 
railway network complexity and the frequency of change.  The dispatchers’ reactive method reduced the 
effectiveness of risk reduction measures and also highlighted the challenges of managing information 
flow within the railways, resulting in delays, inefficiency and accidents. 
Van Welie and Van Der Veer (2003), Stanton et al (2005) and Kirwan (1992) all provide further insight into 
the functionalities and uses of standard human reliability methods such as Human Risk Assessment 
(HRA), and Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP).  Results from these techniques are used 
as input in Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRA).  However, their use on the railways for quantifying 
human reliability are fundamentally flawed as they focus on quantification for performance success and 
failure, and pay less attention to in-depth causes  of observable human behaviour.  These techniques do 
not consider cognitive processes in this area and are therefore unable to appropriately evaluate the 
triggers in human negligence or misconduct that result in accidents. 
Baysari et al. (2008) considers frequent errors causing rail accidents and notes that accurate identification 
can lead to the development of appropriate prevention and/or mitigation strategies.  Two tools for error 
identification were reviewed.  The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) analysis 
indicated that lapses of attention (i.e.  ‘skill-based errors’) were the most common ‘unsafe acts’ with 
drivers.  The Technique for Retrospective Analysis of Cognitive Errors (TRACEr-rail) analysis indicated that 
most ‘train driving errors’ were ‘violations’ while most ‘train stopping errors’ were ‘errors of perception’.  
Both tools identified the underlying factors, with the major causes of driver error to be: 
 Decreased alertness and  
 Incorrect driver expectations/assumptions about upcoming information. 
Overall, both tools proved useful in categorising driver errors from existing investigation reports. 
However, each tool appeared to neglect some important and differing factors associated with error 
occurrence.  Both tools were found to possess only moderate inter-rated reliability.  The reviewers 
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recommended that the tools be modified, or a new tool be developed, for complete and consistent error 
classification. 
RSSB (2008) acts as a guide for understanding human factors affecting the railway industry and provides a 
poignant example associated with use of the ‘Automatic Warning System’. This is installed on all 
passenger trains in the UK, and exemplifies a system that was not designed with the limitations of human 
attentiveness in mind.  It is a device fitted in the train cab, based on the now obsolete mechanical system 
of signalling that used to indicate either STOP or PROCEED.  It sounds a bell when a clear (green) signal is 
passed or a buzzer when caution or danger is signalled.  The AWS is a useful safety system when the press 
of a button does not acknowledge the buzzer, for then the train begins to stop automatically.  However, 
times have changed since it was designed. With today’s heavy commuter traffic, most signals will be at 
the ‘caution’ aspect, and given the frequency of signals (spaced 1km apart), most drivers will face two 
signals per minute.  Since people ‘automate’ highly repetitive behaviour, drivers may lose focus on the 
need for carrying out this repetitive task, and act by reflex whenever the buzzer sounds.  The end result is 
that drivers often hear the buzzer and press the button automatically without thinking about train speed 
and location. 
5.3.13 Separating of Hazards and Triggers 
Platform Edge Doors (PEDs) are used to isolate passengers on a platform from the track and is a very 
effective measure for reducing the frequency of platform-related accidents. PEDs can be effectively used 
to establish a ‘protected platform area’ and are effective for protecting against the escalation of platform 
incidents such as track fires.  In most risk analysis and cost effectiveness studies, this last type of event is 
frequently neglected, resulting in the inaccurate selection of measures for reducing such platform-related 
incidents. PEDs are essentially dual as they are also largely applied to the preventive risk reduction of 
grave incidents such as suicides and murders, or when passengers fall onto the track, and for reducing 
the risk of accidents when trains are passing through a station at high speeds.  PEDs are expensive 
measures and have rarely been considered on platforms until recently. To enhance the application of 
knowledge and thus cost effective implementations, the protective attributes, i.e. the benefits and 
effectiveness of PEDs for risk reduction, must be understood.  To this end, these are more fully explored 
in subsequent sections of this chapter.  
The train movement authority as another example of separating a train from another moving train is 
used to enforce a minimum distance between trains via the train control system. This method of 
preventive risk reduction through automatic train control systems ensures safety as well as improved 
train availability as more trains are permitted to run on the network 
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The signal overlaps, flank protection and trapping are designed into the railway network to control the 
risk of collision between an authorised train movement and a signal passed at danger movement. The 
signal overlaps are distances beyond a stop signal which must be clear or locked before the stop signal 
preceding the signal being passed can display a proceed aspect. The signal overlap is calculated and 
designed into the railway network to avoid the areas of conflict. The a areas of conflict in basic terms are 
the hazards i.e. the section of the railway line ahead of a signal at danger on which a head-on collision, 
same direction converging collision with another legitimately positioned train (moving or stationary) 
could occur in the event that of a SPAD. The flank protection separates or redirects a moving train (the 
hazard or trigger to an accident) from a route or overlap that has been set for an authorised train 
movement.  Trap points are preventive risk reduction measures built into the exits from converging lines 
to derail an unauthorised train movement making train movement on adjacent running lines safe to 
continue operations. The Ladbroke Grove rail crash was a direct consequence of the failure of effective 
use of the signalling system complete with signal overlaps. The debate on the cost effectiveness of the 
signalling system at the time of the crash against the introduction of Automatic Train Protection systems 
(Automatic Train Operation and Control) was as a result of the mismatch between public opinion and the 
results of the ATP cost-benefit analysis.  This accident, ensuing debates and inquiry was discussed in 
detail in Chapters 2 and 3. 
5.4 Removed Risk Associated with the Separate Preventive Methods 
From an extensive study of some UK internal organisation’s operational risk assessments and safety 
cases, a selection of the risk contributors with the most impact on the railway risk profile is presented in 
this section. The different risk reduction measures evaluated for Derailment, Collision between Trains 
and Platform Train Incidents are set out in Table 13, 14 and 15.  
Table 13: Preventive Risk Reduction Measures – Collision Between Trains 
Preventive Risk Reduction Measures Risk Contributor (Collision Between Trains) 
Improve braking systems Brake trigger system failure 
Replacement of brake controllers 
Renewal of brake valves 
Additional testing and inspection - to improve test and inspection 
regimes (specifically brake systems) prior to deployment 
Introduction of alternative / automatic braking systems to improve 
availability of braking systems 
Introduction of brake failure alarms or detection systems 
EMC studies, monitoring interference levels  Train Slow or Stopped 
Traction system renewal/refurbishment 
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Preventive Risk Reduction Measures Risk Contributor (Collision Between Trains) 
Improvement of processes/procedures (including driver training) 
Further/enhanced/additional operational railway testing prior to 
operations on live track 
Improve testing and maintenance regime for trainstop, parking brakes 
for all stabling points 
Train Runs Away 
Enhanced testing and maintenance regime for spring applied parking 
brakes to eliminate/reduce WSF of the spring applied parking brakes 
Relocation of stabling points - from downslope locations 
SCAT system inspected/tested prior to train leaving the depot - 
improved SCAT inspection and testing regime 
SCAT Failure 
Modification of train movement procedures and driver training - 
improved additional training and driver behavioural 
studies/assessments 
Wrong Direction 
Extensive sighting studies to identify potential sighting problems 
Modification of signalling in line with sighting constraints 
Change to single stopping positions 
Introduction and use of in-cab CCTV eliminating/reducing other person 
induced constraints on stopping positions 
Introducing train stops in areas where they are currently absent 
Additional supervision to check the aspect prior to the reverse 
movement 
Track re-alignment to gauge (focus on track stressing & effects of 
weather) on embankment and structures 
Side Swipe 
Speed restrictions - side swipe 
Driver training - braking techniques Service Brake Failure 
Notices on slippery routes 
Alarm/Audible warning of service brake failure prior to brake demand 
Berth track diversity Signal WSF 
Speed restriction - Compromised overlaps Compromised Overlap 
Overlap studies and potential extension of overlaps  
Enhance braking performance (See ‘Improved braking system’ above) 
Studies on effect of power in trains (especially for the introduction of 
new trains) and potentially driver training on specific areas of 
compromised overlaps (controlling trains - traction power management)    
Train speed restrictions - likely SPAD locations (Signal Sighting) 
Increased overlap in the design of the signalling system - extension of 
overlaps 
Poor Wheel/Rail Friction 
Introduction of weather forecasting/predictive systems such as ACAT 
Water jetting and sandite 
Procedures (also covering changes to operational concept) and 
subsequent driver and relevant railway driver training 
Tripcock positions to be re-examined and potential relocation/re- Driver Passed Signal at Danger (SPAD) 
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Preventive Risk Reduction Measures Risk Contributor (Collision Between Trains) 
installation 
Extend operational testing prior to service for tripcocks, arrestors and 
SPAD control systems  
Driver training - additional procedures to support drivers (SPAD) 
ATC system introduction 
New/enhanced interlocking system - route locking system 
Introduction of automatic signalling systems - minimisation of human 
error 
TPWS Train Protection and Warning System 
Modify signalling to align with sighting constraints 
Additional testing and inspection of wheels and rail (NDT) 
Extend overlaps Emergency Brakes fail to function 
Additional testing of brakes to determine if brakes are isolated 
Introduction of enhanced braking system - eliminate scenarios where 
emergency brake signals fail to transmit to brakes (same as ‘improved 
braking’ ) 
Training for maintenance and test teams  
Additional operational testing and inclusion in regime for rigorous asset 
acceptance/approval  
Rewiring/refurbishment of existing communications/radio systems Delayed communications due to train radio system 
Better communication between train drivers and line controllers - 
communications procedure/driver and line controller training 
Update communication procedure and related procedures for drivers 
and line controllers 
Modify the train traction system e.g. filters, ICMU (interference Current 
Monitoring Unit) 
Traction power or track circuit of adjacent line not 
indication occupied or showing shorted by derailed train 
Extended overlap Wrong direction train movement due to signal operator, 
driver error 
Additional procedures and subsequently, Driver and Signal Operator 
training - observation that wrong route is set prior to proceeding past 
signal 
Collision with another train subsequent to a collision 
Points machine failure - new/enhanced point machines with ‘route 
holding diversity’ 
 
Table 14: Preventive Risk Reduction Measures – Platform Train Incidents 
Preventive Risk Reduction Measures Risk Contributor  
(Platform Train Incidents – Platform only) 
Station Master/personnel training Crowded platform inhibiting driver’s view (crowding) 
Increased train frequency - more trains to cater for peak times/special events 
such as football matches 
Painted line warnings/signage 
Improve platform lighting 
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
125 
 
Preventive Risk Reduction Measures Risk Contributor  
(Platform Train Incidents – Platform only) 
Built-in access and egress from incident site  
Replacement of door dampeners (design options) Door dampener fault – door closing with excessive 
force 
Replacement of entire train door units 
Improve inspection, testing and maintenance regimes for doors prior to train 
release 
Redesign/rebuild platform (per platform) Passenger falls from platform 
Improve surfaces on platforms and footbridges 
Introduce/improve reporting arrangements of station defects 
Gap fillers 
Crowd control – emergency and incident plans, barrier control 
Platform barriers 
Introduction of new trains to reduce overcrowding (See also more trains to 
cater for increased traffic above) 
Passenger falls between cars 
Introduction of new trains with open walkthrough between cars - no doors 
between cars 
Additional platform warnings/signage Person pushed from platform 
Platform Edge Doors (half length) Passenger strikes/falls against train 
Platform Edge Doors (full length) 
Ventilation system in summer (subsurface) 
Additional station area lighting 
Stair-nose markings 
Speed restrictions Trespass on track in station area 
Fencing 
Provision of staff at some locations, specifically to watch for people loitering 
on platforms 
Closure of access to unused platforms or platform areas  
Table 15: Preventive Risk Reduction Measures – Derailment 
Preventive Risk Reduction Measures Risk Contributor (Derailment) 
Inspection and maintenance of suspension to prevent incorrectly gauged 
suspensions in the depot prior to train deployment 
Suspension failure (per train) 
Improve inspection, testing and maintenance regime for detection of wheel 
flat and worn wheel failures 
Defective Wheel 
Additional training for route setting personnel 
Speed restrictions Excessive speed  
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Preventive Risk Reduction Measures Risk Contributor (Derailment) 
Optimising cab design for driver protection in a collision 
Traction/power assessment - introduction of systems such as surge arrestors, 
current limiters etc. 
Master controller installed in driver's cab for the driver to reduce or apply 
power to train 
Review of operational concept/procedures for ‘proceed under rule’  Proceed under rule 
Inspection and maintenance of shoe-gear prior to deployment 
Review programme for structural assessments/surveys - potentially more 
surveys/assessments introduced to existing programme 
Train falls down an embankment or bridge after a 
fast derailment 
Programme for assessment and management of workload for train drivers, 
line controllers, signallers and safety-critical staff  
Improve inspection and testing of fish-plated joints - track  
Replacement of fish-plated joints 
EMC studies on trains compatibility with track/signals - monitor interference 
levels, identification and introduction of relevant immunisation/earthing 
solutions and potentially further operational railway testing  
Tripcock fails to activate brakes 
Introduce training and competence management schemes for train crew 
Un-obstructive monitoring of drivers and train despatch and subsequent 
modifications/amendments to despatch rules. Rules for train despatch 
reviewed/simplified; (procedural change and subsequently, driver training on 
new despatch rules) 
Improved management processes for train recovery  
Introduction of sequential systems of various kinds such as axle counters and 
other position detector systems etc, (in addition to track circuits to provide 
redundancy & diversity) 
Loss of train detection – Train fails to shunt track 
circuit 
Replacement of track circuits 
Enhanced maintenance/testing such as detailed observation of the track 
circuit operation and readjustment of the track circuit (operating voltages) 
Review and improvement of recruitment and selection processes 
Examining supervision and monitoring guidelines for operational safety staff, 
including shunters 
Track re-alignment to gauge (focus on track stressing & effects) Track buckling and Side Swipe 
Track inspections - track vehicles 
Track inspections - track workers 
Track refurbishment/renewals (including sleeper management programme to 
reduce gauge spread) 
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Preventive Risk Reduction Measures Risk Contributor (Derailment) 
Track and conductor rail alignment  Shoe caught under the conductor rail 
5.5 Costs Associated with Implementing the Separate Preventive Risk 
Reduction Methods 
The magnitude of removed risk is a significant part of the selection criteria but the cost considerations 
are another key element. Costs generally correlate with the magnitude of removed risk achieved. The 
cost factor influencing the measure’s selection is typically a consideration of all measures, including 
potential alternatives. In some cost effectiveness studies, these are also based on performance factors 
such as the accident effect on timetables and delays in introducing a new technology. It follows, then, 
that the risk reduction attained from applying individual measures to specific applications is evaluated by 
assessing the accident costs and the cost of implementation.   
The worksheet for Collision Between Trains presented in the Appendix uses data from previous internal 
railway economics and safety studies.  As far as practicable, the data sets contain information that can 
support the risk reduction measures selection study. However, this work is primarily for demonstrations 
of how effectively the risk reducing measures can be used when faced with several choices of varying risk 
reduction capabilities. 
In practice, all factors influencing the operation of a safe railway must be considered. Where this is not 
possible, a reasonable and balanced method for assessing effects of implementing the risk reduction 
measure is taken into account.  Cost effectiveness studies (discussed in previous chapters) that are 
undertaken on the railways use similar information to the data provided in assessments of the net cost to 
operations and performance of the railways. The costs considered include: 
 Capital cost and installation cost;  
 Changes in on-going operating costs, e.g., maintenance or staff costs; 
 Operational benefits - revenue from increased usage as a result of passenger benefits; 
 Societal benefit associated with reduction in accidents; 
 Potential costs associated with misuse of the safety systems such as passenger error with 
emergency plungers leading to delays. 
The conventional methods of representing the benefits from implementing any of the risk reduction 
measures is quantified and presented in monetary (cost) units. This representation follows with the 
simplified rationalisation of the risk reduction effort as the evaluation of the likelihood (probability) of 
avoiding or averting an accident.   
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The accurate assessment of the effectiveness of each preventive risk reduction measure under 
consideration is based on a thorough review of databases and internal company literature on safety 
studies and subsequent cost-benefit analysis.  The under-reporting of accidents or incidents generates 
loss of accuracy in prioritising railway accidents for subsequent estimations of the economic benefits 
from risk reduction.  A fundamental requirement for assessing accident costs and benefits of a large 
number of risk reduction measures is to ensure that all measures are compared on equal premises. 
In order to reduce the effect of underestimation or non-reporting, equivalent fatalities are built into 
accident analysis. This has been comprehensively presented in Chapter 2. Incidents on railways are 
categorised as  
 Fatality is considered 100% equivalent fatality 
 Major injury is considered 10% equivalent fatality  
 Minor injury is considered 1% equivalent fatality 
The data set only provides information on actual accident risks and risk reduction with associated costs of 
implementing the risk reduction measures, i.e. capital, installation and maintenance costs for the 
operational time/duration. The key assumptions used for this evaluation include an operational time of 
10 years and the incorporating of a discount rate of 5%.  The latter is employed to demonstrate the flow 
of costs and risk reduction. The future values calculated help illustrate in present terms that a cost-
effective risk reduction is attained from the introduction of the risk reduction measure. 
Accident costs are estimated based on standard unit costs for accidents.  The risk reductions achieved by 
the various measures are then compared to the cost of implementation.  The challenge is that the costs 
of implementing the risk reduction measures are typically expressed in monetary terms.  However, the 
risk reduction (reduced fatalities and injuries) are not conventional ‘traded goods’ and they do not have 
direct monetary values. 
In order to express the accident risk reduction in monetary value for subsequent effectiveness 
assessment, the reduced risk of particular contributions to an accident, for example, derailment is 
estimated using the value of preventing a fatality (VPF) for 2010.  This is approximated as £1.7 million.  
Additionally, it is worth noting that the cost of the risk reduction measures decreases over time, 
potentially making present and least cost-effective measures cost-effective in the future. 
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Figure 34: Application of preventive risk reduction measures – PTI 
Figure 34 illustrates the extent of current investments in line with the ALARP requirements. However, the 
‘Passenger Fall’ risks and current cost benefit practice, the charts indicate that the cost of 
implementation exceeds 3 times the benefit.  Risk reduction measures such as platform barriers, gap 
fillers, improving surfaces or redesigning platform with risk reduction considerations are all considerably 
capital intensive when compared to the risk reduction benefit possible. In evaluating this particular risk, 
most projects tend to centre the cost effectiveness case on other cheaper but less effective measures by 
using the ALARP framework to introduce measures such as crowd control, stair-nose markings and 
additional platform staff. 
 
Figure 35: Application of preventive risk reduction measures – Collision Between Trains 
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Figure 35 presents the disparity between SPADs and low risks such as slow train movement, SCAT failures 
and runaway trains. All of these risks contribute to Collision Between Train accidents. This chart clearly 
indicates that the current risk reduction measures for ‘brake failure’ and ‘wheel/rail interface’ provide a 
great amount of risk reduction for their costs. On the other hand, the cost of implementing measures to 
reduce ‘Signal Wrong-side failures (WSF)’ is typically over the factor of 3 considered during cost benefit 
ALARP studies.  
 
Figure 36: Application of preventive risk reduction measures - Derailment 
Slightly different from the previous charts, Figure 36 shows the need for capital-intensive measures to 
reduce the risks introduced by contributors to the Derailment accident type. The figures demonstrate the 
need for a structured method for optimising cost and risk reduction measures.  
5.6 Constraints and Considerations in Selecting Preventive Risk-reduction 
Measures 
The core principles guiding the selection of preventive risk reducing measures generally ensure that 
accidents are avoided, that there is reduced impact on failure, reduced vulnerability, and increased 
resilience. 
The current practice of selecting risk reduction measures by simply prioritising based on the estimated 
(quantified) risk reduction and the imposition of the preventive-first principle is misleading and 
potentially counter-productive. Without consideration of the consequences in the event of the accident, 
this further exposes railway operations to major incidents and fatalities or unnecessarily increases the 
cost of the risk reduction measures by costing expensive measures for accidents with small impact.  The 
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examples presented here also show that two options with similar estimated risk reduction will not only 
have different costs but will also be suitable for certain applications and not to others.  
The constraint of applying measures for particular risks therefore depends on a thorough understanding 
of the accident; all possible scenarios that could lead to the accident including the contributors to the 
accident; the impact of the accident and potential measures to reduce the accident to ALARP.  This effort 
demonstrates that the effectiveness of the risk reduction measure selected must be based on a thorough 
understanding of the primary functionalities (attributes and limitations) of all measures within the 
application.  This in effect means that we have failed to achieve the estimated magnitude of risk 
reduction by simply selecting the cheapest measure or the one with the highest benefit-cost ratio.   
Preventive risk reduction measures are effective in areas where the intervention subsequent to an 
accident is difficult: restricted access areas such as tunnels/tunnel railways, as is the case with London 
Underground (with both underground and sub-surface lines), Glasgow underground metro, or the 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link. In such cases, the selection of a protective risk reduction measures over a 
preventive measure must incorporate additional factors and associated costs such as: 
 Access and egress requirements 
 Hand-back of line section 
 Training and availability of emergency services for special scenarios such as restricted access 
 Track-side safe areas designed and constructed into the railways 
 Tunnel telephones, alarms 
 Emergency lighting and signs 
 Ventilation for tunnels  
The risk assessment of the railway must be based on a benchmark railway risk reduction target for the 
existing infrastructure.  In practice, most contractual railway risk reduction requirements clearly state 
that the introduction of risk reduction measures must at least, maintain the existing risk level of the 
operational railway.  This invariably means that the relevant interfaces associated with a railway will have 
to be assessed to ensure that the risk level is at least maintained, following implementation of these 
measures.  This implies that the implementation of a preventive risk reduction measure must consider its 
impact on the specific risk but also on all other systems, interfaces and activities so as not to affect the 
performance and safety of the railway.  This is a major challenge when evaluating and managing railway 
risks.  However, it is important that a holistic methodology is considered.   
Selecting effective preventive risk reduction measures is dependent on historical data and an analysis of 
the improvements required to meet specified targets. However, accurate forecasting of future risk is 
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often fraught with uncertainty.   There may be variations in train lengths, operational rule changes, 
introduction of new technologies/systems with associated risks, considerations of the number of 
passengers, number of trains and traffic growth, additional line sections, points, stabling lines/depots, 
platform or station staff issues, and so on. Such factors influence accident or fatality rates which may 
invalidate the preventive risk reduction measure(s) subsequently.   
As discussed in Section 5.3, such an analysis only focuses on the preventive risk reduction measures that 
reduce accidents with associated fatalities and injuries (equivalent fatality ratings).  Other key 
components of a conventional economic assessment such as performance related factors are not 
incorporated.  The scope of the work deliberately omits assessment of effects, for example, the 
distribution of the consequence of an accident on the operational railways following an accident.  The 
extent to which the distribution of accidents is presented is in the assessment of the ‘collision after a 
collision’ risk contributor to the Collision Between Train accidents.  This in itself is insufficient for a 
thorough consideration of performance and potential ripple effects such as the consequences of delays 
leading to overcrowding following an accident.  
However, the comprehensive evaluation of risk contributors and risk scenarios is a key requirement in 
identifying the preventive measures. It is a major challenge in itself.  Establishing credible accident 
scenarios requires a good knowledge of major accident risks on operational railways.  Brainstorming 
sessions on hazard identification sessions with experienced industry personnel are valuable.  The illusion 
of absoluteness can result in a level of uncertainty that can undermine the case for risk reduction.  
Considering that the ‘prevent-first’ principle is typically employed, an assessment gradually builds in high 
levels of uncertainty - a major weakness in the overall risk management process. 
Data limitations also affect the accuracy of the evaluation of preventive risk reduction measures.  It is 
therefore important that qualitative means to reduce the impact of the inevitable inaccuracy of data are 
developed.   
Preventive risk reduction measures may not be relevant or effective when acting to address well 
understood hazards or accident scenarios such as ‘crowded platform inhibiting driver’s view’.  Typical 
preventive risk reducing measures,  such as platform barrier designs, CCTV in the cab and on the 
platform; extensions to platforms; introduction of longer trains with associated platform modifications; 
platform edge doors (half or full length),  are undeniably expensive and require long-term planning and 
disruption/delays to put them in place. 
In such cases, consideration must be given to a cost effective solution with substantial risk reduction, 
such as procedural approaches.  These approaches with impact-reducing attributes, such as ‘emergency 
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timetables’ allow for the increase or decrease in the number of trains in service.  Emergency timetables 
are used to ensure appropriate localisation of any accident on the railways or to relieve the railway from 
other potential contributory factors to accidents such as overcrowding, system failure, disruptions and 
delays.  Other measures to be considered are additional staff presence on platforms; physical constraints 
on platform access, in combination with crowd control procedures, and more training in reducing the 
accident scenario.  
As mentioned in previous chapters, e.g. Section 2.5 and subsequent sections, it is obvious that training, 
monitoring and supervision are essential for the effective implementation of preventive/risk reduction 
measures.  A typical example is the stressing of track against buckling.  This can only be effective if 
training on buckling and stressing is provided for track engineers. Drivers must also be trained on actions 
to prevent incidents such as identification and reporting of track misalignments.  In addition, the 
monitoring of weather and track movements, and subsequent supervision,   developing a structured track 
maintenance programme, is required to achieve optimum standards  
The success of accurate prediction and prevention of major accident risks requires that the root causes of 
failures be addressed, whether they are organisational weaknesses, poor management systems or 
culture.  At present, the relationship between selection, implementation, and the environment/structure 
for ensuring that the risk reduction measure is adequately applied is rarely considered.  It is however a 
standard requirement for developing a safety case: this is a demonstration that the risk reduction 
measures are efficiently managed through the life of the project or system. However, analyses of 
preventive risk reduction methods employed are typically relegated only to basic cost effectiveness 
studies. 
The current practice of risk reduction selection fails to account for how one measure affects others - an 
essential factor for the decision-maker.  These and other constraints illustrate that assessing preventive 
risk reduction measures alone derails the effort for accident reduction. The identification and subsequent 
selection of risk reduction measures must be supplemented by additional information on the 
functionalities or capabilities of all other possible measures, before embarking on a comprehensive and 
structured selection process.   
Preventive risk reduction measures, conventionally used as a priority to eliminate or reduce the 
likelihood of an accident, may result in additional risks that have to be balanced by additional measures 
whether preventive or protective.  The risk reduction achieved by measures proposed for reducing 
particular risks or accident scenarios must be tempered with the realities of their application.  For 
example, dry sand as a preventive risk reduction measure can be effectively used to improve rail/wheel 
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friction but the application must be controlled to ensure that the sand does not build up an insulating 
layer on the rail/wheel surface.  This likelihood should be factored into the estimated risk reduction. The 
use of axle counters which is also a preventive risk reduction measure as a replacement for track circuits 
has its limitations.  It is misleading to claim 100% effectiveness as the axle counter cannot reliably detect 
all wheel sizes from some trains. 
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Chapter 6 Protective Principles and Techniques for Reducing the 
Risk in the Railway Industry 
As a result of technological advances such as improved signalling systems, train control systems etc., 
together with system user training/awareness and other efforts towards preventing the risks of accidents 
(Chapter 5), major railway accidents are becoming less frequent. However, the potential for incidents and 
major accidents - still exists. This was demonstrated in recent accidents in China and Spain where several 
lives were lost both at the site and subsequent to the event.  Protective risk reduction measures are 
applied to reduce the consequences or cost of an event/accident. 
The correct choice of protective measures ensures that fewer fatalities and injuries are realised:  for 
example, the introduction of crash-worthy vehicles significantly reduces the risk to passengers in events 
such as impact, falls from trains (non-sensitive, slam doors on moving trains), passengers getting caught 
between train doors, the opening of wrong side doors, etc. Various protective measures are considered 
in this chapter, in order to provide a comprehensive assessment and structured thought on the 
application of protective risk reduction measures on the railways. 
In line with the overall objective of maximising risk reduction within a fixed budget, this chapter offers an 
essential understanding of the characteristics of protective risk reduction measures by using the basic 
principles of risk reduction through reducing the consequences from risks which materialised. This 
understanding will provide the clarity required within the industry on measures for reducing the 
consequences of an accident, and their relationship with other measures for cost-effective risk reduction. 
The foundation for selecting protective measures that comprehensively support the case for maximum 
risk reduction is developed in the following subsections. 
6.1 Protective Risk Reduction Requirements, Principles and Systems 
Railway risk reduction requirements identified in most railway operational safety cases are presented in 
Section 5.2.1. It is worth noting that a thorough evaluation of these safety cases showed a heavy reliance 
on preventive risk reduction measures demonstrating that minimal effort is put towards assessing the 
impact of protective measures on risks. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, accidents cannot be 
totally prevented as risks exist and undoubtedly propagate quickly if controls are not incorporated in 
system design and operations. Furthermore, protective measures are necessary for the simple reason 
that not all possible risks can be identified. In this case, the only barrier reducing serious consequences is 
the protective barrier. 
Effective protective measures for risk reduction contribute to achieving the control of major accident 
hazards. They are reactive measures and do not prevent accidents from occurring. However, if applied 
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
136 
 
correctly, they can significantly reduce the consequences of an accident by limiting their development, 
magnitude and duration. 
In the absence of well-defined and fixed primary protective requirements on the railways, this section 
summarises the case that systems with protective features must be designed, manufactured, constructed 
and maintained.  It is argued that as far as is reasonably practicable, they should minimise the risks of 
escalation following an accident under normal and abnormal operating conditions or when such 
operations are subjected to malicious acts.  
6.2 Application of Protective Risk Reduction Principles  
The basic risk reduction principles, i.e., relationship to fundamental railway risk reduction (safety) 
requirements and associated applications in the railways, are presented here. Figure 37 provides a simple 
illustration of 12 key protective risk reduction principles (Weli and Todinov, 2013a). 
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Figure 37: Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
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6.2.1 Protective Barriers 
The use of such barriers on the railways has typically been classified as physical or non-physical for 
prevention or mitigation, protection or management, of undesired accidents.  This basic understanding 
helps to provide a platform for developing protective barriers. However, a more detailed analysis would 
be required for the appropriate application of safety barriers in specific cases, such as collision, 
derailment and platform train incidents where protection plays a significant role after such an event.  
In the process industry, where protection also plays an extensive role in risk reduction, studies have been 
undertaken to reduce the ambiguity of protective barriers and their applications.  Sklet (2006) attempts 
to develop common terminology, classification and attributes to enhance the understanding of the 
concept and performance of safety barriers. The study narrows down so-called safety barriers to a 
description of their condition, functionality, reliability, response time and robustness.  
Todinov (2007) uses the release of a toxic substance to demonstrate that the effectiveness of protective 
barrier measures is dependent on a combination of a number of barriers, i.e., passive physical, active 
physical, immaterial, individual/ organised human action, and recovery barriers.  Harms-Ringdahl (2009) 
also provides a method for identifying improvements due to the application of safety barriers by 
proposing the integration of technical, organisational and human functions. 
The combination of the studies for classifying and applying protective barriers in line with the objective of 
this work considers that for a protective barrier to be effective, the following must be fundamental 
requirements: 
 Comprehensive understanding of specific risks and their impacts 
 Function and scope of the barrier – what can practically be achieved with the protective barrier 
 Operational constraints 
 Complementary measures - additional systems, processes etc., to meet risk reduction objectives 
6.2.1.1 Passive Protection Barriers 
Implementation of passive protective barriers on the railways requires the use of separation 
mechanisms, techniques, or materials to isolate the accident from the target.  A good example of a 
passive protective feature is the use of thermal barriers such as passive fire protection systems to reduce 
the risk of fire escalation.  
The introduction of thermal barriers for tunnel railways such as London Underground was in response to 
major accidents such as the King’s Cross Station fire. This technology, transferred from the petrochemical 
sector, is spray-applied or designed into concrete and steel structures as effective resistance to heat.  This 
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risk reduction measure ensures that in the event of a fire, the safety of passengers is improved by 
extending the period of full operations.  In order to achieve this, the integrity of the tunnel structure has 
to be maintained until the passengers are delivered to safety. .  
Stabling track areas are effective means of isolating trains and passengers from escalating accidents on a 
network. Following an accident on a line, the risk of a follow-on accident or exposure to an already 
escalating accident can be significantly reduced. 
Visual and tactile warnings such as safety zones or stair-nose markings are commonly used along 
platform edges, depending on the speed of a train for the particular platform or line section, and/or 
giving protection against the aerodynamic force of a train or slipstream effect of a passing train.  
Similarly, passenger information systems provide regular updates on the state of operations within the 
platform and, on the railways, provide the passenger with information on actions following an accident.  
This intangible risk reduction measure will not fall into the standard categorisation of physical barriers, as 
in current standard classification. 
The effectiveness of these protective barriers depends significantly on human contribution, as in effective 
platform supervision. 
6.2.1.2 Active Protection Barriers 
Active protective barriers are mechanisms for reducing the consequences of failure by triggering (manual 
or automatic) protective systems. 
The operation of emergency braking in conventional signalling systems is a good example of an active 
protective barrier system.  Trainstops operate a tripcock in a raised position to trigger the brake valve and 
activate Emergency Braking (EB). This is an example of an active protective barrier against further 
incidents following a SPAD. 
In the event of an accident on the railway, risk reduction can be achieved by de-energising traction power 
for the affected areas to permit the safe detrainment of passengers.  This is a fundamental feature in any 
railway system: the active de-energising of power is paramount in the event of an incident or accident, 
and an absolute requirement for tunnel railways.  
After a derailment or collision, the activation of Correct Side Door Enable (CSDE) systems provides a 
means of restricting the passenger to the safe doors. 
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6.2.2 Damage Arrestors 
Automatic de-energising or isolation to trip systems can successfully reduce the escalation of a failure, 
e.g. over-voltage protection systems. The effect of incidents such as pantograph arcing, induced 
switching surges from AC systems, short circuits, insulation flashovers, trespass and damage can be 
further reduced if the application of the ‘damage arrestor’ principle is employed by the use of over-
voltage protection and isolation measures. 
Derailments have been known to result from the shunting of adjacent tracks, thereby energising the train 
and track. Isolation and de-energisation techniques and systems ensure that the affected derailment or 
collision sections and their adjacent sections are automatically de-energised, to eliminate the risk of 
electrocution. 
Other measures with this application for risk reduction in the railway industry include flame arresters, 
and stations and central control facilities designed for structural integrity, with growing requirements for 
explosion and fire containment features.   
6.2.3 Blocking Pathways through which Accidents Escalate 
After an accident such as a derailment or collision, a secondary accident can potentially increase the 
severity of the first.  The potential for a second accident scenario on the railways means that the 
passenger is exposed to additional safety risks.  For passengers remaining on the initial accident train, the 
increased risks are: 
 Train hit by a second train 
 Fire escalation 
 Collapse of structures 
For passengers evacuating the accident train, the compounding risks are: 
 Crushing or stampede as a result of evacuation chaos 
 Electrocution of passengers by conductor or power rails (traction power) 
 Passengers struck by passing train 
The principle of blocking routes for accident escalation (i.e. accident after an accident) is an efficient 
method of limiting such consequences. This can be achieved by various applications, and/or various 
individual/combination of risk reducing measures, to attain the operational safety targets. 
Most emergency stopping or braking systems used on the railways, when activated, prevent further 
propagation of an accident or the effect of an accident.  Examples include the operation of Emergency 
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Braking (EB) through activation of Tripcocks and the use of Platform Emergency Stop Plungers (PESP) on 
platforms in order to stop a train approaching a platform.  Other frequently used risk reduction measures 
with similar attributes to block pathways to accident escalation are: crowd control; automatic signalling 
systems with automatic inhibit functions for reducing human errors during an accident; route locking 
systems; buffer stops; fencing or restrictions to the access to an incident; platform edge doors (half and 
full length); closure of unused platforms or platforms areas; gap fillers; improved door control 
mechanisms such as selective door operations; emergency lighting, clear paths or signs to emergency 
exits within trains in the event of an accident; and lastly the de-energising of power for the route or line 
section. 
System operational features on trains such as selective door operation, or correct-side door enable, are 
risk reduction measures normally used as preventive risk reduction measures at short-length platforms. 
However, the systems also have enhanced protective features for blocking paths to the escalation of an 
accident.  
 
Figure 38: Platform Train Interface – Door selection for risk reduction 
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Figure 39: Selective Door Operation (SDO) system for Risk Reduction 
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The selective door operation feature on trains involves the opening of some doors and the inhibition of 
other selected doors, either manually or automatically.  On newer trains, this application usually 
operates.  Further, the automatic train door selection system determines specific doors to open at a 
given station (see Figure 39 above).  The automatic train selection system also provides audio and visual 
information of the doors closed.  This information helps direct passengers to leave the train through the 
appropriate sections or doors. The correct side door enable and automatic train door selection acts as a 
means of blocking further risks of accidents in scenarios where detrainment of passengers is required, 
following a failure or accident.  Such scenarios may include trains that are stuck in a tunnel, or in areas 
where there is the risk of electrocution from alighting due to the presence of a third rail, or adjacent 
running lines with the risk of trains passing. 
6.2.4 Using Fail-safe Devices 
Fail-safe systems have already been comprehensively addressed in their use as a preventive risk 
reduction measure; however, the fail-safe principle is also used as a protective measure.  It is worth 
noting that there are several railway applications of fail-safe systems for protective measures that are 
effective and must be considered in studies of risk reduction and cost effectiveness. 
The use of isolation techniques such as emergency power cut-off switches or stick relays to de-energise 
track circuitry following an accident is an effective protective risk reduction measure.  
The driver uses the driver’s brake valve to control the brake release, running, lap, application, emergency 
and shutdown positions for operating and locking the valve out of use.  The use of the brake valves in 
emergency scenarios for reducing the consequences of an accident is essentially a protective risk 
reduction measure.  
Brake valves are predominantly susceptible to random and design-related failures.  The failures and their 
impact are minimised by employing fault-tolerant, fail-safe techniques in brake valve systems designs.  
Supplementary measures include introducing and adhering to quality management practices during the 
design and implementation lifecycle. 
The implementation of ‘renewal of brake valves’ as a measure for reducing the impact of an accident 
such as Collision Between Trains is primarily a design feature that allows for both the reduction of the 
likelihood of an accident and minimises the cost of such an accident. 
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Figure 40: Simple block diagram of an Electro-pneumatic braking system 
6.2.5 Introducing weak links 
There is a growing need to understand accident survivability with regard to structural ‘crashworthiness’ 
and the dynamic stability of trains in the event of collisions.  This requirement is fundamental to cost-
effective risk reduction for the R&D of train operators and manufacturers. 
RSSB (2006) presents studies using past accidents statistics to demonstrate that casualties are 
significantly reduced when vehicle stability is maintained following a collision or derailment, and that 
there is consequently a benefit in furthering the understanding of collision dynamics and stability.  The 
study concludes that despite the consensus in the industry that incorporating crashworthiness features 
into new-built trains is cost-neutral; there are risks and costs involved with the design and development 
of such features. 
The most stringent train car design standards simply require that these designs address the reaction of 
under-frame proof loading, and mid-collision post-height, without clear requirements on energy 
absorption or other dynamic loading requirements.  The Crash Energy Management (CEM) design 
incorporates several sacrificial crush zones with progressively increasing force-crush characteristics. This 
design came out of the need to develop a vehicle end crush zone that would improve the energy 
absorption capacity of the train structure.  In order to prevent the front train cars from absorbing all the 
energy from a collision, crush zones are introduced to allow the distribution of energy between trains and 
train cars.  This distribution of collision energy is a vital protective risk reduction feature as it helps to 
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ensure that the trains remain on-track, rather than go into vertical displacements in the form of jack-knife 
buckling and subsequently derailment. 
In the event of an accident, the design of emergency exits in order to reduce the severity of injuries is a 
major decision for railway operators and train systems suppliers.  Some train cars are designed to enable 
the use of the sidelights for identifying emergency exits. However, the overall risk reduction case includes 
breaking of the glass with a hammer, specially designed for escaping from an accident.  The glass must be 
the toughened float glass type to enable easy exit.  The use of toughened glass in this application is a 
protective risk reduction measure. However; the specific application of introducing a weak material into 
the design has its disadvantages, as there may be a greater need to keep the passenger from being 
expelled from the train during a collision or derailment.  Toughened glass in recent railway train designs is 
also limited in its ability to prevent the impact from external objects flying into the train during an 
accident.   
6.2.6 Delaying Deterioration 
The application of fireproofing and insulation coatings on materials used for structures in tunnels and 
railways in general is only one way of delaying deterioration in the event of a major accident such as a 
station fire.  The principle of delaying deterioration is of significant importance and effective in risk 
reduction applications if additional measures such as emergency/incident plans, adequate station layout 
designs (egress or emergency exit), crowd control, clear and unambiguous signage, instructions and 
guidance from station supervisors or station staff etc. are used to supplement it. If it takes a calculated 
time interval to exhaust the protective power of fireproofing and insulation, it is necessary that in this 
window, measures are available to remove the target from the hazardous area.  
A practical railway challenge for train drivers, however seldom it occurs, is running with isolated 
emergency brakes. To reduce this risk, designing robust emergency brakes is only a part of it. In 
combination with precautions, procedural modifications and subsequently, the training of drivers is 
essential to achieve the risk reduction. 
Speed restrictions subsequent to an accident could potentially delay deterioration, if action is taken in 
the very short period following the accident. Other similar applications of this principle include structural 
reinforcements, safety design considerations using technologies on crash worthiness and the 
strengthening of vehicle interiors (i.e. the CEM project).  
6.2.7 Reducing Exposure Time/Duration 
The impact from accidents can be significantly reduced by the inclusive design of stations and platforms 
(i.e., the safety in design philosophy). Basic items for egress and access such as steps, stairs, ramps and 
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doors can be designed to take into account the reduction of time of exposure to a hazardous situation, if 
one arises. An example of such a situation is the Kings Cross (London) Underground fire in 1987. HSE 
(1996) presents a comprehensive report on the upward flame spread on inclined surfaces with 
considerable channelled power, demonstrating the ‘trench effect’. This is a well-known and established 
fire propagation mechanism, used to describe and illustrate these events on enclosed slopes such as 
escalators or stairwells in building structures. 
With a good knowledge of  risk contributors such as trench effect, stations and platforms designs, the 
materials (e.g. fireproofing) used and physical layouts (escape routes/emergency exits and egress) can be 
better designed, to ensure the best opportunities for people to survive major accidents such as fire in  
railway tunnels.     
Another practical yet effective example of reducing exposure following an incident or accident is ‘signage 
and way-finding at stations’. Clear and consistent signs, instructions or ways to find exits facilitates easy 
egress thereby reducing exposure to any consequential effect of an accident. This applies to platforms or 
trains. 
6.2.8 Reducing Vulnerability of Passengers 
The use of closed circuit television (CCTV) is an essential measure for reducing the vulnerability of 
passengers to hazardous circumstances. The train driver will not start the train once he is aware that 
passengers are stuck at the door, fallen onto the track, or fallen between train and platform. This in effect 
substantially reduces the severity of injuries that could potentially be sustained by the passenger.  An 
alternative to the CCTV in risk reduction measures analysis is the Platform Edge Doors, which principally 
reduces platform-related accidents by significantly reducing the direct passenger-train interface resulting 
in the minimisation of accidents frequency.  
Other effective measures for reducing the vulnerability of passengers include platform supervision, 
crowd control and enhanced door systems.  The enhanced door system consists of: 
 Sensitive Door Rubber Edge  
 Automatic Door Reversing  
 Door Emergency Unlocking  
 Door Closing Signal  
These measures, in combination with in-cab CCTV (for the driver to monitor passenger movements 
around the platform-train interfaces) achieve a net positive effect on the risk reduction objective. 
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Ready to depart (RTD) indicators or repeater signals are different ways of informing the platform staff 
that the driver has permission to depart the platform and also reduces the vulnerability of passengers. 
Platform area safety systems that can effectively reduce vulnerability when an individual or a combined 
application for the risk reduction is required include: 
 CCTV station and track 
 CCTV platform 
 Station track supervision 
 Intrusion detection 
 Coupler area supervision 
 Platform boundary door supervision 
 Emergency stop plunger 
 Fire detection, alarming and suppression systems 
 Emergency lighting 
6.2.9 Emergency response system or operations 
The emergency preparedness concept in relation to this principle and its application as a protective 
measure on the railways aims to assist in preparations for and responses to occurrences of incidents or 
accidents in a timely and effective manner. A typical example of an emergency response system is the 
‘emergency timetable’. This is used as a contingency plan for dealing with severe disruption. 
Communication and feedback of information to and from line controllers, train drivers and other front 
line personnel are fundamental to the effective application of this principle. The factors essential to the 
effectiveness of emergency preparedness, depend largely on training. The need for training to facilitate 
emergency response planning is highlighted in all the railway emergency preparedness strategies that 
have been studied as part of this project  
Production of emergency timetables usually requires a dedicated team of trained experts in this area. The 
dissemination of timetable information to all personnel, especially operational personnel, following an 
accident is usually undertaken by communications experts. Other systems and operations with the 
application of this principle for risk reduction include: 
 Provision of hammers at strategic locations within those train cars for emergency exit 
 Introduction or implementation of crowd control procedures or processes (i.e. station and 
platform area crowd control) 
 Increased traffic - more trains to cater for peak times/special events such as football matches,  
i.e. the introduction of new trains to reduce overcrowding 
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
146 
 
6.2.10 Degraded operations 
A degraded mode of operation is normally characteristic of a train not operating under normal signals or 
signalling arrangements. This is more difficult to achieve with new train technology such as 
communication-based train control systems as compared to conventional signalling systems. Typical 
causes or conditions resulting in degraded operations include signal equipment failures, failure of block 
signalling equipment such as joints, signal passed at danger, movements during possessions, level 
crossing failure or track circuit failure. 
Accidents do occur during degraded railway operations however degraded operations can also be the 
only means of reducing the impact following an accident. In advocating this principle for use in 
application for effective risk reduction, care must be taken to ensure that concepts such as the ‘integrity 
envelope’, introduced by offshore operators, are considered. Integrity envelopes ensure that alternative 
systems and work-around procedures are identified by using operational hazard assessment techniques. 
The derived potential failure scenarios are then known upfront so railway operations personnel know 
what the options are and what decisions to take and how long to operate in that state in the event of an 
accident and subsequent degraded operations.  
The railway rule books provide guidance on what actions to take in response to an accident via degraded 
working. If the accidents or incidents that result in degraded operations are infrequent, there is a greater 
risk of the unfamiliarity of staff with the appropriate actions. This potentially leads to incorrect responses 
or mistakes.  
Emergency timetables, operating rules (manual, protected manual and fully automated), speed 
restrictions, training of front-line personnel such as controllers, platform or station supervisors, train 
drivers, failure reporting, maintenance and testing, part service suspensions etc., are all essential to 
successful application of degraded operations and the transition from degraded to normal operations. 
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Figure 41: Degraded operations and transitions (adapted from 
http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/degraded_modes/Johnson_Shea_Rail_Submission.p
df. Accessed 24-07-13. 
6.2.11 Failure indication 
With the move towards controlled train operations that provide a comprehensive suite of safety 
applications, railway systems designs have to provide feedback on system failures, including the actions 
of operators.  The diagnostics and feedback features are now considered a standard safety requirement 
and are captured in most operational safety requirements justifications.  
The AWS is a fail-safe device primarily introduced into railway safety operations as a means of protecting 
against large accidents subsequent to incidents, such as SPAD. Failure indicators such as the Automatic 
Warning System (AWS) are only effective for risk reduction if the train driver acknowledges the warning 
and acts to make the operations safe by braking or applying similar measures. 
The AWS alerts the train driver through an audible indication about the aspect of the next signal.  The 
driver is then required to acknowledge by cancelling the horn and potential automatic brake application. 
The system includes a relay control unit, electro-pneumatic valves connected to the braking system, an 
indicator in the train driver’s cab, driver’s AWS acknowledgement button, a control panel (including re-
set plunger), a magnetically activated receiver under the train, operating voltages provided by a static 
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voltage converter, and an isolating handle. A study of the effectiveness of the AWS and the eventual need 
to discontinue its use is provided in HSE (2001).   
Train Protection and Warning Systems (TPWS) are widely used to replace or supplement the functions of 
the AWS. However, it is still limited in its application as a high integrity train protection system. Internal 
railway studies have shown that it provides a 60% to 70% reduction in equivalent fatalities caused by 
SPADs.  Failure status monitoring and reporting as part of overall safety and performance is a standard 
functional requirement of automatic train protection.  The TPWS does not have full Automatic Train 
Protection system functionalities such as failure status monitoring and reporting.  Similar failure 
indications used to good effect to warn of incidents that might escalate into greater degree of loss 
include Passenger Emergency Alarms, passenger/customer information systems, and fire detection 
systems (high integrity systems for tunnel railways). However, these are more effective with crowd 
management processes. 
 
Figure 42: Effective use of TPWS for reducing train accidents (adapted from RSSB TPWS strategy) 
Railway systems that rely on the failure indication feature, despite the built-in reliability or fault 
tolerance, still have the weakness of ‘the failure to correctly indicate’.  This requires its own study, 
considering the effect on accidents if incorrect feedbacks are provided during train operations. Leveson 
(2004) acknowledges that the accurate collection and analysis of data by computer systems to determine 
whether the system is moving toward the boundaries of safety is difficult and complex.  The paper 
suggests using system accident models and the basic concept of safety constraints to provide directions 
for: 
1. Identifying appropriate safety metrics;  
2. Determining whether controls over these constraints are adequate;  
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3. Evaluating the assumptions about the technical failures and potential design errors, 
organisational structure, and human behaviour underlying the hazard analysis;  
4. Detecting errors in the operational and environmental assumptions underlying the design; 
5. Identifying any maladaptive changes over time that could increase the risk of accidents to 
unacceptable levels.   
This methodology has not been tested in a real-life railway application.  
6.2.12 Prediction, Risk planning & Trouble-shooting 
As part of good risk management practice, risk reduction measures introduced for specific risks or 
contributors to accidents are evaluated to assess how well they perform. Safety performance indicators 
can provide evidence of the condition of the railways with regards to safety goals being met or 
progresses towards targets and can be very useful tools to inform and justify the allocation of resources.  
The use of leading and lagging indicators in analysing the effectiveness of protective measures are simple 
and efficient methods that define, measure, monitor and inform accident precursors and safety 
performance.  These protective risk reduction measures help assess the trend of incidents and 
subsequently predict the outcome of events.  
Leading indicators are input-based information that have an indirect relationship to the risk reduction 
objective and can influence lagging indicators by measuring and tracking performance before an accident 
or incident occurs.  Examples of leading indicators are increased frequency of signal overruns indicating 
imminent accident if not avoided.  Number of recent wrong side door openings on the automatic train 
door system, an incident that will immediately require response or action to eliminate further escalation 
of the incident.  Others are increased incidents of improper train berthing and the root cause could be 
track or train-related braking or complaints per 1,000,000 passengers. Other leading indicators such as 
number of passengers during peak periods or increasing number of passengers compared against 
overcrowding can help determine platform related incidents and subsequent protection measures to 
reduce the risks.  
Similarly, lagging indicators are also effective measures for protecting against the risk of further 
propagation of an incident or accident.  These are outcome related measures of safety performance 
directly related to the risk reduction objective.  Lagging indicators measuring the number of preventable 
accidents per 1,000,000 kilometres provide information post-accident that facilitates protection-planning 
programmes.  
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Figure 43: Leading and Lagging indicators in risk reduction 
RSSB (2011) evaluates the effectiveness and suitability of Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) used on 
Great Britain rail industry. The study ranks the SPIs in terms of maturity for specific applications.  In this 
study on safety performance indicators used in the railway industry, definition of leading indicators 
proved problematic.  The study states that no two definitions found were the same. The discrepancies in 
defining leading indicators results in certain circumstances an indicator such as signal passed at danger 
(SPADs) could be considered either leading or lagging.  In order to eliminate this difficulty, the study 
defines leading indicators as the ‘activity’ indicator and lagging indicator as the ‘outcome indicator’.  
 
Figure 44: Safety Performance Indicators (adapted from RSSB 2011) 
The study also identified that the fundamental flaw in the use and reliance on conventional on failure and 
accident data to monitor railway safety performance is that improvements or modifications can only be 
determined after an incident or accident has occurred.  
Examples of current methodologies and technologies used for collecting accident data, reporting 
accidents, supporting accident investigations and periodic assessment of the performance of prevention 
or protection measures include:   
1. Passenger Safety Indicator (PSI) 
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2. Train accident risk data from Precursor Indicator Model (PIM) 
3. Safety Management Information System (SMIS) 
4. Common Safety Indicators (CSI) 
5. Transport Availability Infrastructure and Logistics System (TRAIL) 
6. Service Contract Performance Database (CuPID)  
6.3 Costs Associated with Implementing the Separate Protective Methods 
Protective measures in general are associated with smaller capital costs compared to the preventive risk 
reduction measures.  This is also demonstrated in the analysis of the magnitude of risk reduction against 
the cost of implementing protective measures.  The costs of implementing individual protective measures 
with a positive impact on risk reduction are often shown to be relatively low when compared with 
preventive risk reduction measures. 
These are illustrated below for each accident – Derailment, Platform Train Interface/Incidents and 
Collision between trains. The analysis assumes that the contributions to each accident as identified 
provide a comprehensive coverage of the primary risk scenarios. The distributions of contributions to the 
accidents are heavily dependent on recommendations and data from previous (internal) safety studies. 
The chart depicts the cost of protective risk reduction measures and the risk reduction achieved. The data 
used for the chart illustration does not consider the negative values from two risk-reduction measures 
proposed for reducing the risk of ‘Passenger falls between cars’: 
1. Introduction of new trains with open walkthrough cars 
2. Introduction of new trains to reduce overcrowding 
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Figure 45: Effect of protective risk reduction measures on PTI 
Figure 45 presents Platform Train Interface (platform-only) accident cost data analysis. The data presents 
the representative sample of key contributors to the major accident hazard, PTI. It highlights important 
features or trends that must be noted for any supporting decisions for selecting risk reduction measures. 
Let us consider risk reduction for ‘falls from train to the platform’ (FALLS-TRAIN), the chart shows the 
magnitude of risk reduction (in £) that can be achieved at a substantially low cost. This typically 
represents the risk reduction achievable eliminating gaps between the train and the platforms via gap 
fillers. Other protective risk reduction measures considered include addressing the causes and effect of 
illnesses on the trains. Options for reducing the risk of ‘falls from train to platform’ at a relatively low cost 
could also include signage and warnings; stair nose marking; crowd control; on-train supervision and 
additional platform lighting. 
In the case of ‘person pushed from platform’ (PERSON-PUSHED), the average implementation cost is 
significantly larger than the average risk reduction achieved. In current practice, an ALARP and business 
case can be made for introducing other protective risk reduction measures such as designing and building 
anti-suicide pits instead of the generic platform staff support. Alternatives to the risk reduction measures 
identified in this study will have to be further identified to make a case for selection and implementation. 
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Figure 46: Effect of protective risk reduction measures on Collision Between Trains 
 
Figure 47: Effect of protective risk reduction measures on Derailment 
For collision Between Trains, Figure 47 focuses on five major contributors – accidents as a result of 
Subsequent Collision, SPAD, Emergency Braking, Wheel-Rail interface and Service Brakes.  The chart 
denotes alignment with safety and business cases for collision accidents. The ALARP case can be easier 
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made as the average cost of reduced risk is within the cost of measures considered. Figure 47 however 
shows that one can spend less to achieve more for the protection option ‘emergency exits’ (EXIT) 
subsequent to a derailment accident.  
The above does not consider dependencies and effective risk reduction from possible combinations of 
these measures.   
6.4 Removed Risk Associated with the Protective Methods 
Similar to the information on preventive risk reduction measures provided in Section 5.3, Tables 16, 17 
and 18 present details regarding the protective risk reduction measures and the corresponding risk 
reduction applications.  These risk reduction applications are related to the typical contributors to the 
‘Major Accident Hazards’ or fault tree ‘Top Events’. In line with the scope of this study, Collision Between 
Trains, Platform Train Incidents and Derailment accidents only are detailed. 
Table 16: Protective Risk Reduction Measures – Collision Between Trains 
Protective Risk Reduction Measures Risk Contributor (Collision Between Trains) 
On-board sanding Service Brake Failure 
Vegetation management programme - leaf fall (autumn season specific 
challenge) 
Poor Wheel/Rail Friction 
Fitting of wheel slip protection or Adhesion improvers 
Emergency timetable - contingency plan for dealing with severe 
disruption (production of emergency timetables and dissemination of 
timetable information to all personnel especially operational 
personnel following an accident) 
Driver Passed Signal at Danger (SPAD) 
Crash worthiness and vehicle interior 
Speed restrictions (Adhesion) 
Precautions, procedural modifications and subsequently, driver 
training for running with isolated emergency brakes 
Emergency Brakes Fail to Function 
Emergency accident/incident plans Collision with another train subsequent to a collision 
Training for drivers and incident centre personnel 
Training for local emergency medical team on train accidents/incidents  
Audible warning systems - trains 
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Table 17: Protective Risk Reduction Measures – Platform Train Incidents 
Protective Risk Reduction Measures Risk Contributor  
(Platform Train Incidents – Platform) 
Additional support from platform supervisors Crowded platform inhibits driver's view (crowding) 
Person pushed from platform 
Person retrieving item from platform Audible warnings on platform (Improvements to passenger display 
screens and public address systems) 
Emergency plans - incident management plan 
Increased use of slip, trip and fall toolkit Passenger falls from platform 
Signage/Warnings and car door alarms (Trains) 
Anti-suicide pits on track area 
Platform staff support (incident control - drag and pull) - Same as 
above Additional support from platform supervisors 
Review of incidents of passengers being taken ill on trains to establish 
common causes and develop plans to reduce the numbers of such 
incidents 
Falls onto the platform from train 
Gap fillers - Platform rubber 
Deployment of train co-ordinators train-cars 
Introduction of Sensitive door system Train passengers fail to activate Passenger Emergency 
Alarm (PEA) within station limits 
Passenger Emergency Alarms locations reviewed and relocated 
OPO CCTV (Same as ‘Introduction of improved OPO CCTV systems’ 
above) 
Speed restrictions - enforcement of speed restriction on platform 
areas 
Platform staff unable to stop train before it moves off 
with trapped passenger 
Crowd control 
Audible warnings on platform 
Under-platform lighting Person retrieving item from track 
Audible warning systems - platform (station area) - Same as ‘Audible 
warnings on platform…’ above 
Person on track due to self-action (miscellaneous) 
 
Audible warning systems - trains 
Crowd control station platform area (Same as ‘Crowd control’) above 
Speed restrictions - aerodynamic effect of train on passengers on 
platform (Same as ‘Speed Restrictions - enforcement of speed 
restriction on platform areas’ above)  
OPO CCTV (Same as ‘Introduction of improved OPO CCTV systems’ 
above) 
Passenger strikes/falls against train 
Audible warning systems - trains (used following track trespass)  Trespass on track in station area 
Additional station/platform staff training (See ‘Station 
Master/personnel training’ above) 
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Table 18: Protective Risk Reduction Measures – Derailment 
Protective Risk Reduction Measures Risk Contributor (Derailment) 
Structural re-enforcements - bridges, embankments Train falls down an embankment or from a bridge after 
a fast derailment 
Reduced traffic on bridge/structure 
Repositioning of tripcocks - standard requirement is tripcock 
positioning 1.5m from front of train 
Trip-cock fails to activate brakes 
Introduce injury prevention initiatives e.g. booklets, DVDs and staff 
briefings 
Introduction of (improved) shunting policy Loss of train detection – Train fails to shunt track circuit 
Trains fitted with incident response kits and additional training for 
staff to act as quickly as possible in emergency situations 
Crowd control Involuntary exit 
Fire and rescue services 
Paramedics/medical units (availability of staff trained for train accident 
scenarios) 
Seat belts restraining passengers to their seat 
Emergency Door Release  Emergency exit 
Trip systems to isolate or de-energise traction power 
Emergency lighting and signage (illumination of Emergency Door 
Release mechanisms in passenger vehicles) 
Provision of hammers for emergency exit 
Seat design to minimise passenger injury 
The success of any one or combination of the risk contributors potentially leads to accidents with 
resultant fatalities/injuries. The protective risk reduction measures are used individually or in 
combination to effectively remove or reduce the effect of the risk contributors.  The risk reduction 
measures presented in the tables above are not in any way exhaustive but representative of the primary 
measures used in the overall study. Other risk reduction measures are detailed in the following sections 
providing a complete with the decision support strategy proposed in Chapter 7.  
6.5 Constraints and Considerations in Selecting Protective Risk-Reduction 
Measures 
The general guidance for selecting protective risk reduction measures is ‘what you don’t know can hurt 
you…’ Protection measures are most effective in application to high uncertainty and unexpected events – 
the ‘black swan’ effect (Taleb, 2007). 
Even in an industry with a long history of accidents, a good record of consequences and potential 
escalation of accidents, if proper protection measures are non-existent, the adoption of the ‘prevention is 
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the best cure’ philosophy provides a false sense of the actual state of operational risks. When considered, 
protective measures are typically an afterthought. On some major capital projects, the heavy-loaded 
investments in preventive measures drain the budget before any protective measures are even 
considered. In such cases, optimisation or intense rationalisation of measures to implement subsequent 
to a failure of the high-tech signalling system, as used in this example, becomes essential. However by the 
time the project team get to this realisation, the high tech signalling system is already contracted out or 
secured/procured.  Decision support techniques (rational and optimisation methods) that remove this 
loop-hole in current practice is outline in Chapter 7 and presented in by Weli and Todinov (2013a); Weli 
and Todinov (2013b); Todinov and Weli (2013).    
Similar to the selection of preventive risk reduction measures, training, monitoring and supervision are 
essential for effective implementation of protective risk reduction measures.  An example is the selection 
of a protective risk reduction measure such as introduction of One-Person-Operated Closed Circuit 
Television CCTV (OPO-CCTV). The OPO-CCTV is situated within the cab for a driver to have complete view 
of the platform and surroundings.  The measure provides significant risk reduction and as a result 
minimises the risk, amongst others, of a passenger sustaining further injuries after falling between the 
train and the platform.  By using of the OPO-CCTV, the driver is provided with better awareness of the 
situation and will not start or move the train.  This measure for reducing risk does not preclude that the 
driver and platform staff require training on actions to take in the event of a passenger fall.  The driver 
still needs to be aware and monitor the screens with possible help from platform staff and other 
passengers.  Risk assessments undertaken for the use of the in-cab CCTV also suggests that platform 
supervision must supplement the use of the OPO-CCTV system. 
In Section 6.2.10, degraded operations as a risk reduction principle was listed as effective for risk 
reduction particularly in cases where no sounder alternative exists. Following accidents, incidents or 
failures on the railways such as SPADs, buckled rail or signal failure, the degraded mode of operation is 
usually the only feasible alternative as trains may need to carry on to stabling depots, reduce congestion 
or reduce the consequences from lack of ventilation if trains are stuck in the tunnel. However, 
considerable amount of care is needed to ensure effective application such as prior scenario safety 
assessments, work-around procedures and occasional training irrespective of the frequency of the 
accidents. 
On the railways, the measures generally classified as protective (also see classification in appendices) are 
relatively cheaper and take less time to implement. Nevertheless, the heavier burden of cost is in 
ensuring the maintenance and continuity of the measures. A typical example to illustrate this cost 
continuity for two measures that provide similar risk reduction at different costs is the platform 
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emergency stop plunger (PESP) and the train driver. The PESP will require significant investment for initial 
procurement, installation, testing and handover/commissioning. However, the occasional inspections and 
annual maintenance checks are low compared to the recruitment/salary of a train driver at a lower cost 
to the PESP and increased cost of regular relevant training and exercises required to keep the train driver 
updated and efficient.  
6.6 Effective Methodology for Selection of Preventive or Protective  
The primary objective of the proposed methodology and strategy is to find a solution to the flaws in the 
existing practice and in so doing, to develop a comprehensive and structured framework for effective risk 
reduction.  This task does not come without its own challenges.  These are also highlighted and resolved.  
The main challenge is the development of a framework with a structured case that presents the decision 
maker with a great degree of confidence that effective risk reduction measures are considered – this 
includes correct application of risk reduction measures and at a reasonable cost.  Setting out on this 
work, some careful thought was put to the typical questions that inundate a decision-maker on the 
application of effective risk reduction measures.  The questions are comprehensive, albeit not exhaustive 
and in no particular order. The quest is presented as an overview of some of the fundamental challenges 
to applying risk reduction measures which have not been addressed in current practice. These include:  
 In what cases are preventive or protective measures applied for cost effective risk reduction? 
 What risk reduction measures do we invest in and how is this achieved for particular railway 
accidents and accident scenarios? 
 Assuming we have identified and know the risks or contributors to a major accident, is the 
introduction and implementation of only preventive risk reducing measures sufficient to reduce 
the risk as low as reasonably practicable? 
 In cases where the risk cannot be easily quantified, how are risk reduction measures applied? 
 With varying degrees of uncertainty in data, what methods are in place to reduce the under-
estimation or over-estimation of magnitude of risk reduction and cost effectiveness used in the 
economic analysis for selecting risk reduction measures? 
 In new railway developments with associated scrutiny on costs, is it worth more investment in 
measures that prevent the risk or protect against the risks of accidents? 
 What is the most effective way of allocating budgets - how are the preventive and protective risk 
reduction measures for a particular risk distributed or allocated? 
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 How are risk reduction measures which act in parallel to other measures determined and what is 
the contribution of these parallel measures to the overall risk reduction objective? 
 In marginal reduction cases, mostly cases encountered on the railways, how could preventive or 
protective measures be appropriately employed? 
 What important cost considerations drive the decisions on preventive or protective measures? 
In view of the above and limited research work existing to address these, it can be surmised that the 
fundamental requirements of applying risk reduction measures can be achieved if a comprehensive 
decision support system developed specifically for railway risk reduction applications aims to meet two 
primary objectives: 
 Effective application of preventive or protection measures 
 Effective combination/balance of preventive or protective measures 
The scope of the methodology is not limited to solutions to the above but attempts to extend the 
understanding and application of risk reduction measures on the railways.  
6.7 Classification of Risk Reduction Measures (Preventive and Protective) 
A simple distinction of any given set of measures as preventive or protective based on railway risk 
reduction specific application requirements can be achieved by evaluating their specific application 
properties against the generic principles of risk reduction. This is based on the comprehensive evaluation 
of preventive and protective measures presented in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Given a set of risk reduction measures, the qualitative effectiveness of each of the risk reduction 
measures is evaluated by applying the generic risk reduction principles. A comprehensive understanding 
of the functional limitations and capabilities of each risk reduction measure in the particular risk scenario 
can provide evidence for assessing its benefits and potential for use in an application. 
 The associated limitations and capabilities are based on an assessment against the basic principles of risk 
reduction and can be evaluated against other risk reduction measures with estimated risk reduction and 
associated costs. The limitations highlight the application constraints of the risk reduction measure and 
provide a means for considering parallel risk reduction measures to supplement or support the risk 
reduction measure at a reasonable cost.  
The evaluation of risk reduction measures using both preventive and protective risk reduction principles 
is in line with assertions made in previous sections of this work, that risk reducing measures potentially 
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exhibit attributes for reducing the likelihood of an accident or the consequence in the event of an 
accident or both. 
Let us consider the unambiguous classification of SPAD risk reduction measures that effectively supports 
a decision-maker by effectively minimising the risk of selecting an incorrect measure. The decision-maker 
is provided with a means of assessing the properties of each measure, based on already introduced 
engineering risk reduction principles. This helps assure that for any specific risk reduction application, the 
properties that dominate subsequently influence decisions made on its use as a preventive or protective 
measure. The characteristics of 14 risk reduction measures are assessed and presented in the simplified 
matrix, Table 19 and Table 20 below. 
Table 19: Functional capability (preventive) of risk reduction measures for SPAD risks 
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Table 20: Functional (protective) capability of risk reduction measures for SPAD risks 
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The classification of each risk reduction measure as either preventive or protective is simplified by 
assessing the specific application capabilities and highlights the predominant attributes of each risk 
reduction measure as: 
1. Preventive – Automatic Train Operation, Signalling Modifications, Wheel-slide protection 
systems, Relocating Trip-cock positions, Speed Control system, Extending/improving testing and 
maintenance regimes or scope; 
2. Protective – SPAD incident response, Speed Restrictions, Driver and Line Controller Training, 
Emergency timetable  
3. Preventive and Protective (Dual) – In-cab design, Brake control system 
Using this approach, Appendix A provides a complete data set of distinctly classified risk reduction 
measures for 220 different risk reduction measures identified for a major UK railway renewal project.  
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Chapter 7 Considerations and alternatives for Rational and Optimal 
Budget allocation to achieve a Maximum Risk Reduction 
A thorough understanding of the elements of risk is a prerequisite to appropriate comparisons related to 
the effectiveness of measures minimising risks As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).  Risk 
evaluation and reduction derived from first principles eliminates the ambiguity currently existing in 
current practice in railway safety cases.  Reviews of railway operators’ safety cases indicate that 
necessary work needs to be undertaken to present risks assessment and risk reduction as an integrated 
activity and presented in safety reports as such – traceable and easily appreciated. 
In view of the above and the very limited research work existing to address these, it can be surmised that 
as a minimum, the fundamental requirements of applying risk reduction measures can be achieved if 
decision support systems specifically developed for railway risk reduction aims to meet two primary 
objectives: 
1. Cost effective application of risk reduction measures 
2. Cost effective combination/balance of preventive and protective measures 
The scope of the thesis is not limited to solutions to the above but to extend the understanding and 
application of risk reduction measures on the railways (as provided in Chapters 5 & 6). The final goal is to 
maximise risk reduction when a fixed budget is the major constraint. Considering this goal, chapter 7 uses 
novel concepts such as the Cost of Failure concept and proven system engineering methods to address 
challenges to achieving maximum risk reduction identified in preceding chapters. Comprehensive and 
structured practical solutions to the current misguided practices are also submitted. 
In this chapter, the rational approach to maximum risk reduction in the railway industry further presents: 
 The application of the key risk reduction principles introduced in chapters 5 and 6 into the 
existing industry accepted method for selecting of measures and presents a simplified, 
systematic and verifiable options selection approach 
 Organisational challenges of implementing measures selected and addresses these by 
presenting: 
o The Risk Reduction Readiness Model (R3M) 
o Contracts and Supply Chain Risk Reduction Model 
o D-O-P-T (Design-Operational-Procedural-Technical) classification. This is a categorisation 
of the risk reduction measures to eliminate the gaps between the initiation and 
implementation phases of the risk reduction lifecycle.  
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7.1 Risk Concepts, Considerations and Methods for rational and optimal risk 
reduction 
It is important to define the concepts; constraints and variables; and methods considered that help with 
the development of the new approach. These are summarised in the subsequent sub-sections. Other 
concepts or definitions used are adequately referenced to previous sections where originally introduced. 
7.1.1 ALARP Concept 
The Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) stipulates that expenditure to reduce hazards must be incurred 
up to the point where the remaining risk is ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP). The HSE 
framework for the tolerability of risk defined in HSE (2001c) and adopted on the UK railways is illustrated 
using the triangle in Figure 48. The value of preventing a fatality for 2012 was calculated by the 
Department for Transport (DfT) guidance to be VPF
2012 
= £1,653,000. This value is used in quantitative 
analysis to aid decision-making and its use will be maintained for the case studies and examples in this 
thesis. 
 
 
Figure 48: ALARP Triangle and Tolerability of Risk 
The ALARP triangle above is calibrated against most railway safety standards in the UK. In general, an 
aggregate risk for a system under review below 0.001 fatalities per annum is considered broadly 
acceptable/tolerable. Above 1 in 104 risk to the individual is considered intolerable. The risk reduction 
benefit for individual risks between 1 in 105 and 1 in 104 is taken as £4.96million per life saved and for 
other areas of the ALARP region to be £1.65million per life saved. Expenditure on risk reduction measures 
Reasonable to consider 
£4.96million per 
passenger life saved 
Reasonable to consider 
£1.65million per 
passenger life saved 
Tolerable only if risk reduction is 
impractical or if cost is grossly 
disproportionate to improvement 
gained. Reasonable to consider 
between £4.96million and £1.65 
million depending on level of risk 
from other hazards – assume worst 
case of £4.96 million.  
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to minimise the occurrence of incidents, which could lead to loss of life, injury, or damage to assets is 
expressed in money metrics.  
Cost-of-failure concept 
The direct and accurate application of a risk reduction measure to specific accident or risk scenarios is 
essential to cost effective risk management.  As the risk reduction capability of a measure or combination 
of measures increases, the likelihood of failure or consequences decreases. 
Using the cost-of-failure (CoF) concept introduced in Section 2.4, a risk reduction strategy can be 
developed that reduces the risk of railway accidents (Todinov, 2003).      
Applying        , then; 
               (7.1) 
If      is the maximum acceptable risk of failure and       is the corresponding maximum acceptable 
probability of failure, equation (7.1) is given as: 
                    (7.2) 
The cost-of failure concept provides that for reducing the risk of failure, the probability of failure must 
obey the inequality: 
                   (7.3) 
This means that whenever the probability of failure is         , the risk of failure is reduced 
below     , the maximum tolerable risk.  For the minimum reliability of the system which reduces the 
risk level below Kmax we get: 
                      (7.4) 
This expresses the principle of the risk-based design formulated in (Todinov 2007): for a specified level of 
tolerable risk Kmax, systems whose failures are associated with large cost C should be designed to a 
higher reliability level compared to systems whose failures are associated with smaller cost. At the same 
time, for the same minimum reliability of the system a risk-reduction measure limiting the cost of failure 
automatically reduces the level of risk Kmax. 
7.1.2 Allocation and Management considerations for Risk Reduction  
There is a range of events that result in accidents and in some cases; there is an even broader range of 
associated risk reduction measures and combination of measures.  It is important that these measures 
and varying combinations for the specific risk reduction application are efficiently utilised throughout the 
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operational period.  An efficient method for managing specific application safety risk reduction measures 
is by clearly delineating and categorising the measures for appropriate allocation to the correct sections 
of the organisation.  
However, the categorisation of risk reduction measures on the railways as an integral part of effective 
risk management is hardly in existence.  It is an underestimated area that requires further development.  
In other industries where risks drive investments and business decisions, integrating risk reduction with 
operational categorisation is a core requirement.  Marshal (2001) and Bessis (2002) provide 
comprehensive views of operational risks, defining these as event risks and argue that to effectively 
handle risks of potential losses, categorisation of events will serve as a receptacle for accident data 
gathering on frequencies and costs.  A tentative categorisation of event risks is presented under: 
 People 
 Processes 
 Technical 
 Systems 
In the absence of efficient tracking and accident reporting systems that directly categorise risk reduction 
measures and their functional capabilities for reducing the likelihood of an accident and consequences, 
vital risk reduction measures are ignored and therefore do not trigger any requirement for their 
incorporation. This practice could have potentially catastrophic consequences.  
The clear outline in roles and responsibilities within the risk reduction context ensures that resources 
(finances, technical expertise, information, systems/equipment, medical facilities etc.) necessary for 
implementing the measures are available and used to good effect. 
The effective introduction of these risk-reduction measures must take into account the possible 
duplication of effort and consider whether the organisation or specific departments within an 
organisation could be better placed. This fundamental requirement for any effective risk reduction must 
be applied to the whole life of the project or system.  The inter-relationships between departments 
forming part of a railway risk reduction operation can serve as the baseline structure for developing 
measured strategies for accident prevention and protection. Throughout the project or system lifecycle, 
the clearly defined inter-relationships on reducing any particular risk ensures that the railway operations 
are able to take advantage of the many technical resources that exist within the organisation.  Any 
categorisation employed must also specifically apply to the typical railway organisational structure in 
order to achieve the full benefits of the risk reduction measures over the usage period.  This is facilitated 
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by correctly associating the typical functions of a risk-reduction measure to the typical responsibilities 
within an infrastructure operator. 
7.1.3 Systems Engineering (SE) method to effective risk reduction 
By definition, the system engineering approach to risk management must ensure effective risk reduction 
for any major railway renewal or developmental project.  A considerable amount of effort is expended on 
planning, evaluation and management of potential risks prior to the selection of risk-reduction options. A 
process of cost and benefit evaluation would normally precede such selection. In practice, the selection 
of risk-reduction options is constrained by fixed budgets. The greatest challenges of introducing and 
effectively managing risk-reduction options are: 
1. Novelty of the option;  
2. Complexity of each risk reduction option;  
3. Integration issues. 
The integration issues include: 
 the interaction between subsystems to achieve risk reduction; 
 the correlation and interaction among the risk reduction options; and  
 the correlation and interaction between the risk-reduction options and the environment.  
By considering these interactions as important factors in the risk reduction exercise, the safety and 
business case claims for risk removed and their cost effectiveness can be substantiated and further 
enhanced to support their acceptance and successful implementation.  
By revealing the complex interrelationships between the risk reduction options, the gap between risk 
evaluation, options selection and implementation (i.e. costs, people, process and equipment) can be 
effectively narrowed. The adoption of the systems approach provides coordination between people, 
processes and equipment at the implementation phase, where the organisation plays a crucial role in the 
risk management process. In this sense, the systems approach provides a bridge to the organisation 
structure. A comprehensive understanding of the limitations and strengths of each option for the specific 
application is a prerequisite for effective overall risk reduction (comprehensively addressed in Chapters 5 
and 6). For major railway projects with multiple risk reduction options, the key to effective risk reduction 
lies in the successful integration of the available options.  
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  Figure 49: Systems engineering approach to risk reduction 
7.2 Rational approach to risk reduction in the railway industry 
The classic expression for risk (Vose, 2000), presented in Section 2.4 includes  - the probability of risk 
actualisation and  - the consequence or cost as a result of the risk being realised. Realisation of the risk 
on the railways is any incident or accident with a negative impact.  Most railway applications of this basic 
equation, similar to other safety-critical industries, define that risk is a combination of the probability of 
occurrence, and the probability of the harm occurring, .  Furthermore,  is also developed into three 
primary parts: 
The likelihood of the risk occurring,  
The probability of not reducing the harm,  
The frequency of operations/duration of exposure to the hazard,  
Applying these three parts to the basic equation gives: 
         (7.5) 
Estimations of the risk take into account past accident data and if these are unavailable, engineering 
expert judgement is employed.  Severity or consequence following an accident are considered by taking 
into account the gravity of injuries and are generally classified as minor, major or fatal.  The likelihood of 
the risk occurring is estimated using reliability data, accident history, and other statistical data.  The 
probability of avoiding the harm introduces the human element to the assessment and the consideration 
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of the actions of personnel and passengers, i.e., how quickly the risk event can occur, awareness of the 
risk and response (and response times) by passengers or personnel.  The frequency or duration of 
exposure to the hazard can be estimated by taking into consideration: 
 Time spent in the danger zone  
 Number of persons that must access the area 
 Frequency of access or operations 
Once the risk has been estimated and a risk reduction is required (i.e. intolerable risks are identified), risk 
reduction objectives are set and decisions on risk reduction measures are made and implemented. The 
railways use economic cost-benefit analysis and the ALARP approach to determine the best options to 
implement. Figure 50 shows the risk assessment and risk reduction selection process adopted, i.e. risk 
analysis, evaluation and management.  
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Figure 50: Selecting risk reduction measures (current railway safety method) 
Considering that the accuracy of these parameters are currently heavily dependent on a robust and 
significant degree of accident or failure data, the case for uncertainty in the analysis increases.  Weli and 
Todinov (2013a) establish that the results of the current approach have varying degrees of uncertainty 
and do not support the required minimum cost and effectiveness objective. This thesis demonstrates that 
the current conventional method for selecting risk reduction measures following the above risk 
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evaluation is limited in its ability to adequately support the overall risk management objective. In fact, 
this approach yields misleading results and incorrect risk reduction-related decisions.   
One of the primary requirements for risk reduction in the railway industry and similar safety-critical 
industries is that measures applied to reduce risks must be verifiable. This is a major challenge for the 
existing methods with their critical dependence on accident risk data. Currently, no practical and 
verifiable alternative exists for this selection.  Common sense suggests that the methodology must not be 
entirely dependent on historical accident data. A set of accident data is always associated with particular 
designs and conditions and cannot be entirely transferred to describe new designs and conditions. 
Accident frequencies relevant to old designs and conditions in general, cannot be extrapolated to new 
designs and conditions. Sensitivity analysis has been considered as a tool for preventing misleading 
results from risk analysis and subsequently from cost-benefit studies. However, sensitivity analysis 
methods have been shown to contribute to inaccuracies. Their limitations have been well documented in 
Cullen and Frey (1999); Menard (1995); Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986); Winer et al. (1991); Saltelli 
and Bolado (1998); Lindman (1974); Neter et al. (1996).  
In view of the number of fundamental weaknesses in the existing railway industry practice, this section 
proposes a new decision support approach, based on sound, comprehensive and structured engineering 
principles for identifying and selecting risk reduction measures. The opportunity to make this major 
improvement in the current railway risk management practice is the focus of this work. 
7.2.1 New approach based on fundamental, verifiable risk reduction principles  
Figure 50 illustrates the existing approach that is used to support investment decision-making on risk 
reduction for a typical railway project (same as Figure 51). Figure 51 further highlights the area X, which 
shows that the cost-benefit approach to risk reduction is based on prioritising and selecting the risk 
reduction measures according to their cost-benefit ratio. The effectiveness of existing approaches and 
tools cannot be verified as they are heavily reliant on historical data, which are neither representative nor 
reliable for accident costs and risk-reduction benefits. Furthermore, the historical data are not valid for 
new designs and new conditions. These circumstances significantly increase ambiguity in decisions; 
reduce the level of confidence in the selected risk management procedures; and make it impossible to 
develop a robust case for the railway safety application. 
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 Figure 51: Selecting risk reduction measures (region X introduces incorrect decisions) 
This focus of the new approach is to eliminate the inaccuracies introduced into selecting risk reduction 
measures within the highlighted region X. 
By using a ‘cost-of-failure’ (CoF) concept and the generic principles of risk reduction (Todinov, 2007) an 
appropriate set of generic risk-reduction principles can be formulated, specific to the railway industry, 
from which risk-reduction measures can be derived. Such measures reduce the likelihood of a railway 
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accident or its consequences in the event of the accident. Subsequently, the identified risk-reduction 
measures are assessed with regards to the amount of risk each of them removes and the cost of their 
implementation. Table 21 presents 24 key generic principles. They are referred to as ‘preventive’ if they 
reduce the likelihood of a railway accident or ‘protective’ if they reduce the consequences. Extensive 
details and work on the application of these principles are provided in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Table 21: Key risk reduction principles (preventive and protective). 
Principles for reducing the likelihood of an accident (Preventive) Principles for reducing the consequence of an accident 
(Protective) 
Built-in redundancy e.g. braking systems, route locking systems, 
position detection systems 
Protective barriers e.g. thermal barriers as passive protective 
systems for risk reduction 
Increased connectivity e.g. on-board train units. Delaying deterioration e.g. refurbishments  
Derating e.g. voltage alterations in track circuits for different 
operating temperatures 
Blocking pathways through which accidents escalate e.g. 
platform emergency plungers 
Reducing sensitivity to common cause failures e.g. design diversity in 
train control systems 
Introducing weak links e.g. Crash Energy Management (CEM) 
Minimising interfaces, complexities, weak links and connections e.g. 
use of closed communications networks 
Reducing the vulnerability of passengers e.g. platform CCTV 
or OPO -CCTV for stuck at door or falls between train and 
platform 
Simplification of operations e.g. use of software based systems to 
simplify application such as automating braking systems 
Use of fail-safe devices in isolation techniques e.g. stick relays 
to de-energise track circuitry following an accident 
Maintaining resistive forces and continuity of action e.g. wheel-slip 
and slide control 
Emergency response e.g. emergency timetables, incident 
systems, first aid tool kit  
Opposite effect modifications e.g. stressing track Degraded operations e.g. speed restrictions 
Operations frequency e.g. introducing trains into service to reduce 
overcrowding 
Damage arrestors e.g. over-voltage or surge protection 
Testing, inspections e.g. to detect latent faults  Exposure time e.g. crowd control  
Reducing human errors e.g. training of drivers, controllers, in-cab 
designs. 
Failure indications e.g. Automatic Warning System,  
Voting systems reducing the likelihood of erroneous signals; 
interlocks preventing a wrong sequence of actions (e.g. controls and 
signalling systems) 
Prediction, risk planning and trouble-shooting  e.g. use of 
leading and lagging indicators in risk reduction 
The region X is replaced with a well-defined and structured approach that replaces the highlighted 
activities. The proposed approach presented by Figure 52 is based on a comprehensive understanding of 
the functional capability of the risk reduction measures applied to specific railway risk scenarios. Chapters 
5 and 6 outline these functional capabilities by illustrating the strengths and limitations of preventive and 
protective measures in applying the fundamental risk reduction principles to the railway industry. 
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Figure 52: Simplified new risk assessment and options selection approach 
The process starts with assigning risk reduction measures to the different risk contributors or risk 
scenarios resulting in a major railway accident. Using the 24 key risk reduction principles, the measures 
are classified according to their potential for reducing the likelihood of the accident (preventive 
measures) or reducing the consequence of an accident (protective measures). Each risk reduction 
measure is also assessed in terms of the magnitude of removed risk and the costs of its implementation. 
A comparative analysis informs the decision-maker of risk reduction measures with similar attributes. 
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7.2.2 Application of the decision support methodology for cost effective selection of risk 
reduction measures 
The significant advantage of the proposed approach to the existing cost-benefit approach in selecting 
risk-reduction measures is clarified by the following simple example. Suppose that a budget of £3 million 
has been allocated for the reduction of platform train accidents i.e. reduction in accidents involving 
passengers and trains at the platform area. This is a major risk which is located in the high-risk region of 
the risk matrix. The first risk reduction option ‘A’ requires the driver to operate CCTV monitoring of the 
platform. The train will not be started if there are passengers stuck at the door, fallen onto the track or 
fallen between the train and platform. Option B includes stop plungers - wall mounted alarm devices at 
specified locations/intervals within the platform area - which can be operated by platform staff or 
passengers. Trains in the platform area will be brought to a halt by operating any of these plungers. 
Option C consists of gap fillers between the train and platform to reduce accidents where passengers fall 
into this area when boarding. The three key risk reduction options, A, B and C have been evaluated, and 
the corresponding magnitude of removed risk and costs are shown in Table 22. 
Table 22: Risk reduction measures with the associated costs and removed risks. 
Risk Reduction Measure Removed Risk 
[in millions £] 
Cost of measure 
[in millions £] 
Benefit/Cost ratio 
A (One person operated CCTV) 2.0 1.60 1.25 
B (Platform/passenger 
emergency stop plungers) 
1.5 1.57 0.95 
C (Gap Fillers) 1.2 1.3 0.92 
To remove the major risk of a ‘platform train accident’ from the high-risk region of the risk matrix, the 
risk of minimum magnitude £2.5 million must also be removed. If the cost-benefit approach is used, the 
first measure, A, with benefit-to-cost ratio greater than one, will be the only selected measure. Measures 
B and C will be ignored because their benefit-to-cost ratios are less than one. The magnitude of the 
removed risk within the specified budget is £2 million – insufficient to remove the major risk from the 
high-risk region of the risk matrix. In addition, the magnitude of the removed risk could be significantly 
larger, considering the specified budget of £3 million. According to the proposed new approach, options 
A and C should be selected, because this is the combination whose cost is still in the allocated budget of 
£3 million and the magnitude of the total removed risk is the largest. Furthermore, the magnitude of 
removed risk according to the proposed approach will be £3.2 million, 60% more than the amount of risk 
removed by using the cost-benefit approach. As a result, the amount of removed risk is sufficient to 
remove the ‘platform train accident’ from the high-risk region of the risk matrix. 
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By applying the decision support methodology with the fundamental, verifiable risk reduction principles 
presented in Figure 52, the example of the real-life case in Section 4.3.3 can effectively be eliminated. In 
this particular case, the use of the key risk reduction principles with the proposed systematic and 
iterative process would have identified the inherent flaws from the application of axle counters, thereby 
significantly reducing overall costs. The challenges of the axle counter application are also a clear 
demonstration of the existing gap between the infrastructure and maintenance or operations within the 
railway organisation. 
7.3 Evaluation of risk reduction implementation challenges in a railway 
organisation 
The gap between the selection of risk-reduction options and the task of their effective implementation 
results in compromised safety and substantial losses. An effective risk management system must 
necessarily integrate the evaluation phases with the implementation phase of a project.  
In a bid to continuously enhance safety and operational performance, the railway industry in the UK has 
invested several billions of pounds sterling into risk reduction and organisational structures. However, the 
best examples of risk management challenges and successes are relatively better published for other 
large-scale engineering projects as shown in the evaluations below. 
As established by Van Der Merwe (2002a), hardly any publications exist on the effect that strategy, 
structure, processes and projects have on one another. He argues that an integration of strategy, 
structure, processes and projects is required to facilitate the effective development of a business. In an 
earlier work, Van Der Merwe (2002b) points to the integration of organisational structure, control and 
prioritisation as three critical areas necessary for effective risk reduction within large and complex 
engineering projects. 
The key relationship between design, implementation and operational losses has been addressed in 
Hobbs and Andersen (2001), Neil and Fenton (2005) and Williams et al. (1995). Busby (1998) finds that 
feedback to designers is often unreliable, delayed, negative and sometimes non-existent. The study 
further shows that designers failed to learn from the feedback available, leading to development of plans 
that are at odds with past outcomes and repeat previous errors. 
Millera and Lessard (2001) define risk on large engineering projects as the possibility that events, their 
resulting impact and dynamic interaction may turn out differently from what was expected. The risk of 
not completing the project is subdivided into technical, construction and operational risks. A study on 
how design errors can severely jeopardise safety and contribute to failures in construction and 
engineering projects, with devastating economic, environmental and social consequences, is presented 
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by Love et al. (2011).  In this article, design errors are described as a symptom of dysfunctional 
organisational and managerial practices. Holzmann and Spiegler (2011) state that comprehensive product 
description and product requirements exert essential influences on the risk patterns of IT organisations. 
By comparing product architecture to organisational structure, Gokpinar et al. (2010) describe the 
failures in large-scale product development processes as a misalignment of the organisation to the 
product. The authors point to two fundamental challenges: (i) the assignment of people to parts and 
subsystems that make up the product and (ii) the effective collaboration in the performance of design 
tasks. This is further supported by studies on railway organisational failures, primarily as a result of the 
misalignment between architectural/technical interdependence and organisational communication. 
Hansen (2002); Carlile (2002); Contractor and Monge (2002); Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). 
The risk of failure of large projects is a direct function of the level of interdependency among numerous 
parameters such as time, cost, scope, safety, environment, security and health.  Within a project, the 
existence of interrelated risks naturally results in triggering one risk from another risk and creating 
propagation phenomena such as reaction chains, amplification chains and loops. Using a network theory-
based analysis, Fang et al. (2012) proposed a risk reduction technique for failure within large projects. 
The paper also states that the risk of failure is caused by the lack of capacity to anticipate and control 
complex interactions. Corbett et al. (2002); Schlindwein and Ison (2004) and Baccarini (1996) share the 
same view. However, Vidal et al. (2011) goes further by proposing that the key factors that drive 
complexity are project size, variety, interdependence and context. 
The underpinning requirement for an effective organisation is that the latter must successfully assimilate 
and implement technology, and manage interactions between the source and the recipient of 
technology. The capacity to efficiently act on knowledge is argued to be a critical activity that determines 
the readiness and value of an organisation’s structure (Wong et al. 1998). To build on this point, it is 
important to note that any effort towards risk reduction must comprehensively consider the source of 
risk and the receiver, before any claims for effective risk reduction can be made. According to Ahonena 
and Savoleinena (2010), the primary causes of failure for major engineering projects are: the lack of 
understanding of users’ and operational needs, poor staffing decisions, tight schedules and extensions to 
the functionality of an existing product without a comprehensive understanding of the technical 
challenges. 
The studies on the effectiveness of technology innovation, implementation and risk reduction have 
accumulated and advanced over a number of decades. The partitioning and interdependency of risks 
associated with the conceptualisation and execution phase are best presented by McFarlan (1992). 
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Innovation is partitioned into an initiation phase and an implementation phase, as shown in Zaltman et 
al. (1973). Within an organisation, high complexity, high diversity, low formalisation and low 
centralisation are most conducive during the initiation phase, whilst low complexity, low diversity, high 
formalisation and high centralisation are most conducive at the implementation stage. In line with this 
theory, Baker and Sweeney (1978) demonstrate the potential constraints arising from inadequate specific 
knowledge of the project and the mutual self-reinforcing relationship between organisational structure 
and project. A later study by Remenyi and Heafield (1996) also pointed out that organisational structure, 
corporate culture and people are primary risks. 
The risk of failure during implementation is three-dimensional in project size, experience with the 
technology and organisational structure. Willcocks and Margetts (1991), Bessant (1991) cite amongst 
other factors, the lack of organisational adaptation to complement technological change. An example of 
inappropriate applications is the introduction of new trains in small tunnels when it would have been 
easier to introduce advanced vehicle controllers only, at lower cost.  Other important factors contributing 
to the risk of failure are the lack of skills to support implementation and the lack of exploration of a wide 
range of options. 
These studies clearly demonstrate that the organisational structure is impacted by the risk reduction 
options selected and vice versa. Consequently, for effective risk reduction, it is mandatory to establish 
the relationship between risk reduction at the initiation stage (i.e. the stage of identifying and assessing 
risk reduction options) and risk reduction at the implementation (operational) stage, where there is a 
significant contribution from the organisation and users. Figure 53 illustrates the weaknesses in the 
implementation phase that could partially or fully compromise the high level of potential risk reduction 
achieved at the initiation stage. In order to achieve and maintain a maximum risk reduction, the 
organisation must demonstrate readiness for acceptance and effective implementation of the risk 
reduction options identified at the initiation phase. These may include new techniques, technologies, 
processes etc. 
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Figure 53: A Risk Reduction Curve due to a poor implementation of the risk-reduction options selected at the 
initiation stage 
During the initiation or concept phase, the risk reduction evaluation effort is controlled by a complete 
and well-defined set of safety requirements. During the implementation phase, the integration of several 
options has the potential to expose an organisation to unanticipated problems and vulnerabilities. The 
novelty of the risk reduction measures plays a major role in the implementation stage. At the initiation 
stage, the scope of integration activities to be performed for novel measures must be identified and well 
defined with all potential integration risks assessed and prioritised. In effect, introducing risk reduction 
measures without proving their integration at the earliest possible opportunity means that the overall 
risk reduction objective can be defeated.  
These problems are further compounded by an inefficient organisation. The specification of requirements 
must identify potential stakeholders. This ensures that the proposed solution is not only cost effective 
(i.e. feasible and affordable), but also guarantees the required levels of risk reduction. Most system 
engineering applications use system context diagrams and system architecture to identify all interfaces 
and provide an overview of the interface risks. Each interface can then be assigned an owner who will be 
the stakeholder at the interface. This individual will have the technical authority to influence progress 
and manage risks relating to the interface up to closure. 
On a large and complex project, the primary requirement for maximum risk reduction within a fixed 
budget is that the selection of risk reduction measures complies with the risk reduction potential and the 
budget constraints. This also requires a methodology that facilitates a comprehensive evaluation of the 
selected options.  All operating modes (normal, degraded and abnormal) and the transitions between 
them should be considered. The way in which the systems will be operated, including the capacity and 
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competence of personnel involved, operational arrangements and processes need to be fully understood 
in order to address the full set of possible operational scenarios. The integrated systems in the risk 
reduction exercise are a complex combination of people, processes and supporting structures (i.e. 
equipment or tools), whose interaction must be fully understood in order to achieve efficient risk 
reduction. 
7.3.1 Inter-relationship between risk reduction evaluation and implementation 
The introduction of new techniques, technologies or processes into the railways is usually associated with 
complexity and uncertainty. Whitty and Maylor (2009) qualify projects as dynamically or structurally 
complex and broadly dependent on project elements and interactions that are subject to change. This 
results in unpredictability, uncertainty and emergent behaviours. Structural complexities, on the other 
hand, are quantifiable and predictable, which provides an opportunity for better management. 
Koppenjana et al. (2011) provide insight into the complexities and uncertainties involved in the risk 
reduction and effective management of large railway projects, in cases where there is predictability and 
in-built flexibility in the organisational structure.   
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NO LINK BETWEEN RISK EVALUATION & DECISION-MAKING (OPTION SELECTION) TO ORGANISATIONAL PREPAREDNESS & STRUCTURE 
 
Figure 54:  A system analysis is necessary for the effective implementation of the selected risk reduction 
options.  
Figure 54 provides a simple illustration of the interactions and dependencies between risk reduction 
measures and the application environment, which includes people, processes and equipment necessary 
for effective implementation. This figure raises a fundamental question – is the railway organisation 
adequately built to facilitate the implementation of the selected risk-reduction options? In the current 
system, there is no link between the evaluation phase and the implementation phase of risk-reduction. 
A simple practical illustration is the application of a number of risk reduction options to reduce the 
Collision Between Trains accident. The options are generally classed as (A) brake assist systems; (B) 
collision warning systems and (C) intelligent speed adaptation systems. These three options achieve the 
risk reduction because of their inherent operational characteristics. In practice, these options are not 
mutually exclusive and an investment in all options (A, B and C) is often required to achieve effective risk 
reduction. While for risk reduction options which are relatively independent, the application of dynamic 
programming techniques is fully justifiable and leads to a significant risk reduction within a fixed budget 
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Todinov and Weli (2013), additional (systems) analysis is needed for correlated risk reduction options. In 
cases where some of the options are incompatible (i.e., cannot be applied simultaneously) or in cases 
where the effective risk reduction from the application of one option requires the application of another 
option, the blind application of mathematical optimisation tools may not result in the expected risk 
reduction. 
The limitations, the required conditions, and existing interactions among the risk-reduction options 
should be thoroughly understood and accurately specified.   
Additional risk reduction options, typically introduced in railway safety to reduce the Collision Between 
Trains accidents include: extension of signals, train movement rules, incident response systems, train 
driver training, speed restrictions, wheel-slide protection systems, In-cab design modifications, 
operational testing and maintenance, emergency timetables, track inspections and refurbishment, one-
person (driver) operated closed circuit television, etc. 
Consequently, a number of additional measures can be combined with the selected options A, B and C to 
achieve a significant risk reduction: 
Option A: Brake assist system + (operational testing and maintenance, train driver training, one person-operated 
closed circuit television) 
Option B: Collision warning systems + (train driver training, in-cab design modifications, speed restrictions, 
emergency timetables) 
Option C: Intelligent speed adaptation + (Train movement rules, wheel-slide protection, extension of signals, 
emergency timetables) 
For example, investing in brake assist systems (Option A) without investing in operational testing and 
maintenance does not permit a long term risk-reduction benefit from investing in expensive brake assist 
systems. Option A also requires investment in testing and maintenance if a long-term risk-reduction 
effect is to be achieved. Similarly, investing solely in collision warning systems (Option B) without 
simultaneously investing in driver education and training does not result in a tangible risk reduction 
benefit from applying solely Option B. As a result, if Option B is to have a tangible risk-reduction effect, 
investment in another risk reduction option (‘driver training and education’) is necessary. In fact, without 
driver training and education, there may not be any risk reduction benefit from the purchase of 
expensive collision warning systems. 
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7.3.2 Risk Reduction Readiness Model 
There is surprisingly little research on the risks involved in the implementation of risk-reduction measures 
within the railway organisation. Current studies, mostly of organisations’ internal risk management 
practices are limited in scope and cannot be generalised. In addition, there are no standard measures of 
effectiveness for the implementation of risk reduction options, until an accident occurs. Most ALARP or 
risk management studies have been limited to identification, evaluation and options selection without 
any supporting analysis on the applicability of the selected options within the railway organisation. Any 
knowledge in this area is hardly ever recorded and definitely not incorporated in existing safety and 
business cases, despite the potentially severe financial and safety consequences. The existing safety and 
business cases do not analyse the risk reduction measures in relation to their mutual correlation, 
suitability and implications for the organisation. Without an organisational readiness to support effective 
implementation of the selected risk-reduction options, the existing safety and business cases are 
inadequate and weak. 
The major determinants of cost, schedule and risk reduction is the people-process-systems triad 
discussed in the system engineering approach (Section 7.1). Out of these, process is often considered the 
glue that keeps the triad together. Interestingly, Lockamy and McCormack (2004) use the concept of 
process maturity (which assumes that progress towards a goal comes in stages) to examine the 
relationship between supply chain management process maturity and performance. The paper further 
suggests a supply chain management process ‘maturity model’ for enhanced performance in this area. 
The concept proposes that a process has a lifecycle that is assessed by the extent to which the process is 
explicitly defined, managed, measured and controlled. The concept also implies growth in the areas of 
process capability, richness and consistency across the entire organisation. 
Within an organisation that controls risks, ambiguous specifications and requirements for risk reduction, 
lack of clarity on the inter-relationships between risks, risk reduction options and the associated 
functions are major negative factors. The issues related to managing multiple projects such as 
prioritisation, selection and resource allocation in multi-functional organisations, are well defined in 
Patanakul and Milosevic (2009); Seider (2006); Hendriks et al. (1999); Nobeoka and Cusumano (1995). 
These issues are very similar to managing and implementing multiple risk reduction measures. 
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Figure 55: Parallelism between the implementation of multi-functional projects and the implementation of 
risk reduction measures. 
The left-hand side of Figure 55 illustrates the key stages of effective management of projects. The 
essential stages in the implementation of risk reduction measures are provided in parallel (the right-
hand side of the figure). The diagram clearly illustrates an existing parallelism. The benefit of an 
improved organisational readiness has another, very important dimension: the capability to address 
unanticipated risks. These circumstances cannot be predicted, and are ‘unknown unknowns’ or 
‘black swans’ (Taleb, 2007). However, we do know they might occur. Improving the risk knowledge, 
the safety culture in the organisation, and the level of general risk protection measures are effective 
barriers to unknown unknowns. 
A change in the organisation structure may be necessary to effectively implement particular risk 
reduction options. This is the case when considering two options to eliminate wrong-side failures 
(i.e. failures leading to catastrophic consequences) for spring-applied parking brakes by either  
Enhancing testing and maintenance regimes or  
Replacement with new braking systems.  
Selecting and implementing enhancing testing and maintenance regimes, for example, requires 
specific organisation changes, (such as developing an organisation with emphasis on maintenance 
and testing rather than one with key expertise in design and manufacturing) for maximising risk 
reduction. These organisational changes are driven not only by cost considerations. More 
importantly, they are the only way to guarantee that effective risk reduction will be maintained 
through the life of the operation. In common industry practice for selection of risk-reduction 
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options, no publication, significant work or structured guide exists beyond the standard risk 
evaluation methods based on cost-benefit analysis (CBA). In fact, the existing approach does not 
consider the organisational structure (people, processes and tools/equipment) and its preparedness 
for the selection, evaluation and implementation of the risk reduction measures. The consequences 
of this lack of appropriate structure are: 
 Incorrect evaluation of risk-reduction options, resulting in: 
o Reduced safety levels 
o Increased implementation costs 
o Inaccurate prioritisation of the risk reduction measures 
o Incorrect estimation of residual risks  
o Inaccurate risk profile 
 Misalignment of selected risk-reduction options with the organisational capability and 
management structure, which leads to 
o Increased risk of failure to gain approval for the selected risk-reduction measures 
o Increased implementation costs 
o Inadequate implementation leading to degraded safety levels 
Considering these consequences and existing practices, four distinct levels of readiness for 
implementing risk reduction have been identified for railway organisations. Table 23 presents the 
Risk-reduction readiness levels for railway organisations. 
Table 23: Classification of railway organisations - level of risk-reduction readiness 
Risk Reduction Readiness 
Levels 
Strategy Description 
Level – 1  Reactive level No risk reduction strategy. Reactive approach to risk management 
(dealing with risks as they materialise) 
Level – 2 Basic level Basic risk reduction based only on qualitative assessment and 
measures (e.g. by using risk matrix) 
Level – 3 Normative level Risk reduction based on cost-benefit analysis, which involves 
quantification of risk reduction options in terms of benefit and cost).  
 
No methodology for selecting risk-reduction options. No 
consideration of the interaction among risk reduction options. No 
optimisation in selecting the risk reduction options. No 
consideration of the impact of the selected options on the 
organisation and the environment. No consideration of the required 
organisational changes needed for the implementation of the 
selected options. 
Level – 4  Optimal level Risk reduction is based on a systematic approach impacting the risk 
option selection, the precise quantification of removed risk and the 
optimal selection of risk reduction options.  
The impact of the selected options on the organisation and the 
environment is part of the analysis. The required organisational 
changes needed for the implementation of the selected options are 
carefully considered and specified. 
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Organisations at Levels 1 to 3 do not provide any support for maximising risk reduction within fixed 
budgets. This increases an organisation’s vulnerability to inaccurate assessments of risk and selecting 
weak and inefficient risk reduction options at escalating costs. The proposed classification, based on 
fundamental principles of risk reduction and systems engineering is an initiative with the potential to 
provide a Level-4 framework that supports risk evaluation, optimal options selection and ultimately 
permits organisations to maximise risk reduction within fixed budgets. The proposed classification 
also bridges the gap between evaluation and selection of risk reduction options and specifying 
adequate organisational structure for their effective implementation. 
7.4 A new classification of risk reduction options 
As established, integrating risk evaluation with primary operational functions is a fundamental 
requirement for successfully making the case for the selected options. This requirement is especially valid 
to industries where risk management drives investment and decisions. Bessis (2002) and ROGS expound 
on the topic related to effective management of operational risks. These risks are defined as event risks 
and to effectively handle the risks of potential losses, categorisation of events is necessary. This serves as 
a receptacle for accident data gathering on frequencies and costs. A tentative categorisation for 
managing potential operational losses is further provided as People, Processes, and Systems. 
The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations requires that the infrastructure 
operator and maintainer of the railways demonstrate how safety risks will effectively be managed and 
whether the infrastructure operator and maintainer have the ability, commitment and resources to 
comply with the regulations. This is generally addressed by: 
 Demonstrating capability, commitment and availability of resources to manage safety 
risks; 
 The safety case which provides a framework against which regular assessments, risk 
control measures and management systems are established and maintained;  
 The safety case assures regulators that the risks associated with operations have been assessed and all 
reasonably practicable controls have been implemented to reduce the risks. 
The areas that are considered safety-critical and have a direct impact on the successful prevention of 
accidents on the railways are typically signalling and train control (communication systems); train driving 
and train operations; train manufacture, maintenance and refurbishment; installation, renewal and 
maintenance, faulting and inspection of infrastructure; safety of passengers on trains; passenger and 
visitor movement on stations and platforms; on-track machine manufacture, maintenance and 
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refurbishment. The major risks that are to be reduced are the risk of derailment, risk of collision between 
trains and risks related to the passenger train interface.   
Following the argument that effective risk management must integrate the two phases of initiation 
(evaluation) and implementation, a categorisation of risk reduction measures that best addresses a 
standard railway industry portfolio is introduced. The introduction of a structured approach based on 
categorising the options for reducing major accidents, reflects the standard railway organisational 
structure. By categorising these options into design, operational, procedural and technical options, it is 
guaranteed that the efforts of the implementation facilitators (people, processes and supporting 
systems) are systematically harmonised. The categorisation effectively simplifies a complex register of 
risk reduction options and combination of options into a format that reflects the typical railway 
organisational structure and helps reduce the gap between the evaluation and implementation phases.  
The categorisation includes: 
 Design risk-reduction options (DRRO) – Novel systems, major renewals and modifications  
 Operational risk-reduction options (ORRO) – Communications, Supervision and Speed 
Restrictions or similar operational decisions 
 Technical risk-reduction options (TRRO) – Testing, Maintenance, Inspections, Installations, 
Assessments/Studies informing risk reduction decisions 
 Procedural risk-reduction options (PRRO) – Risk education, Risk training, Processes and Plans 
Each risk reduction option, within each group, is based on sound engineering principles for risk reduction. 
Theoretical considerations, reliability, risk modelling, field-testing and historical track records have 
proved the effectiveness of each of these options. The introduction of these options reduces the 
complexity of selecting risk reduction options for different applications. At the same time, the 
classification guarantees that no efficient risk-reduction option is missed at the evaluation phase. 
Consequently, this classification will be particularly useful for major railway projects with numerous 
possible risk reduction options, typically reflecting all aspects of the standard railway organisational 
operations including: design, maintenance, testing, new technologies etc. combined with people, 
processes and equipment. Table 24 presents a structured categorisation that supports the option 
selection and the evaluation of individual options or combination of options. The systematic process of 
categorising the risk reduction options and aligning them with the existing organisational functions also 
supports the identification and assignment of responsibilities for effective implementation. Table 24 and 
Figure 56 also illustrate the relationship between the major accident hazards, risk reduction measures 
and the direct link with the organisational instruments – people, process and equipment. Figure 56 also 
depicts the role of the proposed categorisation for effective risk reduction. 
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Table 24: Categorisation of risk-reduction options in the railway industry. 
RISK REDUCTION OPTIONS EXAMPLES OF RISK REDUCTION OPTIONS Key Function(s) for 
implementation 
DESIGN OPTIONS (DRRO) 
Novel Systems, Major Renewals, Design 
Modifications (Capital Intensive Projects) 
1. Signalling replacements and modifications - 
automatic signalling and control systems 
2. Optimising cab design for driver protection 
Chief Engineer, System Integration, 
Programme Directorate, Project 
Management 
TECHNICAL OPTIONS (TRRO) 
 
Testing, Maintenance, Inspections, 
Installations, Assessments/Studies 
1. Improving inspection, testing and 
maintenance regime for detection of wheel flat 
and worn wheels 
2. Signal positioning studies and potential 
extension of distances between signals  
Technical Assurance, Civil and 
Power Engineering, Signalling 
Systems Engineering, Train 
Systems Engineering, Asset 
Management 
PROCEDURAL OPTIONS (PRRO) 
 
Risk education and training, Processes and 
Plans. 
1. Risk education and training of key personnel 
2. Amendments to train despatch rules 
3. Review and improvement of recruitment and 
selection processes 
Infrastructure and Systems 
Protection, Training Management 
or Organisational Development.  
OPERATIONAL OPTIONS (ORRO) 
Communications, Supervision and Speed 
restrictions 
1. Crowd Control 
2. Speed restrictions (adhesion) 
Operational Engineering, 
Telecommunications Systems 
Engineering 
The clear outline of the roles and responsibilities within the risk reduction exercise ensures that resources 
such as finances, technical expertise, information, systems and equipment, medical facilities etc., 
necessary for implementing the measures are available and appropriately targeted. In the risk reduction 
effort, undertaking emergency and preparedness planning, immediate post-accident actions and 
response is absolutely essential. The inter-relationships between departments participating in the risk 
reduction operation can be used for developing measured strategies for accident prevention and 
protection. Throughout the project lifecycle, the clearly defined inter-relationships between departments 
ensure that the railway operations also make it possible to take advantage of the many technical 
resources that already exist within the organisation. 
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 Figure 56: Categorisation of risk-reduction options, risk management and the organisation  
The proposed classification promotes a comprehensive understanding of the risks resulting in an accident 
and provides a strong support to the Lessons learned database. It provides a direct and strong support to 
the comprehensive check lists related to known accident scenarios which is an important tool for 
identifying possible accident and failure scenarios. The proposed methodology also draws on concepts 
from organisational theory and optimisation of risk reduction as introduced by Weli and Todinov (2013). 
However, by considering the intricate interrelations between risk reduction options and the 
organisational interdependences, it goes beyond the development in Weli and Todinov’s paper and 
promotes a novel framework that bridges the divide between the identification and implementation of 
risk reduction measures within railway organisations. 
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7.4.1 Readiness for effective risk reduction 
A significant amount of effort towards risk reduction in the railway industry is associated with major 
renewal projects. The renewal projects are usually large-scale engineering undertakings that provide the 
railways with necessary modifications and improvements. Along with reducing particular risks, these 
projects introduce new risks to railway operations. Consequently, essential risk reduction measures are 
considered and implemented to ensure that the safety integrity of the railways is not compromised, and 
where possible, improved. The new risks result from altering fundamental operational parameters such 
as increasing number of trains to cater for a greater passenger volume or the removal of speed limits to 
meet operational schedules. The situation is complicated considering that these changes are weather-
dependent – they are different during different times of the year. The challenges facing the railway 
industry are the unrelenting pressures to reduce cost, improvements for customers and pressure to 
maximise the use of the asset base. 
However, the organisational changes and modifications, every time a big renovation project is initiated, 
are very costly. A railway organisation that has not taken the necessary steps to a dynamic and flexible 
organisation in relation to risk reduction, easily incurs significant implementation costs. The significant 
increase in implementation costs usually deters the selection of appropriate risk reduction options to 
achieve a maximum risk reduction.  
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Figure 57: New operational modifications and the process of risk reduction associated with the new risks. 
By adopting the proposed categorisation technique, the organisation is less likely to invest in new 
organisational development and re-structuring schemes that facilitate the required modifications.  
The comprehensive decision-support framework provided by the proposed categorisation strengthens 
the assurance case for organisational readiness prior to gaining approval to operate. Essentially, it is 
recommended that to achieve a maximum risk reduction within financial constraints, the concept of 
‘Readiness for effective risk reduction’ be stipulated as a fundamental process requirement in railway 
safety cases.  
It is essential that modifications and potential changes to the operating parameters leading to 
modifications are properly assessed and not imposing fundamental changes on an existing railway 
organisation. Without the structure proposed, any rapid evolution of the railway organisation will 
certainly result in excessive implementation costs. By improving an organisation's readiness to implement 
effective risk reduction, significant cost savings and improved safety levels can be secured. 
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7.4.2 The DOPT Assurance Case  
The existing safety and business cases that support project acceptance provide insufficient guarantees 
that the organisation is ready and capable of undertaking massive safety-related projects. Conversely the 
Design-Operational-Procedural-Technical (DOPT) methodology provides the decision maker with a 
structured, simplified and easily understood technique.  
DOPT classification is derived from basic principles of risk reduction and systems engineering to address 
the existing gap between the initiation (evaluation) phase of risk reduction options and the 
implementation phase. The DOPT methodology creates a common categorisation of risk reduction 
measures that best addresses a standard railway industry portfolio. 
The DOPT methodology requires a thorough understanding of the budget location methodology. This 
means that as a minimum, the capability of the measure to reduce the likelihood of the accident or its 
consequences must be thoroughly understood. The DOPT concept permits effective planning of human 
resources, spheres of responsibilities and equipment engaged, taking into account the capabilities of the 
railway organisation. The clear outline of the roles and responsibilities in the context of risk reduction 
ensures that resources such as finance, technical expertise, information, systems and equipment, medical 
facilities etc., required for implementing the measures are available and appropriately targeted. 
A framework for reducing the duplication of effort is provided using DOPT as it supports further 
considerations of whether the organisation or specific departments within the organisation are better 
placed to implement the risk reduction measure or combination of measures for any particular risk. The 
technique also creates a common risk-reduction platform between departments to ensure synergy in the 
risk-reduction effort. It supports technical co-operation for the effective use of preventive and protective 
risk reduction measures. It establishes and implements robust accident prevention programmes and 
mitigates against the consequences of an accident.  
Most importantly, the Level-4 Risk Reduction Readiness that supports risk evaluation and optimal options 
selection permits organisations to maximise risk reduction within a fixed budget. The use of a 
methodology similar to the proposed DOPT methodology is a hallmark of an organisation possessing a 
superior level of risk-reduction readiness. 
7.5 Risk reduction (safety) in contracts / procurement 
All projects have an element of risk within the contract from which they have been set up. From the 
initiation stage of a project, establishing a proactive risk management system significantly increases the 
likelihood of meeting the overall risk reduction objectives. In general, for progressive risk reduction at all 
levels of an organisation, technical co-ordination or management is a fundamental requirement.  
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A management framework that includes techniques for insuring contracts assures competency within the 
supply chain, and reduces the safety risks introduced by contracts. The detrimental effect of the 
unknown risks and more specifically, the difficulty in predicting the extent of risks introduced by 
contracts necessitates substantial compensations for long-term projects.  This translates into an 
accumulation of risk premiums throughout the project supply chain. The exponential growth in such 
premiums further translates into higher charges for the services provided. The growth in risk premiums 
reflects the inability to manage risks rather than a more efficient transfer of risk responsibilities (Ng and 
Loosemore, 2007). Wagner and Bode (2007) agree that the supply chain risks are also triggered by a 
series of catastrophic events that have disrupted economies and supply chains around the globe. These 
events, including numerous examples from the railway industry, increase the need for emphasis on the 
vulnerability of contracts and supply chains. 
Descriptive examples of major UK railway projects that have faced considerable criticism due to failure of 
contracts are well documented. Through a brief evaluation, this work confirms the vital role played by 
contracts in risk reduction measures selection and implementation. Most importantly, they propose a 
simplified approach to elimination, and where this cannot be achieved, at least to reduction of the impact 
from incorrectly specified contracts. 
7.5.1 UK Railway Contracts – Public Private Partnerships 
Due to the capital-intensive requirements of undertaking major railway projects such as the London 
Underground renewal projects, the Sydney Metro project, Beijing Metro and similar projects in Hong 
Kong, Singapore, China and the USA, there is an increasing move towards shared public/government and 
private financing initiatives. 
Most major UK railway contracts are in one form or another of public private partnerships (PPP). The 
majority of railway failures or accidents during a PPP project period are quite easily labelled ‘contractual’. 
This suggests that the flaws in these PPP contracts are generally perceived by the customer as the root 
cause, and requires a change in the existing frameworks. In the case of the UK railways, the customers 
are the passenger and tax payers. Examples of these contract debacles are those of the London 
Underground PPP, the West Coast Main Line project, and the operational railway contracts debacle that 
recently generated significant issues between two major train operators and the Department for 
Transport (DfT). The potential effects on safety risks as a result of the PPP contracts were furiously 
debated by the House of Commons (2002) and are of great concern to the public and taxpayer. However, 
evidence that the PPP contracts negatively impacted railway safety is not as widely documented. 
The PPP, an evolving concept, is essentially an arrangement by which private parties participate in, or 
provide support for the provision of infrastructure-based services. PPPs are not a typical public 
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procurement, which involves the public sector purchasing an asset. Rather, a PPP system involves the 
purchase of a stream of services, defined in a detailed service agreement.  (Ng and Loosemore, 2007) 
classify risks in PPP projects into two main groups: general risks or project risks and affirms that special 
risks associated with PPP procurement process are to be considered. Structured arguments against PPP 
with regards to contracts and procurement are presented in Jones (2002); Moore and Muller (1989); 
Grimsey and Lewis (2004). These criticisms relate to the significant risks retained by the procurer; and 
exorbitant risk-related service charges for the public. These contracts are not economically viable; they 
introduce a greater degree of waste and rework as a result of complex and long tendering, and excessive 
post-tendering negotiation. The last two issues are caused by the additional need to satisfy several 
stakeholders, and the complexity of contracts. 
Jean Shaoul (2002) analyses the implications of the LU PPP cost structure and evaluates the methodology 
for appraising the PPP. She finds that the methodology cannot be relied on to provide sound decision-
making tool for London Underground, as the risk reduction methodology does not account for additional 
risks introduced by PPP. In concluding the evaluation, the paper states that the main risks are those that 
arise from technical obsolescence, changing regulation and demand. The paper also identifies important 
factors, albeit not directly safety-related but noteworthy, to illustrate the weaknesses in one of the most 
publicised UK railway PPP contracts. The obvious weaknesses in the contract that resonates in the 
current economic state include: 
 No consideration of the impact of any recession during the 15-year period on passenger 
numbers. This has proved to be detrimental to the implementation of the contracts. 
 Assumption that the cost of operating passenger services will decline, even though the new 
organisational structure has resulted in additional costs. 
Considering that primary public objective of any contract is ‘Value for Money’, while a primary private 
objective is profit maximisation, Gordon et al. (2013a) raise the question ‘How can the interests and 
objectives of contractual partners be aligned in the contract?’ Gordon et al. (2013b) further propose that 
the solution to this lies in appropriate incentives and results in ‘optimal contracting’. The two explicit 
incentive elements presented are performance payments, penalties and appropriate risk allocation. The 
implicit incentives include performance targets met during tender or contracting process, design, 
contract term and the institutional structures or formations. 
Following an evaluation of different literature on achieving effective risk allocation PPP contracts, Ke et 
al. (2010) present a comparative analysis of risk allocation preferences. For the scope of this work, the 
comprehensive list is reduced to directly illustrate the potential safety-related risk factors and allocation 
preferences in the PPP contracts evaluated (Table 25): 
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Table 25: Risk allocation preferences for safety-related contract risk factors 
Risk factor Risk Definition Risk allocation 
Availability of finance Potential difficulties in financing the tasks Private 
Improper design Neglect of inherent design safety principles Private 
Quality risk The absence of demonstrable evidence that a basic quality 
management process has been followed may signify 
underlying risks – heavily weighted on unknowns 
Private 
Site safety Responsibility for customers (or passengers) and workers 
(staff) 
Private 
Design changes Unanticipated changes and errors in the design resulting from 
improper specifications 
Public 
Unproven engineering technologies The technology adopted being immature or unable to meet 
requirements – including technology qualification risks 
Private 
Operator defaults Operations cost overrun resulting from improper 
measurement, ill-planned schedules or low operation 
efficiency 
Private 
Frequency of maintenance High level of intervention on systems affecting operations and 
potentially compromising system integrity 
Private 
Residual assets risk Assets transferred to the asset owner at the end of the 
concession period normally have residual risks that must be 
addressed prior to handover 
Private 
Condition of facility Unavailability of supporting facilities to achieve safety and 
performance requirements 
Private 
Weather Poor or unexpected weather conditions resulting in rail/wheel 
interface risks or increased likeli-hood of failure/accident 
Public 
Changes in industrial codes of practice Inconsistency in technical standards influencing the scope and 
function of the tasks 
Shared 
Project Approval and Permits Delay or refusal of project approval and permit Shared 
Organisation and co-ordination  An increase of transaction cost or a dispute may occur 
because of  improper organisation and coordination 
Shared 
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In a thorough assessment of the well-publicised condemnation of the London Underground PPP 
contracts, Jupe (2009) argues that public transport PPPs require complex contracts underpinned by 
regulatory mechanisms in order to maintain performance and safety standards. Additionally, the paper 
insists that risk transfer is difficult to achieve, as essential infrastructure cannot be left to the ultimate 
market discipline of bankruptcy. Critiques from the House of Commons Select Committee on Transport 
identified serious concerns from implementation of the PPP contracts that could potentially compromise 
safety as: 
1. The complexity of the management arrangements of the contracts  
2. The conflicts with safe working practices as a result of the pressure to deliver required 
improvements under the contract performance regime 
3. Shortage of funds constraining capacity improvements 
4. Constraints on risk transfer 
5. Impossibility of quantifying some key (subjective) factors in the assessment of value for money  
Liu and Wilkinson (2013a) show that for a successful PPP contract the following key features must be 
considered: 
1. Sound business case development 
2. Streamlined financial agreements 
3. Robust tendering 
4. Effective governance and partnership-based consortium   
5. Realistic risk allocation 
Despite the criticisms of government and private partnerships or initiatives, Sarathy (2006) maintains that 
such partnerships are required to improve safety and security in the supply chain. 
The concept of partnering underlines that mutual objectives between the parties should be agreed upon 
and regularly reviewed. Prior to the partnerships that blighted the railway industry, it was expected that 
the partnering concept would provide an opportunity for continuous improvement of overall risk 
reduction, including safety performance. Partnering was entertained and indeed adopted on major UK 
railway projects as it provided an ideal opportunity to move away from prescriptive- to performance-
based legislation in the regulation and implementation of safety Matthews and Rowlinson (1999). A 
comprehensive study on the effectiveness of safety-based incentives in PPP contracts has been used to 
demonstrate that the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the 
reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents (Rangel et al., 2012). 
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With this in mind, it is necessary to formulate a framework that will have a credible effect on 
understanding and improving deliberations and agreements on major railway contracts. The safety risks 
introduced by such partnerships should be well defined and subsequently assessed prior to contract 
awards or agreements. The approach of using basic engineering and management principles is illustrated 
as effective in the next section where different techniques are developed for managing the complexities 
of safety contracts resulting in product failures. 
7.5.2 Supply Chain risk reduction – product safety and recalls 
Immediate commercial and safety risks associated with an incorrectly specified contract agreement 
between a client and the contractor include integration risks, maintenance or intervention, increased 
product recalls and the risk of failure to gain approval as a result of design failure. In the specific area of 
managing risks associated with product recalls, Pyke and Tang (2010) use the continuous improvement 
process to support the 3-R approach. The 3-R approach uses three parameters: readiness, responsiveness 
and recovery for managing product safety and recalls. Kumar and Schmitz (2011) also present an active 
application of Six Sigma in the control of risks of product recalls. An intriguing article by Hora et al. (2011) 
provides a good analysis of the impact of the time to recall defective products, its impact on safety risk 
and the role of the supply chain in risk reduction. This paper strongly argues that the relationship 
between time to recall and effectiveness of the recalling organisation’s supply chain depends on: 
 The recall strategy (preventive vs. reactive) adopted by the firm; 
 The type of product defect (manufacturing defect vs. design flaw);  
 The supply chain entity that issues the recall 
There has also been a steady increase in publications and research work in the area of product safety as it 
relates to supply chain risks. Notable works include Kleinforder and Saad (2005) whose interesting 
combination of supply chain agility, supply chain optimisation, supply chain information sharing, flexibility 
and modularity, total quality management (TQM) and contingency planning is effectively demonstrated 
as a good management approach. The use of TQM could be appreciated and justifiable if focus is 
primarily on the bottom-line. The neglect of product quality and safety is identified by Minhyung (2010) 
as the major reason for the substantial and widely publicised 2010 Toyota recalls. Other works by Tang 
(2006); Lee et al. (2008) are equally noteworthy.  With a view to evaluating the effect of the global supply 
chain in creating or exacerbating safety risks and vulnerabilities, Maruchek et al. (2011) examine product 
safety issues in five industries that are increasingly globalising their supply chain using operations 
management theory. In previous work, Lee and Whang (2005) proved the use of operations management 
principles as a useful technique in tackling supply chain safety-related risks. The essay identifies four 
areas where techniques can be used to provide innovative solutions: 
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 Product lifecycle management 
 Traceability and recall management 
 Supplier relationships 
 Regulations and standards 
Maruchek et al. (2011) further specify four areas of focus to effectively reduce the risks associated with 
supply chain:  collaborating with regulatory bodies such as governmental institutions to develop 
mechanisms that incentivise safety; better tools and methodologies for managing information during the 
lifecycle of the product from design through disposal; technologies for tracing products across the global 
supply chain and managing recalls; building supplier relationships as a critical element of a product safety 
risk management strategy. Maisel (2005) further points to the safety hazards posed by complex new 
technologies. The paper argues that it is difficult to anticipate these safety risks during development and 
that they may only be understood when the system is in operation and has fully manifested such risks.   
7.5.3 Simplified model for risk reduction in contracts and procurement 
Cooper et al. (2005) present a contract risk-sharing scheme suggesting that the general principle applied 
for optimal risk allocation must be based on allocation to the party best able to manage it, and at least 
cost. In a basic client and contractor type arrangement, the authors propose that an optimal risk 
allocation cannot be achieved by passing all the risks onto the contractor but to seek a solution that 
minimises both, i.e. the total risk management costs. Medda (2007) sees this proposal as sensible, but 
considerably challenging in achieving the minimisation. This is due to the contrasting results in risk 
allocation, i.e. optimum risk reduction is not always achieved with the application of this basic principle. It 
is often the case that the source of the risk has not been well understood, hence there is a small 
possibility to control the risk efficiently and at low cost. 
Narasimhan and Talluri (2009) describe supply chain risks as a disruption or negative outcome triggered 
by unpredictable events. For effective reduction of contract procurement risks relating to safety, the 
options are: 
1. Risks eliminated or minimised by the risk-holder; 
2. Risks transferred to parties most capable of managing them; 
If neither is possible, 
3. Bearing the risks becomes the only alternative.  
It is particularly relevant to examine the complicity of risk bearers, because this is likely to have a strong 
influence on how far other actors should go in providing them with protection. Busby (2008) makes a 
case for an explicit analysis of complicity in parallel with normal processes of risk assessment, and 
proposes a framework for this analysis. The conclusion is that the analysis has to be formative rather than 
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summative, but that it could provide a useful way of exposing differences in the assumptions of various 
actors about agency and responsibility. 
Eriksen and Jensen (2010) examine an important question: ‘Is it possible to design contracts concerning 
payment mechanisms and financial instruments for transport infrastructure that will stimulate social 
efficiency and optimal allocation of risks between parties?’ A fuzzy model using a company’s 
procurement experiences as a way of implementing organisational learning to improve procurement 
decisions is presented in Chao and Hsiao (2012). The paper identifies performance metrics such as safety 
and health as fundamental to the development of decisions on contracts to suppliers during construction 
risk management. Further, Chao and Hsiao (2012) claim that the use of a fuzzy model determines the 
contractual arrangements through which the project realises and fulfils its risk reduction goals. 
However, common sense suggests that a rational technique could be formulated that would ensure 
effectiveness with the current broadly practised techniques. A paradigm shift approach is not practicable. 
Due to the different techniques and complexities introduced by hybrids of safety contracts, the process 
for effective contracts that consider budget constraints on any safety-related project must look to 
simplify and enhance existing practice. The competence of suppliers must play a major role before 
procurement or contract approval. The client must only procure articles from suppliers who are 
demonstrably competent in the management of engineering services or products.  
Considering the key influences on effective risk reduction, an extension of a readiness framework to 
incorporate the contracts or procurement is provided in Figure 58. The risk readiness concept introduced 
in Section 7.4 provides a basic template for safety risk assurance that can be used to assess a supplier (or 
partner in the case of partnerships) prior to procurement or contractual agreements.  
Figure 58 introduces a process flow using the risk reduction readiness concept to support contractor 
competence evaluations and subsequently determine and support approval of suppliers. The risk 
readiness contract evaluations provided in Figure 58 are tailored to suit a generic safety-related railway 
project and incorporate the key conditions of a typical contractual relationship. The approach provides 
the required support for procurement on safety-related projects. 
Table 26: Safety contract evaluations  
Elements of safety contract 
evaluation  
Description Objective 
Business Evaluation  Business governance, financial stability, 
project insurance and ownership of the 
contracting organisation 
Addresses basic quality and safety standards. Used to as 
initial evaluation to retain contractors that can deliver on 
significant tasks 
Technical Evaluation Compliance with applicable technical and 
functional requirements for the work-
scope 
Confirm that the supplier is competent to provide the 
services that comply with functional standards. In railway 
applications this typically covers design, modify, 
manufacture, overhaul, refurbish and service. 
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Elements of safety contract 
evaluation  
Description Objective 
Assurance Evaluation Safety assurance, which includes 
operational risk reduction and safety case, 
project assurance including site work, 
systems maintainability and availability. 
Undertaken to ensure maintenance of an incident-free 
railway prior to obtaining the relevant authorisation to 
operate on the railway network.  
Functional experts within the organisation undertake detailed elements of the evaluation process.  In 
practice, an organisation’s commitment to contracts follows the competency evaluation. However, prior 
to any contract agreement, some organisations may request that the hazards associated with the tasks 
are identified and a gap analysis is undertaken of the supplier’s ability to deal with these hazards. For 
novel technologies or projects, the uncertainties of these evaluations are increased as a result of the 
unknowns that are associated with the novel technology.  
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   Figure 58:  Risk Reduction Readiness (R3) contract evaluations 
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7.6 Evaluation and Application of Techniques for Selecting Among 
Competing Risk Reduction Strategies 
Railway operators and infrastructure owners are increasingly required to enhance services by 
implementing the best options for optimising risk reduction. In practice, the ‘As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable’ (ALARP) framework for risk reduction in the railway industry is a challenge that is 
compounded by decisions that must be made on a finite number of risk reduction options within 
specified budgets.  
7.6.1 Targeting likelihood of first occurrence for risk reduction 
In Chapters 5 and 6, this study used the fundamental principles of risk reduction to comprehensively 
categorise railway risk reduction measures as preventive or protective with examples of their practical 
application.  However, following on from the previous chapters, this section’s consideration of optimality 
seeks to incorporate all risk reduction benefits in line with the concept of ‘amount of removed risk from a 
risk reduction option’ and addresses the key challenges (identified in Section 6.7) of selecting risk 
reduction options. The risk-reduction framework must employ preventive and protective measures in a 
cost effective manner. The rational approaches introduced in Chapter 7 address some of these 
requirements for optimised risk reduction; the decision support system requires a method that considers 
additional cases such as the mutual exclusivity of options for risk reduction within budget constraints.   
Let us consider a practical example for the Collision Between Trains (CBT) accident, its contributory 
factors and possible risk reduction measures. The contributors are mutually exclusive failure modes 
resulting in the event.   
 
Figure 59:  Contributors to Collision Between Trains 
The commonly accepted risk of failure equation, as defined in Henley and Kumamoto (1981) is        
i.e. the product of the probability of the contribution being realised (or failure)    and the loss   given 
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that the failure or contribution occurs. Todinov (2006) proposed a model that gives the risk (in this case 
the risk of top event materialising) as a function of several mutually exclusive failure modes, each 
characterised by a constant hazard rate    and consequence   . The expected value of the potential 
losses from failure (the risk) on a finite time interval with length ‘a’ is: 
  ̅          [           ]    ∑
  
       
 
      ̅  |      (7.6) 
where M is the number of failure modes, k = 1, 2,…..,M and the sum,   ̅̅ ̅   ∑
  
       
 
      ̅  |    are the 
expected losses, given that failure has occurred. Equation 7.6 provides a means of calculating how much 
risk is reduced by minimising the hazard rate of each individual failure mode. This method is particularly 
important in cases of systems with multiple contributors (failure modes) to the system failure. Equation 
7.6 expresses the fact that the contributors to system failure, each with hazard rate λi are competing to 
fail the system but only the first failure mode to materialise is actually failing the system. In such cases 
such as the Collision Between Trains with its contributors (Figure 59), the risk of failure is influenced by 
the failure frequencies of all failure modes but the risk of the top event is actually controlled by the first 
failure mode to be realised. To illustrate this point, let us assume that the four contributors to Collision 
Between Trains have the following parameters (Table 27): 
Table 27: CBT failure parameters – for illustrating risk reduction based on first occurrence 
Contributor (Failure Mode) Hazard/failure rate (   Consequence  
(£  x10^4) 
Signal Passed At Danger (SPAD) 1.0 100 
Overlap/Signal failure 0.1 1000 
Emergency Brake failure 0.5 200 
Poor Wheel/Rail Interface failure 0.2 500 
Then the table of contributors, failure rates and associated costs shows that the consequence of any 
accident from the Overlap/Signal failure is considerably more than each of the other contributors. 
However, the risk of the Collision Between Trains accident will be dominated by the SPAD. This is the 
failure mode that is likely to fail the system. By targeting the risk reduction effort to reduce the 
contribution from the SPAD, the likelihood of collision between trains is reduced.  
7.6.2 Selecting between measures (based on hazard rates and consequence) 
Now each major accident contributor is assigned risk reduction measures that potentially reduce the risk 
of realising the contributor and subsequently, the major accident. These risk reduction measures are 
given in Table 28. 
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Table 28: CBT risk reduction measures 
Risk Contributor  Risk Reduction Measures Category  
(Preventive or Protective) 
SPAD Emergency Timetables Protective 
 Train Warning Systems Preventive 
 Speed Restrictions Preventive 
 Driver Training Protective 
 Crash Worthiness (CEM) Protective 
Emergency Braking Replace Brake Controllers Preventive 
 Inspection and Testing Preventive 
 Speed/Brake failure alarms or detection 
systems 
Preventive 
Poor Wheel/Rail Interface Vegetation Management Programme Protective 
 Weather forecasting Preventive 
 On-board sanding Preventive 
Overlaps/Signals Extend overlaps Preventive 
 Incident Plans Protective 
 Signal Modifications  Preventive 
If our overall objective is to minimise or eliminate the risk of Collision Between Train accidents, then the 
probability of realising any of the contributors must also be minimised or eliminated using the measures 
in Table 28.  
If the preventive-first approach is followed (as generally practiced), without considering the hazard rates 
of the separate failure modes, an application of the measures to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of the 
accident potentially offers us the following possible measures: 
 Replace brake controllers 
 Weather forecasting or predictive systems 
 Extend overlaps 
 On-board sanding 
 Inspection and Testing 
 Train Warning Systems 
 Speed Restrictions 
 Speed /Brake failure alarms or detection systems 
 Signal modifications 
In any combination, the above preventive measure can only satisfy a reduction of hazard rates from the 
Equation 7.6. The potential loss given the realisation of the contributors to the accident can only be 
reduced by protective measures:  
 Driver Training 
 Emergency Timetable 
 Vegetation Management Programme 
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 Incident Plans 
 Crash Worthiness (CEM)  
In real-life scenarios, the conventional method of selecting the preventive measures only is unlikely to 
realise the maximum risk reduction. Furthermore, when budget constraints are introduced or play a 
major part in the selection of risk reduction measures, the typical practice of reducing the likelihood of 
the accident or other conventional methods based on engineering judgement are at best, ineffective. A 
method that optimises the risk reduction within the available budget will potentially have to fully 
consider all measures, preventive and protective. 
Considering that each risk reduction measure will have its own cost, the requirement is to distribute the 
resources (risk reduction measure and associated costs) in such a way that the overall goal of minimising 
the risk of Collision Between Trains is enhanced within specified budgets.  
The combination of all relevant measures in the analysis is attributed to the comprehensive work in 
Chapter 5 and 6 and Equation 7.6. The choice of risk reduction measure to achieve the maximum effect is 
significantly influenced by the available budget and how the contributions to the accident are targeted 
and managed. Consequently, it is especially important that considerations of maximum risk reduction 
with budget constraints reflect the complete benefit of all measures, preventive and protective, during 
analyses, evaluation and selection of measures.  
The following conclusions can now be made regarding optimising risk reduction within a fixed budget: 
 Hazard rates for the contributors to the accident must also be addressed in the overall risk 
reduction exercise 
 Maximum risk reduction within budget constraints can only be achieved if the application 
limitations and strengths of individual risk reduction measure are comprehensively understood 
for the particular application scenario 
 A combination of Preventive and Protective measures must be implemented for degraded and 
abnormal operations. This is particularly relevant to incidents or failure scenarios where there is 
a chance of preventing further accidents or failures. 
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Chapter 8 Optimal Budget Allocation method for achieving 
Maximum Risk Reduction 
By using the concept ‘amount of removed risk by a risk reduction option’, the problem of optimal 
allocation of a fixed budget, among a finite number of risk reduction options in the railways industry, can 
be reduced to an optimisation problem from dynamic programming. This chapter proposes the 
introduction of a dynamic programming technique for optimal risk reduction in the railway industry. For n 
risk reduction options and size of the available risk reduction budget B (in thousands pounds sterling), the 
worst-case running time of the proposed algorithm is O(n x (B+1)). This makes the proposed method a 
very efficient tool for solving the optimal risk reduction problem in the railway industry. 
The optimal solution even for a relatively large number of options has been achieved within a very short 
time, which makes the developed software a very efficient decision support tool for the railway industry. 
This chapter solves the optimal budget allocation problem that supports the maximum risk reduction 
case presented in this thesis by: 
 Defining the maximum risk reduction problem 
 Applying the dynamic programming method to a number of known results from test cases to 
validate the model  
8.1 The maximum risk reduction problem 
In the apparent absence of an adequate definition of the optimisation of risk reduction within a fixed 
budget practised on the railways, a mathematical illustration is presented below: 
Let us consider a set of risk reduction options from       with benefits, 
                        
For each risk reduction option      where          are known functions. 
Find an optimal vector,       
    
      
   such that  
∑      
           is a maximum, given the budget constraint 
∑   
             (8.1) 
where B is the available budget. The optimisation of risk reduction options within a fixed budget is then 
defined below as: Maximise  
∑     
  
 
   
 
given the budget constraint:  
∑   
             (8.2) 
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Considering ALARP and tolerability requirements, the problem can be further represented to capture and 
illustrate risk reduction optimisation within a fixed budget in Figure 60 (the ALARP triangle in reverse to 
reflect the parameters and how they can be linked together) 
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Figure 60:  Optimum risk reduction within fixed budget 
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
208 
 
8.2 Evaluation and Application of Dynamic Programming as a Technique for 
Risk Reduction Decisions 
This section presents the fundamental application principles and application examples of dynamic 
programming (DP). This is a powerful tool that, in general, results in solutions for a variety of complex 
combinatorial optimisation problems. 
8.2.1 Review of alternatives to dynamic programming 
The current application of the cost-benefit technique as a decision support tool for determining the best 
options for risk reduction is inadequate (Elvik, 2001). The limitations of CBA as a widely accepted 
technique on the railways have been comprehensively discussed in previous chapters. 
Advocates for alternative techniques to cost-benefit analysis include Li et al. (2009) and An et al. (2011). 
However, these studies have exposed the inadequacies of applying basic economic theories to the 
transport industry (e.g., Flyvberg et al., 2003). The Expected Utility Theory, has been discussed 
comprehensively in Chapter 4. 
Analytical hierarchy process is another technique, which requires the use of a pairwise comparison matrix 
and eigenvector to specify weights higher than a specified threshold (Ramanthan & Ganesh, 1995); 
(Saaty, 1988). However, the AHP technique does not adequately support the decision-maker in choosing 
alternatives that have higher weights than the threshold and is unsuitable for making more than one 
choice when multiple alternatives are provided (Ghazinoory et al., 2006). Other proponents of 
alternatives to the cost-benefit approach have demonstrated the application of different optimisation 
techniques in addressing risk reduction within budget constraints: (Rashid & Hayes 2011); (Cagno et al. 
2001); (Persaud & Kazakov 1994); (Khisty & Mohammadi 2001); (Lindhe et al. 2010); (Ozmir and Demirel 
2012); (Sato 2012); (Caputo (2012).  
These studies apply multi-criteria optimisation methods such as AHP, Simulated Annealing, Tabu Search, 
Genetic Algorithms, and combinations of these, with varying success. Limitations to the use of these 
approaches are well documented (Pirlot, 1996); (Olson 1988); (Hey 1995); (van Laarhoven et al. 1992); 
(Johnson et al. 1991); (Mitchell 1996); (Aven & Korte 2003); (Fukuba & Ito 1983) and (Aven & Kristensen 
(2005). Heuristic methods do not guarantee that the solutions found will be optimal.  
Basso & Peccati (2001) through a comprehensive analysis, demonstrate that optimal resource allocation 
problems are NP-hard problems. Horowitz & Sahni (1974); Balas & Zemel (1980), supported by studies 
undertaken on the suitability of optimisation techniques have concluded that the solution of optimal 
resource allocation is best addressed by using dynamic programming (Bjorndal et al. 1995). 
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8.2.2 Definitions and Applications of Dynamic Programming 
For a good introduction to the solution of problems lying within the domain of dynamic programming, we 
refer to the basic approaches introduced by Bellman (1957). Dynamic programming is based on the 
principle of optimality which considers that an optimal policy has the property that, whatever the initial 
state and initial decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to 
the state resulting from the first decision. Bellman considers a simple multi-stage allocation process that 
possesses many of the elements common to a variety of practical problems including the control of 
engineering systems. This straightforward, formulation presents the fundamentals to dynamic 
programming as an effective computational analysis technique for risk reduction within a fixed budget.  
To illustrate the basic idea of the dynamic programming, we introduce the functional equation approach. 
The optimisation of the resource allocation related to a multi-stage allocation process can be illustrated 
by considering a two stage process. 
Bellman defines the function       as the maximum return obtained from an N-stage process starting 
with an initial quantity  , for                  .  
                          ,                (8.3) 
with  
           [             ]   where            (8.4) 
where   and   are the known functions. For a two-stage process, the total return will be the return from 
the first stage plus the return from the second stage giving us a total of            left to allocate.  
The remaining amount must then be used in the most effective way to obtain a two-stage optimisation. 
For the two-stage process resulting from the initial allocation of  , the expression is: 
                                             (8.5) 
The recurrence relation is also provided as: 
          [                 (          )]     (8.6) 
where and a and b are known constants satisfying the condition         . By applying the same 
argument for the -stage process, the basic functional equation is represented as: 
          [                   (          )] where       .  (8.7)  
for    with       defined as             [             ]   where         
The solution of the computation will consist of a tabulation of the sequence of functions 
                   for               
 ̅        , 
 ̅          ̅         ̅ ), 
 ̅          ̅         ̅  ), 
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 ̅          ̅             ̅    ), where    ̅  ̅         ̅     is a set of allocations that maximises 
the total -stage return. 
 Eddy (2004) summarises that, the DP algorithm consists of 4 primary steps:  
1. A recursive definition for the optimal solution  
2. A look-up table to store the optimal solution for the sub optimal problem; 
3. A bottom-up approach which starts from the simplest sub-problem to fill the look-up table; 
4. A track-back method to reconstruct the final optimal solution to the problem. 
The wide range of applications using dynamic programming that has been used in research and industry 
for solving optimisation problems includes optimal resource allocation, which is close to the topic of this 
thesis. Other applications that frequently feature in industry and research include complex decision-
making problems under uncertainty such as biological sequence manipulation, risk management, 
operations research, control and information theory, artificial intelligence and reliability analysis. In 
addition, Dreyfus (2010) provides a comprehensive list of dynamic programming application areas. 
As identified in Arunkumar (1975), Gessford and Karlin (1958) were among the first to employ a dynamic 
programming model to obtain the form of optimal release rules for an infinite dam over finite periods of 
time, allowing the probability distributions of the input variables and the convex cost function to depend 
on time. Tsitsiklis and Van Roy (1999) illustrate its use in solving the classical optimal stopping position 
problem. Gitirana (2005) introduces a decision support system using dynamic programming for managing 
railway embankment hazards, based on concepts of unsaturated soil mechanics and hydrology. The 
dynamic programme constitutes an algorithm for slope stability analysis (Safe-DP) and is incorporated 
into an existing weather-related geo-hazard model.  The latter is used to efficiently assess railway 
embankment hazards based on factors of safety and probabilities of failures that are computed by 
applying soil property variability and case scenarios. 
Baker (1980); Pham and Fredlund (2003) demonstrate an unusual yet efficient application of dynamic 
programming to slope stability analysis. The results obtained were compared against findings from 
several well-known limit equilibrium methods. The comparisons demonstrated the superiority of dynamic 
programming compared to limit equilibrium methods. The factors of safety derived by the use of dynamic 
programming were shown to be slightly lower. However, as the Poisson’s ratio approaches 0.5, the 
computed factors of safety from the dynamic programming method and the limit of equilibrium method 
resulted in similar outcomes. By applying the tools of dynamic programming to theoretical economics, 
specific case of unbounded returns, Alvarez and Stokey (1998) show that  the basic existence, 
uniqueness, and convergence of the dynamic programming solution hold when the return function is 
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homogeneous of degree      and the constraints are homogeneous of degree one. This particular work 
proves that dynamic programming hold for homogeneous unbounded problems. 
Dynamic programming is widely applied in developing speech recognition systems in order to address the 
problem of the time alignment between speech segment and synthesised speech artefact.  Most 
commercially available speech recognisers and many of the systems developed in research laboratories 
are discussed in Silverman and Morgan (1990).  
In practice, a typical engineering optimisation challenge provides a variety of application constraints such 
as technical and functional requirements, cost limitations and resource allocation issues. Dynamic 
programming has been proved to be an effective tool for providing solutions to such problems. A good 
example of this application of dynamic programming is that presented by Tung et al. (2013). A DP model 
is designed for thermal generating units which include operating cost as the most imperative parameter 
to optimize. Unit output ranges are extracted and computation revealed an optimisation of operating 
cost that corresponds to various load demands. The load is increased in small step sizes and number of 
unit combinations to be derived for particular plant output is substantially reduced. As a result, the 
computation time is significantly reduced compared to direct enumeration techniques. The paper 
presents simulation studies that reflect different combination units against different load demands and 
the effective minimisation of operating cost for the total load. 
In advanced engineering applications of dynamic programming, the approach in Bhardwaj et al. (2012) in 
optimising power system unit commitment further demonstrates the wide ranging capability of DP. A 
unit commitment problem typically involves scheduling on/off states of generating units which minimises 
the costs of operating, start-up, and shut-down for a specified system under operating constraints. In 
addition to fulfilling a significant number of constraints, load demands, spinning reserves requirements 
and time thresholds must be achieved at a minimum cost. This detailed study presented definitive 
solutions to the optimisation problem by using dynamic programming.   Optimisation of a road network is 
undertaken by a dynamic programming model that evaluates the shortest path in the road network 
(Shehzad and Shah 2009). 
 
8.2.3 Limitations of Dynamic Programming 
The challenges of applying dynamic programming to develop sequential decision-making on complex 
processes such as real-time operation adaptive signalling control are outlined in Chai (2009). The work is 
based on the premise that applying the classic dynamic programming technique to controlling traffic 
signals at isolated intersections and in distributed traffic networks increases computational burden. The 
work suggests that an approximate dynamic programming (ADP) technique for such difficult 
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computational problems can be employed as a second-best option. This specific application is one of the 
published few applications of dynamic programming in the transport industry. Similarly, an earlier 
transport industry analysis, Henry et al. (1983) found that the memory requirements for problems with 
very large state space such as a traffic section with four links proves computationally intractable in 
dynamic programming. 
Bellman and Dreyfus (1962); Powell (2007) point to the computational limitations caused by the ‘curse of 
dimensionality’ that makes dynamic programming impracticable for use on transport systems 
applications where risk reduction within a specified time frame (e.g. safe stopping functionality) is a 
primary requirement. The paper considers this impracticality for some systems applications a 
fundamental flaw considering the limited time window available for evaluating and implementing a 
safety-related decision. In clearer terms, this acute problem in empirical applications of dynamic 
programming means that the time required for computing a solution exponentially increases with the 
number of possible decisions or states.  However, despite this specific limitation, the exponential growth 
of developments in information technology has resulted in more powerful computers capable of 
performing huge number of operations per second. These significant improvements in information 
technology have made the application of dynamic programming viable for problems with higher 
dimensionality. With a view to proving the validity of dynamic programming solutions, Sniedovich (1978) 
developed a sequential decision model to define the principles of optimality and to validate solutions 
from dynamic programming functional equations. 
8.3 Description of the proposed method and algorithm 
Let   be the set of all available n risk reduction options i=1, 2..., n for a particular major risk in the railway 
industry. As a measure of the effectiveness of each risk reduction option, we postulate the amount of 
removed risk. This is the expected cost of prevented accidents, delays, fatalities, injuries etc. expressed in 
monetary terms. Each risk reduction measure i, (i=1, 2..., n) is characterised by the amount of risk that it 
removes after its implementation. Each risk reduction measure i, (i=1, 2..., n), is also characterised by its 
cost of implementation. 
Each risk reduction option cannot be selected more than once. As a result, each option from the set S of 
all available risk reduction options can either be accepted or rejected. 
The task of optimal allocation of the fixed budget reduces to determining the optimal subset of risk 
reduction options, whose total sum of removed risks is maximum and whose total cost does not exceed 
the available risk reduction budget B. This problem can be formally presented as:  
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Maximise:  
∑      
            
Given the budget constraint: ∑   
        
Where the risk reduction benefit,   for each option,    is subject to the available budget, .  
Considering the magnitude of the implementation costs for the risk reduction options in the railway 
industry and the magnitude of removed risks, we can safely assume that the costs and the amount of 
removed risk can always be expressed as relatively small integer numbers. In the application related to 
the railways, the removed risk and the cost of implementation are expressed in thousands of pounds 
sterling. 
Thus, removed risk of 65 and by a risk reduction option which costs 27, stands for removed risk worth 
£65000 by an option whose cost of implementation is £27000. It is also assumed that the available 
budget can also be specified in thousands of pounds sterling, as a relatively small integer number. 
As a result, the problem of optimal allocation of a risk reduction budget in the railway industry has been 
reduced to a combinatorial optimisation problem involving relatively small integer numbers only. This 
problem can be solved by using a dynamic programming technique also used for solving the ‘knapsack 
without repetition problem’ (Dasgupta et al., 2008). Although dynamic programming techniques have 
been known for a long time, to the best of our knowledge, these methods have been applied for the first 
time in this thesis to solve the problem of optimal risk reduction in the railway industry. 
The advantage of the dynamic programming (Bellman 1957), consists in the fact that it finds solutions to 
sub-problems increasing in size, stores them in the memory, and describes the solution of each sub-
problem in terms of already solved and previously stored solutions of smaller sub-problems. As a result, 
sub-problems are solved only once, which makes the dynamic programming significantly more efficient 
than a brute-force method based on the enumeration of all possible subsets in the set S. The number of 
all possible subsets in a set S with n elements is and the computational time of a brute-force method 
based on the enumeration of all possible subsets rises dramatically with increasing the number n of risk 
reduction options. Here is the description of the algorithm in pseudo-code: 
8.3.1 Algorithm 1 (in pseudo-code)- Building the dynamic risk reduction table. 
Initialising array x [][] with zeroes in the first row and in the first column. 
     for i=1 to n do 
     for j=1 to B do 
n2
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   { 
     cur_budget=j; 
     if(c[i]>cur_budget) then  { x[i][j]=x[i-1][j]; trac[i][j]=0; } 
 else 
 { 
               rem = cur_budget-c[i]; 
               tmp = rr[i]+x[i-1][rem]; 
               if(x[i-1][cur_budget]>tmp) then { 
                                                        x[i][j] = x[i-1][j]; trac[i][j]=0; 
                                                      } 
           else { 
         x[i][j]=tmp; trac[i][j]=1; 
       } 
 } 
   } 
The algorithm works as follows. The solutions of the sub-problems are kept in the array x[][]. The 
information necessary to restore the optimal solution is kept in the array trac[][]. The size of the x[][] 
array is (n+1) x B elements. The first row of the array x[][] corresponds to zero number of selected 
options in the optimal set P; the first column of the array x[][] corresponds to zero budget. 
The sub-problems are defined by the size of the current budget which varies from 1 to B units. The cost of 
the ith risk reduction option is compared with the value of the current budget and if it is greater than the 
current budget, the ith risk reduction option is not included in the optimal set, which is reflected by the 
zero value in the trac array ( trac[i][j]=0). In the case where the current budget is greater than the cost of 
the ith risk reduction option, a decision is taken whether to include the ith risk reduction option or not.  
Initially, the statement ‘rem = cur_budget-c[i];’ determines the amount of remaining budget if the ith risk 
reduction option is included. The sub-problem marked by x[i-1][rem] however has already been solved 
and its solution has been recorded in the x[][] array. The entry x[i-1][rem] gives the maximum amount of 
removed risk within budget equal to ‘rem’ and for available risk reduction options from 1 to i-1. 
Consequently, the solution of the sub-problem does not need to be obtained again; it can simply be read 
out from the x[][] array. The amount of risk removed by the ith risk reduction option is rr[i]. 
Consequently, the maximum amount of removed risk for budget cur_budget=j, if the ith risk reduction 
option is included, is given by ‘tmp = rr[i]+x[i-1][rem];’. If the ith option is not included in the optimal set 
P, the maximum amount of removed risk within the budget cur_budget is given by x[i-1][cur_budget]. 
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Consequently, the decision whether to include the ith risk reduction option in the optimal set or not 
depends on the outcome of the comparison made in the statement: if(x [i-1][cur_budget]>tmp) 
If  ‘x[i-1][cur_budget] > tmp’, not including the ith risk reduction option yields greater amount of removed 
risk and the entry  ‘trac[i][j]=0’ in the track[][] array is set to zero, which indicates that the ith risk 
reduction option has not been included in the optimum set of options P. The maximum amount of 
removed risk is equal to the maximum amount of removed risk within the current budget ‘j’, for i-1 total 
number of available options. This maximum however has already been computed and is in the array x[][]; 
this is the entry x[i-1][j]. 
If ‘x[i-1][cur_budget] < tmp’ then including the ith option yields greater amount of removed risk and the 
entry in the array  trac[i][j]=1; is set to one which indicates that the ith risk reduction option has been 
included in the optimal set P. The maximum amount of removed risk is equal to: 
 x[i][j]=tmp; or  x[i][j]= rr[i]+x[i-1][rem]; 
In words, the maximum amount of removed risk is equal to the removed risk from including the ith risk-
reduction option plus the maximum amount of removed risk for i-1 available options within the 
remaining budget ‘rem’. The optimal set of options is restored by the next algorithm in pseudo-code. 
  
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
216 
 
8.3.2 Algorithm 2 - Restoring the optimal set of risk reduction options from the dynamic 
tables. 
   Initialise all entries of the solution [] array with zeroes. 
    cur_bud=B; 
    cur_opt=n;  
    tmp=trac[cur_opt][cur_bud]; 
     while (cur_opt > =1 ) do 
 { 
                   if (trac[cur_opt][cur_bud]=1)  then   { 
                                                                         solution[cur_opt] = 1; 
                      cur_bud=cur_bud - c[cur_opt]; 
                       cur_opt = cur_opt - 1; 
      } 
                  else  cur_opt=cur_opt-1; 
 } 
The algorithm starts with the entry trac[n][B] of the track[][] array, which corresponds to a full budget B 
and all n available risk reduction options. If the n-th options has been included in the optimal set, this will 
be indicated by a non-zero entry in the trac array (trac[n][B]=1). In this case, the solution array marks the 
n-th option as ‘included’ in the optimal set P, by the statement ‘solution[n]=1’. The current budget is then 
reduced by the statement ‘cur_bud=cur_bud - c[cur_opt]’ with the cost of the current (n-th ) option. The 
current option to be considered should now be the n-1st option. This is ensured by the statement 
‘cur_opt = cur_opt-1’. 
If the n-th option has not been included in the optimal set, this will be indicated by a zero entry in the 
trac-array (trac[n][B]=0). In this case, the current budget is not altered because no cost has been incurred 
for implementing the n-th risk reduction option.  
The process of considering the options in reverse order continues until the first option is reached. At this 
point, the entries of the solution array will contain ‘1’ for the options which have been included in the 
optimal set P. The running time of Algorithm 1 for building the dynamic tables is determined by the two 
nested loops: 
for i=1 to n do 
for j=1 to B do 
{ ............. } 
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which contain a set of operation that are executed in constant time. The maximum number of steps after 
which Algorithm 1 will terminate is     . The maximum number of steps for Algorithm 2 is   because 
after each iteration of the while-do loop, the number of options is reduced by 1. As a result, after at most 
n steps, Algorithm 2 will terminate. The total number of steps is therefore                 . The 
worst-case running time of the algorithm for optimal allocation of a risk reduction budget is 
therefore            .  
This algorithm has been tested on a large number of standard data sets with known solutions and 
presented in Section 8.4. For each of the data sets the algorithm reproduced the correct solution. 
8.4 Solved test cases by the proposed method, featuring optimal budget 
allocation to achieve a maximum risk reduction in the railway industry  
In this section, a case study of a railway line section has been used to demonstrate the effectiveness and 
accuracy of the dynamic programming optimisation technique for a major renewal project. The accident 
data set has been extracted from a major renewals project on a 70km railway line with 34 stations, 
operating 33 - 35 trains a day. The railway line operates at an average speed of 60 to 70km/h with 54 
million journeys annually. Three major railway accidents for the line are used as test cases for the 
optimisation algorithm using different budget parameter settings. The test cases are: 
 Test Case 1 (relatively small number of standard data sets) – Platform Train Interface accidents 
with 20 risk reduction options, associated with removed risks at variable costs. 
 Test Case 2 (medium sized data set) – Derailment accidents with 42 risk reduction options, 
associated with removed risks at variable costs. 
 Test Case 3 (large data set) – Train Collision accidents with 81 risk reduction options, associated 
with removed risks at variable costs.  
In addition, Test Case 4 is based on data from a renowned train systems manufacturer and demonstrates 
that the dynamic programming approach to budget allocation converges to a global optimum, relevant 
and practicable considering recent budget cuts on railways projects worldwide. This is further proven by 
analysis of the results in Section 8.5.  
8.4.1 Test case 1 – Platform Train Interface 
The study focuses on the major accident risks on the line – Platform Train Interface (Platform-only 
accidents). For the Platform Train Interface only accidents, 20 available risk reduction options have been 
identified. The removed risk and cost are given as a multiple of £10000. Table 29 provides details used for 
computing the optimum risk reduction when budgets are specified.   
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Table 29: Platform Train Interface – Cost and Removed Risk  
ID Risk Reduction Option Cost 
[x £10,000] 
Removed Risk 
[x £ 10,000] 
1 Emergency/incident management systems 100 530 
2 Station defect reporting & corrective system 10 35 
3 Emergency drills – station staff training 20 67 
4 Crowd control procedures & systems 100 265 
5 Slip, trip, fall toolkit 10 20 
6 Station surface inspections/testing 100 220 
7 Platform Edge Doors (half length) 800 1360 
8 Audible warnings on platform 100 132 
9 Access & egress from incident site 200 260 
10 Support from platform supervisors 300 320 
11 Painted line warnings/signage 50 530 
12 Platform emergency plungers – train stops 400 3900 
13 Gap fillers 200 180 
14 One-person-operated CCTV systems 1200 6100 
15 Stair-nose marking 500 350 
16 Station supervisor/personnel training  100 660 
17 Re-design/re-build platform 1000 2800 
18 Platform lighting (incl. emergency lighting) 550 1300 
19 Increased traffic – major events, peak times 1000 1200 
20 Enhanced surfaces –platforms 350 410 
For different specified budgets, the optimal set of risk reduction options are according to Table 30 
Table 30: Risk reduction options after optimisation based on fixed budgets 
Budget 
[x  £10,000] 
Optimal set of options Cost of option 
[x  £10,000] 
Removed Risk 
[x  £10,000] 
2900 1,11,12,14,15,16,17 2900 14870 
3300 1,4,6,9,11,  12,14,15,16,17 3300 15615 
3500 1,2,3,5,11,12,14,15,16,17,18 3490 16292 
4000 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,11,12,14,15,16,17,18 3990 17169 
8.4.2 Test case 2 – Derailment 
The analysis is undertaken for derailment accidents with cost and removed risk information provided in 
Table 31. 
Table 31: Derailment – Cost and Removed Risk 
ID Risk Reduction Option Cost  
[x £10,000] 
Removed Risk  
[x £ 10,000] 
1 Replacement of rubber springs  1200 2300 
2 Inspection and Maintenance of suspension to prevent incorrectly gauged suspensions in the 
depot prior to train deployment 
1000 4600 
3 Improve inspection, testing and maintenance regime for detection of wheel flat and worn 
wheel failures 
1000 4600 
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ID Risk Reduction Option Cost  
[x £10,000] 
Removed Risk  
[x £ 10,000] 
4 Additional training for route setting personnel 1000 4600 
5 Speed restrictions 5000 15000 
6 Optimising cab design for driver protection in a collision 6000 55000 
7 Traction/power assessment - introduction of systems such as surge arrestors, current limiters 
etc. 
1000 9000 
8 Buffer stops 5200 36000 
9 Master controller installed in driver's cab for the driver to reduce or apply power to train 6000 9000 
10 Review of operational concept/procedures for ‘proceed under rule’  1000 900 
11 Inspection and maintenance of shoe-gear prior to deployment 1000 900 
12 Review programme for structural assessments/surveys - potentially more surveys/assessments 
introduced to existing programme 
1000 1700 
13 Structural reinforcements - bridges, embankments 15000 1200 
14 Reduced traffic on bridge/structure 10000 4000 
15 Programme for assessment and management of workload for train drivers, line controllers, 
signallers and safety-critical staff  
1000 1800 
16 Improve inspection and testing of fishplated joints - track  1000 1800 
17 Replacement of fishplated joints 10000 2600 
18 Repositioning of tripcocks - standard requirement is tripcock positioning 1.5m from front of 
train 
1000 28000 
19 EMC studies on trains compatibility with track/signals - monitor interference levels, 
identification and introduction of relevant immunisation/earthing solutions and potentially 
further operational railway testing  
6000 13000 
20 Introduce training and competence management schemes for train crew 5000 7000 
21 Introduce injury prevention initiatives e.g. booklets, DVDs and staff briefings 200 5000 
22 Review and improve rostering to reduce fatigue 500 14000 
23 Unobstructed monitoring of drivers and train despatch and subsequent 
modifications/amendments to despatch rules (Rules for train despatch reviewed/simplified 
(procedural change and subsequently, driver training on new despatch rules) 
1000 9300 
24 Improved management processes for train recovery  1000 5000 
25 Introduction of sequential systems of various kinds such as axle counters and other position 
detector systems etc. (in addition to track circuits to provide redundancy & diversity) 
15000 38000 
26 Replacement of track circuits 55000 43000 
27 Enhanced maintenance/testing such as detailed observation of the track circuit operation and 
re-adjustment of the track circuit (operating voltages) 
6500 13000 
28 Introduction of (improved) shunting policy 1000 28000 
29 Review and improvement of recruitment and selection processes 1000 14000 
30 Examining supervision and monitoring guidelines for operational safety staff, including 
shunters 
1000 7000 
31 Trains fitted with incident response kits and additional training for staff to act as quickly as 
possible in emergency situations 
400 14000 
32 Crowd control 7000 17000 
33 Fire and rescue services 5000 27000 
34 Paramedics/medical units (availability of staff trained for train accident scenarios) 5000 27000 
35 stronger windows -also minimises risk of object penetration through windows 6000 35000 
36 Emergency lighting and signage (illumination of Emergency Door Release mechanisms in 200 900 
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ID Risk Reduction Option Cost  
[x £10,000] 
Removed Risk  
[x £ 10,000] 
passenger vehicles) 
37 Provision of hammers for emergency exit 10 3000 
38 Track re-alignment to gauge (focus on track stressing & effects) 10000 180000 
38 Track inspections - track vehicles 4000 170000 
40 Track inspections - track workers 2000 93000 
41 Track refurbishment/renewals (including sleeper management programme to reduce gauge 
spread) 
2500 200000 
42 Track and conductor rail alignment  3000 35000 
Different budgets are specified for achieving the optimal set of risk reduction options and provided in 
Table 32. 
Table 32: Derailment - Risk reduction options after optimisation based on fixed budgets 
Budget 
[x  £10,000] 
Optimal set of options Cost of option 
[x  £10,000] 
Removed Risk 
[x  £10,000] 
3000 7,18,21,22,23,24, 28, 
29,30,31, 36,37,38,39,40,41,42 
2981 81520 
3500 6,7,18,21,22,23,28, 
29,30,31,36,37,38,39,40,41,42 
3481 86520 
4000 6,7,8, 18, 21,22, 23, 28, 
29,30,31,37,38,39,40,41,42 
3981 90030 
5000 6,7,8,18,21,22,23,28, 
29,31,34,35,37,38,39,40,41,42 
4981 95530 
8.4.3 Test case 3 – Collision Between Trains 
The number of identified risk reduction options for the risk ‘Collision Between Trains’ was 81. The risk 
reduction measures have been listed with the associated costs and risk reduction achieved. 
Table 33: Collision Between Trains (CBT) – Cost and Removed Risk 
ID Risk Reduction Option Cost  
[x £10,000] 
Removed Risk  
[x £ 10,000] 
1 Improve braking systems 7000 49000 
2 Replacement of brake controllers 6000 42000 
3 Renewal of brake valves 3000 35000 
4 Additional testing and inspection - improve test and inspection regimes (specifically brake 
systems) prior to deployment 
5000 4500 
5 Driver training on the use of emergency braking (deadman handle) 1000 12000 
6 Introduction of alternative / automatic braking systems to improve availability of braking 
systems 
12000 52000 
7 Introduction of brake failure alarms or detection systems 6000 17000 
8 EMC studies, monitoring interference levels  1000 900 
9 Traction system renewal/refurbishment 5000 5800 
10 Improvement of processes/procedures (including driver training) 1000 1700 
11 Further/enhanced/additional operational railway testing prior to operations on live track 5000 700 
12 Re-assessment of stabling procedures - potentially leading to change in stabling procedures 1500 1600 
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ID Risk Reduction Option Cost  
[x £10,000] 
Removed Risk  
[x £ 10,000] 
and subsequently training of depot staff and train drivers 
13 Improve testing and maintenance regime for trainstop, parking brakes for all stabling points 5000 1500 
14 Enhanced testing and maintenance regime for spring applied parking brakes to 
Eliminate/reduce WSF of the spring applied parking brakes 
5000 1100 
15 Relocation of stabling points - from downslope locations 5500 700 
16 Improved communication between line controller and drivers/operators 1000 3400 
17 Replace with improved speed sensing equipment 12000 20000 
18 SCAT system inspected/tested prior to train leaving the depot - improved SCAT inspection and 
testing regime 
10000 27000 
19 Modification of train movement procedures and driver training - improved additional training 
and driver behavioural studies/assessments 
3000 8900 
20 Extensive sighting studies to identify potential sighting problems 1000 6100 
21 Modification of signalling in line with sighting constraints 40000 13000 
22 Change to single stopping positions 5000 11000 
23 Introduction and use of in-cab CCTV eliminating/reducing other person induced constraints on 
stopping positions 
30000 13000 
24 Introducing train stops in areas where they currently don't exist 7000 16000 
25 Introduction of enhanced technology such as radar/alarm systems 7000 11000 
26 Additional supervision to check the aspect prior to the reverse movement 1000 18000 
27 Track re-alignment to gauge (focus on track stressing & effects of weather on embankment and 
structures 
10000 41000 
28 Speed restrictions - side swipe 5000 17000 
29 On-board sanding 2000 6000 
30 Driver training - braking techniques 1000 12000 
31 Notices on slippery routes 1000 3000 
32 Alarm/Audible warning of service brake failure prior to brake demand 3000 12000 
33 Berth track diversity 20000 31000 
34 Speed restriction - Compromised overlaps 5000 17000 
35 Overlap studies and potential extension of overlaps  3000 5900 
36 Enhance braking performance (See ‘Improved braking system’ above) 7000 22000 
37 Studies on effect of power in trains (especially for the introduction of new trains) and 
potentially driver training on specific areas of compromised overlaps (controlling trains - 
traction power management)    
1000 3000 
38 Driver training – SPAD 3000 18000 
39 Train speed restrictions - likely SPAD locations (Signal Sighting) 5000 23000 
40 Vegetation management programme - leaf fall (autumn season specific challenge) 5000 35000 
41 Fitting of wheel slip protection or Adhesion improvers 2200 12000 
42 On-board sanding (see also ‘Service Brake Failure’) 2000 12000 
43 Increased overlap in the design of the signalling system - extension of overlaps 3000 12000 
44 Introduction of weather forecasting/predictive systems such as ACAT 500 6000 
45 Water jetting and sandite 2000 12000 
46 Wheel rim scrubbers 200 1200 
47 Anti-icing trains - spraying heated anti-freeze onto the affected areas 4000 6000 
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
222 
 
ID Risk Reduction Option Cost  
[x £10,000] 
Removed Risk  
[x £ 10,000] 
48 Procedures (also covering changes to operational concept) and subsequent driver and relevant 
railway driver training 
5000 47000 
49 Train arrestor assessment and deployment/installation 20000 170000 
50 Extend operational testing prior to service for tripcocks, arrestors and SPAD control systems  1000 6000 
51 Emergency timetable - contingency plan for dealing with severe disruption (production of 
emergency timetables and dissemination of timetable information to all personnel especially 
operational personnel following an accident) 
2000 4600 
52 Driver training - additional procedures to support drivers (SPAD) 2000 6000 
53 SPAD incident plan (immediate detection and action on signals passed at danger to reduce the 
consequence of failure) 
1000 15000 
54 Crash worthiness and vehicle interior 21000 86000 
55 ATC system introduction 190000 107000 
56 New/enhanced interlocking system - route locking system 85000 201000 
57 Introduction of automatic signalling systems - minimisation of human error 110000 179000 
58 TPWS Train Protection and Warning System 50000 180000 
59 Modify signalling to align with sighting constraints 40000 66000 
60 Speed restrictions (Adhesion) 15000 65000 
61 Additional testing and inspection of wheels and rail (NDT) 6000 12000 
62 Tripcock positions to be re-examined and potential relocation/re-installation 5000 24000 
63 Exhaustive network survey to identify potential sighting issues 300 600 
64 Extend overlaps 3000 19000 
65 Additional testing of brakes to determine if brakes are isolated 1000 6000 
66 Precautions, procedural modifications and subsequently, driver training for running with 
isolated emergency brakes 
3000 18000 
67 Introduction of enhanced braking system - eliminate scenarios where emergency brake signals 
fail to transmit to brakes (Same as ‘improved braking’ above) 
12000 47000 
68 Assess the emergency brake performance of trains 300 3100 
69 Training for maintenance and test teams  1000 6000 
70 Additional operational testing and inclusion in regime for rigorous asset acceptance/approval  5000 8500 
71 introduction of advanced radio/comms network across line section 11000 20000 
72 Rewiring/refurbishment of existing comms/radio systems 11000 4000 
73 Update communication procedure and related procedures for drivers and line controllers 600 4900 
74 Modify the train traction system e.g. filters, ICMU (Interference Current Monitoring Unit) 1000 6000 
75 Emergency accident/incident plans 1000 7000 
76 Incident team on site - trained incident stations staff availability 3000 8700 
77 Training for drivers and incident centre personnel 1200 4700 
78 Training for local emergency medical team on train accidents/incidents  600 4800 
79 Additional procedures and subsequently, Driver and Signal Operator training - observation that 
wrong route is set prior to proceeding past signal 
1000 7100 
80 Audible warning systems – trains 1100 4700 
81 Points machine failure - new/enhanced point machines with ‘route holding diversity’ 11000 10000 
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Using the ‘Train Collisions’ data set, different budgets are applied for achieving the optimal set of risk 
reduction options and provided in Table 34. 
Table 34: Collision Between Trains - options after optimisation with fixed budgets 
Budget 
[x  £10,000] 
Optimal set of options Cost of option 
[x  £10,000] 
Removed Risk 
[x  £10,000] 
7500 1-3,5,20,26,30,38,40-42,44-46, 
48-50,53,63-66,68,69,73-75,78,79 
7470 59080 
9000 1-3,5,20,26,30,38-46, 
48-50,53,62-66,68,69,73-75,77-80 
9000 65920 
11000 1-3,5-6,16,20,26,30,38,40-42,44-46, 
48-50,53,60,62-66,68-69,73-75,77-80 
11000 74460 
12500 1-3,5,6,16,20,26,27,30,38-42,44-46, 
48-50,53,60,62-66,68,69,73-75,77-80 
12500 80860 
8.4.4 Test case 4 – Passenger Door Trap and Drag 
To further illustrate the effectiveness of the optimisation tool, it was used for optimising the reduction of 
a risk that is recurrent in the industry. The results are presented in Table 37. 
Let us consider the upgrade of the design of a standard train door following increased incidents of train 
body-side door trap and drag risks. To reduce the number of incidents in these instances, a number of 
options are recommended for design improvements. The improved design options aim as far as 
reasonably practicable, to reduce or eliminate risk of doors trapping passengers (or their clothing, bags 
etc.) between the doors so that the train pulls off and drags the entrapped passenger. This is a significant 
risk, which is represented in the fault tree diagram (Figure 61).   
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Figure 61:  Simplified representation of the typical Train Trap and Drag Fault Tree  
Table 35: Train Trap and Drag – Cost and Removed Risk 
QRA Event Event Description 
INTCLOSE Passenger Caught in Doors with Interlock Inside Tolerance 
INTWSF Door Interlock Wrong Side Failure 
PCPF Passenger Cannot Pull Free Once Caught in Train Doors 
PASSSLOWENTER Passenger Slow to Enter Train 
PASSSLOWLEAVE Passenger Slow to Leave Train 
PASSENGER CAUGHT IN 
TRAIN DOORSAND DRAGGED 
ALOG PLATFORM
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PASSENGER SLOW 
TO LEAVE OR ENTER 
TRAIN
PCPF
SLOW
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ENTER
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In order to reduce the risk of trap and drag, options are recommended which generally conform to 
standard requirements for body-side doors and include: 
 Obstacle detection capability ensuring object detection, the ability to re-open doors to the push 
back zone of the doors and additional capability to ensure that the door is fully closed; 
 Enhanced control of door speed and impact by introducing of locked speed control for the doors 
across the full stroke of movement. This offers the capability to reduce the impact force to a 
passenger or an obstruction when closing;  
 Anti-dragging features of the door design and condition monitoring of the door, i.e., easy 
detection and rectification.  
The safety benefit was assessed by considering the net change in risk arising from the implementation of 
the proposed mitigation option. In order to estimate the lifetime risk reduction from the annual risk 
reduction, the CBA considers the risk reduction to be effective over the life of the system, i.e. 25 years. 
Best-fit design and procedural options which could potentially reduce risks associated with the trap and 
drag event are provided in Appendix A.  
A further analysis to assess each option with the aim of determining factors that could possibly influence 
each option’s cost and risk reduction benefit is then undertaken to illustrate the risk reduction benefits 
following implementation. These are the same standard techniques used in estimating risk benefit and 
estimated costs during a basic CBA exercise. The assumption is that the risk benefit and estimated costs 
are known quantities for each option identified. 
Table 36: Options for risk reduction with estimated cost benefit 
ID Option for risk reduction Risk Reduction Benefit Estimated Cost Estimated Cost / 
Benefit 
1 Pushback on both door leaves and increase spring 
forces. 
£480,011.00 £491,432.00 1.02 
2 Door self-tests on each leaf of each door. £47,164.00 £44,840.00 0.95 
3 No rubber seals: metal-to-metal contact of doors.  £272,608.00 £50,000.00 0.18 
4 Dot matrix (PIS) on train exterior to indicate that 
doors are about to close. 
£53,328.00 £5,000.00 0.09 
5 Dot matrix (PIS) on train exterior to indicate that 
doors are about to close. 
£53,328.00 £5,000.00 0.09 
6 Larger monitor/better resolution. £13,160.00 £137,240.00 10.43 
7 Cameras on the platform to address blind spots £48,620.00 £42,985.00 0.88 
8 Camera on the outside of each car. £14,476.00 £47,000.00 3.25 
9 Slow train acceleration from station £39,618.00 £140,000.00 3.53 
10 Transparent doors £184,541.00 £1,175,000.00 6.37 
11 Pushback on both door leaves. £7,520.00 £10,456.00 1.39 
12 More signs/platform plungers.  £1,681,864.00 £21,000.00 0.01 
13 Conductive door edge makes interlock when 
doors close (two foil edges or carbon seals make 
circuit). 
£464,399.00 £2,000,000.00 4.31 
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ID Option for risk reduction Risk Reduction Benefit Estimated Cost Estimated Cost / 
Benefit 
14 On double door,  one maglock with magnet placed  
on one door and reed switch on the other 
£287,686.00 £700,000.00 2.43 
15 Better signage. £5,900.00 £12,000.00 2.03 
16 Different seal profile - male-to-male profile. £10,213.00 £60,000.00 5.87 
17 Audible announcement (train or platform). £1,536.00 £3,360.00 2.19 
18 Platform CCTV and plunger within the line or 
station control centre. 
£53,333.00 £19,200.00 0.36 
Using the ‘Trap and Drag’ data set, different budgets are applied for achieving the optimal set of risk 
reduction options and provided in Table 37. 
Table 37: Optimal set of risk reduction options (using optimal method) 
Budget 
[x  £1,000] 
Optimal set of options Cost of option 
[x  £1,000] 
Removed Risk 
[x  £1,000] 
250 2,3,4,5,7,8,11,12,17,18 248 2234 
280 2,3,4,5,7,8,11,12,15,17,18 260 2240 
320 2,3,4,5,7,8,11,12,15,16,17,18 320 2250 
350 2,3,4,5,7,9,11,12,15,18 350 2264 
8.5 Comparison of the proposed method with the currently adopted 
strategy in the railway industry.  
Any project on the railways – whether greenfield, major renewals or brownfield (maintenance) is 
constantly subjected to budget constraints. The deficiencies of the widely used cost benefit method for 
selecting risk reduction options on the railways is comprehensively addressed in Weli and Todinov 
(2013a). The limitations of this method are clearly illustrated by revisiting Test Case 4 – Trap and Drag (as 
presented in Section 8.4.4). The application of the dynamic programming technique as introduced by 
Todinov and Weli (2013), using the same test case, illustrates the effectiveness and superiority of the 
technique when the objective is optimising risk reduction under fixed budgets. 
In order to appropriately compare the optimisation tool and the currently practised cost benefit for 
selecting options for risk reduction, the simple example of the Door Trap and Drag risk is employed. To 
simplify the illustration, only 18 risk reduction options are provided to achieve as low as reasonably 
practicable levels  –  within a fixed budget (which is today’s project reality). The sample size is reasonably 
small but the illustration shows the effectiveness of this optimisation tool in relatively small applications. 
The method provides increasingly superior results as the data sets and numbers of possible options 
expand. 
The data in Table 36 is extracted from a major train systems manufacturer, integrator and principal 
contractor to most of the railways and metros in the world.  
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This table shows the cost benefit ratio calculations made by the company. All values are approximated to 
the nearest thousand. This method limits the options possible to a set that provides a cost-benefit of 1 or 
less. The total cost of implementing the options using the cost benefit method is approximately £188,000 
with a risk reduction of £2,210,000. The optimisation tool also achieves a risk reduction of £2,210,000 
when provided with a budget of £188,000. This is best result attainable by the cost-benefit’s method 
using this data set. 
Given that the cost-benefit looks for options with ratios less than 1, this suggests that those possible are 
2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 12 and 18. Any consideration of additional options means option 1 which has a cost-benefit 
ratio of 1.02 however, over the threshold of 1. Let us consider Option 1, as a case can be made for its 
cost-benefit value of 1.02. The resultant cost of implementing the Options 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 12 and 18 
significantly increases to £678,000 from £188,000.  This is an incredible 260% increase in cost which only 
achieves a risk reduction of £2,690,000. This is equivalent to a 22% increase in risk reduction and simply 
illustrates the ineffectiveness of the cost-benefit method and further shows how difficult it is for an 
optimised risk reduction under budget constraints to be achieved with this method. This clearly 
demonstrates that if the cost-benefit method is blindly followed (as in cases of this type and other 
examples provided in previous chapters), no level of budget control during a project can adequately 
restrain potential cost escalation. 
By applying the optimisation method, an existing budget can effectively be used to determine the best 
options that will provide the most risk reduction. A similar challenge is set and a baseline of options 
similar to the cost-benefit method is initially selected by the tool, i.e. Options 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 12 and 18. 
Budget constraints are incrementally applied and the results provided in Table 37 (see results in Test Case 
4, Section 8.4). It is important to note that the optimisation tool works within the constraints of any 
budget. For this test case, the budget is steadily increased from £188,000 to £200,000. The options 
selected are 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11 and 12, providing a risk reduction of £2,218,000 at a cost of £198,000. 
Another step increase in budget to £250,000 illustrates a further increase in risk reduction of £2,234,000 
at a cost of £248,000, when using Options 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 17 and 18. The results (also in Table 37 
above) reveal that the best options can be selected to support any budget constraints without limiting 
the options to ratios that are in reality, impracticable.  
The budget constraints on the cost-benefit limit the number of options that can be selected from a data 
set and invariably, the additional risk reduction obtainable. However, using the same data set from the 
Door Drag and Trap example, the optimisation method achieves an enhanced risk reduction, as 
illustrated in Table 38. Figure 62 and Figure 63 present the effect of various budget constraints on the 
methods when applied to Test Case 4. This clearly shows the difference in removed risk between the 
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proposed optimisation method and existing cost-benefit practice, once budget constraints are applied. 
This improved risk reduction is a result of the increased number of options that can be considered within 
the separate budget scenarios that are characteristically neglected by using cost-benefit ratios.  
Table 38: Comparison of risk reduction optimisation method against CBA  
  Budget Constraints (x £1,000) 
  £188 £200 £250 £280 £320 £350 
Achieved Risk 
Reduction 
Cost Benefit  £2,210 £2,210 £2,210 £2,210 £2,210 £2,210 
Optimisation  
using DP tool 
£2,210 £2,218 £2,234 £2,240 £2,250 £2,264 
 
 
Figure 62:  Effect of budget constraints on risk reduction for the option selection methods 
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Figure 63:  Illustration of the difference in the achievable risk reduction using variable budgets 
8.5.1 Advantages of the proposed method 
The results reported for real life test cases 1 – 4 prove that the problem related to optimal allocation of a 
fixed budget to achieve maximum risk reduction in the railway industry can be reduced to an 
optimisation problem through dynamic programming. The advantages of the latter as an optimisation 
technique have also been comprehensively addressed. 
The objective of this part of the thesis is to develop a platform superior to the existing practices of risk 
reduction option selection on the railways. As they are mostly based on cost-benefit and other economic 
theories, such practices have resulted in unfavourable performance, escalating costs, safety risks and 
business losses for railway operators, facilities owners and the supply chain. The current widely practised 
methods (particularly cost-benefit methods) for selecting options for risk reduction exposes the decision 
maker or analyst to uncertain levels of cost and risk. 
By using the new concept ‘amount of removed risk by a risk reduction option’, the proposed 
optimisation method solves the problem of a maximum risk reduction resulting in a ‘minimised remaining 
risk’ solution. This is demonstrated to be markedly superior to the current widely used method on the 
railways, particularly for large test cases. 
The advantages of the optimisation method are presented in three main areas – its suitability for meeting 
regulatory requirements such as the ALARP framework, its effective reduction of assessment errors, i.e. 
its suitability as comprehensive decision support tool, and its efficiency in terms of computation time.   
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The ALARP framework stipulates that a comprehensive evaluation of all possible options for risk 
reduction and a subsequent value-driven decision must be made.  In practice, the demonstration of 
ALARP requires that the sacrifice of introducing further risk reduction measures should not be ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the benefit that is obtained from the introduction of such measures. Based on the 
ALARP requirements, different organisations would conventionally apply mandatory steps for illustrating 
and proving that risk is reduced to ALARP.  
The method set out above comprehensively achieves the requirements of the ALARP framework. 
Following a comprehensive hazard identification and derivation of risk reduction options, the proposed 
optimisation method seeks out all available options with a potential amount of removed risk and 
associated costs. Based on the objective function value, it derives the best set within economic 
constraints (budget).  
The use of an industry agreed factor to show that the cost is not grossly disproportionate to the benefit 
of a particular risk reduction option is, in most capital programmes, used as the budget. Considering the 
several different subsystems, processes and combinations of measures that are required within this 
budget constraint, the proposed optimisation method is an effective solution to the challenge posed by 
the allocation of a limited budget. 
This is also particularly necessary in the current economic downturn, with budget cuts to essential 
projects. The recent government budgetary reviews have dramatically reduced funding for priority 
projects such as renewals on mainline and underground railway systems and projects. The current theme 
is ‘maintaining risk levels’. With the reality of such cuts putting managers under intense pressure, the 
method described goes a long way to maximise risk reduction under specified budgets and is an excellent 
tool countering the impact of the growing austerity measures currently affecting the railways.  
The widely used CBA in railway applications does not incorporate all the factors (and certainly not all risk 
reduction options) that influence engineering judgements on the right choice of system to implement. To 
remove doubt, Section 8.5 demonstrates that cost-benefit methods are ineffective when budget 
constraints are applied. Cost-benefit methods totally neglect the marginal benefit to be derived from a 
complete set of options.  
By using the proposed optimisation method, all available options are considered during the computation 
process, thus reducing the unavoidable build-up of uncertainties inherent in risk assessments made 
before the option selection process. 
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Furthermore, the ‘curse of dimensionality’ as described in Section 7.7 has been shown to have no effect 
on this optimisation method. It  is  very efficient for solving optimal risk reduction problems with 
computation time ranging from less than 0.01 seconds for small- and medium-sized data sets (i.e. 10 to 
50 options) to 0.15 seconds for large-scale data (i.e. over 80 options) with varying magnitudes of risk 
reduction and associated costs. 
8.5.2 Disadvantages of the proposed method.  
For an overall risk management objective, the effectiveness of the optimisation method is dependent on 
a comprehensive risk assessment process and subsequently, options for risk reduction. Weli and Todinov 
(2013a) propose a sound and verifiable approach, based on structured engineering principles, from which 
risk reduction options are identified. The application of this method before optimisation reduces the 
inherent weaknesses of risk identification and assessment such as uncertainties in data, errors in 
judgements concerning risks, among others.  
The proposed optimisation method is limited to independent risk reduction options. Interactions 
between subsystems – an essential factor for effective risk reduction are not easily modelled. The 
optimisation method however, produces an exact solution for all computations.  
Examples of these essential interactions are provided in Section 7.3. Weli and Todinov (2013b) present a 
systems approach to risk reduction that shows the interconnectivity between subsystems, systems and 
application. The paper also illustrates how risk reduction can be improved through this link and 
effectiveness from initiation (analysis) to implementation (organisation).  
8.6 Validation of the proposed method  
In the absence of real-life verifiable railways optimisation applications with known practical solutions, 
validation is demonstrated through comparison of the test results with mathematical solutions from 
resource allocation examples downloaded from the internet. The data sets used for validation are taken 
from various optimisation (dynamic programming or knapsack) exercises from different applications and 
industries.    
The examples have been extracted from real optimisation cases for which the solution is known. The 
knapsack validation exercises are further proof that the proposed algorithm is successful when the 
options are statistically independent and gives an exact solution for each test. Validation using data set 1 
is presented in Table 39 below: 
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Table 39: Validation - Data Set-1  
ID Risk Reduction Benefit Estimated Cost 
1 92 23 
2 57 31 
3 49 29 
4 68 44 
5 60 53 
6 43 38 
7 67 63 
8 84 85 
9 87 89 
10 72 82 
With a budget value of 165, the optimal solution includes Options 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6. The options are 
accurate to the known optimisation results from the example used. 
Validation checks using data set 2 are presented in Table 40 
 Table 40: Validation - Data Set-2 
ID Risk Reduction Benefit Estimated Cost 
1 135 70 
2 139 73 
3 149 77 
4 150 80 
5 156 82 
6 163 87 
7 173 90 
8 184 94 
9 192 98 
10 201 106 
11 210 110 
12 214 113 
13 221 115 
14 229 118 
15 240 120 
A budget value of 750 imposed on the set of 15 options provided the following options as optimal: 1, 3, 5, 
7, 8, 9, 14, and 15.  An evaluation against the known solution shows another accurate solution using the 
proposed algorithm. Similarly, the algorithm was tested using the data set presented in Table 41. 
Table 41: Validation - Data Set-3 
ID Risk Reduction Benefit Estimated Cost 
1  825594 382745 
2 1677009 799601 
3 1676628 909247 
4 1523970 729069 
5  943972 467902 
6   97426  44328 
7   69666  34610 
8 1296457 698150 
9 1679693 823460 
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ID Risk Reduction Benefit Estimated Cost 
10 1902996 903959 
11 1844992 853665 
12 1049289 551830 
13 1252836 610856 
14 1319836 670702 
15  953277 488960 
16 2067538 951111 
17  675367 323046 
18  853655 446298 
19 1826027 931161 
20   65731  31385 
21  901489 496951 
22  577243 264724 
23  466257 224916 
24  369261 169684 
A budget value constraint of 6404180 is used on the set of 24 options provided in Table 41. The accurate 
optimal solution includes 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 16, 22, 23, and 24.  This result further verified the 
accuracy of the optimisation algorithm.  
The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm producing always the exact solution 
can accurately support any decisions associated with optimising risk reduction within a fixed budget. 
8.7 Case for implementing the optimisation method to support efficient 
decision making and risk 
The economic resources available for capital programmes, maintenance and interventions are usually 
limited: thus the need arises for optimally allocating them to achieve the best possible risk reduction. 
This chapter focused on presenting a novel algorithmic method for targeting the allocation of budgets to 
options with sufficient value in order to minimise the overall system and operational risks. The 
optimisation of risk reduction options concerns the stages of decision analysis, where exact solutions 
from algorithms and models are required to support decisions to invest in systems that achieve the target 
of maximum risk reduction under budget constraints. To reduce the flaws in the overall objective a more 
inclusive ‘best options-search’ has been introduced to improve risk-based decisions in the railway 
industry. 
In developing this algorithm, important factors considered were the regulatory policies, such as the 
ALARP framework. This is usually a basis for budget constraints, probabilistic quantification of risk or risk 
exposures, cost of equipment and systems, risk reducing options and resource allocation. The model has 
been cautiously constructed to avoid unquantifiable units i.e. things without a price tag.  
To the pure economist, the value of the tangible and intangible depends on the price a person is willing 
to pay for an object. In this method, developed solely for efficiently optimising risk reduction within a 
fixed budget, Willingness-to-Pay and the Value of Preventing Fatality are taken as parameters determined 
outside the scope of the optimisation model.  
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The decision support optimisation algorithm was computed using 3 different processors to demonstrate 
accuracy and consistency of results and computation time: 
 Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Duo CPU T9900 @ 3.06 GHz 
 Intel(R) Core(TM) i3 CPU M370 @2.40 GHz 
 Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU M540 @2.53GHz 
In all cases, using the same parameters of risk removed, cost and budget, each of the optimisation 
problems produced the same results with a maximum computation time of 0.15secs for the largest data 
set. A degree of uncertainty in the approach used to estimate probabilities and the frequency of risk 
events during quantified risk assessments is already assumed.  
Most railway network projects or undertakings will not always have cases where the risk reduction 
benefit outweighs the cost (i.e. cost effective risk reduction). In addition the inherent inaccuracies in risk 
evaluations before selection of the options further obscure any argument of rationality or effectiveness. 
In practice, we are often faced with a good number of options where the costs outweigh the safety 
benefit. What do we do then? Do we ignore viable options because of cost implications and in so doing 
expose the system and passenger to further risks?  
Is it justifiable to use the existing approach when it is obviously fundamentally flawed? The novel 
approach presented here considers the maximum risk reduction within a fixed budget by factoring in all 
relevant risk reduction options irrespective of individual costs (which are subject to errors in individual 
assigned risk reduction values). 
In practical terms, let us assume that no cheaper option exists for a given scenario. Nonetheless, the 
safety risk has to be minimised (to ALARP) within specified overall budget constraints. Using a signalling 
overlap example, the installation or introduction of speed restrictions may only marginally reduce the risk 
but still leave it within the ALARP range where further risk reduction is necessary. Despite the existence 
of ‘non-conforming cost-benefit’ options such as an overlap extension that could potentially be added to 
the speed restriction, those options are discounted. The question remains – have we done everything 
possible to ensure maximum risk reduction within the specified budget? 
With the existing methodology, the answer is ‘No.’ As a result, potentially viable options are left out of 
most railway industry selection methods.  
The processes, activities or prerequisites of the maximum risk reduction approach presented in this 
chapter can be summarised as: 
 Application of robust processes or methods for identifying risks and contributors 
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 Application of sound and verifiable means of evaluating the magnitude of risks reduced by the 
options identified 
 Application of a comprehensive method for deriving the cost of each risk-reduction option  
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Chapter 9 Conclusions, Contributions and Future Work 
The core objectives of this work, -  developing a novel solution for the problem of optimising risk 
reduction within a fixed budget, which is systematic, verifiable and fitting for the railway industry in the 
current economic climate, has been achieved. In this respect, the most important findings and 
contributions of this research are highlighted.  
 This thesis has established that the cost-benefit approach fails to determine the optimal 
selection of options leading to a maximum risk reduction when a budget limitation is present. 
 The thesis has shown that only verifiable methods based on sound engineering principles can 
objectively result in optimum risk reduction.  
  The thesis pioneered the application of powerful dynamic programming model for effective 
risk reduction in the railway industry. 
 This thesis reveals the critical deficiency of the maximum expected profit criterion in selecting a 
risk reduction option.     
 The tools currently being used for optimising risk reduction are ineffective. In addition, these 
tools cannot be modified to solve the maximum risk reduction problem when budget 
constraints are applied.  
 Guidelines and systematically developed methods for precisely identifying and applying known 
measures to reduce the likelihood of accidents or the consequences in the event of the 
accidents are non-existent. This is the corner stone to any risk optimisation effort. 
 This thesis established that the challenge of optimal risk reduction cannot be solved by the 
preventive-first approach (i.e. selecting options primarily for reducing the likelihood of the 
accident only) as widely practiced. This approach leads to weak and potentially damaging 
decisions. This thesis proves through practical illustrations and by the use of mathematical 
methods that the choice of risk reduction measures to achieve the maximum effect is 
significantly influenced by the available budget and how the contributors to accidents are 
targeted and managed. 
 With the aid of practical railway illustrations, this thesis demonstrates that a severe defect in 
existing methods for selecting measures is the lack of structured methods for comprehensively 
identifying all interactions that support the maximum risk reduction. By revealing the complex 
interrelationships between the risk reduction options; the gap between risk evaluation, options 
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
237 
 
selection and implementation can be effectively narrowed. Subsequently, the weakness in the 
risk management chain (i.e. costs, people, process and equipment) can effectively be eliminated.  
The thesis demonstrated that in the current risk management practice, the link between the 
evaluation and implementation phases of risk-reduction is commonly overlooked or 
disregarded. As a result, this erroneous practice is a significant bottle-neck in gaining approval of 
submissions for operational safety (risk reduction). 
Considering the above, this project has gone beyond the basic case of cost effective risk management to 
propose concepts and verifiable methods that can be considered for optimising risk reduction when 
faced with budget constraints – the growing reality of the railway industry. These concepts and methods 
have been applied to specific examples with known solutions in which realistic and exact numerical 
values are achieved. This work is novel and the first to deliver on a robust decision support framework 
that comprehensively supports a railway operational case for maximising risk reduction when faced with 
fixed budgets. The flow diagram (Figure 64) clarifies the primary contributions and how they are 
applicable to the overall objective of this thesis.    
Thesis Objective:
Maximising Risk Reduction 
Within Fixed Budget
Decision Support Framework
Approach 2: 
Rational Methods
Decision Support Framework
Approach 2: 
Optimisation Methods
Concept
 “Amount of risk 
removed by a risk 
reduction option”
Method
Dynamic 
Programming
Concept
 “Cost of 
Failure”
Method
Generic 
Principles of Risk 
Reduction
Concept
 “DOPT” 
Assurance
Method
DOPT 
Categorisation
Concept
 “Readiness for 
Effective Risk 
Reduction”
Method
Risk Reduction 
Readiness Model
(R3M)
Method
Contracts and 
Supply Chain 
Risk Reduction 
Model
Figure 64:  Thesis objective and achievements 
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 Cost of Failure’ concept and generic principles of risk reduction 
By using the ‘cost-of-failure’ (CoF) concept and the generic principles of risk reduction, an 
appropriate set of generic risk-reduction principles has been developed, specific to the railway 
industry, from which risk-reduction measures are derived (Chapters, 5, 6 and 7). These measures 
reduce the likelihood of a railway accident or the consequences in the event of an accident. 
Subsequently, the identified risk-reduction measures are assessed with regards to the amount of 
risk each of them removes and the cost of their implementation.  
 Application of risk reduction principles on the railway network 
A comprehensive understanding of the limitations and strengths of each option for the specific 
application is a prerequisite for effective overall risk reduction. Using the principles in Chapters 5 
and 6, railway applications of risk reduction measures are comprehensively outlined providing 
the risk analyst or decision maker an authentic baseline for selecting and combining measures 
for prevention or protection. A significant step towards the overall optimisation goal and easily 
verifiable when developing a robust engineering or operational (risk reduction) safety case.   
 Classification and guidance for risk reduction measures 
Considering that no form of guidance or verifiable system exists to help railway risk analysts and 
decision-makers determine what part a risk reduction option plays in any specific application, 
this work uses the basic principles of risk reduction to classify options as preventive or 
protective. The thesis employs 26 fundamental principles to develop an extensive yet simple 
classification based on the options of functional capability (strengths and limitations) for the 
particular application.  
This clear and unambiguous method for determining whether an option is appropriate for use as 
a preventive or protective measure provides the risk analyst with a degree of confidence that the 
selected option stems from fundamental risk reduction principles. A comprehensive list with 
classification based on the work in Chapters 5 and 6 is provided in Appendices A1, A2 and A3 for 
the major accident risks ‘Collision Between Trains’, ‘Derailment’ and ‘Platform Train Incidents’ 
respectively. 
 Concept and Application of ‘D-O-P-T Assurance’ 
Based on a sound argument that by integrating the initiation (evaluation) phase with the 
implementation (operational) phase of a project, cost-effective risk management can be 
achieved, this work introduces a key assurance concept and methodology that categorises risk 
reduction measures for a standard railway portfolio. The DOPT categorisation approach reflects 
the options and organisation, providing the necessary link that ensures an option can be 
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accurately and systematically identified and subsequently implemented. The categorisation (see 
Chapter 7) includes: 
o Design risk-reduction options (DRRO) – Novel systems, major renewals and modifications  
o Operational risk-reduction options (ORRO) – Communications, Supervision and Speed 
Restrictions or similar operational decisions 
o Technical risk-reduction options (TRRO) – Testing, Maintenance, Inspections, 
Installations, Assessments/Studies informing risk reduction decisions 
o Procedural risk-reduction options (PRRO) – Risk education, Risk training, Processes and 
Plans 
This concept provides a novel framework that bridges the divide between the identification and 
implementation of risk reduction measures within railway organisations. 
 Concept of ‘Readiness for Effective Risk Reduction’ and the Risk Reduction Readiness Model 
(R3M). 
This work is based on the foundations of system engineering, and uses the systems approach to 
demonstrate the inter-relationship between risk reduction evaluation and implementation. The 
concept of ‘Readiness for Effective Risk Reduction’ is developed and recommended as a required 
and fundamental process in railway safety cases. An essential framework is presented in the 
form of the ‘Risk Reduction Readiness Models’ (R3M). 
 Contracts and Supply Chain Risk Reduction Model 
Due to the vital role played by procurement and contracts in assuring that  risk reduction 
requirements are captured and executed, a simplified model, aligned with the essence of the 
concept of ‘Readiness for Effective Risk Reduction’ is developed. It provides a solution to the 
major challenges facing railway contracts and procurement i.e. frequent failure partnerships and 
lack of robust systems for product recalls associated with safety related failures. 
 Optimisation Model 
Finally, the concept of ‘amount of risk removed by a risk reduction option’ is introduced as a 
superior alternative to the widely used cost-benefit method.   
This novel approach resulted in the development of a robust tool that provides exact optimal 
solutions for a relatively large number of options. The computation is also achieved within a 
relatively short time, making the developed system an efficient decision support tool for the 
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railway industry. Chapter 8 presents the method, algorithms, and four test cases using railway 
safety risk data. Validation exercises were also conducted and results presented. 
It is worth noting that as a consequence of elements of this work, an invitation to join the editorial board 
of the Journal of Geological Resource and Engineering was received. A clear indication of acceptance of 
the concepts and methods proposed. Additionally, this demonstrates the potential application of these 
concepts and methods in a different application (i.e. geotechnical and petroleum technology industry).. 
9.1 Overall Summary 
This work demonstrates that the current conventional methods for selecting risk reduction measures is 
limited in its ability to adequately support the overall risk management objective of maximising risk 
reduction within fixed budgets. In fact, the practice leads to misleading results and incorrect risk 
reduction-related decisions. 
A comprehensive understanding of the limitations and strengths of each option for the specific 
application is successfully applied for effective overall risk reduction. Applications from decisions based 
on the successful integration and implementation of the available options are demonstrated as superior 
to existing methods and shown as a powerful tool for solving current decision-making challenges on 
optimising risk reduction. 
The methods proposed substantially reduce and remove the inadequacies of the methods currently 
practised. Currently, optimisation techniques to the problem of risk reduction and budget allocation are 
not being practised on the railways due to the dominance of cost-benefit methods. By the use of 
verifiable concepts and methods, this thesis offers a framework combining a rational approach with exact 
optimisation techniques. This has been demonstrated by the much more precise solutions from the 
proposed optimisation tool. 
The suggested framework is a holistic approach to maximising risk reduction within specified budget 
constraints and a robust solution to the growing complexities associated with operating the current 
railway network. 
The relevance of the solutions provided by this framework stems from the common shortage of funds for 
railway projects. Recent economic downturns with ongoing significant cuts affect maintenance and 
capital projects and expose railway operators, staff, passengers and others to the consequences of 
performance and safety risks. Despite these cuts, the proposed optimisation techniques guarantee that 
the safety expectations and the level of control of consequences in the event of failure will not be 
degraded. 
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
241 
 
The framework for maximising risk reduction within specified budgets has proved advantageous as it 
further increases safety assurance - potentially amounting to significant magnitudes of reduced risk. This 
thesis concludes that increased cost effectiveness can be derived from the combination of the rational 
risk reduction strategies and the optimal budget allocation techniques.. 
9.2 Future Work 
The presented concepts and methods can be readily extended to other industries where the widespread 
practices of cost-benefit and various economic theories are delivering sub-optimal solutions, 
misrepresenting and underachieving risk reduction.  The aim is to unify the approaches and develop a 
framework that pushes further into an organisation’s core risk management structures. 
In order to support the existing framework, a method needs to be developed to introduce cross 
acceptance of risks and responsibilities within the organisation (i.e., between the different departments), 
allying the strengths and limitations of the options to the existing systems of risk management within the 
existing departments.  
An optimisation tool could be devised that is capable of analysing not only relatively independent risk 
reduction options but could consider various complex interactions (within the subsystems, systems in an 
organisation) from initiation through to implementation. The difficulties of modelling different states 
stems from the circumstance that the state-space could grow exponentially in larger models, reducing 
the feasibility of the approach. 
It is recommended that the DOPT Assurance Case is enhanced and made a mandatory requirement for 
developing robust safety cases in the railway industry and other related safety-critical industries.  
As a result of the comprehensive evaluations and current system opportunities highlighted through this 
work, new process and assessment requirements need to be examined in order to determine the railway 
organisation’s maturity levels for risk reduction throughout any project lifecycle. Recommendations 
include extension of the work on the risk reduction readiness models i.e. beyond contracts and 
procurement. 
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APPENDIX A1: Risk reduction measures for ‘Collision Between Trains’ accidents 
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                    .   
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applied parking 
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          . .     .     
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from downslope 
locations 
        . .              .                       
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communication 
between line 
controller and 
drivers/operator
s 
        . .           . 
 
            .     .     
 Dual 
SCAT failure Replace with 
improved speed 
sensing 
equipment . .       .           . 
 
  .   
.
  
    
 
          
 Preventive 
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
266 
 
Major 
Accident 
Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
Categorisation 
B
u
ilt
-i
n
 r
e
d
u
n
d
an
cy
 
In
cr
e
as
e
d
 c
o
n
n
ec
ti
vi
ty
 o
f 
 s
ys
te
m
s 
o
r 
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
s 
U
se
 o
f 
vo
ti
n
g 
sy
st
em
s 
D
e
ra
ti
n
g 
Si
m
p
lif
yi
n
g 
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
s 
R
e
d
u
ci
n
g 
w
e
ak
 li
n
ks
 in
 t
h
e
 d
e
si
gn
/o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
 
M
ai
n
ta
in
in
g 
co
n
ti
n
u
it
y 
o
f 
ac
ti
o
n
 
O
p
p
o
si
te
 e
ff
ec
t 
m
o
d
if
ic
at
io
n
s 
M
in
im
is
in
g 
fr
e
q
u
e
n
cy
 o
f 
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
 
Te
st
in
g 
to
 p
re
ci
p
it
at
e
 la
te
n
t 
fa
u
lt
s 
M
in
im
is
e
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 c
au
se
 f
ai
lu
re
s 
M
in
im
is
e
 h
u
m
an
 e
rr
o
rs
 
Se
p
ar
at
in
g 
h
az
ar
d
s 
an
d
 t
ri
gg
e
rs
 
D
am
ag
e
 A
rr
es
to
rs
 
R
e
d
u
ci
n
g 
p
as
se
n
ge
r 
vu
ln
er
ab
ili
ty
 
B
lo
ck
in
g 
p
at
h
w
ay
s 
to
 e
sc
al
at
io
n
 
U
si
n
g 
fa
il-
sa
fe
 d
ev
ic
e
s 
D
e
lib
e
ra
te
ly
 in
tr
o
d
u
ci
n
g 
w
e
ak
 li
n
ks
 
D
e
la
yi
n
g 
th
e
 r
at
e
 o
f 
d
e
te
ri
o
ra
ti
o
n
  
R
e
d
u
ci
n
g 
Ex
p
o
su
re
 t
im
e
 
M
in
im
is
in
g 
th
e
 v
u
ln
e
ra
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
ta
rg
et
s 
Em
e
rg
e
n
cy
 s
ys
te
m
s 
an
d
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s 
P
ro
ce
ss
e
s/
Sy
st
em
s 
fo
r 
 
d
e
gr
ad
e
d
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
Fa
ilu
re
 In
d
ic
at
o
rs
 (
fa
ilu
re
 s
ta
tu
s 
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g)
 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
, R
is
k 
P
la
n
n
in
g,
 T
ro
u
b
le
 s
h
o
o
ti
n
g 
 
P
ro
te
ct
iv
e
 B
ar
ri
e
rs
 
SCAT system 
inspected/tested 
prior to train 
leaving the 
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SCAT inspection 
and testing 
regime 
          . .     .     
 
                    .   
 Preventive 
Wrong 
direction 
Modification of 
train movement 
procedures and 
driver training - 
improved 
additional 
training and 
driver 
behavioural 
studies/assessm
ents 
          . .     .     
 
                . .     
 Preventive 
Extensive 
sighting studies 
to identify 
potential 
        .             .                        . 
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sighting 
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signalling in line 
with sighting 
constraints 
        . .           .      .     .             
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Change to single 
stopping 
positions 
          .           .                .   .     
 Preventive 
Introduction and 
use of in-cab 
CCTV 
eliminating/redu
cing other 
person induced 
constraints on 
stopping 
positions 
  .                   . 
 
              .         
 Preventive 
Introducing train 
stops in areas 
where they 
currently don't 
.         .                                .     
 Preventive 
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enhanced 
technology such 
as radar/alarm 
systems 
.         .                              .   .   
 Dual 
Additional 
supervision to 
check the aspect 
prior to the 
reverse 
movement 
  .       .           . 
 
              .         
 Preventive 
Side Swipe Track re-
alignment to 
guage (focus on 
track stressing & 
effects of 
weather on 
embankment 
and structures 
   
  
 
. .   
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Speed 
restrictions - side 
swipe 
          .   .       .        
 
      .   .     
 Preventive 
Service brake 
failure 
Onboard sanding 
      .   
 
  .          .             .   .     
 Protective 
Driver training - 
braking 
techniques 
                .     .                  .       
 Preventive 
Notices on 
slippery routes           .   .                              .   
 Preventive 
Alarm/Audible 
warning of 
service brake 
failure prior to 
brake demand 
          .           .                      .   
 Preventive 
Signal WSF Berth track 
diversity . .       .           .        .                 
 Preventive 
Compromised 
overlap 
Speed restriction 
- Compromised 
overlaps 
          .   .       .                .   .     
 Preventive 
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Major 
Accident 
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Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
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Overlap studies 
and potential 
extension of 
overlaps  
. .       .                          .           
 Preventive 
Enhance braking 
performance 
(See ‘Improved 
braking system’ 
above) 
. .     . .           .      . .         .       
 Preventive 
Studies on effect 
of power in 
trains (especially 
for the 
introduction of 
new trains) and 
potentially driver 
training on 
specific areas of 
compromised 
overlaps 
(controlling 
trains - traction 
power 
          .     .       
 
                      . 
 Preventive 
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Major 
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Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
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management)    
Driver training - 
SPAD                       .                  .       
 Dual 
Train speed 
restrictions - 
likely SPAD 
locations (Signal 
Sighting) 
        . .   .                        .   .     
 Preventive 
Poor 
Wheel/Rail 
Friction 
Vegetation 
management 
programme - 
leaf fall (autumn 
season specific 
challenge) 
          .             
 
              .   .     
 Protective 
Fitting of wheel 
slip protection or 
Adhesion 
improvers 
          .                            .   .     
 Protective 
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Major 
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Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
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On-board 
sanding (see also 
‘Service Brake 
Failure’) 
      .   .   .          .             .   .     
 Dual 
Increased 
overlap in the 
design of the 
signalling system 
- extension of 
overlaps 
          .           . .           .             
 Preventive 
Introduction of 
weather 
forecasting/predi
ctive systems 
such as ACAT 
          .           .                        . 
 Preventive 
Water jetting 
and sandite           .         . .  .                 .     
 Preventive 
Wheel rim 
scrubbers           . .            .                 .     
 Dual 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
Categorisation 
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Anti-icing trains - 
spraying heated 
anti-freeze onto 
the affected 
areas 
          .   .          .                 .     
 Dual 
Procedures (also 
covering changes 
to operational 
concept) and 
subsequent 
driver and 
relevant railway 
driver training 
          .           . 
 
                .       
 Preventive 
Driver passed 
signal at 
danger 
(SPAD) 
Train arrestor 
assessment and 
deployment/inst
allation 
                    . .  .               .       
 Dual 
Extend 
operational 
testing prior to           .   .   .                          .   
 Preventive 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
Categorisation 
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service for 
tripcocks, 
arrestors and 
SPAD control 
systems  
Emergency 
timetable - 
contingency plan 
for dealing with 
severe disruption 
(production of 
emergency 
timetables and 
dissemination of 
timetable 
information to 
all personnel 
especially 
operational 
personnel 
following an 
accident) 
                
.     
  
 
  .       . . . . .     
 Protective 
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Driver training - 
additional 
procedures to 
support drivers 
(SPAD) 
          .           .                  .       
 Preventive 
SPAD incident 
plan (immediate 
detection and 
action on signals 
passed at danger 
to reduce the 
consequence of 
failure) 
          .           . 
 
            . . . .      
 Protective 
Crash worthiness 
and vehicle 
interior           .              . . .                   
 Protective 
ATC system 
introduction . . .   . .           .      . . .       .       
 Preventive 
New/enhanced 
interlocking 
system - route 
locking system 
. . .   . .           .      . .       .   .     
 Preventive 
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Major 
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Risk Reduction 
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Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
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automatic 
signalling 
systems - 
minimisation of 
human error 
                      . .                         
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TPWS Train 
Protection and 
Warning System 
. . .   . .           .      . .          .     
 Preventive 
Modify signalling 
to align with 
sighting 
constraints 
        . .           .      .     .             
 Preventive 
Speed 
restrictions 
(Adhesion)           .       .                    . . .     
 Protective 
Additional 
testing and 
inspection of 
wheels and rail 
(NDT) 
          .   .                              .   
 Preventive 
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
277 
 
Major 
Accident 
Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
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Tripcock 
positions to be 
re-examined and 
potential 
relocation/re-
installation 
  
.
  
      
.
  
            
 .
  
                      
 Preventive 
Exhaustive 
network survey 
to identify 
potential 
sighting issues 
          .                                  .   
 Dual 
Extend overlaps 
          . .     .     .             .           
 Preventive 
Emergency 
brakes fail to 
apply 
Additional 
testing of brakes 
to determine if 
brakes are 
isolated 
          . .     .                          .   
 Preventive 
Precautions, 
procedural 
modifications 
and 
                      .                  .  .     
 Protective 
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Accident 
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Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
Categorisation 
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subsequently, 
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for running with 
isolated 
emergency 
brakes 
Introduction of 
enhanced 
braking system - 
eliminate 
scenarios where 
emergency brake 
signals fail to 
transmit to 
brakes (Same as 
‘improved 
braking’ above) 
  . .   . .   . . .     
 
    . .     . . .       
 Preventive 
Assess the 
emergency brake 
performance of 
trains 
                  .                            . 
 Dual 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
Categorisation 
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Training for 
maintenance 
and test teams            .           .                .         
 Preventive 
Additional 
operational 
testing and 
inclusion in 
regime for 
rigorous asset 
acceptance/appr
oval  
          . .     .     
 
                    .   
 Preventive 
introduction of 
advanced 
radio/comms 
network across 
line section 
                  .                        .     
 Dual 
Delayed 
communicatio
ns due to 
train radio 
system 
Rewiring/refurbi
shment of 
existing 
comms/radio 
systems 
        .             .            .             
 Preventive 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
Categorisation 
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Better 
communication 
between train 
drivers and line 
controllers - 
comms 
procedure/driver 
and line 
controller 
training 
. .     . .             
 
                        
 Preventive 
Update 
communication 
procedure and 
related 
procedures for 
drivers and line 
controllers 
          .       .     
 
                      . 
 Preventive 
Modify the train 
traction system 
e.g. filters, ICMU 
(Interference 
Current 
Monitoring Unit) 
. . .   . .           . 
 
    .                   
 Preventive 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
Categorisation 
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Traction 
power or 
track circuit of 
adjacent line 
not indicating 
occupied or 
showing 
shorted by 
derailed train 
Extended overlap 
  .       .             
 
            .           
 Preventive 
Wrong 
direction train 
movement 
(due to 1. 
Signal 
Operator 
error and 2. 
Driver error) 
Emergency 
accident/inciden
t plans 
                      . .             
 
. . .     
 Protective 
Collision with 
another train 
subsequent to 
a collision. 
Incident team on 
site - trained 
incident stations 
staff availability 
                      . .               . . .     
 Protective 
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
282 
 
Major 
Accident 
Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
Categorisation 
B
u
ilt
-i
n
 r
e
d
u
n
d
an
cy
 
In
cr
e
as
e
d
 c
o
n
n
ec
ti
vi
ty
 o
f 
 s
ys
te
m
s 
o
r 
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
s 
U
se
 o
f 
vo
ti
n
g 
sy
st
em
s 
D
e
ra
ti
n
g 
Si
m
p
lif
yi
n
g 
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
s 
R
e
d
u
ci
n
g 
w
e
ak
 li
n
ks
 in
 t
h
e
 d
e
si
gn
/o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
 
M
ai
n
ta
in
in
g 
co
n
ti
n
u
it
y 
o
f 
ac
ti
o
n
 
O
p
p
o
si
te
 e
ff
ec
t 
m
o
d
if
ic
at
io
n
s 
M
in
im
is
in
g 
fr
e
q
u
e
n
cy
 o
f 
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
 
Te
st
in
g 
to
 p
re
ci
p
it
at
e
 la
te
n
t 
fa
u
lt
s 
M
in
im
is
e
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 c
au
se
 f
ai
lu
re
s 
M
in
im
is
e
 h
u
m
an
 e
rr
o
rs
 
Se
p
ar
at
in
g 
h
az
ar
d
s 
an
d
 t
ri
gg
e
rs
 
D
am
ag
e
 A
rr
es
to
rs
 
R
e
d
u
ci
n
g 
p
as
se
n
ge
r 
vu
ln
er
ab
ili
ty
 
B
lo
ck
in
g 
p
at
h
w
ay
s 
to
 e
sc
al
at
io
n
 
U
si
n
g 
fa
il-
sa
fe
 d
ev
ic
e
s 
D
e
lib
e
ra
te
ly
 in
tr
o
d
u
ci
n
g 
w
e
ak
 li
n
ks
 
D
e
la
yi
n
g 
th
e
 r
at
e
 o
f 
d
e
te
ri
o
ra
ti
o
n
  
R
e
d
u
ci
n
g 
Ex
p
o
su
re
 t
im
e
 
M
in
im
is
in
g 
th
e
 v
u
ln
e
ra
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
ta
rg
et
s 
Em
e
rg
e
n
cy
 s
ys
te
m
s 
an
d
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s 
P
ro
ce
ss
e
s/
Sy
st
em
s 
fo
r 
 
d
e
gr
ad
e
d
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
Fa
ilu
re
 In
d
ic
at
o
rs
 (
fa
ilu
re
 s
ta
tu
s 
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g)
 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
, R
is
k 
P
la
n
n
in
g,
 T
ro
u
b
le
 s
h
o
o
ti
n
g 
 
P
ro
te
ct
iv
e
 B
ar
ri
e
rs
 
[Both incident 
train drivers 
incapacitated 
(fast 
collision)] 
Training for 
drivers and 
incident centre 
personnel                       . 
 
                
.
  
.      
 Protective 
Training for local 
emergency 
medical team on 
train accidents 
/incidents  
                      .                  .  .     
 Protective 
Additional 
procedures and 
subsequently, 
Driver and Signal 
Operator 
training - 
observation that 
wrong route is 
set prior to 
proceeding past 
signal 
          .     .     . 
 
                . .     
 Preventive 
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Audible warning 
systems - trains                                          .       . 
Protective 
Points machine 
failure - 
new/enhanced 
point machines 
with ‘route 
holding diversity’ 
. .     .             . 
 
      .                 
 Preventive 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors Risk Reduction Options 
% 
reduction 
achieved 
Accident 
cost (£) 
 Cost (£) 
Risk 
reduction 
(£) 
[Accident - 
Measure] 
Actual 
Removed 
Risk (£) 
Reduction/Cost Categorisation 
Option 
Type 
Code  
(used for 
identification) 
Collision 
Between 
Trains 
Brake trigger 
system failure 
Improve braking systems 0.9 6.18E+07 7.00E+06 5.48E+07 4.94E+07 7.05E+00 Preventive Design D-01A 
Replacement of brake controllers 0.75 6.18E+07 6.00E+06 5.58E+07 4.19E+07 6.98E+00 Preventive Design D-02A 
Renewal of brake valves 0.6 6.18E+07 3.00E+06 5.88E+07 3.53E+07 1.18E+01 Preventive Design D-03A 
Additional testing and inspection - 
improve test and inspection regimes 
(specifically brake systems) prior to 
deployment 
0.08 6.18E+07 5.00E+06 5.68E+07 4.55E+06 9.09E-01 Preventive Technical T-01 
Driver training on the use of emergency 
braking (dead-man handle) 
0.2 6.18E+07 1.00E+06 6.08E+07 1.22E+07 1.22E+01 Dual Procedural P-01A 
Introduction of alternative / automatic 
braking systems to improve availability 
of braking systems 
0.9 6.18E+07 4.50E+06 5.73E+07 5.16E+07 1.15E+01 Preventive Design D-04A 
Introduction of brake failure alarms or 
detection systems 
0.3 6.18E+07 4.00E+06 5.78E+07 1.74E+07 4.34E+00 Preventive Design D-05A 
Train slow or 
stopped 
EMC studies, monitoring interference 
levels  
0.08 1.24E+07 1.00E+06 1.14E+07 9.09E+05 9.09E-01 Preventive Procedural P-02 
Traction system renewal/refurbishment 0.8 1.24E+07 5.00E+06 7.37E+06 5.89E+06 1.18E+00 Preventive Technical T-02 
Improvement of processes/procedures 
(including driver training) 
0.15 1.24E+07 1.00E+06 1.14E+07 1.71E+06 1.71E+00 Preventive Procedural P-03 
Further/enhanced/additional operational 
railway testing prior to operations on live 
track 
0.1 1.24E+07 5.00E+06 7.37E+06 7.37E+05 1.47E-01 Preventive Technical T-03 
Train runs away Re-assessment of stabling procedures - 
potentially leading to change in stabling 
procedures and subsequently training of 
depot staff and train drivers 
0.15 1.24E+07 1.50E+06 1.09E+07 1.63E+06 1.09E+00 Dual Procedural P-04 
Improve testing and maintenance regime 
for train-stop, parking brakes for all 
stabling points 
0.2 1.24E+07 5.00E+06 7.37E+06 1.47E+06 2.95E-01 Preventive Technical T-04 
Enhanced testing and maintenance 
regime for spring applied parking brakes 
to eliminate/reduce WSF of the spring 
applied parking brakes 
0.15 1.24E+07 5.00E+06 7.37E+06 1.11E+06 2.21E-01 Preventive Technical T-05 
Relocation of stabling points - from 
downslope locations 
0.1 1.24E+07 5.50E+06 6.87E+06 6.87E+05 1.25E-01 Preventive Technical T-06 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors Risk Reduction Options 
% 
reduction 
achieved 
Accident 
cost (£) 
 Cost (£) 
Risk 
reduction 
(£) 
[Accident - 
Measure] 
Actual 
Removed 
Risk (£) 
Reduction/Cost Categorisation 
Option 
Type 
Code  
(used for 
identification) 
Improved communication between line 
controller and drivers/operators 
0.3 1.24E+07 1.00E+06 1.14E+07 3.41E+06 3.41E+00 Dual Operational O-01A 
SCAT failure Replace with improved speed sensing 
equipment 
0.8 3.71E+07 1.20E+07 2.51E+07 2.01E+07 1.67E+00 Preventive Design D-08 
SCAT system inspected/tested prior to 
train leaving the depot - improved SCAT 
inspection and testing regime 
0.1 3.71E+07 1.00E+07 2.71E+07 2.71E+06 2.71E-01 Preventive Technical T-07 
Wrong direction Modification of train movement 
procedures and driver training - 
improved additional training and driver 
behavioural studies/assessments 
0.15 6.18E+07 3.00E+06 5.88E+07 8.83E+06 2.94E+00 Preventive Procedural P-05 
Extensive sighting studies to identify 
potential sighting problems 
0.1 6.18E+07 1.00E+06 6.08E+07 6.08E+06 6.08E+00 Preventive Technical T-08A 
Modification of signalling in line with 
sighting constraints 
0.6 6.18E+07 4.00E+07 2.18E+07 1.31E+07 3.28E-01 Preventive Design D-09A 
Change to single stopping positions 0.2 6.18E+07 5.00E+06 5.68E+07 1.14E+07 2.27E+00 Preventive Technical T-09 
Introduction and use of in-cab CCTV 
eliminating/reducing other person 
induced constraints on stopping positions 
0.4 6.18E+07 3.00E+07 3.18E+07 1.27E+07 4.25E-01 Preventive Design D-10 
Introducing train stops in areas where 
they currently don't exist 
0.3 6.18E+07 7.00E+06 5.48E+07 1.65E+07 2.35E+00 Preventive Design D-11 
Introduction of enhanced technology 
such as radar/alarm systems 
0.2 6.18E+07 7.00E+06 5.48E+07 1.10E+07 1.57E+00 Dual Design D-12 
Additional supervision to check the 
aspect prior to the reverse movement 
0.3 6.18E+07 1.00E+06 6.08E+07 1.83E+07 1.83E+01 Preventive Operational O-02 
Side Swipe Track re-alignment to gauge (focus on 
track stressing & effects of weather on 
embankment and structures 
0.8 6.18E+07 1.00E+07 5.18E+07 4.15E+07 4.15E+00 Preventive Design D-14 
Speed restrictions - side swipe 0.3 6.18E+07 5.00E+06 5.68E+07 1.71E+07 3.41E+00 Preventive Operational O-03A 
Service brake 
failure 
On-board sanding 0.1 6.18E+07 2.00E+06 5.98E+07 5.98E+06 2.99E+00 Protective Technical T-10A 
Driver training - braking techniques 0.2 6.18E+07 1.00E+06 6.08E+07 1.22E+07 1.22E+01 Preventive Procedural P-01B 
Notices on slippery routes 0.05 6.18E+07 1.00E+06 6.08E+07 3.04E+06 3.04E+00 Preventive Operational O-04 
Alarm/Audible warning of service brake 
failure prior to brake demand 
0.2 6.18E+07 3.00E+06 5.88E+07 1.18E+07 3.92E+00 Preventive Design D-15 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors Risk Reduction Options 
% 
reduction 
achieved 
Accident 
cost (£) 
 Cost (£) 
Risk 
reduction 
(£) 
[Accident - 
Measure] 
Actual 
Removed 
Risk (£) 
Reduction/Cost Categorisation 
Option 
Type 
Code  
(used for 
identification) 
Signal WSF Berth track diversity 0.3 1.24E+08 2.00E+07 1.04E+08 3.11E+07 1.56E+00 Preventive Design D-16A 
Compromised 
overlap 
Speed restriction - Compromised overlaps 0.3 6.18E+07 5.00E+06 5.68E+07 1.71E+07 3.41E+00 Preventive Operational O-03B 
Overlap studies and potential extension 
of overlaps  
0.1 6.18E+07 3.00E+06 5.88E+07 5.88E+06 1.96E+00 Preventive Technical T-11A 
Enhance braking performance (See 
‘Improved braking system’ above) 
0.4 6.18E+07 7.00E+06 5.48E+07 2.19E+07 3.13E+00 Preventive Design D-01B 
Studies on effect of power in trains 
(especially for the introduction of new 
trains) and potentially driver training on 
specific areas of compromised overlaps 
(controlling trains - traction power 
management)    
0.05 6.18E+07 1.00E+06 6.08E+07 3.04E+06 3.04E+00 Preventive Technical T-12 
Driver training - SPAD 0.3 6.18E+07 3.00E+06 5.88E+07 1.77E+07 5.88E+00 Dual Procedural P-01C 
Train speed restrictions - likely SPAD 
locations (Signal Sighting) 
0.4 6.18E+07 5.00E+06 5.68E+07 2.27E+07 4.55E+00 Preventive Operational O-03C 
Poor Wheel/Rail 
Friction 
Vegetation management programme - 
leaf fall (autumn season specific 
challenge) 
0.3 1.24E+08 5.00E+06 1.19E+08 3.56E+07 7.12E+00 Protective Operational O-07 
Fitting of wheel slip protection or 
Adhesion improvers 
0.1 1.24E+08 2.20E+06 1.21E+08 1.21E+07 5.52E+00 Protective Design D-17 
On-board sanding (see also ‘Service 
Brake Failure’) 
0.1 1.24E+08 2.00E+06 1.22E+08 1.22E+07 6.08E+00 Dual Technical T-10B 
Increased overlap in the design of the 
signalling system - extension of overlaps 
0.1 1.24E+08 3.00E+06 1.21E+08 1.21E+07 4.02E+00 Preventive Technical T-11B 
Introduction of weather 
forecasting/predictive systems such as 
ACAT 
0.05 1.24E+08 5.00E+05 1.23E+08 6.16E+06 1.23E+01 Preventive Technical T-42 
Water jetting and sandite 0.1 1.24E+08 2.00E+06 1.22E+08 1.22E+07 6.08E+00 Preventive Technical T-12A 
Wheel rim scrubbers 0.01 1.24E+08 2.00E+05 1.23E+08 1.23E+06 6.17E+00 Dual Design D-18 
Anti-icing trains - spraying heated anti-
freeze onto the affected areas 
0.05 1.24E+08 4.00E+06 1.20E+08 5.98E+06 1.50E+00 Dual Technical T-13 
Procedures (also covering changes to 
operational concept) and subsequent 
driver and relevant railway driver 
0.4 1.24E+08 5.00E+06 1.19E+08 4.75E+07 9.49E+00 Preventive Procedural P-01D 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors Risk Reduction Options 
% 
reduction 
achieved 
Accident 
cost (£) 
 Cost (£) 
Risk 
reduction 
(£) 
[Accident - 
Measure] 
Actual 
Removed 
Risk (£) 
Reduction/Cost Categorisation 
Option 
Type 
Code  
(used for 
identification) 
training 
Driver passed 
signal at danger 
(SPAD) 
Train arrestor assessment and 
deployment/installation 
0.6 3.09E+08 2.00E+07 2.89E+08 1.74E+08 8.68E+00 Dual Technical T-14 
Extend operational testing prior to 
service for tripcocks, arrestors and SPAD 
control systems  
0.02 3.09E+08 1.00E+06 3.08E+08 6.16E+06 6.16E+00 Preventive Technical T-16 
Emergency timetable - contingency plan 
for dealing with severe disruption 
(production of emergency timetables and 
dissemination of timetable information 
to all personnel especially operational 
personnel following an accident) 
0.015 3.09E+08 2.00E+06 3.07E+08 4.61E+06 2.30E+00 Protective Procedural P-06 
Driver training - additional procedures to 
support drivers (SPAD) 
0.02 3.09E+08 2.00E+06 3.07E+08 6.14E+06 3.07E+00 Preventive Procedural P-01E 
SPAD incident plan (immediate detection 
and action on signals passed at danger 
to reduce the consequence of failure) 
0.05 3.09E+08 1.00E+06 3.08E+08 1.54E+07 1.54E+01 Dual Procedural P-07 
Crash worthiness and vehicle interior 0.3 3.09E+08 2.10E+07 2.88E+08 8.65E+07 4.12E+00 Protective Design D-07A 
ATC system introduction 0.9 3.09E+08 1.90E+08 1.19E+08 1.07E+08 5.65E-01 Preventive Design D-06B 
New/enhanced interlocking system - 
route locking system 
0.9 3.09E+08 8.50E+07 2.24E+08 2.02E+08 2.37E+00 Preventive Design D-23 
Introduction of automatic signalling 
systems - minimisation of human error 
0.9 3.09E+08 1.10E+08 1.99E+08 1.79E+08 1.63E+00 Preventive Design D-06A 
TPWS Train Protection and Warning 
System 
0.7 3.09E+08 5.00E+07 2.59E+08 1.81E+08 3.63E+00 Preventive Design D- 
Signal overrun (Same as SPAD)   1.24E+08               
Modify signalling to align with sighting 
constraints 
0.8 1.24E+08 4.00E+07 8.37E+07 6.69E+07 1.67E+00 Preventive Design D-09B 
Speed restrictions (Adhesion) 0.6 1.24E+08 1.50E+07 1.09E+08 6.52E+07 4.35E+00 Protective Operational O-03D 
Additional testing and inspection of 
wheels and rail (NDT) 
0.1 1.24E+08 6.00E+06 1.18E+08 1.18E+07 1.96E+00 Preventive Technical T-17 
Tripcock positions to be re-examined and 
potential relocation/re-installation 
0.2 1.24E+08 5.00E+06 1.19E+08 2.37E+07 4.75E+00 Preventive   T-15 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors Risk Reduction Options 
% 
reduction 
achieved 
Accident 
cost (£) 
 Cost (£) 
Risk 
reduction 
(£) 
[Accident - 
Measure] 
Actual 
Removed 
Risk (£) 
Reduction/Cost Categorisation 
Option 
Type 
Code  
(used for 
identification) 
Exhaustive network survey to identify 
potential sighting issues 
0.005 1.24E+08 3.00E+05 1.23E+08 6.17E+05 2.06E+00 Dual Technical T-18 
Emergency 
brakes fail to 
apply 
Extend overlaps 0.4 4.95E+07 3.00E+06 4.65E+07 1.86E+07 6.20E+00 Preventive Technical T-11C 
Additional testing of brakes to determine 
if brakes are isolated 
0.1 6.18E+07 1.00E+06 6.08E+07 6.08E+06 6.08E+00 Preventive Technical T-19 
Precautions, procedural modifications 
and subsequently, driver training for 
running with isolated emergency brakes 
0.3 6.18E+07 3.00E+06 5.88E+07 1.77E+07 5.88E+00 Protective Procedural P-01F 
Introduction of enhanced braking system 
- eliminate scenarios where emergency 
brake signals fail to transmit to brakes 
(Same as ‘improved braking’ above) 
0.95 6.18E+07 1.20E+07 4.98E+07 4.73E+07 3.95E+00 Preventive Design D-04B 
Assess the emergency brake 
performance of trains 
0.05 6.18E+07 3.00E+05 6.15E+07 3.08E+06 1.03E+01 Dual Technical T-20 
Training for maintenance and test teams  0.1 6.18E+07 1.00E+06 6.08E+07 6.08E+06 6.08E+00 Preventive Procedural P-08 
Additional operational testing and 
inclusion in regime for rigorous asset 
acceptance/approval  
0.15 6.18E+07 5.00E+06 5.68E+07 8.53E+06 1.71E+00 Preventive Technical T-21 
Delayed 
communications 
due to train 
radio system 
introduction of advanced radio/comms 
network across line section 
0.75 3.71E+07 1.10E+07 2.61E+07 1.96E+07 1.78E+00 Dual Design D-19A 
Rewiring/refurbishment of existing 
comms/radio systems 
0.3 2.47E+07 1.10E+07 1.37E+07 4.12E+06 3.75E-01 Preventive Design D-20A 
Better communication between train 
drivers and line controllers - comms 
procedure/driver and line controller 
training 
0.2 2.47E+07 6.00E+05 2.41E+07 4.83E+06 8.05E+00 Preventive Operational O-01B 
Update communication procedure and 
related procedures for drivers and line 
controllers 
0.2 2.47E+07 6.00E+05 2.41E+07 4.83E+06 8.05E+00 Preventive Procedural P-09 
Traction power 
or track circuit 
of adjacent line 
not indicating 
occupied or 
showing 
Modify the train traction system e.g. 
filters, ICMU (Interference Current 
Monitoring Unit) 
0.1 6.18E+07 1.00E+06 6.08E+07 6.08E+06 6.08E+00 Preventive Design D-21 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors Risk Reduction Options 
% 
reduction 
achieved 
Accident 
cost (£) 
 Cost (£) 
Risk 
reduction 
(£) 
[Accident - 
Measure] 
Actual 
Removed 
Risk (£) 
Reduction/Cost Categorisation 
Option 
Type 
Code  
(used for 
identification) 
shorted by 
derailed train 
Wrong direction 
train movement 
(due to 1. Signal 
Operator error 
and 2. Driver 
error) 
Extended overlap 0.8 1.24E+07 3.00E+06 9.37E+06 7.49E+06 2.50E+00 Preventive Technical T-11D 
Collision with 
another train 
subsequent to a 
collision. [Both 
incident train 
drivers 
incapacitated 
(fast collision)] 
Emergency accident/incident plans 0.3 2.47E+07 1.00E+06 2.37E+07 7.12E+06 7.12E+00 Protective Procedural P-10A 
Incident team on site - trained incident 
stations staff availability 
0.4 2.47E+07 3.00E+06 2.17E+07 8.69E+06 2.90E+00 Dual Operational O-09 
Training for drivers and incident centre 
personnel 
0.2 2.47E+07 1.20E+06 2.35E+07 4.71E+06 3.92E+00 Protective Procedural P-11 
Training for local emergency medical 
team on train accidents/incidents  
0.2 2.47E+07 6.00E+05 2.41E+07 4.83E+06 8.05E+00 Protective Procedural P-12 
Additional procedures and subsequently, 
Driver and Signal Operator training - 
observation that wrong route is set prior 
to proceeding past signal 
0.3 2.47E+07 1.00E+06 2.37E+07 7.12E+06 7.12E+00 Preventive Procedural P-01G 
Audible warning systems - trains 0.2 2.47E+07 1.10E+06 2.36E+07 4.73E+06 4.30E+00 Protective Design D-24A 
Points machine failure - new/enhanced 
point machines with ‘route holding 
diversity’ 
0.75 2.47E+07 1.10E+07 1.37E+07 1.03E+07 9.36E-01 Preventive Design D-25A 
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APPENDIX A2: Risk reduction measures for Derailment accidents 
Major 
Accident 
Contributor 
Risk 
Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
Categorisation 
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      .    .   
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     . .    .  . 
 
            
 
Preventive 
Excess 
speed - 
leading to 
derailment 
Speed 
restrictions . .  .  .       . 
 
        .  . . 
 
Preventive 
Optimising cab 
design for 
driver 
protection in a 
collision 
      .  . .   . 
 
        .  . . 
 
Preventive 
Traction/powe
r assessment - 
introduction of 
systems such 
    .  .     .   . .           
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Review of 
operational 
concept/proce
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‘proceed-
. . . . Dual
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prior to 
deployment 
          .   
 
            
 
Preventive 
Train falls 
down an 
embankmen
t or from a 
bridge after 
a fast 
derailment 
Review 
programme 
for structural 
assessments/s
urveys - 
potentially 
more 
surveys/assess
ments 
introduced to 
existing 
programme 
          .   
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embankments 
      .       
 
        .  . . 
 
Protective 
Reduced traffic 
on 
bridge/structu
re 
         .    
 
  .     .     
 
Protective 
Programme 
for assessment 
and 
management 
of workload 
for train 
drivers, line 
controllers, 
signallers and 
safety-critical 
staff  
      .      . 
 
       .     
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inspection and 
testing of 
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joints - track 
. . Preventive
Replacement 
of fishplated 
joints
. . . Preventive
Tripcock 
fails to 
activate 
brakes
Repositioning 
of tripcocks - 
standard 
requirement is 
tripcock 
positioning 
1.5m from 
front of train
. . . . . . Protective
EMC studies 
on trains 
compatibility 
with 
. . . . Preventive
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
 
296 
 
Major 
Accident 
Contributor 
Risk 
Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Principles 
Categorisation 
B
u
ilt
-i
n
 r
e
d
u
n
d
an
cy
 
In
cr
e
as
e
d
 c
o
n
n
ec
ti
vi
ty
 o
f 
sy
st
em
s 
o
r 
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
s 
U
se
 o
f 
vo
ti
n
g 
sy
st
em
s 
M
in
im
is
at
io
n
 o
f 
se
n
si
ti
vi
ty
 t
o
 s
in
gl
e
 p
o
in
t 
fa
ilu
re
s 
 
D
e
ra
ti
n
g 
Si
m
p
lif
yi
n
g 
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
s 
R
e
d
u
ci
n
g 
w
e
ak
 li
n
ks
 in
 t
h
e
 d
e
si
gn
/o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
 
M
ai
n
ta
in
in
g 
co
n
ti
n
u
it
y 
o
f 
ac
ti
o
n
 
O
p
p
o
si
te
 e
ff
ec
t 
m
o
d
if
ic
at
io
n
s 
M
in
im
is
in
g 
O
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
s 
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
  
Te
st
in
g 
to
 p
re
ci
p
it
at
e
 la
te
n
t 
fa
u
lt
s 
M
in
im
is
e
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 c
au
se
 f
ai
lu
re
s 
M
in
im
is
e
 h
u
m
an
 e
rr
o
rs
 
Se
p
ar
at
in
g 
h
az
ar
d
s 
an
d
 t
ri
gg
e
rs
 
D
am
ag
e
 A
rr
es
to
rs
 
R
e
d
u
ci
n
g 
p
as
se
n
ge
r 
vu
ln
er
ab
ili
ty
 
B
lo
ck
in
g 
p
at
h
w
ay
s 
fo
r 
e
sc
al
at
io
n
 
U
si
n
g 
fa
il-
sa
fe
 d
ev
ic
e
s 
D
e
lib
e
ra
te
ly
 in
tr
o
d
u
ci
n
g 
w
e
ak
 li
n
ks
 
D
e
la
yi
n
g 
ra
te
 o
f 
d
e
te
ri
o
ra
ti
o
n
  
R
e
d
u
ci
n
g 
Ex
p
o
su
re
 t
im
e
 
M
in
im
is
in
g 
th
e
 v
u
ln
e
ra
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
ta
rg
et
s 
Em
e
rg
e
n
cy
 s
ys
te
m
s 
an
d
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s 
P
ro
ce
ss
e
s/
Sy
st
em
s 
 
d
e
gr
ad
e
d
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
Fa
ilu
re
 In
d
ic
at
o
rs
 (
fa
ilu
re
 s
ta
tu
s 
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g)
 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
, R
is
k 
p
la
n
n
in
g,
 t
ro
u
b
le
 s
h
o
o
ti
n
g 
P
ro
te
ct
iv
e
 B
ar
ri
e
rs
 
    P
ro
te
ct
iv
e
 B
ar
ri
er
s 
track/signals - 
monitor 
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      .      . 
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      .      . 
 
.         .  . 
 
Protective 
Review and 
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rostering to 
reduce fatigue 
            . 
 
       .     
 
Dual 
 
Unobstructed 
monitoring of 
drivers and 
train despatch 
and 
subsequent 
modifications 
to despatch 
     . .      . 
 
          .  
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. . . . Preventive
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Train fails to 
shunt track 
circuit
Introduction of 
sequential 
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various kinds 
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. . . . . . . . . Preventive
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diversity) 
Replacement 
of track 
circuits 
. .     .        .    .        
 
Preventive 
Enhanced 
maintenance/t
esting such as 
detailed 
observation of 
the track 
circuit 
operation and 
       .   .   
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(improved) 
shunting policy 
      .       
 
        .  .  
 
Protective 
Review and 
improvement 
of recruitment 
and selection 
processes 
     .       . 
 
        .    
 
Preventive 
Examining 
supervision 
and 
monitoring 
guidelines for 
operational 
safety staff, 
     .       . 
 
         .   
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. . . . Protective
Involuntary 
exit
Crowd control
. . Protective
Fire and rescue 
services . . . . . . Protective
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.       . . .  . 
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. .       .    
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.   .      .  . 
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          .  . 
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Options 
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under the 
conductor 
rail 
Track and 
conductor rail 
alignment      .  .  .   .  
 
 .       .  .  
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors Risk Reduction Options Cost (£) 
% Risk 
reduction 
achieved 
Risk 
reduction 
(£) 
[Accident 
- 
Measure] 
Actual 
Removed 
Risk (£) 
Reduction/Cost Categorisation 
Option 
Type 
Code  
(used for 
identification) 
Derailment Suspension failure 
(per train) 
Replacement of rubber springs  1.20E+06 0.05 4.59E+07 2.29E+06 1.91E+00 Dual Design D-26 
Inspection and Maintenance of suspension to prevent 
incorrectly gauged suspensions in the depot prior to 
train deployment 
1.00E+06 0.1 4.61E+07 4.61E+06 4.61E+00 Preventive Technical T-39 
Defective Wheel Improve inspection, testing and maintenance regime 
for detection of wheel flat and worn wheel failures 
1.00E+06 0.1 4.61E+07 4.61E+06 4.61E+00 Preventive Technical T-40 
Additional training for route setting personnel 1.00E+06 0.1 4.61E+07 4.61E+06 4.61E+00 Preventive Procedural P-13 
Excess speed - 
leading to 
derailment 
Speed restrictions 5.00E+06 0.8 1.83E+08 1.47E+08 2.93E+01 Preventive Operational O-10A 
Optimising cab design for driver protection in a 
collision 
6.00E+06 0.3 1.82E+08 5.47E+07 9.12E+00 Preventive Design D-27 
Traction/power assessment - introduction of systems 
such as surge arrestors, current limiters etc. 
1.00E+06 0.05 1.87E+08 9.37E+06 9.37E+00 Preventive Technical D-30A 
Buffer stops 5.20E+06 0.2 1.83E+08 3.66E+07 7.04E+00 Preventive Design D-39 
Master controller installed in driver's cab for the 
driver to reduce or apply power to train 
6.00E+06 0.05 1.82E+08 9.12E+06 1.52E+00 Preventive Design D-28 
Proceed under rule 
leading to 
derailment 
Review of operational concept/procedures for 
‘proceed-under-rule’  
1.00E+06 0.05 1.78E+07 8.92E+05 8.92E-01 Preventive Procedural P-14 
Inspection and maintenance of shoe gear prior to 
deployment 
1.00E+06 0.05 1.78E+07 8.92E+05 8.92E-01 Preventive Technical T-23 
Train falls down an 
embankment or 
from a bridge after 
a fast derailment 
Review programme for structural 
assessments/surveys - potentially more 
surveys/assessments introduced to existing 
programme 
1.00E+06 0.1 1.78E+07 1.78E+06 1.78E+00 Preventive Procedural P-15 
Structural reinforcements - bridges, embankments 1.50E+07 0.3 3.84E+06 1.15E+06 7.67E-02 Protective Design D-29 
Reduced traffic on bridge/structure 1.00E+07 0.5 8.84E+06 4.42E+06 4.42E-01 Protective Operational O-11 
Programme for assessment and management of 
workload for train drivers, line controllers, signallers 
and safety-critical staff  
1.00E+06 0.1 1.78E+07 1.78E+06 1.78E+00 Preventive Procedural P-16 
Improve inspection and testing of fish-plated joints - 
track  
1.00E+06 0.1 1.78E+07 1.78E+06 1.78E+00 Preventive Technical T-24 
Replacement of fish-plated joints 1.00E+07 0.3 8.84E+06 2.65E+06 2.65E-01 Preventive Design D-31 
Tripcock fails to 
activate brakes 
Repositioning of tripcocks - standard requirement is 
tripcock positioning 1.5m from front of train 
1.00E+06 0.3 9.32E+07 2.80E+07 2.80E+01 Protective Technical T-25 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors Risk Reduction Options Cost (£) 
% Risk 
reduction 
achieved 
Risk 
reduction 
(£) 
[Accident 
- 
Measure] 
Actual 
Removed 
Risk (£) 
Reduction/Cost Categorisation 
Option 
Type 
Code  
(used for 
identification) 
EMC studies on trains compatibility with track/signals 
- monitor interference levels, identification and 
introduction of relevant immunisation/earthing 
solutions and potentially further operational railway 
testing  
6.00E+06 0.15 8.82E+07 1.32E+07 2.20E+00 Preventive Technical T-26 
Introduce training and competence management 
schemes for train crew 
5.00E+06 0.08 8.92E+07 7.13E+06 1.43E+00 Preventive Procedural P-17 
Introduce injury prevention initiatives e.g. booklets, 
DVDs and staff briefings 
2.00E+05 0.05 9.40E+07 4.70E+06 2.35E+01 Protective Procedural P-18 
Review and improve rostering to reduce fatigue 5.00E+05 0.15 9.37E+07 1.41E+07 2.81E+01 Dual Procedural P-19 
Un-obstructive monitoring of drivers and train 
despatch and subsequent modifications/amendments 
to despatch rules (Rules for train despatch 
reviewed/simplified (procedural change and 
subsequently, driver training on new despatch rules) 
1.00E+06 0.1 9.32E+07 9.32E+06 9.32E+00 Preventive Procedural P-20 
Improved management processes for train recovery  1.00E+06 0.05 9.32E+07 4.66E+06 4.66E+00 Preventive Procedural P-21 
Loss of train 
detection - Train 
fails to shunt track 
circuit 
Introduction of sequential systems of various kinds 
such as axle counters and other position detector 
systems etc. (in addition to track circuits to provide 
redundancy & diversity) 
1.50E+07 0.3 1.26E+08 3.79E+07 2.53E+00 Preventive Design D-32 
Replacement of track circuits 5.50E+07 0.5 8.63E+07 4.31E+07 7.84E-01 Preventive Design D-33 
Enhanced maintenance/testing such as detailed 
observation of the track circuit operation and re-
adjustment of the track circuit (operating voltages) 
6.50E+06 0.1 1.35E+08 1.35E+07 2.07E+00 Preventive Technical T-27 
Introduction of (improved) shunting policy 1.00E+06 0.2 1.40E+08 2.81E+07 2.81E+01 Protective Procedural P-22 
Review and improvement of recruitment and 
selection processes 
1.00E+06 0.1 1.40E+08 1.40E+07 1.40E+01 Preventive Procedural P-23 
Examining supervision and monitoring guidelines for 
operational safety staff, including shunters 
1.00E+06 0.05 1.40E+08 7.01E+06 7.01E+00 Preventive Procedural P-24 
Trains fitted with incident response kits and 
additional training for staff to act as quickly as 
possible in emergency situations 
4.00E+05 0.1 1.41E+08 1.41E+07 3.52E+01 Protective Technical T-28 
Involuntary exit Crowd control 7.00E+06 0.2 8.72E+07 1.74E+07 2.49E+00 Protective Operational O-12A 
Fire and rescue services 5.00E+06 0.3 8.92E+07 2.68E+07 5.35E+00 Protective Operational O-13 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors Risk Reduction Options Cost (£) 
% Risk 
reduction 
achieved 
Risk 
reduction 
(£) 
[Accident 
- 
Measure] 
Actual 
Removed 
Risk (£) 
Reduction/Cost Categorisation 
Option 
Type 
Code  
(used for 
identification) 
Paramedics/medical units (availability of staff trained 
for train accident scenarios) 
5.00E+06 0.3 8.92E+07 2.68E+07 5.35E+00 Protective Operational O-14 
stronger windows -also minimises risk of object 
penetration through windows 
6.00E+06 0.4 8.82E+07 3.53E+07 5.88E+00 Dual Design D-35 
Emergency exit 
systems 
Emergency lighting and signage (illumination of 
Emergency Door Release mechanisms in passenger 
vehicles) 
2.00E+05 0.1 9.22E+06 9.22E+05 4.61E+00 Protective Design D-36 
Provision of hammers for emergency exit 1.00E+04 0.3 9.41E+06 2.82E+06 2.82E+02 Protective Design D-37 
Track buckling & 
Side Swipe 
Track re-alignment to gauge (focus on track stressing 
& effects) 
1.00E+07 0.8 2.25E+08 1.80E+08 1.80E+01 Preventive Technical D-14 
Track inspections - track vehicles 4.00E+06 0.75 2.31E+08 1.74E+08 4.34E+01 Preventive Technical T-xx 
Track inspections - track workers 2.00E+06 0.4 2.33E+08 9.34E+07 4.67E+01 Preventive Technical T-xx 
Track refurbishment/renewals (including sleeper 
management programme to reduce gauge spread) 
2.50E+06 0.9 2.33E+08 2.10E+08 8.39E+01 Preventive Technical D-40A 
Shoe caught under 
the conductor rail 
Track and conductor rail alignment  3.00E+06 0.8 4.41E+07 3.53E+07 1.18E+01 Preventive Technical T-29A 
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APPENDIX A3: Risk reduction measures for Platform Train Interface accidents 
Major 
Accident 
Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Measures 
Categorisation 
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Crowded 
platform 
inhibits driver's 
view 
(crowding) 
 
Additional support 
from platform 
supervisors 
          .           .                  . .      Dual 
Audible warnings 
on platform 
(Improvements to 
passenger display 
screens and public 
address systems) 
          .           . 
 
                . . .   
 
Protective 
Emergency plans - 
incident 
management plan 
                      .                  . .      Protective 
Passenger falls 
from platform 
 
Programme of 
stair-nose marking                       . .     .         
 
         Preventive 
Increased use of 
slip, trip and fall 
toolkit 
                                 .       .        Protective 
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Falls onto the 
platform from 
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Review of incidents 
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being taken ill on 
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common causes 
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          .      .       .            Protective 
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passengers fail 
to activate 
Passenger 
Emergency 
Alarm (PEA) 
within station 
limits 
 
Introduction of 
Sensitive door 
system 
  .     . .                  . .       .          Protective 
PEA locations 
reviewed and 
relocated 
          .                  .           .        Protective 
OPO CCTV (Same 
as ‘Introduction of 
improved OPO 
CCTV systems’ 
above) 
                                       .         
 
Protective 
Platform staff 
unable to stop 
train before it 
moves off with 
Additional support 
from platform 
supervisors 
(especially during 
                      . .             .   . .      Protective 
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Major 
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Options 
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rush hour or peak 
times) - Same as 
above Additional 
support from 
platform 
supervisors 
Speed restrictions - 
enforcement of 
speed restriction 
on platform areas 
                                       .   .      Protective 
Crowd control                            .         . .          Protective 
Additional 
platform lighting - 
Same as ‘improve 
existing lighting’ 
above 
                      . .                 . .      Dual 
Audible warnings 
on platform                                          . . .    Protective 
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Major 
Accident 
Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Measures 
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from platform 
Additional 
platform staff for 
supervision/control 
. . Protective 
Person 
retrieving item 
from track 
Additional 
platform staff for 
supervision/control 
. . Protective 
Under platform 
lighting . . . . Dual 
Person on track 
due to self-
action 
(miscellaneous) 
Audible warning 
systems - platform 
(station area) - 
Same as ‘Audible 
warnings on 
platform…’ above 
. . . Protective 
Audible warning 
systems - trains . . . Protective 
Crowd control 
station platform 
area (Same as 
‘Crowd control’) 
. . . Protective 
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
313 
Major 
Accident 
Contributors 
Risk Reduction 
Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Measures 
Categorisation 
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aerodynamic effect 
of train on 
passengers on 
platform (Same as 
‘Speed Restrictions 
- enforcement of 
speed restriction 
on platform areas’ 
above)  
. . Protective 
Passenger 
strikes/falls 
against train 
OPO CCTV (Same 
as ‘Introduction of 
improved OPO 
CCTV systems’ 
above) 
. Protective 
Fencing . . . . . Preventive 
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Options 
Preventive Risk Reduction Principles Protective Risk Reduction Measures 
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Additional station 
area lighting . . . Protective 
Trespass on 
track in station 
area 
Audible warning 
systems - trains 
(See ‘audible 
warning systems - 
trains’ above  
. . . Protective 
Additional 
station/platform 
staff training (See 
‘Station 
Master/personnel 
training’ above) 
. . . Protective 
Closure of access 
to unused 
platforms or 
platform areas  
. . . . . Preventive 
Provision of staff 
at some locations, 
specifically to 
watch for people 
loitering on 
. . . Preventive 
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Options 
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Major Accident Contributors Risk Reduction Options  Cost (£) 
Risk 
Reduction 
Achieved 
Risk 
reduction 
(£) 
[Accident 
- 
Measure] 
Actual 
Removed 
Risk (£) 
Risk 
reduction/Cost 
Categorisation 
Option 
Type 
Code  
(used for 
identification)  
 Platform Train Interface 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Crowded 
platform 
inhibits driver's 
view 
(crowding) 
 
Additional support from platform 
supervisors 
5.00E+06 15% 1.29E+08 1.93E+07 3.86E+00 Protective Operational O-16A 
Audible warnings on platform 
(Improvements to passenger display 
screens and public address systems) 
1.00E+06 10% 1.33E+08 1.33E+07 1.33E+01 Protective Operational O-18A 
Emergency plans - incident 
management plan 
1.00E+06 10% 1.33E+08 1.33E+07 1.33E+01 Protective Procedural P-10B 
Passenger falls 
from platform 
Programme of stair-nose marking 5.00E+05 8% 4.40E+07 3.52E+06 7.05E+00 Preventive Technical T-32 
Increased use of slip, trip and fall 1.00E+05 5% 4.44E+07 2.22E+06 2.22E+01 Protective Technical T-33 
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Major Accident Contributors Risk Reduction Options  Cost (£) 
Risk 
Reduction 
Achieved 
Risk 
reduction 
(£) 
[Accident 
- 
Measure] 
Actual 
Removed 
Risk (£) 
Risk 
reduction/Cost 
Categorisation 
Option 
Type 
Code  
(used for 
identification)  
toolkit 
Signage/Warnings and car door 
alarms (Trains) 
1.00E+06 10% 7.91E+06 7.91E+05 7.91E-01 Protective Design D-53 
Deployment of train co-ordinators 
train-cars 
1.00E+06 5% 7.91E+06 3.95E+05 3.95E-01 Protective Operational O-21 
Platform staff support (incident 
control - drag and pull) - Same as 
above Additional support from 
platform supervisors 
2.00E+06 20% 6.91E+06 1.38E+06 6.91E-01 Protective Operational O-16B 
Falls onto the 
platform from 
train 
Review of incidents of passengers 
being taken ill on trains to establish 
common causes and develop plans to 
reduce the numbers of such incidents 
5.00E+05 10% 1.78E+08 1.78E+07 3.55E+01 Protective Technical T-37 
Gap fillers - Platform rubber 2.00E+06 50% 1.76E+08 8.81E+07 4.40E+01 Protective Design 
D-55 
Train 
passengers fail 
to activate 
Passenger 
Emergency 
Alarm (PEA) 
within station 
limits 
PEA locations reviewed and relocated 1.00E+06 20% 1.77E+08 3.54E+07 3.54E+01 Protective Design D-56 
Introduction of Sensitive door system 1.30E+06 30% 1.65E+07 4.95E+06 3.81E+00 Protective Design D-57 
OPO CCTV (Same as ‘Introduction of 
improved OPO CCTV systems’ above) 
1.20E+07 80% 5.82E+06 4.65E+06 3.88E-01 Protective Design D-41B 
Platform staff 
unable to stop 
train before it 
moves off with 
trapped 
customer 
Additional support from platform 
supervisors (especially during rush 
hour or peak times) - Same as above 
Additional support from platform 
supervisors 
5.00E+06 40% 3.95E+07 1.58E+07 3.16E+00 Protective Operational O-16C 
Speed restrictions - enforcement of 
speed restriction on platform areas 
5.00E+06 20% 3.95E+07 7.91E+06 1.58E+00 Protective Operational O-22A 
Crowd control 7.00E+06 20% 3.75E+07 7.51E+06 1.07E+00 Protective Operational O-12C 
Additional platform lighting - Same as 
‘improve existing lighting’ above 
5.50E+06 10% 3.90E+07 3.90E+06 7.10E-01 Preventive Design D-42B 
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Major Accident Contributors Risk Reduction Options  Cost (£) 
Risk 
Reduction 
Achieved 
Risk 
reduction 
(£) 
[Accident 
- 
Measure] 
Actual 
Removed 
Risk (£) 
Risk 
reduction/Cost 
Categorisation 
Option 
Type 
Code  
(used for 
identification)  
Audible warnings on platform 1.00E+06 10% 4.35E+07 4.35E+06 4.35E+00 Protective Design D-58 
Person pushed 
from platform 
Additional platform staff for 
supervision/control 
5.00E+06 20% 3.95E+07 7.91E+06 1.58E+00 Protective Operational O-16D 
Person 
retrieving item 
from track 
 
Additional platform staff for 
supervision/control 
5.00E+06 10% 3.95E+07 3.95E+06 7.91E-01 Protective Operational O-16E 
Under-platform lighting 
6.00E+05 10% 4.39E+07 4.39E+06 7.32E+00 Protective Design D-59 
Person on track 
due to self-
action 
(miscellaneous) 
 
Audible warning systems - platform 
(station area) - Same as ‘Audible 
warnings on platform…’ above 
1.00E+06 10% 8.81E+07 8.81E+06 8.81E+00 Protective Operational O-18B 
Audible warning systems - trains 1.20E+06 10% 8.79E+07 8.79E+06 7.32E+00 Protective Design D-24B 
Crowd control station platform area 
(Same as ‘Crowd control’) above 
7.00E+06 20% 8.21E+07 1.64E+07 2.35E+00 Protective Operational O-12D 
Speed restrictions - aerodynamic 
effect of train on passengers on 
platform (Same as ‘Speed Restrictions 
- enforcement of speed restriction on 
platform areas’ above)  
5.00E+06 20% 8.41E+07 1.68E+07 3.36E+00 Protective Operational O-22B 
Passenger 
strikes/falls 
against train 
 
OPO CCTV (Same as ‘Introduction of 
improved OPO CCTV systems’ above) 
1.20E+07 40% 1.66E+08 6.65E+07 5.54E+00 Protective Design D-41C 
Fencing 3.00E+06 40% 1.75E+08 7.01E+07 2.34E+01 Preventive Design D-61 
Additional station area lighting 4.00E+05 10% 1.78E+08 1.78E+07 4.44E+01 Preventive Design D-62 
Trespass on 
track in station 
area 
 
Audible warning systems - trains (See 
‘audible warning systems - trains’ 
above  
1.20E+06 10% 8.79E+07 8.79E+06 7.32E+00 Protective Design D-24C 
Additional station/platform staff 
training (See ‘Station 
Master/personnel training’ above) 
1.00E+06 10% 8.81E+07 8.81E+06 8.81E+00 Protective Procedural P-25D 
Closure of access to unused platforms 
or platform areas  
3.00E+06 40% 8.61E+07 3.44E+07 1.15E+01 Preventive Technical T-38 
Provision of staff at some locations, 
specifically to watch for people 
loitering on platforms 
5.00E+06 10% 8.41E+07 8.41E+06 1.68E+00 Preventive Operational O-16F 
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APPENDIX B: Published Papers 
APPENDIX B1: A new approach to risk reduction in the railway industry.  
Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) Special Interest Publication titled “The Infrastructure 
Risk and Resilience: Transportation”, 47 – 52.  
Abstract 
In view of a number of fundamental weaknesses in the existing railway industry practice for selecting 
effective risk reduction measures, this paper proposes a new decision support approach based on sound, 
comprehensive and structured engineering principles from which risk reduction measures are identified. 
The proposed new approach is based on assessing the amount of risk the risks-reduction measures 
remove and their cost and on selecting the combination of risk-reduction measures which removes the 
largest amount of risk within the specified budget. We show that this approach is superior to the 
traditional cost-benefit-analysis approach, based on prioritising the risks according to their cost-benefit 
ratio and selecting only risk-reduction measures with benefit-cost ratio greater than one. 
Keywords: Railways, Risk Reduction, Cost Effectiveness, Cost Benefit Analysis, Decision Support. 
1. Introduction
Cost benefit studies are broadly used in the railways as a decision support tool for selecting accident 
reduction measures. A number of studies have exposed the inadequacies of the basic economic theories 
and practices in the transport industry [1]. 
Uncertainty in accident data has necessitated conservatism leading to an overestimation of the major 
accident risks on the railways. This paper presents a basic but structured approach to identifying and 
prioritising risk reduction measures for specific applications without reliance on accident risk data as 
currently practiced. The use of expected utility theory to reduce uncertainties associated with the 
application of cost-benefit analysis has been proposed in [2]. Attempts at developing alternatives to cost 
benefit analysis have also relied on economic theories. Currently, no practical and verifiable alternative 
exists for selecting risk reduction measures. Common sense suggests that the methodology must not be 
entirely dependent on historical accident data. A set of accident data is always associated with particular 
designs and conditions and cannot be transferred to new designs and new conditions. Accident 
frequencies relevant to old designs and conditions cannot be extrapolated to new designs and new 
conditions. 
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One of the primary requirements for risk reduction in the railway industry and similar safety-critical 
industries is that measures applied to reduce risks must be verifiable. This is a major challenge for the 
existing methods with their critical dependence on accident risk data. Sensitivity analysis has been 
considered as a tool for preventing misleading results from risk analysis and subsequently from cost-
benefit studies. However, sensitivity analysis methods have been shown to contribute to inaccuracies, as 
a result of their limitations. These limitations have been well documented in [3-9].  
2. Existing cost-benefit approach for risk-reduction 
The choice of risk reduction measures is currently based on analysis using historical accident data with 
varying levels of uncertainty. As a result, the accuracy of decisions is often in question and could 
potentially lead to serious incidents. Figure 1 demonstrates the existing approach to reach decisions on 
risk reduction measures for investments on a typical railway project.  
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Figure 1: Existing cost-benefit approach for risk-reduction. 
As can be seen from the diagram in Figure1, the cost-benefit approach to risk reduction is based on 
prioritising and selecting the risk reduction measures according to their benefit-cost ratio. Furthermore, 
despite the broad use of this approach, the effectiveness of the cost-benefit approach cannot be verified 
as it is heavily reliant on historical data. The historic data are neither representative nor reliable for actual 
and estimated accident costs. Furthermore, they are not valid to new designs and new conditions. These 
circumstances significantly increase ambiguity in decisions; reduce the level of confidence in the selected 
risk management procedures and make it impossible to develop a robust case for the railway safety 
application. This paper focuses on the highlighted region X in Figure 1 by introducing a well-defined and 
structured approach that replaces the highlighted activities. The proposed approach is based on the 
functional capability of the risk reduction measures applied to specific railway risk scenarios. 
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3. A new decision support methodology for selecting risk reduction measures
By using the cost-of-failure concept and the generic principles of risk reduction concept [10], an 
appropriated set of generic risk-reduction principles can be formulated, specific to the railway industry, 
from which risk-reduction measures can be derived. These risk-reduction measures reduce the likelihood 
of a railway accident or the consequence in the event of the accident. Subsequently, the identified risk-
reduction measures are assessed with regards to the amount of risk each of them removes and the cost 
of their implementation. Table 1 presents 24 key generic principles for reducing risks in the railway 
industry. They are referred to as ‘preventive’ if they reduce the likelihood of a railway accident or 
‘protective’ if they reduce the consequences, given that the accident has occurred. 
Table 1: Key risk reduction principles (preventive and protective). 
Principles for reducing the likelihood of an accident 
(Preventive) 
Principles for reducing the consequence of an 
accident (Protective) 
Built-in redundancy e.g. braking systems, route 
locking systems, position detection systems 
Protective barriers e.g. thermal barriers as 
passive protective systems for risk reduction 
Increased connectivity e.g. on-board train units. Delaying deterioration e.g. refurbishments 
Derating e.g. voltage alterations in track circuits for 
different operating temperatures 
Blocking pathways through which accidents 
escalate e.g. platform emergency plungers 
Reducing sensitivity to common cause failures e.g. 
design diversity in train control systems 
Introducing weak links e.g. Crash Energy 
Management (CEM) 
Minimising interfaces, complexities, weak links and 
connections e.g. use of closed communications 
networks 
Reducing the vulnerability of passengers e.g. 
platform Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) or 
One Person Operated (OPO) CCTV for stuck at 
door or falls between train and platform 
Simplification of operations e.g. use of software 
based systems to simplify application such as 
automating braking systems 
Use of fail-safe devices in isolation techniques 
e.g. stick relays to de-energise track circuitry 
following an accident 
Maintaining resistive forces and continuity of action 
e.g. wheel-slip and slide control 
Emergency response e.g. emergency 
timetables, incident systems, first aid tool kit 
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Opposite effect modifications e.g. stressing track Degraded operations e.g. speed restrictions 
Operations frequency e.g. introducing trains into 
service to reduce overcrowding 
Damage arrestors e.g. over-voltage or surge 
protection 
Testing, inspections e.g. to detect latent faults Exposure time e.g. crowd control 
Reducing human errors e.g. training of drivers, 
controllers, in-cab designs. 
Failure indications e.g. Automatic Warning 
System,  
Voting systems reducing the likelihood of erroneous 
signals; interlocks preventing a wrong sequence of 
actions (e.g. controls and signalling systems) 
Prediction, risk planning and troubleshooting  
e.g. use of leading and lagging indicators in risk 
reduction 
The X-region in Figure 1 is replaced with a well-defined set of risk-reduction measures that provides the 
risk analyst and the decision-maker with a thorough and verifiable decision support system. Figure 2 
presents the proposed decision support technique based on the 24 key risk reduction principles. 
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Figure 2: A simplified new approach 
The process starts with assigning risk reduction measures to the different risk contributors or risk 
scenarios resulting in a major railway accident. Using the 24 key risk reduction principles, the measures 
are classified according to their potential for reducing the likelihood of the accident (preventive 
measures) or reducing the consequence given that the accident has occurred (protective measures). Each 
risk reduction measure is also assessed in terms of the magnitude of removed risk and its cost of 
implementation. A comparative analysis informs the decision maker of risk reduction measures with 
similar attributes.  
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4. Application of the decision support methodology for cost effective selection of risk
reduction measures 
The significant advantage of the proposed approach to the existing cost-benefit approach in selecting 
risk-reduction measures becomes clear from the following simple example. Suppose that a budget of £3 
million has been allocated for the reduction of platform train accidents i.e. reduction in accidents 
involving passengers and trains at the platform area. This is a major risk which is located in the high-risk 
region of the risk matrix. The first risk reduction option ‘A’ requires the driver to operate a CCTV 
monitoring of the platform. The train will not be started if there are passengers stuck at the door, fallen 
onto the track or fallen between train and platform. Option B includes stop plungers - wall mounted 
alarm devices at specified locations/intervals within the platform area which can be operated by platform 
staff or passengers. Trains in the platform area will be brought to a halt by operating any of these 
plungers. Option C consists of gap fillers between train and platform to reduce accidents where 
passengers fall between train and platform whilst boarding the train. The three key risk reduction 
options, A, B and C have been evaluated, and the corresponding magnitudes of removed risk and costs 
are according to Table 2. 
Table 2: Risk reduction measures with the associated costs and magnitude of the removed risk. 
Risk Reduction Measure Removed Risk 
[in millions £] 
Cost of measure 
[in millions £] 
Benefit/Cost ratio 
A (One person operated 
CCTV) 
2.0 1.60 1.25 
B (Platform/passenger 
emergency stop 
plungers) 
1.5 1.57 0.95 
C (Gap Fillers) 1.2 1.3 0.92 
To remove the major risk ‘platform train accident’ from the high-risk region of the risk matrix, risk of 
minimum magnitude £2.5 millions must be removed. If the cost-benefit approach is used, the first 
measure, A, with benefit-to-cost ratio greater than one, will be the only selected measure. Measures B 
and C will be ignored because their benefit- to-cost ratios are less than one. The magnitude of the 
removed risk within the specified budget is £2 million – insufficient to remove the major risk from the 
high-risk region of the risk matrix. In addition, the magnitude of the removed risk could be significantly 
larger, considering the specified budget of £3 million. According to the proposed new approach, options 
A and C should be selected, because this is the combination whose cost is still in the allocated budget of 
£3 million and the magnitude of the total removed risk is the largest. Furthermore, the magnitude of 
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removed risk according to the proposed approach will be £3.2 million, by 60% more than the amount of 
risk removed by using the cost-benefit approach. In addition, the amount of removed risk is sufficient to 
remove the major risk ‘platform train accident’ from the high-risk region of the risk matrix. 
The next example is a real-life case, which has been an issue on all UK applications of the product ‘axle 
counters’, for over 10 years. The introduction of axle counters to achieve position detection for the 
trains, as a replacement for ‘track circuits’, is an illustration of the catastrophic effect of the cost-benefit 
approach which is based on historical data. Train position detection is a primary requirement for a safe 
operation of the railways. Due to lack of historical data regarding the frequency of failure of the axle 
counters, the accident history of the track circuit was used in the cost-benefit analysis. The cost-benefit 
analysis revealed net benefit of £500 per unit, from the use of axle counters. However, the historical data 
related to track circuits failed to reveal the following dangerous failure scenarios associated with the axle 
counters: (i) broken rails could easily be detected by the track circuit device but not by the axle counters; 
(ii) rail grinding wagons frequently brake axle counter heads, which makes them unsuitable for operation. 
These problems entail inability to detect broken tracks and, in addition, the axle counter heads have to 
be re-calibrated and re-installed after grinding operations. The result was increased risk levels to 
passengers, delays and severe operational challenges. 
In this particular case, the use of the key risk reduction principles with the proposed systematic and 
iterative process would have identified the inherent flaws from the application of axle counters, thereby 
significantly reducing overall costs.  
5. Conclusions 
o The proposed decision support approach is a structured and comprehensive methodology for 
selecting risk reduction measures, where the likelihood of omitting a risk-reduction option is 
reduced to a minimum; 
o  The proposed decision support methodology is capable of identifying a set of risk reduction 
measures characterised by a larger removed risk within a specified budget, compared to the 
cost-benefit approach. The proposed methodology works particularly well in the common cases 
where the budgets for risk reduction are fixed and cannot be extended. 
o The cost-benefit approach is based on historical accident data, which often results in a failure to 
detect dangerous new failure modes, if the technology or the operation conditions are changed.  
o In contrast, the proposed decision support methodology does not depend on the completeness 
or correctness of historical accident data, which are often associated with great deal of 
uncertainty and have only local relevance. 
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o The decision support approach is an engineering application of sound risk reduction principles 
that support accurate classification of the risk reduction measures. Consequently, the proposed 
decision support approach provides confidence in the measures selected for risk reduction. 
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APPENDIX B2: Optimal Risk Reduction in the Railway Industry by Using 
Dynamic Programming. 
International Conference on Risk Safety and Security Engineering, World Academy of Science, 
Engineering and Technology 79, pp. 220 – 224. 
Abstract — The paper suggests for the first time the use of dynamic programming techniques for 
optimal risk reduction in the railway industry. It is shown that by using the concept ‘amount of removed 
risk by a risk reduction option’, the problem related to optimal allocation of a fixed budget to achieve a 
maximum risk reduction in the railway industry can be reduced to an optimisation problem from dynamic 
programming. For n risk reduction options and size of the available risk reduction budget B (expressed as 
integer number),the worst-case running time of the proposed algorithm is O (n x (B+1)), which makes the 
proposed method a very efficient tool for solving the optimal risk reduction problem in the railway 
industry. 
Keywords — Optimisation, railway risk reduction, budget constraints, dynamic programming. 
INTRODUCTION 
HE railway operators and infrastructure owners are increasingly required to enhance services by 
introducing and implementing the best options for optimising risk reduction. In practice, the application 
of the “As Low As Reasonably Practicable” (ALARP) framework for risk reduction in the railway industry is 
a challenge, further compounded by decisions that must be made on a finite number of risk reduction 
options, within specified budgets. The current application of the cost-benefit technique as a decision 
support tool for determining the best options for risk reduction is inadequate 1 and there are advocates 
for alternative techniques 2. However, studies have exposed the inadequacies of applying basic economic 
theories in the transport industry 3. A fuzzy-analytical hierarchy process has been proposed by 4. The 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) requires the use of pair-wise comparison matrix and eigenvector to 
specify weights higher than a specified threshold 5, 6. AHP does not adequately support the decision-
maker in choosing alternatives that have higher weights than the threshold and are unsuitable for 
selecting more than one choice when multiple alternatives are present 7. Other proponents of 
alternatives to the cost-benefit approach have demonstrated the application of different optimisation 
techniques in addressing risk reduction within budget constraints [8]–[15]. These studies apply multi-
criteria methods such as AHP, Simulated Annealing, Tabu Search, Genetic Algorithms, Expected Utility 
Theory and combinations of these. The limitations of these approaches are well documented in [16]-[21]. 
A comprehensive analysis by 22, demonstrates that the optimal resource allocation problems are NP-
hard problems. Studies undertaken on the suitability of optimisation techniques concluded that the 
optimal resource allocation is best addressed by using dynamic programming 23, [24].  
T 
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In this paper, a case study of a railway line section has been used to demonstrate the effectiveness and 
accuracy of the dynamic programming optimisation technique for a major renewal project. The accident 
data set has been extracted from a 70km railway line with 34 stations, operating 33 - 35 trains daily. The 
railway line operates at an average speed of 60 to 70km/h line and 54 million journeys annually. The 
study focuses on the major accident risks on the line – Platform Train Interface (Platform-only accidents) 
and Collision between Trains. For the platform-only accidents, 20 available risk reduction options have 
been identified (Table I). The number of identified risk reduction options for the risk ‘Collision Between 
Trains’ was 81, of which only a small sample has been listed in Table II, due to space limitations. The risk 
reduction measures have been listed with the associated costs and risk reduction achieved. 
TABLE I 
A SET OF RISK REDUCTION OPTIONS FOR THE RISK OF PLATFORM TRAIN INCIDENTS (PLATFORM-ONLY) 
ID Risk Reduction Option 
Cost 
[x £10,000] 
Removed Risk 
[x £ 10,000] 
1 Emergency/incident management systems 100 530 
2 Station defect reporting & corrective system 10 35 
3 Emergency drills – station staff training 20 67 
4 Crowd control procedures & systems 100 265 
5 Slip, trip, fall toolkit 10 20 
6 Station surface inspections/testing/renewals 100 220 
7 Platform Edge Doors (half length) 800 1360 
8 Audible warnings on platform 100 132 
9 Access & egress from incident site 200 260 
10 Support from platform supervisors 300 320 
11 Painted line warnings/signage 50 530 
12 Platform emergency plungers – train stops 400 3900 
13 Gap fillers 200 180 
14 One-person-operated CCTV systems 1200 6100 
15 Stair-nose marking 50 350 
16 Station supervisor/personnel training 100 660 
17 Re-design/r-build platform 1000 2800 
18 Platform lighting (incl. emergency lighting) 550 1300 
19 Increased traffic – major events, peak times 1000 1200 
20 Enhanced surfaces –platforms 350 410 
TABLE II 
A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE SET FROM 81 RISK REDUCTION OPTIONS FOR THE RISK OF COLLISION BETWEEN TRAINS 
ACCIDENTS 
ID Risk Reduction Option 
Cost 
[x £100,000] 
Removed Risk 
[x £ 100,000] 
1 Train stops 70 160 
2 
Speed restrictions – compromised 
overlaps 
50 170 
3 On-board sanding 20 60 
4 In-cab CCTV 300 130 
5 Driver training – Signal Passed at Danger 30 180 
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Algorithm for Solving the Problem of Optimal Budget Allocation in the Railway Industry 
Let S be the set of all available n risk reduction options i=1,2,...,n, for a particular major risk in the railway 
industry. As a measure of the effectiveness of each risk reduction option, we postulate the measure 
amount of removed risk. The amount of removed risk is the expected cost of prevented accidents, delays, 
fatalities, injuries etc. expressed in monetary terms. Each risk reduction measure i, (i=1,2,...,n) is 
characterised by the amount of risk     it removes after its implementation. Each risk reduction measure 
i, (i=1,2,...,n) is also characterised by its cost of implementation   . 
Each risk reduction option cannot be selected more than once. As a result, each risk reduction option 
from the set S of all available risk reduction options can either be accepted or rejected. 
The task of optimal allocation of the fixed budget reduces to determining the optimal subset     of risk 
reduction options, whose total sum of removed risks    ∑        is maximum and whose total cost of 
implementation does not exceed the available risk reduction budget B. 
   ∑       ; ∑                                       (1) 
Considering the magnitude of the implementation costs for the risk reduction options in the railway 
industry and the magnitude of removed risks, it can be assumed that the costs and the amount of 
removed risk can always be expressed integer numbers. These express the removed risk and the cost of 
implementation in thousands, tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of pounds sterling. It is also 
assumed that the available budget can also be specified by an integer number. As a result, the problem of 
optimal allocation of a risk reduction budget in the railway industry is reduced to a combinatorial 
optimisation problem involving integers only. This problem can be solved by using dynamic programming 
techniques 25, 26. Although the dynamic programming techniques have been known for a long time, to 
the best of our knowledge, in this paper, these methods have been applied for the first time to solve a 
problem of optimal risk reduction in the railway industry. 
The advantage of the dynamic programming 23, 25, 26 consists of the fact that it finds solutions to sub-
problems increasing in size, stores them in the memory and describes the solution of each sub-problem 
in terms of already solved and previously stored solutions of smaller sub-problems. As a result, sub-
problems are solved only once, which makes the dynamic programming significantly more efficient than a 
brute-force method based on the enumeration of all possible subsets in the set of available risk reduction 
options S. The number of possible subsets in the set S is    and the computational time of a brute-force 
method based on scanning all possible subsets increases dramatically with increasing the number n of 
risk reduction options. 
The description of the algorithm in pseudo-code is presented next. 
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Algorithm 1: Building the Dynamic Risk Reduction Table 
Initialising array x[][] with zeroes in the row with index ‘0’ and in the column with index ‘0’. 
for i=1 to n do 
for  j=1 to B do 
   { 
cur_budget=j; 
if (c[i]>cur_budget) then  { x[i][j]=x[i-1][j]; trac[i][j]=0; } 
  else 
  { 
               rem = cur_budget-c[i]; 
tmp = rr[i]+x[i-1][rem]; 
if (x[i-1][cur_budget] >tmp) then { 
 x [i][j] = x[i-1][j]; trac [i][j]=0; 
                                                     } 
 else { 
 x [i][j]=tmp; trac [i][j]=1; 
      } 
 } 
   } 
The algorithm works as follows. The solutions of the sub-problems are kept in the array x[][], where the 
rows correspond to the risk reduction options and the columns correspond to the available budget. The 
information necessary to restore the optimal solution is kept in the array trac[][]. The size of the x[][] 
array is (n+1) x (B+1) elements. The row with index ‘0’ of the array x[][] corresponds to zero number of 
selected risk reduction options in the optimal set P; the column with index ‘0’ of the array x[][] 
corresponds to zero budget. 
The sub-problems are defined by the size of the current budget which varies from 1 to B units. The cost of 
the ith risk reduction option is compared with the value of the current budget and if it is greater than the 
current budget, the ith risk reduction option is not included in the optimal set P, which is reflected by 
placing zero in the trac array (trac[i][j]=0). In the case where the current budget is greater than the cost of 
the ith risk reduction option, a decision is taken whether to include the ith risk reduction option or not.  
Initially, the statement ‘rem = cur_budget-c[i];’ determines the remaining budget if the ith risk reduction 
option is included in the optimal set P. The sub-problem marked by x[i-1][rem] however has already been 
solved and its solution has been recorded in the x[][] array. The entry x[i-1][rem] gives the maximum 
amount of removed risk within budget equal to ‘rem’ and for i-1 available risk reduction options. 
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Consequently, the solution of the sub-problem does not need to be determined again; it can simply be 
read out from the x[][] array. The amount of risk removed by the ith risk reduction option is rr[i]. 
Consequently, the maximum amount of removed risk for budget cur_budget=j,if the ith risk reduction 
option is included, is given by ‘tmp = rr[i]+x[i-1][rem];’. If the ith option is not included in the optimal set 
P, the maximum amount of removed risk within the budget cur_budget is given by x[i-1][cur_budget], 
(cur_budget=j). Consequently, the decision whether to include the ith risk reduction option in the optimal 
set or not, depends on the outcome of the comparison made in the statement‘if(x[i-1][cur_budget]>tmp)’ 
where tmp = rr[i]+x[i-1][rem]. 
If ‘x[i-1][cur_budget] >tmp’, not including the ithrisk reduction option yields greater amount of removed 
risk and the entry‘trac[i][j]=0’in the track[][] array is set to zero, which indicates that the ith risk reduction 
option has not been included in the optimum set of options P. The maximum amount of removed risk is 
equal to the maximum amount of removed risk within the current budget ‘j’, for i-1 total number of 
available options. This maximum however, has been computed and is already in the array x[][]; this is the 
entry x[i-1][j]. 
If ‘x[i-1][cur_budget] <tmp’, including the ith option yields greater amount of removed risk and the entry 
in the trac-array is set to one(trac[i][j]=1;), which indicates that the ith risk reduction option has been 
included in the optimal set P. The maximum amount of removed risk is equal to x[i][j]= rr[i]+x[i-1][rem]. 
In words, the maximum amount of removed risk is equal to the removed risk from including the ith risk-
reduction option plus the maximum amount of removed risk for i-1 available options within the 
remaining budget ‘rem’. 
The optimal set of risk reduction options is restored by the next algorithm in pseudo-code. 
Algorithm 2: Restoring the Optimal Set of Risk Reduction Options from the Dynamic Tables 
   Initialise all entries of the solution [] array with zeroes. 
cur_bud=B; 
cur_opt=n;  
tmp=trac[cur_opt][cur_bud]; 
while (cur_opt> =1 ) do 
  { 
if (trac[cur_opt][cur_bud]=1)  then  { 
 solution [cur_opt] = 1; 
    cur_bud=cur_bud - c[cur_opt]; 
    cur_opt = cur_opt - 1; 
     } 
 else cur_opt=cur_opt-1; 
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 } 
The algorithm starts with the entry trac[n][B] of the track[][] array, which corresponds to a full budget B 
and all n available risk reduction options. If the n-th option has been included in the optimal set P, this 
will be indicated by a non-zero entry in the trac array (trac[n][B]=1). In this case, the solution array 
‘solution[]’ marks the n-th option as ‘included’ in the optimal set P, by the statement ‘solution [n]=1’. The 
current budget is then reduced by the statement ‘cur_bud=cur_bud-c[cur_opt]’ with the cost of the 
current (n-th ) option. The current option to be considered should now be the n-1st option. This is 
ensured by the statement ‘cur_opt=cur_opt-1’. 
If the n-th option has not been included in the optimal set, this will be indicated by a zero entry in the 
trac-array (trac[n][B]=0). In this case, the current budget is not reduced because no cost has been 
incurred for implementing the n-th risk reduction option.  
The process of considering the options in reverse order continues, until the first option is reached. At this 
point, the entries of the solution array will contain ‘1’ for options which have been included in the 
optimal set P and ‘0’ for options which have not been included in the optimal set P. 
The running time of Algorithm 1building the dynamic table, is determined by the two nested loops: ‘for 
i=1 to n do’ and ‘for j=1 to B do’, which contain a set of operations that are executed in constant time. 
The maximum number of steps, after which Algorithm 1 will terminate, is      . The maximum number 
of steps performed by Algorithm 2 is n, because after each iteration of the while-do loop, the number of 
options is reduced by 1. As a result, after at most n steps, Algorithm 2 will terminate. The total number of 
steps of the optimisation algorithm is therefore              . The worst-case running time of 
the algorithm for optimal allocation of a risk reduction budget is            .  . 
The algorithm has been tested on standard data sets with known solutions. For each of the data sets the 
algorithm returned the correct solution. 
Now consider the risk ‘platform train incident’ with 20 available risk reduction options (Table I), whose 
removed risk and cost have been given as a multiple of £10000. For different specified budgets, the 
optimal set of risk reduction options are according to Table III. 
TABLE III 
OPTIMAL SETS OF RISK REDUCTION OPTIONS FOR THE RISK OF PLATFORM TRAIN INCIDENTS (PLATFORM-ONLY) 
Budget 
[x £10,000] 
Optimal set 
of options 
Cost of option 
[x £10,000] 
Removed Risk 
[x £ 10,000] 
2900 
1,11,12, 
14,15,16,17 
2900 14870 
3300 
1,4,6,9,11, 
12,14,15,16,17 
3300 15615 
3500 
1,2,3,5,11, 
12,14,15,16,17,18 
3490 16292 
4000 
1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,11, 
12,14,15,16,17,18 
3990 17169 
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For the risk ‘train collision’ (Table II presents a representative sample data set) from 81 available risk 
reduction options, whose costs and associated removed risk have been given as a multiple of £100,000. 
For a specified budget of £110 million, the optimal set of risk reduction options is according to Table IV. 
TABLE IV 
OPTIMAL SETS OF RISK REDUCTION OPTIONS FOR THE RISK OF TRAIN COLLISION ACCIDENT 
Budget 
[x £10,000] 
Optimal set 
of options 
Cost of option 
[x £100,000] 
Removed Risk 
[x £ 100,000] 
1100 1-3;5,6, 16,20, 26,30, 
38,40-42, 
44-46, 48-50, 53, 60, 62-
66, 68, 69, 73-75, 77-80 
1100 7446 
The largest running time of the budget allocation algorithm, on a computer with processor Intel(R) 
Core(TM) 2 Duo CPU T9900 @ 3.06 GHz, was 0.015s! 
Conclusions 
1. By using the concept ‘amount of removed risk by a risk reduction option’, the problem of optimal
allocation of a fixed budget, among a finite number of risk reduction options in the railways industry,
can be reduced to an optimisation problem from dynamic programming.
2. For a risk reduction budget B and n risk reduction options, the running time of the optimal allocation
algorithm is O(n x (B+1)) (where B is the size of the budget).
3. The optimal solution for 81 available risk reduction options and various fixed budgets has been
achieved within a very short time, which makes the developed algorithm a very efficient decision
support tool for the railway industry.
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APPENDIX B3: A new classification of risk-reduction options to improve the 
risk-reduction readiness of the railway industry. 
International Journal of Systems Engineering, vol. 7, No. 9, pp. 816 – 825. 
Abstract 
The gap between the selection of risk-reduction options in the railway industry and the task of their 
effective implementation results in compromised safety and substantial losses. An effective risk 
management must necessarily integrate the evaluation phases with the implementation phase. This 
paper proposes an essential categorisation of risk reduction measures that best addresses a standard 
railway industry portfolio. By categorising the risk reduction options into design, operational, procedural 
and technical options, it is guaranteed that the efforts of the implementation facilitators (people, 
processes and supporting systems) are systematically harmonised. The classification is based on an 
integration of fundamental principles of risk reduction in the railway industry with the systems 
engineering approach. 
The paper argues that the use of a similar classification approach is an attribute of organisations 
possessing a superior level of risk-reduction readiness. The integration of the proposed rational 
classification structure provides a solid ground for effective risk reduction. 
[Keywords – systems, risk reduction, cost effectiveness, organisational readiness, railway] 
1. Case for effectively implementing options for risk reduction
A considerable amount of effort is expended on planning, evaluation and management of potential risks 
prior to the selection of risk-reduction options. The selection of risk-reduction options would normally be 
preceded by a process of cost and benefit evaluation. In practice, the selection of risk-reduction options 
is constrained by fixed budgets. The greatest challenges of introducing and effectively managing risk-
reduction options are the novelty of the option; the complexity of each risk reduction option; and the 
integration issues. The integration issues include (i) the interaction between subsystems to achieve risk 
reduction, (ii) the correlation and interaction among the risk reduction options and (iii) the correlation 
and interaction between the risk-reduction options and the environment. A comprehensive 
understanding of the limitations and strengths of each option for the specific application is a prerequisite 
for effective overall risk reduction. For major railway projects with multiple risk reduction options, the 
key to effective risk reduction lies in the successful integration of the available options. During the 
implementation phase, the integration of several options has the potential to expose an organisation to 
unanticipated problems and vulnerabilities. These problems are further compounded by an inefficient 
organisation. 
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This paper argues that a well-structured decision-support technique for selecting risk reduction measures 
must necessarily consider the organisational readiness to implement them, as an integral part of the risk 
options selection and evaluation. As a result, effective risk reduction during the “evaluation and 
selection” of risk-reduction measures benefits immensely from a systematic approach that considers the 
organisational readiness and structure.  
There is surprisingly little research on the risks involved with the implementation of risk-reduction 
measures within the railway organization. Current studies, mostly organisation’s internal risk 
management practices are limited in scope and cannot be generalised. In addition, there are no standard 
measures of effectiveness for the implementation of risk reduction options, not until an accident occurs. 
Most ALARP or risk management studies have been limited to identification, evaluation and options 
selection without any supporting analysis on the applicability of the selected options within the railway 
organization. Any knowledge in this area is hardly ever recorded and definitely not incorporated in in 
existing safety and business cases, despite the potentially severe financial and safety consequences. The 
existing safety and business cases do not analyse the risk reduction measures in relation to their mutual 
correlation, suitability and impact for the organisation. Without an organisational readiness to support 
effective implementation of the selected risk-reduction options, the existing safety and business cases 
are inadequate and weak.  
2. Risk reduction on large-scale engineering projects 
To address the potential challenges posed by the implementation of the risk reduction options on the 
railway industry, a thorough understanding of similar challenges from large-scale engineering projects is 
necessary.  
As established by [1], hardly any publications exist on the effect that strategy, structure, processes and 
projects have on one another. The paper further argues that an integration of strategy, structure, 
processes and projects is required to facilitate the effective development of a business. In earlier work, 
[2] points to the integration of organisational structure, control and prioritisation as three critical areas 
necessary for effective risk reduction within large and complex engineering projects. 
The key relationships between design, implementation and operational losses have been addressed in 
[3], [4] and [5]. [6] defines risk on large engineering projects as the possibility that events, their resulting 
impact and dynamic interaction may turn out differently than expected. The risk of project completion is 
further broken down to technical, construction and operational risks. A study on how design errors can 
severely jeopardise safety and contribute to failures in construction and engineering projects, with 
devastating economic, environmental and social consequences is presented by [7].  Design errors are 
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described as a symptom of dysfunctional organisational and managerial practices. [8] states that 
comprehensive product description and product requirements are essential influences on the risk 
patterns of IT organisations. 
By comparing product architecture to organisational structure, [9] describe the failures in large-scale 
product development processes as a misalignment of the organisation to the product and points to two 
fundamental challenges: (i) the assignment of people to parts and subsystems that make up the product 
and (ii) the effective collaboration in the performance of design tasks. This is further supported by studies 
on railway organisation failures, primarily as a result of the misalignment between architectural/technical 
interdependence and organisational communication [10] – [13]. 
The risk of failure of large projects is a direct function of the level of interdependency among numerous 
parameters such as time, cost, scope, safety, environment, security and health.  Within a project, the 
existence of interrelated risks, naturally results in triggering one risk from another risk and creating 
propagation phenomena such as reaction chains, amplification chains and loops. Using the network 
theory-based analysis, [14] proposed a risk reduction technique for reducing the risks of failure within 
large projects. The paper also states that the risk of failure is caused by the lack of capacity to anticipate 
and control complex interactions. [15] - [17] share the same view. However, [18] goes further by 
proposing that the key factors that drive complexity are project size, variety, interdependence and 
context. 
The underpinning requirement for an effective organisation is that the organisation must successfully 
assimilate and implement technology and manage interactions between the source and the recipient of 
technology. The capacity to efficiently act on knowledge is argued to be a critical activity that determines 
the readiness and value of an organisation’s structure [19]. To build on this point, it is important to note 
that any effort towards risk reduction must comprehensively consider the source of risk and the receiver, 
before any claims for effective risk reduction can be made. According to [20], the primary causes of 
failure for major engineering projects are: the lack of understanding of users’ and operational needs, poor 
staffing decisions, tight schedules and extensions to the functionality of an existing product without a 
comprehensive understanding of the technical challenges. 
The studies on the effectiveness of technology innovation, implementation and risk reduction have 
accumulated and advanced over a number of decades. The partitioning and interdependency of risks 
associated with the conceptualisation phase and the execution phase is best presented by [21]. 
Innovation is partitioned into an initiation phase and an implementation phase [22]. Within an 
organisation, high complexity, high diversity, low formalisation and low centralisation are most conducive 
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during the initiation phase, whilst low complexity, low diversity, high formalisation and high 
centralisation are most conducive at the implementation stage. In line with this theory, [23] demonstrate 
the potential constraints arising from inadequate specific knowledge of the project and the mutual self-
reinforcing relationship between organisational structure and project. Later studies by [24] also pointed 
out that organisational structure, corporate culture and people are primary risks. 
The risk of failure during implementation is three-dimensional in project size, experience with the 
technology and organisational structure. [25], [26] cite amongst other factors, the lack of organisational 
adaptation to complement technological change. An example of inappropriate applications is introducing 
new trains in small tunnels when it would have been easier to introduce advanced vehicle controllers 
only, at a cheaper price. Other important factors contributing to the risk of failure are the lack of skills to 
support implementation and the lack of exploration of a wide range of options. 
These studies clearly indicate that the organisational structure is impacted by the risk reduction options 
selected and vice versa. Consequently, for effective risk reduction, it is mandatory to establish the 
relationship between risk reduction at the initiation stage (i.e. the stage of identifying and assessing risk 
reduction options) to risk reduction at the implementation (operational) stage where there is a significant 
contribution from the organisation and users. Fig. 1 illustrates that weaknesses in the implementation 
phase could partially or fully compromise the high-level of potential risk reduction achieved at the 
initiation stage. In order to achieve and maintain a maximum risk reduction, the organisation must 
demonstrate readiness for acceptance and effective implementation of the risk reduction options 
identified at the initiation phase. These may include new techniques, technologies, processes etc. 
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Figure 1: A risk Reduction Curve due to a poor implementation of the risk-reduction options selected at 
the initiation stage 
3. Organisational readiness – complexities and management 
Within an organisation that controls risks, ambiguous specifications and requirements for risk reduction, 
lack of clarity on the inter-relationships between risks, risk reduction options and the associated 
functions are major factors impacting effective risk-reduction. The issues related to managing multiple 
projects such as project prioritisation, selection and resource allocation in multi-functional organisations, 
are well defined in [27] - [30]. These issues are very similar to managing and implementing multiple risk 
reduction measures.  
 
Maximum Risk Reduction with a Fixed Budget in the Railway Industry 
341 
Stage 1
Risk reduction 
Evaluation
Stage 2
Prioritisation of Options 
for risk reduction
Stage 3 
Selection of Options 
for risk reduction 
Stage 4
Implementation
of Options
Stage 1
Project Evaluation
Stage 2
Project Prioritisation
Stage 3
Project Selection
Stage 4
Project Execution ORGANISATION
Figure 2: Parallelism between the implementation of multi-functional projects and the implementation 
of risk reduction measures. 
The left-hand side of Figure 2 illustrates the key stages of effective management of projects. The essential 
stages in the implementation of risk reduction measures are provided in parallel (the right-hand side of 
Figure 2). The diagram clearly illustrates an existing parallelism between the two. The benefit from an 
improved organisational readiness has another, very important dimension - the capability to address 
unanticipated risks. Apart from operational circumstances that can be foreseen, there are also 
unforeseen risk events which are the product of unforeseen operational circumstances. These 
circumstances cannot be predicted, they are “unknown unknowns” or “black swans” [31]. We never 
know exactly what they are, but we do know they might occur. Improving the risk knowledge, the safety 
culture in the organisation and the level of general risk protection measures are effective barriers to 
unknown unknowns. 
A change in the organisation structure may be necessary to effectively implement particular risk reduction 
options. This is for example the case when considering two options to eliminate wrong-side failures (i.e. 
failures leading to catastrophic consequences) for spring-applied parking brakes by (i) enhancing testing 
and maintenance regimes or (ii) by replacement with new braking systems. Selecting and implementing 
enhancing testing and maintenance regimes for example, requires specific organisation changes, (such as 
developing an organisation with emphasis on maintenance and testing rather than one with key expertise 
in design and manufacturing) if the measures are to result in maximising risk reduction. These 
organisational changes are driven not only by cost considerations. More importantly, these organisational 
changes are the only way to guarantee that effective risk reduction will be maintained through the life of 
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the operation. In common industry practice for selection of risk-reduction options, no publication, 
significant work or structured guide exists beyond the standard risk evaluation methods based on cost-
benefit analysis (CBA). In fact, the existing approach does not consider the organisational structure 
(people, processes and tools/equipment) and its preparedness for the selection, evaluation and 
implementation of the risk reduction measures. The consequences of the lack of appropriate structure to 
support and maintain the maximum risk reduction are: 
 Incorrect evaluation of risk-reduction options, which subsequently resulting in: 
o Reduced safety levels 
o Increased implementation costs 
o Inaccurate prioritisation of the risk reduction measures 
o Incorrect estimation of residual risks  
o Inaccurate risk profile 
 Misalignment of selected risk-reduction options with the organisational capability and 
management structure, which leads to 
o Increased risk of failure to gain approval for the selected risk-reduction measures 
o Increased implementation costs 
o Inadequate implementation leading to degraded safety levels 
Considering these consequences and existing practices, railway organisations typically have four distinct 
levels of readiness for implementing risk reduction. Table 1 presents the Risk-reduction readiness levels 
for railway organisations. 
Table 1. Classification of railway organisations according to their level of Risk-Reduction Readiness. 
Risk Reduction 
Readiness Levels 
Strategy Description 
Level – 1  Reactive level No risk reduction strategy. Reactive approach to risk 
management (dealing with risks as they materialise) 
Level – 2 Basic level Basic risk reduction based only on qualitative 
assessment and measures (e.g. by using risk matrix) 
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Risk Reduction 
Readiness Levels 
Strategy Description 
Level – 3 Normative level Risk reduction based on cost-benefit analysis which 
involves quantification of risk reduction options in 
terms of benefit and cost).  
No methodology for selecting risk-reduction 
options. No consideration of the interaction among 
risk reduction options. No optimisation in selecting 
the risk reduction options. No consideration of the 
impact of the selected options on the organisation 
and the environment. No consideration of the 
required organisational changes needed for the 
implementation of the selected options. 
Level – 4 Optimal level Risk reduction is based on a systematic approach 
impacting both the risk option selection, the precise 
quantification of removed risk and the optimal 
selection of risk reduction options.  
The impact of the selected options on the 
organisation and the environment is part of the 
analysis. The required organisational changes 
needed for the implementation of the selected 
options are carefully considered and specified. 
Organisations at Levels 1 to 3 do not provide any support to maximising the risk reduction within fixed 
budgets. This increases the organisations’ vulnerability to inaccurate assessments of risk and selecting 
weak and inefficient risk reduction options at escalating costs. The proposed classification, based on the 
fundamental principles of risk reduction and systems engineering is an initiative with the potential to 
provide a Level-4 framework that supports risk evaluation, optimal options selection and ultimately 
permits organisations to maximise risk reduction within fixed budgets. The proposed also bridges the gap 
between evaluation and selection of risk reduction options and specifying adequate organisational 
structure for their effective implementation.  
4. Systems engineering approach to risk-reduction in a railway organisation
By definition, the system engineering approach to risk management must ensure effective risk reduction 
for any major railway renewal or developmental project.  
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System X System Y
Subsystem 1 Subsystem 2 Subsystem 3
Subsystem 4
Option A Option B Option C
Specific 
Application
Generic 
Application
Risk Reduction 
Options
 
  Figure 3. Systems engineering approach to risk reduction 
During the initiation or concept phase, the risk reduction evaluation effort is determined by a complete 
and well-defined set of safety requirements. The specification of requirements must identify potential 
stakeholders. This ensures that the proposed solution is not only cost effective (i.e. feasible and 
affordable), but also guaranteeing the required levels of safety. On a large and complex project, the 
primary requirement for maximum risk reduction within a fixed budget is that the selection of risk 
reduction measures complies with the risk reduction potential and the budget constraints. This also 
requires a methodology that facilitates a comprehensive evaluation of the selected options.  All operating 
modes (normal, degraded and abnormal) and the transitions between them should be considered. The 
way in which the systems will be operated, including the capacity and competence of personnel involved, 
operational arrangements and processes need to be fully understood in order to address the full set of 
possible operational scenarios. The integrated systems participating in the risk reduction exercise are a 
complex combination of people, processes and supporting structures (i.e. equipment or tools), whose 
interaction must be understood in order to achieve efficient risk reduction.  
5. The inter-relationship between risk evaluation and risk reduction implementation 
The introduction of new techniques, technologies or processes into the railways is usually associated with 
complexity and uncertainty. [32] qualify projects as dynamically or structurally complex and broadly 
dependent on project elements and interactions that are subject to change. This results in 
unpredictability, uncertainty and emergent behaviours. Structural complexities on the other hand, are 
quantifiable and predictable which provides an opportunity for better management.  [33] provide insight 
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into the complexities and uncertainties involved in the risk reduction and effective management of large 
railway projects, in cases where there is predictability and in-built flexibility in the organisational 
structure.   
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NO LINK BETWEEN RISK EVALUATION & DECISION-MAKING (OPTION SELECTION) TO ORGANISATIONAL PREPAREDNESS & STRUCTURE 
Figure 4.  A system analysis is necessary for the effective implementation of the selected risk reduction 
options.  
Figure 4 provides a simple illustration of the interactions and dependencies between risk reduction 
measures and the application environment which includes people, processes and equipment necessary 
for effective implementation. Figure 4 raises a fundamental question – is the railway organisation 
adequately built to facilitate the implementation of the selected risk-reduction options? In the current 
system, there is no link between the evaluation phase and the implementation phase of risk-reduction. 
A simple practical illustration is the application of a number of risk reduction options to reduce the 
Collision Between Trains accident. The options are generally classed as (A) brake assist systems; (B) 
collision warning systems and (C) intelligent speed adaptation systems. Options A, B and C achieve the 
risk reduction because of their inherent operational characteristics. In practice, these options are not 
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mutually exclusive and an investment in all options (A, B and C) is often required to achieve effective risk 
reduction. While for risk reduction options which are relatively independent, the application of dynamic 
programming techniques is fully justifiable and leads to a significant risk reduction within a fixed budget 
[34], additional (systems) analysis is needed for correlated risk reduction options. In cases where some of 
the options are incompatible (cannot be applied simultaneously) or in cases where the effective risk 
reduction from the application of one option requires the application of another option, the blind 
application of standard optimisation tools may not result in the expected risk reduction. 
The limitations, the required conditions and existing interactions among the risk-reduction options should 
be thoroughly understood and accurately specified.   
Additional risk reduction options, typically introduced in railway safety to reduce the Collision Between 
Trains accidents include: extension of signals, train movement rules, incident response systems, train 
driver training, speed restrictions, wheel-slide protection systems, In-cab design modifications, 
operational testing and maintenance, emergency timetables, track inspections and refurbishment, one-
person (driver) operated closed circuit television, etc. 
Following this understanding, a number of additional measures can be combined with the selected 
options A, B and C to achieve a significant risk reduction: 
Option A: Brake assist system + (operational testing and maintenance, train driver training, one person-
operated closed circuit television) 
Option B: Collision warning systems + (train driver training, in-cab design modifications, speed 
restrictions, emergency timetables) 
Option C: Intelligent speed adaptation + (Train movement rules, wheel-slide protection, extension of 
signals, emergency timetables) 
For example, investing in brake assist systems (Option A) without investing in operational testing and 
maintenance does not permit obtaining a long term risk-reduction benefit from investing in expensive 
brake assist systems. Risk reduction Option A requires also investing in testing and maintenance if a long-
term risk-reduction effect is to be achieved. 
Similarly, investing solely in collision warning systems (Option B) without simultaneously investing in 
driver education and training does not permit obtaining the risk reduction benefit from applying solely 
Option B. As a result, if Option B is to have a tangible risk-reduction effect, investment in another risk 
reduction option (“driver training and education”) is required. In fact, without driver training and 
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education, there may not be any risk reduction benefit from purchasing expensive collision warning 
systems. 
By considering these interactions as important factors in the risk reduction exercise, the safety and 
business case claims for risk removed and cost effectiveness can be justified and further enhanced to 
support their acceptance and successful implementation.   
By revealing the complex interrelations among the risk reduction options, the gap between risk 
evaluation, options selection and implementation (i.e. costs, people, process and equipment) can be 
effectively closed. The adoption of the systems approach provides coordination between people, 
processes and equipment at the implementation phase, where the organisation plays a crucial role in the 
risk management process. In this sense, the systems approach provides a bridge to the organisation 
structure.  
6. A new classification of risk-reduction options  
As established, integrating risk evaluation with the primary operational functions is a fundamental 
requirement for successfully making the case for the selected options. This requirement is especially 
applicable to industries where risk management drives investments and decisions. [36] and [37] expound 
on the topic related to effective management of operational risks. These risks are defined as event risks 
and to effectively handle the risks of potential losses, categorisation of events is necessary. This serves as 
a receptacle for accident data gathering on frequencies and costs. A tentative categorisation for 
managing potential operational losses is further provided as People, Processes, and Systems. 
The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 [38] requires that the 
infrastructure operator and maintainer of the railways demonstrate how safety risks will effectively be 
managed and whether the infrastructure operator and maintainer have the ability, commitment and 
resources to comply with the regulations. This is generally addressed by (i) demonstrating capability, 
commitment and availability of resources to manage safety risks; (ii) the safety case which provides a 
framework against which regular assessments, risk control measures and management systems are 
established and maintained (ii) the safety case assures regulators that the risks associated with 
operations have been assessed and all reasonably practicable controls have been implemented to reduce 
the risks. 
The areas that are considered safety-critical and have a direct impact on the successful prevention of 
accidents on the railways are typically signalling and train control (communication systems); train driving 
and train operations; train manufacture, maintenance and refurbishment; installation, renewal and 
maintenance, faulting and inspection of infrastructure; safety of passengers on trains; passenger and 
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visitor movement on stations and platforms; on-track machine manufacture, maintenance and 
refurbishment. The major accidents that are to be reduced are attributed to risk of derailment, risk of 
collision between trains and risks related to the passenger train interface.   
Following the argument that effective risk management must necessarily integrate the initiation 
(evaluation) phase with the implementation phase, we propose a categorisation of risk reduction 
measures that best addresses a standard railway industry portfolio. The introduction of a structured 
approach based on categorising the options for reducing major accidents, reflects the standard railway 
organisational structure. By categorising the risk reduction options into design, operational, procedural 
and technical options, it is guaranteed that the efforts of the implementation facilitators (people, 
processes and supporting systems) are systematically harmonised. The categorisation effectively 
simplifies a complex register of risk reduction options and combination of options into a format that 
reflects the typical railway organisational structure and helps reduce the gap between the evaluation and 
implementation phase.  
The categorisation includes: 
 Design risk-reduction options (DRRO) – Novel systems, major renewals and modifications
 Operational risk-reduction options (ORRO) – Communications, Supervision and Speed
Restrictions or similar operational decisions
 Technical risk-reduction options (TRRO) – Testing, Maintenance, Inspections, Installations,
Assessments/Studies informing risk reduction decisions
 Procedural risk-reduction options (PRRO) – Risk education, Risk training, Processes and Plans
Each risk reduction option, within each group, is based on sound engineering principles for risk reduction. 
The effectiveness of each of these options has been proved by theoretical considerations, reliability and 
risk modelling, field testing and historical track records. The introduction of these options reduces the 
complexity of selecting risk reduction options for different applications. At the same time, the 
classification guarantees that no efficient risk-reduction option is missed at the evaluation phase. 
Consequently, this classification will be particularly useful for major railway projects with numerous 
possible risk reduction options, typically reflecting all aspects of the standard railway organisational 
operations including: design, maintenance, testing, new technologies etc. combined with people, 
processes and equipment. Table 2 presents a structured categorisation that supports the option selection 
and the evaluation of individual options and combination of options. The systematic process of 
categorising the risk reduction options and aligning them with the existing organisational functions also 
supports the identification and assignment of responsibilities for effective implementation. Table 2 and 
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Figure 5 also illustrate the relationship between the major accident hazards, risk reduction measures and 
the direct link with the organisational instruments – people, process and equipment. Figure 5 also depicts 
the role of the proposed categorisation in the relationship between these, for effective risk reduction. 
Table 2. Categorisation of risk-reduction options in the railway industry. 
RISK REDUCTION OPTIONS EXAMPLES OF RISK REDUCTION 
OPTIONS 
Key Function(s) for 
implementation 
DESIGN OPTIONS (DRRO) 
 
Novel Systems, Major Renewals, 
Design Modifications (Capital 
Intensive Projects) 
1. Signalling replacements and 
modifications - automatic signalling 
and control systems 
2. Optimising cab design for driver 
protection 
Chief Engineer, System 
Integration, Programme 
Directorate, Project 
Management 
TECHNICAL OPTIONS (TRRO) 
 
Testing, Maintenance, Inspections, 
Installations, Assessments/Studies 
1. Improving inspection, testing and 
maintenance regime for detection 
of wheel flat and worn wheels 
2. Signal positioning studies and 
potential extension of distances 
between signals  
Technical Assurance, Civil 
and Power Engineering, 
Signalling Systems 
Engineering, Train Systems 
Engineering, Asset 
Management 
PROCEDURAL OPTIONS (PRRO) 
 
Risk education and training, 
Processes and Plans. 
1. Risk education and training of key 
personnel 
2. Amendments to train despatch 
rules 
3. Review and improvement of 
recruitment and selection processes 
Infrastructure and Systems 
Protection, Training 
Management or 
Organisational 
Development.  
OPERATIONAL OPTIONS (ORRO) 
 
Communications, Supervision and 
Speed restrictions 
1. Crowd Control 
2. Speed restrictions (adhesion) 
Operational Engineering, 
Telecommunications 
Systems Engineering 
The clear outline of the roles and responsibilities within the risk reduction exercise ensures that resources 
such as finances, technical expertise, information, systems and equipment, medical facilities etc., 
necessary for implementing the measures are available and appropriately targeted. In the risk reduction 
effort, undertaking emergency and preparedness planning, immediate post-accident actions and 
response is absolutely essential. The inter-relationships between departments, participating in the risk 
reduction operation, can be used for developing measured strategies for accident prevention and 
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protection. Throughout the project lifecycle, the clearly defined inter-relationships between departments 
ensure that the railway operations also make it possible to take advantage of the many technical 
resources that already exist within the organisation. By reflecting the typical railway organisational 
structure, the proposed categorisation makes it possible to tap into the existing resources within the 
organisation. 
Major Accident Hazards - Railways
Event X Event Y Event Z
Risk Reduction Options 1, 2, 3
Design
Operational
Procedural
Technical
Functional capability of risk 
reduction options – detailing 
strengths and limitations
Prioritisation 
& Selection
People
Process
Equipment
Support 
organisational 
readiness
Extract organisational 
readiness information
Risk analysis
Risk Evaluation
Contributions from:
Combination of:
Classification into:
Cost considerations:
Initiation
Implementation
Commence: 
Co-ordination of organisational 
interdependencies 
Figure 5: Categorisation of risk-reduction options, risk management and the organisation  
The proposed classification promotes a comprehensive understanding of the risks resulting in an accident 
and provides a strong support to the Lessons learned database. It provides a direct and strong support to 
the comprehensive check lists related to known accident scenarios which is an important tool for 
identifying possible accident and failure scenarios. The proposed methodology also draws on concepts 
from organisational theory and optimization of risk reduction as introduced by [38]. However, by 
considering the intricate interrelations between risk reduction options and the organisational 
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interdependences, it goes beyond the development in [38] and promotes a novel framework that bridges 
the divide between the identification and implementation of risk reduction measures within railway 
organisations. 
7. Readiness for effective risk reduction
A significant amount of effort towards risk reduction in the railway industry is associated with major 
renewal projects. The renewal projects are usually large-scale engineering undertakings which provide 
the railways with necessary modifications and improvements. Along with reducing particular risks, these 
projects introduce new risks to railway operations. Consequently, essential risk reduction measures are 
considered and implemented to ensure that the safety integrity of the railways is not compromised, and 
where possible, improved. The new risks are the result from altering fundamental operational 
parameters such as increasing number of trains to cater for a greater passenger volume or the removal of 
speed limits to meet operational schedules. The situation is complicated considering that these changes 
are weather-dependent – they are different during different times of the year. The challenges facing the 
railway industry are the unrelenting pressures to reduce cost, improvements for customers and pressure 
to maximise the use of the asset base. 
However, the organisational changes and modifications, every time a big renovation project is initiated 
are very costly. A railway organisation that has not taken the necessary steps to a dynamic and flexible 
organisation in relation to risk reduction, easily incurs significant implementation costs. The significant 
increase in implementation costs usually deters the selection of appropriate risk reduction options to 
achieve a maximum risk reduction.  
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Interactions and 
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Figure 6: New operational modifications and the process of risk reduction associated with the new risks. 
By adopting the proposed categorisation technique, the organisation is less likely to invest in new 
organisational development and re-structuring schemes that facilitate the required modifications. The 
assurance of organisational readiness prior to gaining approvals to operate is significantly strengthened 
by the comprehensive decision-support framework provided by the proposed categorisation. Essentially, 
it is recommended that to achieve a maximum risk reduction within financial constraints, the concept of 
“Readiness for effective risk reduction” be stipulated as a fundamental process requirement in railway 
safety cases.  
It is essential, that modifications and potential changes to the operating parameters leading to 
modifications are properly assessed and do not necessarily impose fundamental changes to an existing 
railway organisation. Without the structure proposed, any rapid evolution of the railway organisation will 
absolutely result in excessive implementation costs. By improving an organisation's readiness to 
implement effective risk reduction, significant costs and improved safety levels can be secured.  
The DOPT methodology requires a thorough understanding of the budget allocation methodology. This 
means that as a minimum, the capability of the measure of reducing the likelihood of the accident or the 
consequences following an accident to be thoroughly understood. The DOPT methodology provides the 
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framework for reducing the duplication of effort as it supports further considerations of whether the 
organisation or specific departments within the organisation are better placed to implement the risk 
reduction measure or combination of measures for any particular risk. The DOPT concept creates also a 
common risk-reduction platform between departments to ensure synergy in the risk-reduction effort. It 
supports technical co-operation for the effective use of preventive and protective risk reduction 
measures to effectively achieve minimisation of railway safety risks. It facilitates establishing and 
implementing robust accident prevention programmes and mitigation against consequences of an 
accident.  
Conclusions 
1. The paper introduced the DOPT classification, derived from basic principles of risk reduction and
systems engineering, to address the existing gap between the initiation (evaluation) phase of risk 
reduction options and the implementation phase. The DOPT methodology creates a common 
categorisation of risk reduction measures that best addresses a standard railway industry portfolio. 
2. The DOPT concept permits effective planning of human resources, spheres of responsibilities and
equipment engaged in the risk reduction effort, considering the capabilities of the railway organisation. 
The clear outline of the roles and responsibilities within the risk reduction context ensures that resources 
such as finances, technical expertise, information, systems and equipment, medical facilities etc., 
necessary for implementing the measures are available and appropriately targeted. 
3. The DOPT concept promotes a comprehensive understanding of the risks resulting in an accident. It
provides a strong support to the Lessons learned database and the check lists related to known accident 
scenarios.  
4. The DOPT concept eliminates the duplication of effort and creates a common risk-reduction platform
between departments to ensure synergy in the risk-reduction effort and cooperation at all levels. 
5. The DOPT concept is a framework necessary to provide a Level-4 framework that supports risk
evaluation, optimal options selection and ultimately permits organisations to maximise risk reduction 
within a fixed budget. The use of a methodology similar to the proposed DOPT methodology is a 
characteristic of an organisation possessing a superior level of risk-reduction readiness.  
6. In order to achieve a maximum risk reduction within financial constraints, the concept of “Readiness
for effective risk reduction” must be stipulated as a fundamental process requirement in railway safety 
cases. The integration of the proposed rational classification structure provides a robust and verifiable 
case for effective risk reduction. 
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